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ABSTRACT 
  
Conflict and the Resolution Process in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2013 
The timing of conflict resolution efforts is important in identifying when an intervention is likely to succeed 
according to ripeness of conflicts theory (Zartman, 1985). Although the ripeness theory appears to be a great 
contribution to the conflict resolution doctrine, there is no scholarly consensus on its plausibility with criticisms that 
are centred on: a contest on the variables that should help in its identification; low predictability; lack of cross-case 
generalisations; and, methodological weaknesses inherited from rational and public choice theories. The study took 
the position that conditions creating ripeness should be expanded beyond what is currently obtaining in literature, 
can help in determining the formula for resolution and indicate what to do in the implementation of the agreement so 
reached. To interrogate the theory’s plausibility, interpretivism was used to gather evidence from the case - the 
conflict that prevailed in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2013 - to extrapolate implications for the ripeness theory and 
suggest improvements through paradigm complementarity.  
Although the external dimension of the conflict in Zimbabwe remained unaffected, ripeness was found in its 
domestic setting deriving from the indecisive/disputed elections of 2008 and the threat of a failed economy that 
triggered a Southern African Development Community intervention and offered a cue to the formula for resolution - 
the Global Political Agreement. Shared political legitimacy in the Global Political Agreement however saw that 
ripeness diminishing and it had vanished by 2013, although the conflict which by 2013 was yet to realise complete 
resolution, was to a large extent transformed to lower levels of hostilities with dysfunctionality temporarily arrested. 
Ripeness proved to be a product of both perceptual and structural variables that change in intensity over time, thus 
affecting the implementation of agreements that arise from ripeness. The study proved that ripeness theory in its 
expanded form is a viable strategic tool in conflict resolution, though success as in military doctrine depends on the 
accurate identification of the variables creating ripeness, timely intervention and a fitting operational plan to 
effectively exploit the opportunities so created.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ON THE CONFLICT AND THE RESOLUTION 
PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Conflict is stifling development in post-colonial Africa with negative ramifications for the well 
being of its inhabitants. The issues creating conflict in Africa relate to the challenges of 
addressing a checquered past that among others include a legacy of slavery that lasted for 
centuries, close to a century of colonialism and the realities of suddenly being faced with the 
demands of statecraft at independence when both the ruling elite and the electorate were not fully 
prepared for the post-colonial dispensation. In some instances, the problem is further 
compounded by the former colonial masters that seek to perpetuate their enjoyment of the 
benefits they carved for themselves during colonialism well after the granting of independence 
through neo-colonialism, which Nkrumah (1965) called ‘the highest stage of imperialism’. 
Whilst sociologists are generally agreed that conflict is a form of socialization that cannot be 
wished away in human relations and has to be managed for progress, for some societies and 
especially in post-colonial Africa, conflict has often led to violence, and in worst cases, war with 
devastating consequences.  
Zimbabwe got off to a good start at independence in 1980 following a protracted liberation 
struggle against white minority rule promising to be a model post-colonial African nation in 
which the former warring parties had managed to reconcile to create a better future for all. 
Although there were disturbances in the Matabeleland regions, the Unity Accord of 1987 ended 
hostilities but just after two decades into independence, the country soon found itself buffeted by 
a complex conflict that was threatening it with state failure. Three major developments coalesced 
into a vicious, complex and protracted political conflict that had devastating consequences on the 
economy and people’s livelihoods. The first was the enduring hold on power by the Zimbabwe 
African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) under President Robert Mugabe buoyed by 
the idea of having brought independence through a grueling liberation struggle and increasingly 
championing an anti-imperialist stance. The second was the fast track land reform programme 
that reclaimed land from the white settlers to address a skewed land tenure system that was 
modeled along racial lines. The third was the emergence of liberal opposition politics supported 
by Western governments that sought to replace the liberation party in government. Consequently, 
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since the turn of the century, Zimbabwe experienced perpetual internal political and economic 
turmoil that was made worse by external interference in its internal affairs and the attempts to 
isolate it from the community of nations orchestrated by Western countries embittered by the 
ruling party’s post-colonial policies.  
From 2000, Zimbabwe became one of the leading examples of a country where things were not 
going right and remained like that for close to a decade with no solution in sight. The conflict 
situation more or less remained latent without turning into an armed confrontation for most of 
the tumultuous period but occasionally experienced bouts of violence especially around election 
periods. Following the disputed elections of 2008, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) through the then South African President Thabo Mbeki, was formally 
mandated by the African Union (AU) to intervene and find a negotiated solution to the conflict 
(AUEOM Report, 2013). SADC formally intervened with President Thabo Mbeki as its 
facilitator and in six months of difficult negotiations, a political agreement was signed on 15 
September 2008 leading to the creation of an Inclusive Government that lasted until the elections 
of 2013.  
The thesis is a case study that investigated the conflict situation and the resolution process that 
obtained in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2013. Although negotiated inclusive governments as 
a formula for resolving disputed elections have been criticised for circumventing democracy 
(Maina, 2010), the way SADC handled the Zimbabwean conflict was worth scholarly attention 
given the prevalence of cases where disputes of a similar nature have degenerated into 
widespread violence as was the case after elections in Kenya and Ivory Coast in 2010.  Conflicts 
that are left unattended to or resist resolution tend to get worse at times escalating to higher 
levels of hostilities that may lead to war culminating in many deaths, massive destruction of 
property and devastated economies causing untold suffering to people. This trend has been 
common in developing countries especially on the African continent, a situation that begs for 
more concerted scholarly effort to come up with better ways of constructively resolving conflicts 
before they go out of hand. 
1.2 Background to the Study 
The conflict in Zimbabwe was underpinned by several factors that occurred at the end of the 
second decade of independence including: a land reform programme that began in 1999 
spearheaded by the ruling ZANU PF Government and was vehemently opposed by former white 
commercial farmers and Western governments; and, the urban middle class, the dispossessed 
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former white commercial farmers, trade unions and other externally funded civil society groups 
that came together to form the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as an opposition party 
in 1999 with organizational, financial and moral support from Britain’s Westminster Foundation 
(Mudenge, 2004) 1 . The ZANU PF-led Government condemned the MDC soon after its 
formation saying it was a project of Western countries created to effect regime change as a way 
of punishing the liberation party for embracing the land reform programme. The MDC accused 
ZANU PF, in particular President Robert Mugabe, of wanting to cling on to power through 
autocratic means (MDC Manifesto, 2000). As the land reform rolled out, Western countries led 
by Britain and the United States of America (USA) began to display ever-increasing hostilities 
towards ZANU PF accusing it of human rights violations and applying sanctions against 
Zimbabwe (Mutambara, Interview, 2013, Jun, 20). In 2001, the USA came up with the 
Zimbabwe Economic and Recovery Act (ZIDERA) that pronounced travel bans on selected 
ZANU PF members and barred Zimbabwe from accessing international financial support as well 
as receiving American and by extension, Western countries’ Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)2, 
meanwhile pledging support for the forces that were working to remove ZANU PF from power 
(ZIDERA, 2001). The European Union, Australia, Canada and New Zealand followed suit with 
travel bans on selected Zimbabweans and other restrictive economic measures. Zimbabwe, under 
a ZANU PF Government, was increasingly being isolated by Western countries that were also 
supporting the opposition. In response to the sanctions, ZANU PF adopted a Look East Policy 
and sought greater ties with China, Russia and Iran, countries that had issues with Western 
countries. From 2000 onwards, Zimbabwe became enmeshed in a seemingly unending and 
complex conflict in which parties to the conflict were not willing to engage each other directly to 
resolve their differences. 
                                                    
1
 Baffour Ankomah in an article extracted from the New Africa magazine and published in the Herald of 11 
October 2013, titled The trouble with Tsvangirai, said in 2001 the Westminister Foundation, a front organisation for 
Britain’s three main political parties, the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, published on its website 
a breakdown of money that had been spent nurturing Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC to achieve regime change in 
Zimbabwe but when the Zimbabwean Government made a fuss about it, the Foundation realising the monumental 
mistake it had made quickly took down the pages. In an Interview on 7 May 2013, the then British Ambassador 
Deborah Bronnert however dismissed the claim that the Westminster Foundation had played a role in bankrolling 
the opposition project in Zimbabwe. 
2
  Western countries were for the greater part of the conflict period refusing that they had applied sanctions 
against the country preferring to call them ‘targeted measures’ though in reality these were sanctions that were 
barring Zimbabwe from accessing international finance as well as freezing assets of companies and Zimbabwean 
leaders that were critical in propelling economic development. 
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The conflict situation was also underpinned by a war of words between the conflicting parties. 
The ruling party, ZANU PF, modeled its defence and propaganda on liberation ethos, 
nationalism, people empowerment and a fight against neo-colonialism which were propagated 
mainly through the state controlled media. President Mugabe also took every opportunity 
available including on international conferences to attack Western powers for wanting to violate 
Zimbabwe’s sovereignty by seeking a regime change agenda using the opposition to perpetuate 
colonial imbalances. The opposition supported to a large extent by some Western and local 
private media also embarked on a massive demonisation campaign against the ruling party with 
the main news channels such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Cable News 
Network (CNN), domestic privately owned media and pirate radio stations continuously 
attacking the ZANU PF government accusing it of bad governance, human rights abuses and 
corruption and portraying the opposition as the only hope for Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2006). 
The stage was thus set for a grueling confrontation pitting the opposition supported by Western 
countries against ZANU PF in power since 1980 getting sympathy to a large extent from China 
and to a lesser degree Russia.  
Plebiscites held from the year 2000 did not help the situation as competition for political 
dominance and polarisation often led to sporadic cases of intra-party and inter-party violence that 
reached peak levels with the coming of every election resulting in disputed outcomes. In the 
2000 general election, the newly formed MDC came close to off-setting the ZANU PF majority 
in parliament garnering 57 seats compared to ZANU PF’s 62 though the latter continued to have 
a majority due to the twenty presidential parliamentary appointees (Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC), 2000)3. The MDC and most of Western countries condemned the elections 
as not being free and fair. In the 2005 general elections, the MDC lost ground garnering 41 seats 
against ZANU PF’s 78 (EISA, 2005). Most Western countries and the MDC again dismissed the 
election as not being free and fair (Chiroro, 2005). Since the opposition was continuing to 
receive moral, financial and material support from Western countries, ZANU PF became more 
hostile accusing the opposition of supping with the countries that had done little or nothing to 
stop black people’s oppression during the days of colonial settler rule (Mugabe, 2007). The 
political conflict became a vicious cycle with tensions and hostilities reaching peak levels during 
                                                    
3
 This was the first time since independence in 1980 that an opposition party had made such significant gains 
against the ruling ZANU PF party in an election. 
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election periods which in turn had negative ramifications for the ever-worsening economic 
situation.  
Bratton, Chikwanha & Sithole (2005) said from 2000 Zimbabwe went through a “tumultuous 
period” that resulted in “a sharp deterioration in the economy and a violent confrontation 
between government and opposition” (p. 78).  Although the economy had begun to decline in the 
second decade of independence under the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), the 
third decade saw a rapid decline in all aspects of survival with land reform (Moyo, 2005), 
political instability (Coltart, 2008), the HIV and Aids pandemic (Heinecken, 2001), sanctions 
(Gono, 2008), economic decline (Collier & Gunning, 1999), governance and security (Manungo, 
2007), social security (Kaseke, 1988), and external interference (Moyo, 2011), threatening the 
state with perpetual decay and instability. The conflict that underpinned the situation in 
Zimbabwe in the period under study was thus complex displaying three main sets of 
incompatibilities: those deriving from the unfinished business at independence centering on 
addressing colonial imbalances in accessing national resources; the continuing interference with 
the Zimbabwe’s domestic politics by external powers; and a struggle for political power pitting 
the liberation party against an opposition born mainly out of labour unionism with support from 
Western powers.  
There was however no consensus on the nature and causes of the conflict amongst the parties. 
ZANU PF blamed external forces, citing Britain and her European and American allies of 
working with Zimbabwe’s opposition to subvert the status quo by promoting civil disobedience, 
disinvestment, blocking international lines of credit, isolating the country and orchestrating 
negative propaganda against Zimbabwe to further a neo-colonial agenda (Mugabe, 2007). The 
opposition argued that there was no democracy in Zimbabwe due to ZANU PF machinations to 
hang on to power through autocratic means in the face of waning popularity (Tsvangirai, 2008). 
Policy makers in the United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank pointed to bad governance, wrong policies and 
the long stay in power by President Robert Mugabe as the major causes of the decline and crisis 
(Clemens & Moss, 2005). Countries that supported ZANU PF including China and Russia were 
urging non-interference in the internal affairs of the country and continuing to do business with 
the ZANU PF government. 
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On the ground, the period 2000 to 2013 witnessed a conflict that manifested as a complex 
potpourri whose signs included clashes over land, a contest for power between political parties, 
polarisation, civil unrest, political violence, international isolation, sanctions, massive 
propaganda campaigns by all the parties involved, a deteriorating economy, collapsing 
infrastructure and social services that were coming to a stand-still. From the time the MDC came 
onto the scene in 1999, there were several skirmishes between the ruling party and the 
opposition4. The MDC called for several job stay-aways including the failed 2003 ‘Final Push’ in 
which it attempted a mass uprising to unseat ZANU PF from power5 (Huni, 2003). The ZANU 
PF government tightened laws including the passing of the Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2001 and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002 to 
ostensibly restore order and security (Extraordinary Government Gazette, 2002, Jan. 22) arguing 
that the laws were needed to deal with the regime–change agenda and the propaganda onslaught 
by Western countries. On the economic front, the ZANU PF government moved a gear up ‘in its 
fight against neo-colonialism’ embracing the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) that 
accelerated the transfer of land to blacks as well as carrying out massive empowerment 
programmes that used state resources arguing that these were imperative to transfer wealth to the 
formerly marginalized blacks. The MDC cried foul saying the laws were closing the media and 
political space in Zimbabwe at its expense and that the economic policies were favouring ZANU 
PF supporters, violating private property rights, alienating the country and destroying the 
economy.  
The sanctions by Western countries that were on paper said to be selective, targeted areas that 
were deemed to be effective in crippling governance to create problems for the ruling party. This 
view is supported by the fact that there were sectors, such as in mining and manufacturing where 
companies from Western countries such as Rio Tinto and Lever Brothers were benefiting that 
were not included in the sanctions regime. The sanctions together with the poorly implemented 
pro-poor empowerment policies wreaked havoc in the economy. As hostilities deepened, land 
                                                    
4
 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) said that taking up arms to target offending state institutions that the 
MDC T perceived as harassing its supporters was an option which they did not adopt as a party because it was going 
to be a painful and longer route to democracy. 
5
 Mwonzora (Ibid) said the ‘Final Push’ was not an attempt to unseat the government by force but a strategy 
to force the High Court to preside over the 2002 MDC T petition on the presidential elections and to push for key 
reforms that the MDC T desperately needed to level the political playing field. 
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reform took a more radical course as more legislation was passed to ensure compulsory 
acquisition and most remaining white farmers were forcibly evicted. The ZANU PF Government 
began to take a more hard-line stance against the West and the opposition pronouncing policies 
inclined towards resource nationalisation (Raftopoulos, 2006). With ZANU PF increasingly pre-
occupied by the Western countries’ onslaught, good governance became secondary as patronage 
and loyalty to the party became the visa to access resources and to guarantee protection against 
prosecution, in the process, allowing corruption to set in. Although the pro-poor policies were in 
some cases instrumental in empowering some blacks, they also became the main drivers of 
corruption that worsened the already declining economy as the resources that were channeled to 
indigenous people and corporate entities to spur productivity were in some instances diverted to 
personal non-productive consumption (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). The Zimbabwe dollar began to 
fall by unprecedented levels against other currencies and by 2008 the country was experiencing a 
hyper-inflation (World Economic Outlook, 2008). The declining livelihoods saw the ruling party, 
ZANU PF, losing popular support especially amongst the urban voters and increasingly turning 
to liberation war veterans and the state security apparatus to mobilize ballot support whilst the 
opposition continued to look up to the West for financial and moral support as well as guidance 
(Dell, 2010). 
In the harmonized 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections that were described as being 
generally free and fair (EISA, 2008), the parliamentary elections failed to produce an outright 
winner with the Morgan Tsvangirai-led MDC getting 100 seats, ZANU PF 99, the Arthur 
Mutambara-led MDC 10 seats and one going to an independent (ZEC, 2008). This was the first 
time since independence in 1980 that an opposition party had overturned the liberation party 
dominance in parliament albeit without a majority to form a government on its own. Although 
Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC claimed victory in the first round of voting, the presidential 
elections according to official results, also failed to produce an outright winner with no candidate 
garnering the required 50 percent plus one vote as required by the law (AUEOM Report, 2008). 
With the liberation party facing the threat of losing power, former liberation combatants 
including those employed in state institutions, went out in full force “to educate the masses not to 
let the gains of the liberation struggle to be reversed by an opposition created and sponsored by 
the West” (Muchena, Personal Communication, 2012, Nov. 8). The MDC complained that most 
of these deployments were characterised by acts of violence against its supporters. Morgan 
Tsvangirai boycotted the Presidential run-off of June 27, 2008, arguing that the election would 
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not be free and fair because of violence (Badza, 2008). With a hung Parliament and a disputed 
presidential ballot, the outcome on the ground was a political stalemate that saw a deepening of 
the conflict and the creation of a power vacuum. The political crisis further worsened the ailing 
economy and the rate of decline became alarming triggering despondency and hopelessness in 
the general populace. Violence between ZANU PF and MDC supporters escalated with many 
clashes recorded in the capital, Harare and the countryside.  Government announced that the 
MDC was training an insurgent group in neighbouring Botswana and arrests and abductions of 
members of the opposition were on the increase (Dzirutwe, 2008). Life in Zimbabwe became 
unbearable with shortages of basic commodities, capital flight, factory shutdowns and 
unemployment, hyper-inflation, political violence between the major parties, farm evictions and 
migration of both skilled and non-skilled labour taking a heavy toll on the country and creating a 
series of political, economic and social crises.  
Given the political stalemate of 2008, the escalating intra-party violence, strong support from the 
security sector for the liberation party, isolated bombing acts and the alleged acquisition of arms 
by people aligned to the MDC, the possibility of the situation degenerating into widespread 
violence or an armed civil conflict could not be ruled out (Mutambara, Interview, 2013, Jun. 20). 
Developments in the Middle East that began in 2011 in the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ showed that 
Western countries led by the USA, Britain and France that were at the forefront in supporting the 
North African uprisings under the guise of spreading democracy were the ones that provided 
troops, arms and aircraft that were used to forcibly remove those governments from power 
whose worst episode was the hunting and murdering of the former Libyan leader, Muammar 
Kaddafi. The same countries were also accused of providing rebels in the conflict in Syria with 
weapons and before the eruption of the Islamic State (ISIS) threat, went as far as withholding aid 
to rebel groups to force them to unite so they could pose a more formidable threat to the Assad 
regime (Marcus, 2012). The Western countries that were active in supporting regime change 
forces in the Middle East during the North African uprisings were the same countries that were at 
the forefront in calling for a change of government in Zimbabwe. If the experience of how 
regime change forces operated in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 and was continuing in Syria 
in 2014 is anything to go by, it demonstrated that if a conducive opportunity presented itself in 
any country where they had huge interests, Western countries could very much be willing to 
supply weapons and other forms of support to those desiring to rebel against governments they 
were opposed to and Zimbabwe was not an exception. In 2008 however, following the 
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inconclusive and disputed election result, SADC intervened in the conflict and helped the 
warring parties to negotiate a Global Political Agreement (GPA) that eventually led to an 
Inclusive Government and restored some degree of normalcy and stability both politically and 
economically.  
The study interrogates Zartman’s (1985) ripeness theory and later refinements by other scholars 
to establish how much it explains the GPA of 2008. Zartman was involved in extensive research 
on how to resolve conflicts and advanced a theory that says intervention by third parties is likely 
to meet with success if a conflict is ‘ripe for resolution’. The African Union Mediation Support 
Handbook (2014) also lists ripeness of a conflict as an important pre-requisite for any 
negotiations6. Given the fact that the SADC intervention in Zimbabwe became most attractive 
after the indecisive elections of 2008, the study’s main assumption was that some degree of 
‘ripeness’ as suggested by Zartman could have presented itself in the conflict in Zimbabwe 
following the political stalemate. Since the pioneering work of Zartman, many scholars have 
sought to improve the theory by focusing on its weaknesses that include: being tautological; how 
to deal with irrationality in a conflict; identifying the range of variables that help in its 
identification; and, how to address its narrowness of focusing on two parties only in a conflict 
(Haas, 1990, Druckman & Green, 1995, Mitchell, 1995 and Pruitt, 1997). Despite many attempts 
to improve the theory, there is however no consensus amongst researchers on its plausibility with 
the strongest criticism coming from Kleiboer (1994) though its claims especially  in identifying 
the best time to intervene in a conflict and its potential to  provide a cue on the formula for 
resolution remain attractive.  
1.3 The Conflict Ripeness Theory  
Zartman’s ‘ripeness of conflicts’ theory is embodied in his publications during the period 
between the 1980s to the early 2000s and was first presented in full in his book: Conflict and 
intervention in Africa (Zartman 1985, 1989, 2000, 2001). Arguing that conflicts that are 
experiencing ‘ripeness’ present ‘ripe moments’ that should be seized for intervention by third 
parties to find a negotiated solution, Zartman (1985) defined the ripe moment of a crisis in three 
overlapping ways: 
                                                    
6
 The AU Mediation Support Handbook (2014) however does not explain how that ripeness is to be 
ascertained nor does it specify its indicators. 
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As mutual, painful stalemate marked by recent or impending catastrophe; as a time when 
both parties’ efforts at unilateral solutions or ‘tracks’ are blocked and bilateral solutions 
or ‘tracks’ are conceivable; and or as a place on a long slope where the ‘ins’ start to slip 
and the ‘outs’ start to surge (p. 10).  
In the 1985 book, six cases of conflict were examined and after discussing examples of 
escalation and de-escalation, Zartman concluded that the point when conflict is ‘ripe for 
resolution’  is associated with two different kinds of intensity which he called ‘plateaus’ and 
‘precipices’ which produce different types of pressures that he called ‘deadlocks’ and 
‘deadlines’. According to Zartman, a plateau is reached when one side is unable to achieve its 
goals and the process is consummated when the other side arrives at a similar perception. On the 
precipice, Zartman (1985) says it is the opposite of a plateau: the point in the conflict continuum 
when things suddenly come to a cliff-edge that makes parties realise that matters will swiftly get 
worse and that such a development threatens a mutual check (hurting stalemate) between the two 
sides. He identified a linkage between the ‘ripe moment’ and the ‘hurting stalemate’ and 
elaborated on the difficulties in defining, identifying and seizing that ripe moment to resolve a 
conflict. The political crisis that emerged after the indecisive and disputed Zimbabwean elections 
of 2008 however created a stalemate in which the contending parties could not proceed with their 
unilateral paths in the conflict. Zartman also posited that an ‘impending catastrophe’ helps in 
creating ripeness and the declining Zimbabwean economy which was at its lowest in 2008 could 
have created a sense that a mutual solution was imperative to arrest the economic decline thus 
contributing to the notion of ripeness. On third-party mediation, Zartman (2006) said it is neither 
a pre-requisite nor a part of the theory but went on to say if the parties to the conflict fail to 
perceive an intolerable situation, it is the role of a mediator/facilitator to persuade the parties that 
an escalation to break the deadlock is not possible. This is the role that SADC through South 
Africa, under President Thabo Mbeki, played in Zimbabwe from 2007 culminating in the GPA of 
2008.  
Ripeness theory is grounded in cost benefit analysis which is consistent with rational choice 
theory particularly public choice notions of rationality, studies of war termination and 
negotiation (Zartman, 2003). According to Zartman (2001), these theories assume that a party 
will pick the alternative which is best for itself, and that a decision to opt for a negotiated 
solution is induced by increasing pain associated with the present course of the conflict, thereby 
making the change a rational choice from a cost-benefit point of view. From the onset of the 
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conflict in 2000, the best course of action for the political parties in Zimbabwe was a unilateral 
acquisition of power and when all the other means to attain that objective became closed in 2008, 
the most viable way out became a negotiated solution. Zartman (2001) said a conflict becomes 
ripe for resolution when the parties realise that the status quo (no negotiation) is a negative sum 
(lose-lose) situation, not a zero-sum (win-lose) situation and that to avoid the mutual loss, they 
must consider negotiation in an attempt to reach a positive sum (win-win) outcome. Although 
Zartman focused on conflicts characterised by armed violence in the theory’s original 
formulation, he did not totally exclude the possibility that it could apply to low level conflicts 
that have not become full-blown armed confrontations similar to the situation that prevailed in 
Zimbabwe since 2000.  
This study thus sought to contribute to the theory’s development by applying it in a conflict that 
had not yet transitioned to an armed confrontation. Whilst Zartman (2001) was confident that the 
theory could be used to identify and explain ripeness and intervention, he left open for further 
research the question of whether conditions creating ripeness had any direct bearing on the 
substance for the formula for resolution, subsequent negotiations and the full implementation of 
the agreement. The extent to which the conflict situation in Zimbabwe in its emergent form could 
have been ripe for resolution at some point and how the conditions creating that ripeness 
impacted on the resolution process provided an opportunity to not only interrogate the theory 
further but to also ground it in the conflict prevention discourse.  
1.4 Problem Statement 
Given the prevalence of intra-state conflicts that get out of hand, the study uses the Zimbabwe 
case to answer its main question which is how can conflicts be managed so that they are timely 
and constructively resolved to minimize human suffering. When the formerly colonised nations 
in Africa started gaining independence beginning in the 1960s, the expectation was the freedom 
from colonial bondage would translate to stability, development and prosperity. This however 
has not been the case with a significant number of African countries experiencing conflicts that 
have often escalated to war threatening the state’s existence by destroying the economy and the 
social fabric, and causing untold suffering to the citizens. Gurr (1991) identified structural 
deficiencies in African societies, including African countries’ relations with the rest of the world 
and domestic political processes as being interrelated in causing complex conflicts in post-
colonial Africa. The numerous problems facing African countries including political and 
economic marginalization, bad governance, poor economic and other social management 
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policies, underdevelopment, external interference and the challenges of redistributing resources 
for equitable growth in the post-colonial period create fertile ground for the outbreak of conflicts 
that become difficult to resolve.  
All societies experience conflicts of varying magnitudes at some point in their existence but the 
difference lies in how those societies deal with the situations confronting them. In cases where 
political will and resources are available to the aggrieved parties, unresolved conflicts tend to 
grow sometimes leading to war. While the competition for power is common in all states, in 
Africa, acceptance of the outcome of the people’s will expressed through the ballot has not 
always been the norm with allegations (confirmed and unconfirmed) of external interference, 
vote rigging, intimidation, denial of political space and violence in most cases resulting in the 
rejection of the election outcome. Even in instances where the election has been viewed as 
generally free and fair, outcomes that fail to produce a clear winner as happened in Britain after 
the May, 2010 plebiscite, wield great potential for creating instability in Africa. Failure to create 
a government after an election creates a power vacuum in an environment already poisoned by 
historical grievances, poor governance and external interference.  
Lalman (1987) said the escalation of conflict in crisis situations is the outcome of choices made 
by rationally thinking players and stakeholders. In cases of political crisis, rationality suggests 
that parties to the conflict on their own or with the help of third parties, need to reflect on the 
conflict with the objective of coming out with a workable and viable solution in the interest of 
national stability. The parties choose either to negotiate or to fight and the form that the conflict 
takes is determined by the options chosen, leading to peace or violence. Wanis-St John (2009) 
pointed out that policy makers and theorists interested in conflict resolution are in broad 
agreement that preventing violent conflicts is generally preferable to post hoc responses after the 
outbreak of full-scale armed violence.  
Up to a few months before the GPA of 2008, both the ruling party and the opposition in 
Zimbabwe were giving indications that the two sides were like oil and water that do not mix and 
working together was unthinkable7. Society, including the media and civic organizations, was 
highly polarised along the political divide. The political stalemate that was created by the 
                                                    
7
 Mujuru (Interview, 2013, Sept. 5) said that no one ever imagined that ZANU PF and the opposition would 
sit on the same table working together because of ideological differences and deep-seated hostilities between the 
parties. 
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harmonised elections of 2008 and the pressure applied by Western governments for political 
change worsened the situation as the economy continued to deteriorate. The general feeling in 
Zimbabwe in the post-2008 election period was that if the crisis was not contained by some form 
of political settlement, the conflict would escalate creating possibilities of greater violence that 
could lead to a civil war and a failed state (Mswela, Personal Communication, 2014, Sept. 24). 
Following the signing of the GPA in 2008 that was described by the media and political analysts 
as a ‘shaky marriage’, the opposition shared power with ZANU PF and despite there being 
outstanding issues that remained unresolved by the time of the elections in 2013; the domestic 
dimension of the conflict subsided during the period of the GPA only to pick up as the next 
general election approached. SADC’s intervention appeared to have to a limited degree managed 
to contain the conflict since full resolution was yet to be realised. The main issue under 
consideration is if violent armed conflicts have their moments of ripeness where resolution is 
more likely to meet with success, do political conflicts that are emerging but protracted and 
showing signs of going out of hand as was the case in Zimbabwe in 2008, have their own ripe 
moments which can be seized by the parties on their own or with the help of third parties for 
peaceful and constructive resolution.   
Conflict can result in any of the following three outcomes: escalate into war; continue at more or 
less the same level of hostility; or deescalate to peace, and as it plays out, opportunities always 
present themselves at times creating ‘ripe moments’ which need to be identified and seized to 
persuade the parties to reach a negotiated settlement before things become worse. In light of the 
foregoing arguments, the purpose of the study was to establish the implications of the practical 
application of the theoretical notions of ripeness on the Zimbabwean conflict case. This was 
done by carrying out an in-depth examination of the conflict and the resolution efforts that 
obtained in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2013 to check whether ripeness set in at some point 
in the conflict, establish its nature, how long it lasted and determine its bearing on the formula 
that was adopted for resolution, the negotiations and the implementation of the agreement.  
1.5 Objectives of the Study and Research Questions  
The study’s main objective is to check how ripeness theory fits and explains the conflict that 
prevailed in Zimbabwe from 2000 by examining the conflict, the SADC intervention and the 
resolution process. Alternatively, if the notion of ripeness is found to be elusive, the research 
would proceed by way of explaining why there is no fit between ripeness theory and the conflict, 
and what accounted for the timing of the SADC intervention and the subsequent turn of events. 
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The original formulation of the ripeness theory was informed by rational and public choice 
theories which are variants within the rationalist paradigm. Given that a number of studies 
including Stedman (1991), Mitchell (1996) and Pruitt (2005) used rational and public choice 
theory-based approaches to test the plausibility of the ripeness of conflicts theory and the 
scholarly criticisms that have been made on rationalism in general and rational and public choice 
theories in particular and following Denzin (1978) who said that the robustness of a study can be 
increased by among other strategies, theory and methodology triangulation, the research sought 
to ride on two research paradigms, rationalism and interpretivism in the form of a sequential 
explanatory design to interrogate the theory using an alternative research approach from a 
contending paradigm.  
The study thus used qualitative evidence derived through interpretivism to check on the claims of 
an existing rationalist based first order theory (ripeness of conflicts) as formulated by Zartman 
(1985) including its subsequent refinements. The advantages and problems of using this 
approach are dealt with in the literature review and methodology chapters. It is however 
important to indicate at this stage that the study proceeded by way of interrogating and stating 
the ripeness of conflicts theory claims as presented within the rationalist paradigm and held these 
in abeyance whilst interpretivism was used to gather data. The emerging first and second order 
constructs were then checked against the ripeness of conflicts theory claims to confirm or 
disconfirm the presence of ripeness in the conflict as well as to explain the effects of that 
ripeness on the substance of the proposals for resolution, subsequent negotiations and the 
implementation of the agreement.  
In line with interpretivism, the study did not have a hypothesis (Lester, 1999) but proceeded by 
way of questions to informants that were carefully constructed so as to avoid revealing the object 
of the study and the answers were abstracted to higher order constructs that were used to 
interrogate ripeness in the conflict. This was done to avoid a situation where the informants 
would situate their answers in the quest to explain the notion of ripeness since the main idea was 
to have the views  of the targeted population either confirming or disconfirming ripeness without 
giving them a cue. The objectives of the study were:  
 To establish the incompatibilities that were creating conflict in Zimbabwe in the period 
2000 to 2013;  
 To search for the presence of ripeness in the conflict and establish its nature in the period 
2000 to 2013; and, 
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 To establish how ripeness affected the conflict and the resolution process.  
The overarching research question was: how does the ripeness of conflicts theory explain the 
conflict and the resolution process in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2013? The sub-questions 
are listed below:  
 Was there conflict in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2013 and who were the parties to it? 
 What were the differences that created conflict in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2013? 
 How did SADC come up with the formula for resolution leading to the GPA?  
 What explains the SADC intervention leading to the GPA of 2008? 
 Why did the parties to the conflict in Zimbabwe only agree to a GPA in 2008 and not 
before that? 
 How did changed circumstances over time affect ripeness, subsequent negotiations, the 
implementation of the agreement and the conflict?  
The research was a qualitative case study in which evidence from purposefully targeted 
informants, document analysis, observation of the conflict and the resolution process, and the 
researcher’s experience as a citizen contemporaneous with the conflict were combined and 
synthesised to interrogate ripeness theory claims. 
1.6 Justification of the Study 
As pointed out above, there are serious governance and structural deficiencies that characterise 
African societies in most cases leading to crisis, instability and violent conflict that wreak havoc 
on the continent. The researcher took the position that peace and stability are pre-requisites for 
progress and their pursuance a matter of rational choice by rationally thinking societies. To that 
end, violent conflict is destructive and all efforts should be directed at avoiding its outbreak.  As 
conflict unfolds, there is sometimes a window of opportunity that appears (ripe moments) giving 
an indication that resolution is more likely to succeed than at any other time before.  The way the 
window opportunity presents itself, how it can be observed and seized is an attractive area of 
study given the need for the successful and constructive resolution of conflicts. Further, Thomas 
(2005) has argued that the fundamental intellectual problem facing the discipline of political 
science is a huge backlog of attractive, highly developed theories that stand in need of testing. As 
alluded to earlier on, Zartman’s (1985) ripeness theory, whilst offering attractive possibilities in 
dealing with conflict situations, has been tested by a number of scholars (Stedman 1991, 
Kleiboer 1994, Mitchell 1995, Pruitt 2005, Anstey 2007) and evidence suggests there is still 
controversy and a scholarly divide over its plausibility. The study thus sought to explain ripeness 
of conflicts theory using a design based in another paradigm as a way of increasing rigor to see 
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whether it explains the SADC intervention and the resolution process. It is hoped that by this 
approach, the thesis will not only confirm its plausibility but also marginally contribute to the 
theory’s usefulness as a tool in conflict prevention and resolution.  
Although Stedman (1991) did a case study testing for ripeness in the negotiations that ended the 
liberation war in Zimbabwe in 1979, a repeat test of the theory on the country’s post 
independence crisis remains attractive given that some of the incompatibilities creating the 
conflict suggest that there was unfinished business in the 1979 Lancaster House settlement.  
1.7 Limitations and Delimitations 
In doing such a research that focused on a conflict case that was vacillating at the borderline 
between a latent and violent conflict, the major problem was that some of the parties, for reasons 
that they thought would help their cause, were refusing to admit that there were incompatibilities 
that were creating disharmony whilst others sought to exaggerate them. It was thus not 
uncommon to get some ZANU PF members who were at pains to portray the situation in 
Zimbabwe as non-violent and under control yet on the other extreme, some of the opposition 
members sought to exaggerate the extent of the violence to gain sympathy. Another dimension 
was that the researcher was a government official who lived through the conflict and participated 
in the resolution process. Smyth (2005) raised a number of important points about the conduct of 
research by insiders versus outsiders to a conflict relating to the issues of subjectivity and 
objectivity. As a Director in the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services and a 
beneficiary of the Land Reform Programme, the researcher was an insider both as an official 
participant in the resolution process and as an ordinary citizen. Following Smyth (2005), insider 
knowledge was however used as a source of data striving for objectivity in its analysis for the 
benefit of the study. Another point was that as an insider, some of the parties to the conflict 
viewed the researcher as an agent and/or supporter of the other side in the conflict and were 
initially reluctant to open up. To circumvent these fears, the researcher clearly explained to the 
targeted interviewees the genuineness and objectiveness of the study in seeking to contribute to 
the theory of conflict resolution. The explanation was given weight by letters of introduction 
from the researcher’s university that helped in confirming the genuineness and objectiveness of 
the research.  
The study was bounded in time, focusing on the period 2000 to 2008 as the period in which the 
Zimbabwean conflict eventually crystallized into some form of agreement. It then used the 
period after the signing, 2008 up to 2013, to provide insights on the SADC intervention, the 
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agreement and its implementation. Given that on paper the GPA was initially allocated a two-
year life span though in practice it lasted for four years, the study which was done as the conflict 
was unraveling became a moving target.  While the study was eventually bounded by setting a 
cut-off date of December 2013, the undertaking was not easy to do and was only helped by the 
clarity that was provided by the ending of both the GPA and the Inclusive Government in that 
year. The conflict situation was thus contemporary and ongoing and as such the study benefited 
from the hindsight that obtained from analysing evidence that became available after the expiry 
of the GPA up to the time of writing the report in 2014. 
1.8 Conclusions 
The conflict situation that unraveled in Zimbabwe was a threat to stability and development and 
if left unresolved, might have led to greater violence or even a failed state. Although no 
permanent solution was in sight at the time of writing in 2014, the GPA signed in September 
2008 managed to somehow impact positively on the conflict and transformed it to a degree of 
lesser hostilities. The chapter set the stage for the study by giving brief overviews of the conflict 
from 2000 to 2008 and the resolution efforts from 2008 to 2013. It also presented the ripeness 
theory as offering promise not only in identifying the right time for third parties to intervene but 
what to do to manage and resolve the conflict situation. A case was briefly made for the need to 
use a competing paradigm to interrogate the ripeness of conflicts theory that was originally 
formulated within a rational choice theory framework. The main issues to be tackled in the case 
study were given as a review of the ripeness theory to establish its claims and an in-depth 
examination of the conflict situation in Zimbabwe using interpretivism to build evidence that 
was used to interrogate the theory claims.  
Chapter 2 focuses on literature review and the theoretical foundations of the study whilst chapter 
3 presents the methodology used. Chapter 4 gives the case context which should be clearly 
understood if one is to make meaningful comments on the conflict and the subsequent resolution 
process. Chapters 5 and 6 which form the core of data presentation and analysis focus on: the 
incompatibilities that were creating conflict, ripeness and intervention, ripeness and the 
substance of the proposals; the effect of time on ripeness; and, the effect of a changing degree of 
ripeness on subsequent negotiations and the implementation process. Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusions and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature related to the topic to find out what other scholars have said about 
conflict, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and ripeness of conflicts theory to illuminate the 
implications for the case study so as to establish gaps to be filled by the research. Given that the 
phenomenon being studied was contemporary, it emerged that whilst some information was 
available in books and articles, a substantial amount of accounts of what happened, what was 
said by the major players and analyses of the conflict situation were only available in media 
reports. Consequently, media accounts were also a major data source. Efforts were however put 
in priotising information from primary sources where ever they were available. The chapter also 
discusses the rationalist and interpretivist paradigms’ main theoretical standpoints focusing on 
the gulf between them and goes on to explain the ontological and epistemological implications of 
interrogating a theory originating from the former paradigm using evidence gathered and 
abstracted using an approach grounded in the latter.  
2.2 Conflict and the situation in Zimbabwe 
Conflict has been defined as a situation where there are incompatibilities between parties in a 
given setting (Galtung, 1972). Bercovitch, Kremenyuk & Zartman (2009) posit that conflict is 
the existence of incompatible positions which are usually normal, universal, unavoidable and 
permanently recurring phenomena within and amongst societies. Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1997) 
further say conflict refers to “a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings is 
engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable groups because these groups 
are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals” (p. 179). They also say conflict 
implies more than competition where the latter shades off into the former when the parties try to 
enhance their own position by reducing that of others, try to thwart others from gaining their own 
ends, and try to put their competitors out of business or even try to destroy them (Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, 1997). According to Mark & Snyder (1957), for conflict to be said to be present in a 
given setting, there should be: the existence of two or more parties; a situation of resource or 
position scarcity; the presence of behaviour that is designed to hurt or injure the other; and, 
mutually opposed goals. These definitions show that whilst a conflict has causes, its 
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manifestation takes the form of hostile pronouncements and actions between the parties in which 
war is the highest stage. Whilst conflict is ever present in human relations, it generally becomes 
undesirable when it escalates from non-violent to violent levels causing disharmony and discord 
that disrupts or destroys elements of a society. In as much as conflict occurs at the personal level 
or amongst small groups such as families or organisations, the study focused on conflicts where 
the setting is between large groups within the same state with or without the involvement of 
external players.   
Zartman (1989) differentiates between conflict and crisis saying that while the former refers to 
an underlying issue in a dispute between parties, crisis refers to the outbreak of and/or 
perpetuation of hostilities. Isyar, (2008) defines a crisis as an urgent situation that suddenly 
happens and breaks the routine processes of any system. He further says where there is a crisis, 
there is no war but there is no peace. Isyar (2008) also makes a distinction between crisis and 
conflict saying the former often focuses on specific urgent matters and can be dissociated with 
deep-protracted or low-level conflicts or discord. A crisis or a series of crises can happen within 
a conflict. In Zimbabwe one could cite an economic crisis whose zenith was the crash of the 
Zimbabwe dollar in 1997 and the political crisis that occurred following the disputed elections of 
2008 as good examples of crises occurring in a conflict8.  
The conflict in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2013 had political and economic dimensions at 
the domestic level with varying degrees of involvement by external players. Although sporadic 
violence was intermittently experienced in its manifestation, the conflict by 2013 had not 
developed into an armed confrontation though it had undergone varying degrees of 
transformation. Despite the fact that at times the situation on the ground had all the signs of a 
conflict going out of hand, players were not always agreed on whether a conflict actually existed 
and between which parties. ZANU PF portrayed the conflict as one between itself against 
external powers, especially Britain the former colonial power and its European allies working in 
cahoots with the opposition in Zimbabwe to achieve a regime change agenda (Mugabe, 2001). 
The opposition claimed the conflict was between a dictatorship and its people (Marcovitz, 2011). 
To establish whether a conflict really existed in Zimbabwe, the study explored the situation and 
                                                    
8
 Moyo (Interview, 2013, Apr. 8) was of the view that there was no conflict in Zimbabwe since 2000 but 
only a number of crises precipitated by the formation of the MDC as an opposition party with financial support from 
the Westminster Foundation to pursue regime change in Zimbabwe. 
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the relationships that prevailed in the period covered by the study to establish how they fitted 
into the definition of conflict and its related concepts. 
In attempting to answer the question why people in a country start killing each other, Ohlson 
(2008) says an actor needs to get the answer yes to three questions: (1) Do we want to do it? (2) 
Can we do it? And, (3) Do we dare do it? He says the answers to these questions translate to 
three concepts, Reasons, Resources and Resolve which he calls the ‘Triple R’. Under reasons, he 
identifies background reasons which are the structural conditions or underlying remote and 
proximate causes which are the immediate triggers to the next level of conflict intensity. The 
background reasons constitute long-term enabling conditions for conflict as fault lines that over 
time provide fertile ground for violent conflict when proximate reasons appear while the last are 
the sudden events that tip emotions beyond the boiling point and could be a sudden further 
widening of the legitimacy gap or any occurrence that relatively worsens the situation (Ohlson, 
ibid). Under the background causes, Ohlson (ibid) says protracted economic and political 
subordination to another power as happened during colonialism as well as the asymmetric 
character and structural dynamics of the international system which tend to favour others and 
disfavour others, all combine to create problems of state-making and the establishment of a 
legitimate central authority with a propensity to create conflict. These factors contribute to a 
weak state structure with low capacity to govern effectively and deliver public goods to citizens 
subsequently creating conditions favourable to conflict and even war.  
Ohlson (ibid) identified vertical legitimacy, which is the right to rule through responsible 
authority and voluntary subordination and horizontal legitimacy which is about mutual 
acceptance and tolerance at the elite and mass levels. Linked to both dimensions is what Ohlson 
(ibid) calls the legitimacy gap which is the difference between what citizens perceive they have a 
right to expect from their state in terms of protection, political and cultural freedoms, socio 
economic well being, etc., in exchange for taxes and loyalty on the one hand, and what the state 
is willing or able to do for the citizens on the other. Expressed in another way, conflict results 
from the difference between what groups expect from each other in terms of understanding, 
benevolence and magnanimity on the one hand, and the actual leniency manifested in group 
relations, on the other. According to this view, the wider the gap becomes, the greater the risk of 
intra-state violence.  
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Ohlson (2008) says resources cover a broad range of concrete issues including capabilities such 
as manpower, weapons, supporters, money, organisation related to networking and mobilisation 
as well as contextual constraints and possibilities such as topography, rear bases and hostile 
neighbourhoods. Also included in the factors that cause conflict and war are effects of 
globalisation, weak central state authority and the role played by non-state actors such as non-
governmental organisations and multinational corporations. The benefits that derive from the 
chaos and re-arrangement of power dynamics that come with war are another factor. The 
presence of high value resources such as access to and control of diamond or oil fields is one 
example that can feed into the opportunity structure that can motivate the resort to war. The third 
aspect of the Triple-R is resolve which Ohlson (ibid) says comes from a complex rationality-
driven process of cost-benefit analysis of the different alternatives available interwoven with the 
reasons for war (the grievances) as well as the idiosyncratic mix of distant and recent 
experiences, perceptions and misperceptions, imperfect information, hopes and fears. Also 
important in the resolve is the ability to mobilize around the chosen path of war (Ohlson, ibid). 
Despite there being many factors that affect perceptions in a conflict, Bercovitch, et al. (2009) 
identify two broad categories of issues: matters expressing disagreement over means; and those 
expressing disagreement over ends. They conclude that issues of interest occur in situations 
where the parties do not agree on what they want (the preferred distribution of resources) and 
issues of value where the parties differ even on what they want or what is desirable (differences 
in beliefs, ideologies and the cognitive structure). Conflicts over values are usually less amenable 
to a compromise solution than conflicts over how to distribute resources. Mitchell (1996) also 
differentiates conflict according to content such as whether the conflict is over resources, 
sovereignty, survival, honour or ideology. The conflict that prevailed in Zimbabwe in the period 
2000 to 2013 was over ideas and values as well as over means. It was over ideas and values to 
the extent that the two main domestic players where advancing two divergent ideologies with 
ZANU PF embracing an anti-imperialist and nationalistic stance whilst the MDC was displaying 
a neo-liberal and capitalist outlook (Muzondidya, 2010). Consequently, ZANU PF and the MDC 
were not agreeing on many issues including over the value of sovereignty, the nature of the 
political economy to aspire for and whether the country should cooperate with Western or 
Eastern countries including on the terms of engagement. The clash over means included the 
disagreements over governance in general, over how programmes such as land reform should 
 22 
 
have been conceived and implemented, and how to distribute the national cake (Raftopoulos, 
2005).  
Bercovitch, et al. (2009) say one key issue in the analysis of any conflict concerns the identity of 
the ‘parties’ involved where the term refers to individuals, groups, organisations, nations or other 
systems involved in a conflict. Identifying parties to a conflict is not always a straight-forward 
issue as they may have sub-systems under them or themselves maybe a sub-system of a larger 
unit.  According to Galtung (1972), parties can be categorised into four cells as to whether they 
are individuals, collective groups, intra-system or inter-system. In the conflict in Zimbabwe, it 
was quite evident that ZANU PF was one of the parties to the conflict whose hold on to power 
was being challenged by the opposition, and the MDC, as another party. Mangena & Hove 
(2013) posit that ZANU PF had enjoyed uninterrupted rule before the formation of the MDC and 
the arrival on the scene of the latter changed the political landscape as the former’s continued 
political hegemony could no longer be guaranteed. The result was a drawn out contest for 
political power pitting the MDC against ZANU PF. While Britain, the USA and other European 
nations were denying that they were part to the conflict, these countries were in varying degrees 
players in the conflict working in collusion with the opposition against ZANU PF. In this context 
and as pointed out above on how parties can be complex, the opposition can be viewed as a sub-
system of Western powers on one hand against the ruling party, ZANU PF that enjoyed support 
from mainly China and to some extent Russia on the other9. Both ZANU PF and the opposition 
had sub-systems within them with the former having war veterans and the state security 
apparatus whilst the opposition had most Western sponsored civic organisations. 
Bercovitch, et al. (2009) say differences in a conflict emanate from the state of each party, its 
values and needs, its historical experience, competence, context and modes of attribution. The 
differences between the parties to the conflict in Zimbabwe were well grounded in the historical 
experiences of the parties: ZANU PF, as a party that was at the centre of the liberation war and 
has been in power since independence in 1980; the opposition MDC, as a party that emerged two 
decades after independence formed by groups that were frustrated by ZANU PF’s hold on power 
with support from Western powers; Britain’s position and responsibilities as the former colonial 
                                                    
9
 Whilst the collaboration between the opposition and some Western powers had crystallised into some form 
of system and sub-system, the same could not be said about ZANU PF and its allies because Eastern countries that 
were supporting ZANU PF were not in conflict with the opposition. 
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power; and the USA as a superpower seeking a hegemonic status in world affairs in the post 
Cold War period. As parties differ so widely in terms of their values, beliefs and goals, so also 
do they differ with respect to their perception of issues that they believe or say are the causes of a 
conflict they are involved in. One party may see the conflict as an attack on a country’s national 
security while the other may see the same as emanating from a lack of democracy. In the context 
of the conflict in Zimbabwe, ZANU PF saw it as resulting from an attack on the country’s 
sovereignty and nationalism whilst the other side saw it mainly as a governance crisis. Getting 
the parties to agree on what a conflict is about is not an easy undertaking and its bridging goes a 
long way in finding a common solution to the conflict.  
Although the parties were haggling on whether there was a conflict or not, the situation that 
obtained in Zimbabwe in the period leading to the GPA of 2008 and after had the characteristics 
of a conflict in its early stage of development. The disagreements over governance matters 
including: the implementation of land reform and other policies that sought to redistribute wealth 
to address historical imbalances; corruption; external interference; sanctions; as well as the 
continued failure to agree on election outcomes in plebiscites held from 2000 culminating in that 
of 2008 that resulted in a political stalemate, among other factors, aggravated the situation and 
turned it into a series of political and economic crises. Although it became a political imperative 
to resolve the governance crisis that was caused by the disputed election of 2008, this move 
alone would not guarantee the removal of all the other incompatibilities that caused conflict in 
Zimbabwe.  
Conflict is a phenomenon that is generated and supported by psychological factors and of these, 
attitude formation is the most important. Bercovitch, et al. (2009) say attitudes are relatively 
enduring dispositions with three basic dimensions: the cognitive referring to the parties’ beliefs 
and ideas about the environment, the affective referring to the parties’ feelings and emotions; 
and, the behavioural referring to the specific readiness to respond, each of them influencing a 
conflict situation. Often attitudes are made more negative or extreme and are usually structured 
so as to view the other party in the worst possible light. In Zimbabwe attitudes were deeply 
entrenched with ZANU PF arguing that as a liberation party that dismantled colonialism, it was 
justified to hold on to power to complete the emancipation of the formerly oppressed blacks 
(Magure, 2010). The opposition MDC was thus viewed as a puppet party created by Western 
countries to effect regime change to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle (Mangena & 
Hove, 2013). On the other extreme, the opposition MDC viewed itself as a democratising force 
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formed to deliver the people of Zimbabwe from ZANU PF’s dictatorship with the help of 
democratic countries in the world (Muwati & Mangena, 2013). Another important dimension is 
conflict behaviour best described as a means by which each party in a conflict proposes to 
achieve its goal resulting in conflict manifestation. Kriesberg (1982) suggests that a party to a 
conflict may resort to three basic types of behaviour: persuasion, coercion and reward, all aiming 
to influence the adversary to change, modify or abandon a goal. Once a conflict has transformed 
from the latent stage and is beginning to be active as was happening in Zimbabwe after the year 
2000, chances are it can continue to escalate until one of the three outcomes are reached: victory 
of one side, painful stalemate forcing the parties to consider de-escalation and a stable stalemate 
where the conflict continues at the same level for some considerable time (Zartman, 2009).  
At the level of a state and where the main incompatibility is political power as was the case in 
Zimbabwe, the actions that a party challenging an existing authority may resort to vary and may 
include various strategies. These include demonisations, denying legitimacy by disputing 
elections, boycotting national programmes and processes, civil disobedience, demonstrations, 
challenging the sovereign’s authority, and calling for external support, interference and 
sanctions, what Johansen (2009) called non-violent means as well as low level violence which 
can be sporadic as was obtaining in Zimbabwe or organised and widespread violence in the form 
of a civil war as what obtained in Ivory Coast after the disputed elections of 2010, among other 
strategies aimed at making the country ungovernable. Other than organised violence that 
qualifies to be called war, most of the strategies listed above were used in the conflict in 
Zimbabwe by the opposition. The ruling party may respond, as ZANU PF did in the period after 
2000, with clamp-downs on the opposition, tightening up of laws, violent suppression of dissent, 
all aimed at containing the perceived threat (Mangena & Hove, 2013). As the political players 
haggle, the conflict begins to scare investors, developmental programmes are relegated to a 
lower priority as resources are channeled towards the conflict and the economy begins to suffer 
as the country risk soars. Since the conflict is active and escalating, chances are that the other 
party may choose greater violence as a strategy to prevail over the other party and this marks the 
beginning of a civil war. This appeared to be the direction the opposition was heading for when 
in 2000 Morgan Tsvangirai addressed a rally at Rufaro Stadium in Harare and declared that if 
President Robert Mugabe did not want to relinquish power peacefully, the MDC would remove 
him violently (Mangena & Hove, 2013). Although the conflict in Zimbabwe experienced 
occasional bouts of violence both within and between parties as from 2000 with the most serious 
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and widespread inter-party violence taking place soon after the first round of the presidential 
elections in 2008, the situation did not degenerate into an armed confrontation. Despite the 
failure to transit into an open civil war, the failure to find a solution in the period from 2000 to 
2008 saw the country experiencing some kind of siege, strangulation and a dysfunctional society 
from the negative consequences of the conflict. 
Galtung (2009) says an untransformed conflict is like a festering wound, always there causing 
pain and decay. As ZANU PF continued to hold on to power denying political space to the 
opposition at times through heavy-handed means, the opposition, supported by Western powers 
that were bent on stopping the land reform programme, disputed each election as not being free 
and fair in the process denied the ruling party legitimacy as well as advocated for the isolation of 
ZANU PF and by extension Zimbabwe through the imposition of sanctions, the countermoves by 
the parties combining to create a poisoned environment. In addition to the occasional inter-party 
violence, there was litigation and counter-litigation on issues of disagreement mainly over land 
and election outcomes (Charamba, Interview, 2013, Jun. 3).  The MDC’s 2003 attempt to 
escalate the means towards the attainment of its objective to remove the ruling party from power 
through the ‘Final Push’ was a failure more due to poor timing, poor messaging, a low turnout by 
the MDC supporters and the countermeasures put in place by the security forces. Writing in the 
Newzimbabwe.com, Innocent Sithole reinforced this view when he argued that: 
In essence, the failure of the MDC’s ‘final push’ did not owe itself to the robust response 
of the state apparatus, for that was predictable and therefore a redundant factor in the 
party’s strategic planning. Rather, it lay in the opposition party’s prevarication on the 
option to seize the Machiavellian moment immediately after the elections (of 2002) and 
champion a mass action programme with the demand for wholesale, people-driven 
constitutional reform at its core. The ‘final push’ was thus tantamount to striking the 
hammer when the iron had (already) gone cold (Sithole, 2005). 
Taking advantage of its labour background, the opposition on several occasions since 2000 also 
called for several strike actions by the workers but these failed to shake ZANU PF’s continued 
hold on power. The poisoned environment became toxic following the indecisive harmonised 
elections of 2008 as inter party violence increased. The leader of the MDC T, Morgan Tsvangirai 
boycotted the presidential re-run citing widespread persecution of his supporters by ZANU PF 
supporters. The political stalemate and widespread violence took a knock on an economy that 
was already in decline since the ESAP days (Kadenge, Ndoro & Zwizwai, 1992). Beginning with 
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the Zimbabwe dollar crash of 1997, inflation rocketed to unprecedented levels as the conflict and 
sanctions scared away investors and worsened the economic situation (Kanyenze, Kondo, 
Chitambira & Martens, 2011). By 2008, the situation had become more chaotic showing signs 
that ‘the wound was now festering’ with no immediate ‘therapy’.  As the Zimbabwe conflict 
dragged on from 2000, it became abundantly clear that something had to be done to contain the 
conflict and stop the country from sliding into a failed state status10. Figure 1 overleaf presents a 
diagram showing the complex conflict patterns in Zimbabwe as of February 2007 before the 
intervention by SADC when President Mbeki was still informally involved focusing on the 
parties that were involved, hostilities, collaboration and potential resolution engagements.  
Alker, Gurr, & Rupesinghe (2001) distinguish six stages of a conflict which form a cycle to start 
and get back to peace: dispute (equivalent to conflict emergence); crisis (equivalent to 
escalation); limited violence; massive violence (war); abatement (equivalent to de-escalation); 
and settlement (peace). These stages are similar to those set out by the Complex Emergency 
Response and Transition Initiative (CERTI) project: conflict, crisis, chaos, complex emergency, 
recovery (Alker, Gurr & Rupesinghe, 2001). The Health as a Bridge for Peace (HBP) project 
also defines five phases: impending crisis, outbreak of violence, war, post-crisis, and stable 
peace. The time a stage lasts and the level of intensity depends on the context (level of hostilities, 
the resources available to the parties and their resolve as suggested by Ohlson (2008)) in the 
conflict. It is not always the case that a conflict will pass through all these stages sequentially  
because in some cases it can be resolved before completing the full cycle or skip some of the 
stages as the conflict escalates rapidly. The most desirable outcome is for the cycle to be bridged 
and a solution found early in the cycle or at most before conflict reaches the destructive stage of 
war. This however is not always the case as some conflicts escalate to war or in the event that 
they do not get to the highest stage, drag on at a particular stage yet causing untold suffering to 
the people. Actions that are taken to bridge the cycle in the early stages are generally associated 
with preventive diplomacy, those which take place when war has broken out, conflict 
management focusing on peace-making and after, peace building. We borrow a diagram of the 
conflict cycle from Rodriguez-Garcia, Macinko, Solórzano & Schlesser (2001) showing the both  
                                                    
10
 The Global Policy Forum (2015) defines a failed state as one in which the political or economic system (or 
both) of a country has become so weak that it can no longer provide basic functions such as education, security or 
governance. 
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FIGURE 2: THE CONFLICT CYCLE 
 
Source:  Rodriguez-Garcia, et al. (2001, p. 21). 
the BHP and CERTI conflict cycles in Figure 2 above. The conflict that prevailed in Zimbabwe 
had gone past the crisis stage gravitating towards widespread violence. Using the Rodriguez-
Garcia, et al.’s (1998) conflict cycle, if the conflict in Zimbabwe had been left to take its natural 
course, it was going to consolidate itself in the widespread violence stage and without an 
immediate solution probably escalate to war. The major question that arises and which this study 
seeks to answer is whether anything could be done to stop such a conflict from progressing to the 
next stages so that the situation reverts to a state of peace11.  
Finally, Bercovitch et al. (2009) assert that a conflict relationship occurs within a specific social 
context (the conflict environment) which affects it, and is in turn affected by it. The environment 
within which the conflict parties exist helps to shape their perceptions of the conflict, their 
options, responses and possible outcomes. In the study of conflicts, there are homogeneous 
factors that can be generalised across conflict cases and unique contextual factors which depend 
                                                    
11
 By posing this question, the study does not predict that war was imminent in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 
to 2013 but assumes that, given the natural cycle of a conflict described above, it was theoretically possible.  
 
 
 29 
 
on the setting, the nature of the incompatibilities and the makeup of the parties. It is for this 
reason that Galtung (2004) and Bercovitch, et al. (2009) argued that a discussion of the 
contextual variable with particular reference to the degree of differentiation, social organisation, 
collective identity and nature of social change is absolutely indispensible in developing an 
integrated approach to the study of conflict. Following this reasoning, the study presents in 
chapter 4 a detailed account of the conflict environment of the Zimbabwean case.  
It should however be pointed out that an objective discussion of the contextual variable affecting 
a conflict is not easy due to biases that are driven by prior interests and positions in the conflict 
by those carrying out the review. Every conflict has a minimum of two diverging views that 
become the source of differences creating the conflict and scholars and conflict resolution 
practitioners as human beings often find themselves driven by their conscience to take sides 
along the divide.  This was the case in most of the literature focusing on the conflict situation in 
Zimbabwe in which accounts depended on whether one was sympathetic to ZANU PF as was the 
case with Gowans (2008, 2010), and Tendi (2008, 2010, 2011) or to the opposition including 
Raftopoulos (2006, 2006), Sachikonye (2002), Magure (2010) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002, 
2011), to mention a few. Whilst ordinary citizens are free to take sides in a conflict, scholars 
need to be objective as much as conflict resolution practitioners also need to add impartiality 
because taking sides in a conflict not only adds to polarisation with the potential to further 
entrench positions but makes them extensions of the parties in the conflict further escalating it. 
Taking sides in a conflict also militates against an objective establishment of the real causes 
which Bercovitch et al. (2008) say is a prerequisite for finding lasting solutions.  
2.3 Conflict Resolution  
The preceding section has shown that conflict can be resolved before it assumes destructive 
proportions but may escalate causing untold suffering to communities. The protracted political 
conflict that prevailed in Zimbabwe in the period under study was beginning to show signs that it 
was escalating towards wide spread violence. Such a conflict needs to be contained either by the 
parties on their own or with the help of third parties and this is the domain of conflict resolution.  
Conflict when left unresolved can lead to war. Although a conflict resolution doctrine is 
growing, an analysis of how war is fought should provide insights that can contribute to its 
further development given that the doctrine guiding the latter is better established. Gray (1999) 
says a German military philosopher, Karl von Clausewitz, has had a lasting influence on the 
conduct of war due to his views that continue to shape modern military doctrine. Some of 
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Clausewitz’s (1832) greatest contributions to the study of war which can help in the evolution of 
conflict resolution doctrine include the assertions that its prosecution is affected by chance, 
probability, friction, fog of war, constraints that call the genius of a commander in coming up 
with strategies and operational plans supported by good intelligence to overcome those 
impediments and improve the likelihood of success. These constraints are important to consider 
in the formulation of military doctrine which is defined as: 
A formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the army accepts as being 
relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army 
for conflict, and the method of engaging in conflict to achieve success ... it is descriptive 
rather than prescriptive, requiring judgement in its application. It does not establish 
dogma or provide a checklist of procedures, but is rather an authoritative guide, 
describing how the army thinks about fighting, not how to fight. As such it attempts to be 
definitive enough to guide military activity, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide 
variety of situations (Sheffield, 2005). 
Military doctrine thus is a codification of beliefs or a body of teaching or instructions, taught 
principles or positions that also include an outlining of a vision of a future war, the institutions 
that are put in place and the training required to attain its objectives. Whilst peacekeeping has its 
own emerging doctrine as evidenced by the Capstone Doctrine which speaks into the civilian and 
military operations so should conflict resolution and prevention. For military doctrine, one 
dominant approach has been the use of the Estimate Process which is a doctrinal thinking and 
planning tool that helps commanders faced with strategic or operational situations in a field of 
uncertainties to determine the best course of action to take after considering factors at play 
including the enemy situation, state of own forces, the terrain in which the battles are to be 
fought and relative capabilities among others. In the same vein and if ripeness of conflicts is a 
fruitful notion, similar tools such as the Estimate Process can be adapted to conform to the nature 
and logic of conflict resolution to help its practitioners with how to identify ripeness, determine 
its nature and the best way to proceed in its exploitation so as to increase chances of success in 
accordance with the context of the environment in which the conflict is occurring where chance, 
probability and uncertainty are major factors at play. The African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) published The Peacekeeping Handbook (2013) which is a 
stride towards developing a contextual African doctrine offering insights on the best practices in 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution on the continent though more needs to be done to broaden 
and deepen its scope in dealing with conflict situations. 
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Dingwall (2002) says much of negotiation literature in conflict resolution is seemingly based on 
the assumption that resolution is indeed possible in a rational environment. The intervener is thus 
seen as a skilled professional, impersonally applying his or her techniques to whatever problems 
that are present in a conflict yet there are other value frameworks that also present challenges, 
opportunities and constraints in conflict situations. Dingwall (2002) concludes that often the 
moral rightness of the outcome is usually left as less relevant than an agreement that is minimally 
agreeable to both parties. In most cases, solutions come at a cost to absolute moral virtue when 
pragmatic solutions are elevated over outcomes that embody justice and fairness yet pursuing 
these moral imperatives might easily derail the process as the party accused might feel 
threatened. It is in this context that The Peacekeeping Handbook (2013) indicates that one of the 
major challenges to conflict resolution emanate from conflicting principles, mandates and 
approaches with regard to priorities and the scope of the resolution efforts and cites several 
possible areas that have potential to clash. From a strategic point of view, interveners may 
typically prefer to focus on stabilising a situation before dealing with the attendant negativities 
such as corruption, black market trading, racketeering, narcotics, human rights, etc. Those 
specialising in crime and human rights will argue, however, that robustly dealing with those 
responsible for human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour earlier in the resolution process will 
result in more sustainable stability. Consequently; the justice versus peace tension is ever present 
in determining an approach to resolution processes with those favouring justice arguing that 
efforts to identify and bring war criminals to justice should have priority, whilst pragmatists 
argue that peace should first be achieved (The Peacekeeping Handbook (2013).  
The other aspect relates to differences over the depth and scope of the formula in which some 
parties might choose to prioritise short term solutions whilst others might prefer to focus on long 
term goals. Zartman (2009) suggests that the best approach is to start with conflict management 
aimed at reducing hostilities which later on can be followed by a search for a formula that 
completely resolves all the incompatibilities and this appears as the approach that was adopted 
by SADC from 2007 in Zimbabwe. Despite opposition claims that its supporters had been 
abused in the period just before the June 27 Presidential run-off, SADC did not appear keen to 
interrogate those claims as a way of pursuing justice but only went as far as putting provisions 
that sought to bar the recurrence of the same problems in future. Just as war practitioners face 
uncertainties in its conduct, so do interveners in conflict resolution and success depends on how 
one understands the situation facing them and the ability to employ the means available to 
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achieve success. How the facilitation effort in Zimbabwe mustered the situation that faced them, 
the approach that was chosen and how effective it was in resolving the conflict will thus be 
another area of interest to the study. 
The human quest to deal with destructive conflict has seen the emergence of conflict resolution 
as a stand-alone discipline. Kriesberg (2007) says conflict resolution is a field oriented toward 
changing conflicts so that they can be conducted constructively in the sense that violence is 
minimised, antagonism between adversaries overcome, outcomes are mutually acceptable to the 
opponents and settlements are enduring. Other than complete resolution, a conflict can be 
transformed to varying lower levels of hostilities (Galtung, 2004). Resolution occurs when the 
differences are addressed and totally eliminated whilst conflict prevention occurs when 
escalation is contained. Conflict management is what happens in the course of seeking a 
preventive measure or resolution. As a discipline, Kriesberg (2007) says conflict resolution is a 
generally pluralistic approach that cannot be narrowly defined as it borrows from other 
disciplines such as comparative politics, international relations, sociology and psychology. On 
methodology, he further says it includes long term strategies, short term tactics, actions by 
adversaries, as well as by mediators. While conflict resolution has been studied at the 
interpersonal, family and organisational level, at the state level, the discipline has been greatly 
influenced by theories of international relations since in its infancy, it dealt to a greater extent 
with interstate conflict during the Cold War that in the main pitted the USA and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) soon after the Second World War (WW2).  
Bercovitch, et al. (2009) point out that a conflict takes place in an environment that can be 
structured or unstructured. In structured environments, conflict is usually institutionalised and 
when differences occur, generally well understood procedures for handling it can be, and are 
usually invoked. Such procedures are more common in family and organisational settings and to 
some extent within states. When the authority of the state is challenged however because, by way 
of example, one party disputes an election outcome as was happening in Zimbabwe in all the 
general elections that took place since 2000, the conflict environment becomes somehow 
unstructured because the formal and informal norms that should provide a sense of a community 
are to some extent eliminated and any of the parties may refuse to be subjected to the domestic 
processes. If a third party intervenes in the form of another country or a region, as was the case 
when South Africa formally intervened in Zimbabwe in 2008 under the auspices of SADC and 
became the new structure super-imposed on the conflict, the challenge is on balancing internal 
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laws and procedures with international or regional norms. Although a community of nations can 
be said to be evolving with emerging norms that are meant to guide acceptable practice in 
handling disputes, at the state level, compliance with these norms remains voluntary since the 
United Nations (UN) Charter upholds the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states (UN Charter, 1945). Over the years caveats have been added 
specifying instances in which sovereignty can be restricted or wholly side-stepped, including in 
situations where acts of genocide or excessive human rights abuses are being experienced and 
those perceived as a threat to international security12, but the notion of sovereignty has endured 
in the relations of states due to the anarchic nature of the world order. ZANU PF invoked the 
notion of sovereignty and non-interference on a number of occasions whenever it felt the 
involvement of external powers would disadvantage it whilst the opposition, owing to its weaker 
disposition in the conflict and the dovetailing of its goals in the conflict with those of some 
Western powers, was always advocating for the their greater involvement.  
Institutionally, conflict resolution at the state level has three dimensions that are complementary 
to each other: the scholarly effort that has seen the rise of academic institutions researching on 
conflict resolution; the rise of non-state actors that involve themselves with conflict situations in 
various forms; and, the actual practice of states when faced with conflict situations 
(Rambosbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005). Along the scholarly route of development, the 
discipline of conflict resolution first gained prominence soon after WW2 with most studies 
focusing on finding a lasting solution to the threat of a global war. Further advances saw 
scholarly journals like the Journal of Conflict Resolution being created and the field of conflict 
resolution broadening to cover international crises, internal wars, social conflicts and approaches 
ranging from negotiation and mediation to experimental games (Rambosbotham, Woodhouse & 
Miall, 2005). Institutions focusing on conflict prevention and resolution include the African 
Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Accord), the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
(CCR) and the Nyerere Foundation, to mention a few, that carry out wide-ranging research on 
how to end conflicts. Of great significance to the practitioners is to synthesise a coherent doctrine 
that is effective in the field from available knowledge. This study, seeking to analyse a conflict 
                                                    
12
 A good example is the emerging AU principle of ‘non-indifference’ in which the continental body is taking 
a position that it can not look aside and do nothing when the security of any of its regions or member states is under 
threat. 
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case to contribute to the development of an existing conflict resolution theory is also minimally a 
good example of this effort.  
When it comes to the conduct of states, despite the inherent weaknesses of the international 
regime deriving from an anarchic world order and the quest by other countries to dominate 
others, over the years some forms of conflict resolution structures have also been emerging to 
deal with conflict situations both at the regional and wider international levels. The end of WW2 
saw the creation of the United Nations that among other developments focused on collective 
global security. At the global level, the UN is one of the most prominent organizations in 
resolving conflict through negotiation and mediation and once involved, it can offer a forum, 
resources, monitoring ability and the capacity to mobilize international consensus (Bercovitch, 
2002). Weaker countries in distress however have in certain instances feared being put on the 
agenda of the UN because of the vested interests of the powerful countries that dominate its 
critical organs such as the Security Council. In the case of the conflict situation in Zimbabwe, 
Britain and the United States of America, the countries that applied sanctions and openly called 
for a change of government in Zimbabwe had veto power in the Security Council and their 
position in any forum discussing the country was likely to be influenced and guided by their 
prior stance. It is on this basis that ZANU PF was resisting that the Zimbabwe conflict be put on 
the UN Security Council agenda and as such strove to demonstrate that the situation unfolding in 
the country was not a threat to international security13. 
At the continental level, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1993 established a 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and in 2001 following the 
transformation to the African Union (AU), the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government decided to incorporate it as one of its organs (Cawthra, 2008). The AU 
adopted the Protocol establishing a Peace and Security Council as a standing decision-making 
organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (AU Peace and Security 
Protocol, 2002). Despite establishing the Council as a collective security and early-warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa 
                                                    
13
 Motae (Interview, 2013, Aug. 5) indicated that the UN played a minimal role though there was occasional 
sharing of information with SADC and whilst it continued with its country programmes, its involvement in the 
negotiations was likely to spoil the whole SADC effort given the reservations about its role in the conflict by ZANU 
PF. Chihuri (interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said allowing the UN to be involved in the talks would have been tantamount 
to openning floodgates for hostile forces to enter and distabilise the internal negotiations. 
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and making considerable headway in a number of conflicts including in Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Sudan (Chergui, NDC Lecture, 2015, Feb. 26), the 
Arab uprisings in 2011 demonstrated that in situations where major powers have a direct interest, 
the AU still lacks the clout to be on top of the situation in crisis situations on the continent. 
Military might and interests of powerful countries emerged as the critical factors that determined 
how the conflicts were handled. Britain, France and the United States of America pushed for the 
UN Resolution 1973 that saw the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) brushing aside the 
AU recommendations on the conflict and enforced a no-fly zone which was in effect a military 
strategy to force their preferred end-states in the affected countries (UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973, 2011). Deep-seated and drown-out conflicts in the DRC, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, 
Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda have also proved difficult to deal with as they continue to 
resist resolution efforts at times mutating to new levels of hostilities and engagements without a 
clear distinction as to whether they are religious conflicts, struggles for self-determination, 
justified struggles against oppression or mere acts of terrorism.  
Despite institutional and resource constraints, the AU continues to be seized with the idea of 
enhancing its capacity to contain violent conflict through the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) which is now fully operational (Chergui, 2015). It was in this context that 
following the political stalemate of 2008 in Zimbabwe and as the economic situation continued 
to deteriorate, the AU passed a resolution on 1 July 2008 at Sharma El Sheikh in Egypt urging 
parties to the conflict to negotiate a settlement under the facilitation of SADC (AU Resolution, 
2008). Although the resolution might have been viewed as passing the buck to a regional body, 
the decision was in line with the emerging view in conflict resolution that regional countries are 
better positioned to take the lead in dealing with conflict situations in their neighbourhoods (part 
of the African solutions to African problems APSA doctrine), a position also acknowledged by 
the UN Charter’s chapter 8. 
APSA envisages working closely with regional security arrangements. In southern Africa, SADC 
established the Organ for Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in 1996 to 
forestall instability in the sub-region (Cawthra, 2008). According to Landsberg (2003), SADC 
aims to be an effective regional political and security community based on shared norms, values, 
procedures and institutions. He further said, notwithstanding the creation of the ‘SADC 
Community’ and its security organ, the OPDSC, the regional organization has serious capacity 
problems including: a weak human resource capacity, poor coordination, constant pressure for 
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trade-offs between the priorities of states which often pull in different directions and a constant 
battle to raise funds thereby distracting it from substantive issues. This capacity shortfall has 
been cited as the major factor distracting the sub-region’s ability to maintain peace and security, 
and the promotion of good governance and democratization. This is because there is an imposing 
gap between making and adopting norms, values and institutions in the SADC on the one hand 
and their implementation on the other.  
Landsberg (2003) further argued that the creation of the SADC community lacked relevant 
effective protocols, values, norms and customs. While the protocol governing the OPDSC came 
in the late 1990s and in 2001 SADC member-states committed to collective security, collective 
defence, democratic governance and the protection of human rights, the development of common 
foreign policy approaches in international fora, the building of joint capacities in areas such as 
peacekeeping, disaster management and coordination of humanitarian assistance, a gap still 
exists on implementation and what it stands for (Landsberg, ibid). A perusal of the protocol 
establishing the OPDSC revealed that it has two committees, one focusing on politics and 
governance (human rights, the rule of law, corruption) and the other on diplomacy (early 
warning, preventing conflicts and conflict management (SADC Protocol on OPDSC, 2001). To 
Landsberg (2003), SADC however lacks the political gravitas, institutional capacity and 
mandates to play an effective governance role including in peace and security impaired by a 
‘cargo cult’ because it is heavily dependent on donor resources and thus spends much time and 
energy servicing donor relations and obligations14.  
Further, Nathan (2013) observed that during the formative years of the OPDSC, member states 
did not want the Secretariat to have any policy influence on regional security matters fearing 
usurpation of member states’ political and military power and were thus not pleased with its 
efforts to play a dominant role in the Organ’s policy formulation and decision-making process. 
Although the protocol establishing the OPDSC and Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ 
(SIPO) eventually laid out the working relationship by spelling out that the Secretariat handles 
the administrative needs of the Organ among other provisions (SIPO, 2004), the founding 
attitude of the member states on the role of the Secretariat continues to inhibit its will and 
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capacity to fully provide operational support to the needs of the Organ in conflict situations. 
Despite these cited shortcomings, SADC took a decision at an extra-ordinary summit in Dar as 
Salaam, Tanzania on 29 March 2007 which commissioned then President Thabo Mbeki to 
facilitate dialogue between the warring parties in Zimbabwe following an incident on 11 March 
2007 in which police used force to prevent the Save Zimbabwe Campaign from convening a 
prayer meeting and leaders of the opposition including Morgan Tsvangirai were brutally 
assaulted, one person killed and 50 hospitalised15 (Masunungure, 2009). Following this decision, 
the opposition was keen to engage in dialogue but the ruling ZANU PF party displayed 
reluctance and despite the slow progress; changes were made to contested laws including the 
AIPPA, POSA and the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) (Masunungure, 2009). Increased 
impetus to the SADC involvement in Zimbabwe was only realised following the disputed 
harmonised elections of 2008. The result was the GPA of 2008 and the formation of an Inclusive 
Government which, despite difficulties, provided an intervention framework that dealt with the 
conflict whose appraisal is the subject of this study.  
Even in situations where a conflict is displaying signs of being ripe for resolution, an 
intervention can help end the conflict or can further escalate it. It is this researcher’s contention 
that the way the resolution effort plays out depends to some extent on how long the conditions 
creating ripeness will last, how attractive the proposals for resolution are, the commitment of the 
parties to the resolution process, the quality of the framework for intervention and how suitable 
to the task and acceptable to the parties the interveners are. Just as in the prosecution of war, 
once the situation is perceived to be suitable for intervention, the speed of identifying the right 
framework for intervention, the strategy and operational plan to be followed and the most 
appropriate person to lead it are critical if the strategic initiative obtaining from the perception 
that the situation is ripe for resolution is not to be lost in a fluid environment.   
Mediation by ‘third parties’ is one of the dominant approaches in resolving conflict through 
negotiation. The term ‘third party’ is used to refer to a person or team of people who become 
involved in an intermediary role in a conflict to help the disputing parties to manage or resolve it 
(Wehr, 1998). Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Willie, (1991) define mediation as a process of conflict 
management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from a third party 
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in the form of an individual, a group, organisation or state to settle their conflict or resolve their 
differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law. Zartman 
(1992) and Bercovitch & Houston (1996) distinguish between third party mediation strategies 
such as diagnosis, facilitation, communication, formulation, manipulation and direction on the 
one hand, and the tactics that go with those strategies. Carment, Samy & Achkar (2009) say 
mediation’s characteristics and its potential for success are case-specific depending on the nature 
of the conflict, the conflict environment and the skill and charm of the mediator/facilitator.  
Literature on intervention in conflict situations shows that when properly done, the introduction 
of a third party changes both the physical and social structure of a conflict as new groups and 
sets of transactions appear and their presence in a conflict tend to put contenders on better if not 
their best behavior (Wehr, 1998, Zartman, 1985, 2001, Bercovitch, et al., 2009). Further, 
accurate communication can be facilitated by intermediaries and the issues, interests and needs 
of the warring parties become clear. Third parties might act as consultants, helping one side or 
both sides to analyze the conflict and plan an effective response or they might act as facilitators, 
arranging meetings, setting agendas and guiding productive discussions. A more active and 
powerful third party role is that of mediator who not only facilitates discussions, but usually 
imposes a structure and process on the discussions designed to move the parties toward a mutual 
understanding and win-win agreements as opposed to a facilitator who only helps the parties to 
work out solutions on their own (Wehr, 1998). While many different styles of mediation are 
common, most mediators have the conflicting parties sit down together to explain to each other 
their views about the nature of the problem and how they think it might best be solved, what 
Weitzman, E. A., & Weitzman, P. F. (2000) call problem solving in conflict resolution.  
The AU working in collaboration with ACCORD suggested critical components for formulating 
mediation strategy which include the consideration that it should be timed to start when a 
conflict is showing signs of ripeness (The AU Mediation Support Handbook, 2014). The 
suggested guidelines are listed below:  
 The parties must own the agreement; 
 Mediation and negotiations should be inclusive of all significant political actors; 
 Civil society must be involved in the mediation and negotiations; 
 The mediator(s) must help the parties develop a relationship of trust and cooperation; 
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 Mediation must be a non-threatening venture for the parties; 
 Mediators must be impartial; 
 There is no quick-fix solution in deep-rooted conflict; 
 Mediators must help the parties address the root causes of the conflict; 
 Mediators must be flexible, creative, responsive and adaptive; 
 The drafting and implementation of peace agreements should be properly linked; 
 The process must address the regional dimensions of national conflicts; and that, 
 There is a need for systematic and rigorous approaches to mediation processes (The AU 
Mediation Support Handbook, 2014). 
While some mediators take a stronger role in option identification and selection than others, 
generally mediators do not have the power to impose a solution. At most, they can suggest a 
solution, which the disputants may or may not accept. In addition to the framework of the 
intervention therefore, the touch and aptitude of a mediator which derives from the personalities 
of those chosen to lead the intervention are critical to the success of the mediation process. Some 
of the important attributes of a good mediator are listed in Galtung (2004) as: motivation, general 
and specific knowledge of the conflict environment, skills, empathy, non-violence, compassion, 
persistence and smartness. The role that South Africa under SADC played in the Zimbabwe 
conflict under the presidencies of Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlantle and Jacob Zuma appeared to 
have hovered between facilitation and mediation. Official documents used both terms 
interchangeably in reference to that role. There was an attempt to impose a structure on the talks, 
a practice consistent with mediation, though in public statements the South African leadership 
was emphasising that its role was only to help Zimbabweans find their own solutions which is 
more of facilitation. An evaluation of the SADC involvement in Zimbabwe focused on the 
appropriateness of the intervention framework including the change over between presidents 
Mbeki, Motlantle and Zuma, the suitability of the interveners and how the mediatory/facilitatory 
efforts played out as read against best practices in the field.  
Once a decision to intervene was taken, the approach that SADC adopted when the parties to the 
conflict accepted the offer of help was that of negotiations between the political parties that had 
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won some seats in the general elections of 2008; that is ZANU PF and the two MDC formations.  
Zartman (2009) says if one adopts a rational choice definition of war or violent conflict as 
bargaining failure, then successful bargaining or negotiation is the means of preventing or 
resolving violent conflict. Zartman (2009) further says when conflict becomes active because it 
is beginning to escalate as was obtaining in Zimbabwe from 2000, it becomes troublesome and 
negotiation as an approach in conflict resolution may be used in any of these ways: to prevent the 
conflict from escalating or turning violent; or to manage the conflict in de-escalating the means 
of its pursuit from violence and dysfunctional politics to peace and functional politics; or may be 
the means to actually resolve the basic incompatibilities of positions or to minimally transform 
them into cooperative relationships. Zartman (ibid) also says parties consider positively the 
notion of conflict resolution through direct or mediated negotiation when they perceive 
conditions of ripeness in the conflict; that is when the parties feel they can no longer expect to 
win the conflict unilaterally through escalation. Once negotiation has become a perceived way 
out by the parties either directly or through the help of a third party, the resolution process 
typically goes through its own logic involving a number of stages and turning points which are 
events marking a new outlook in the resolution process (Druckman, 2001). Typically, the 
negotiation process starts from the diagnosis of the problems, a decision on who to include in the 
process, formulation of the substance of the proposals, concession making where parties move 
from their initial positions on items to meeting points, compensations to over-come the zero-sum 
problem and construction which involves integration and problem solving to reframe the 
problem in such a way that an outcome beneficial to all the parties is envisaged (Zartman, 2009). 
Negotiation is a process and its outcome can best be explained by process-tracing because it is a 
function of two fluid processes: the conflict and the resolution efforts (Zartman, ibid). The study 
thus also used process-tracing to establish the effect of time on ripeness and that of a changing 
degree of ripeness on the negotiations and on the parties’ attitudes, and commitment to the 
process over time. 
The idea of nurturing a GPA in Zimbabwe appeared to have worked in stabilising the situation in 
the short to medium terms. Gates & Strom (2007) did research to establish whether power-
sharing agreements reduce the risk of civil war and discovered that in conflict situations, cases 
where parties are roughly equal to each other in strength as was obtaining after the elections of 
2008, power-sharing can significantly contribute to the aversion of a civil war. This appears to 
have been the case in Zimbabwe as evidenced by a decrease in hostilities, some form of working 
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together and an economic turn-around that reversed the violent and failed path the country was 
heading towards before the GPA of 2008. Maina (2011) did research that sought to place 
governments of national unity (GNU) such as the one put in place in Zimbabwe following the 
GPA of 2008 in the conflict transformation discourse and found out that while in the short term 
GNUs usually produce positive outcomes in stabilising the political situation, in the long run, 
there are costs related to the size of the negotiated government and that the arrangement may fail 
to address the underlying causes effectively. She further observed that the practice of inclusive 
governments as a formula for resolution can encourage those that would have lost elections to 
contest outcomes with the hope of being taken on board in the settlement. It will be thus 
informative to establish how these findings resonate with the way the GPA played out. 
2.4 Conflict Prevention 
Conflict prevention is part of conflict resolution though there are efforts to make it a stand-alone 
field. Generally it occurs at two levels: the long term efforts that aim at eliminating potential 
conflict causes; and the short to medium term measures that are taken to stop a conflict from 
escalating to higher levels of hostilities. Cahill (2000) asserts that one of the supreme creations of 
the human spirit is the idea of prevention. Drawing similarities in conflict prevention to 
developments in disease prevention, he argues that the defining principle of preventive 
diplomacy should be based on socio-detection and early intervention. Former UN Secretary 
General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, described conflict prevention as an action to prevent disputes 
from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into more violent 
conflicts and to limit the spread of the violent conflicts when they occur (Siegfried, 2007). 
Wanis-St John (2011) argues that whilst the international community has often responded to 
crises and threats to peace and security in an ad hoc manner, preventing these conflicts is 
generally preferable to post hoc responses. Cahill (2000) identifies origins of violence as 
prejudices and injustices that inevitably breed hatred and conflict and argues that just as health 
experts device control programmes based on careful research, experiments and post-mortems, so 
nations should research about conflicts and learn from their failed practices and efforts to find 
preventive and lasting solutions.  
Hume (2000) says humanity has an individual and collective responsibility to devote efforts to 
resolving conflicts and the major impediment is curing symptoms leaving the underlying causes. 
He argues that in conflict prevention and resolution, without an adequate definition of the 
problem and some degree of consensus on the diagnosis, it is impossible to find solutions.  
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Bedjaoui (2000) says the lack of democracy in developing countries is a danger to world security 
owing to the violations of human rights and the spread of various kinds of fundamentalism. His 
preferred solution is to work to eradicate tensions in societies by generating economic 
development and the promotion of significant progress in the instruction, education and training 
of men and women as citizens as a preventive measure. The conflict situation that was 
fermenting in Zimbabwe in the period under study had the potential to become a civil war. If 
Zimbabwe was to avoid this dangerous and disastrous route, preventive diplomacy should have 
played a major role in pushing for early solutions to the conflict. As already argued in the 
preceding section, the challenge of preventing violent conflict in Zimbabwe was at two levels - 
intervention to stop the conflict from becoming more violent and the application of measures that 
would eliminate the underlying causes of conflict to achieve lasting peace. In this context, if the 
decision to intervene was inspired by the quest to find an immediate pragmatic solution to the 
crisis that plagued Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the disputed elections of 2008, that intervention 
can be viewed as both a preventive measure that was designed to contain the conflict by 
transforming it to lesser levels of hostilities in the process setting the stage for the eventual 
elimination of the underlying causes in the future to satisfy the full requirements of conflict 
resolution. Often however, once a solution has been found that stops the conflict from escalating 
and a semblance of peace is obtaining, no further efforts are put in place to entrench a more 
lasting peace. It was instructive therefore to find out if SADC had follow up plans to its 
pragmatic approach with phased long-term strategies that would eventually ensure total 
elimination of the underlying causes of the conflict. 
Although the SADC intervention of 2008 can be viewed as a regional strategy that qualifies as a 
preventive measure, Western countries that imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe were also arguing 
that they did so to stop the situation from getting worse by putting a curb on ZANU PF excesses. 
After analysing the role of sanctions for preventive purposes (to contain and bring to an end 
localised violence), Skidelsky & Mortimer (2000) concluded that sanctions: should be seen as a 
method of waging war rather than preventing it; that in most cases sanctions do not affect the 
targeted leaders but the general population; that targeted regimes manipulate sanctions and the 
populace for their own political mileage; they disrupt socio-economic activities leading to losses 
and crisis situations; and that, isolating and pillorying a state will not normally bring about an 
improvement in human rights performance. In an effort to coerce ZANU PF ostensibly to 
improve governance and its human rights record, the West, particularly Britain through the 
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European Union (EU), the US and other European countries introduced sanctions that they 
claimed to be targeted but whose effects in practice resonate with the findings of Skidelsky & 
Mortimer’s (2000). Sanctions in Zimbabwe appeared to have generally caused untold suffering 
to the ordinary Zimbabweans, hardened the resolve of ZANU PF which used them for its own 
political mileage and failed to reduce political violence. Viewed from another angle, the 
sanctions to a certain extent might have contributed to conflict prevention by creating an 
economic and social crisis in Zimbabwe - being cruel now to save the country from more 
devastating consequences in the future - which eventually triggered conditions for intervention 
by creating conditions of ripeness. The thesis thus sought to determine whether the sanctions 
helped in creating an environment conducive for resolution or they actually perpetuated the 
conflict.  
When a conflict is pugnacious at a certain level of hostilities or escalating with no signs that 
parties can find a solution on their own, the logical thing in conflict prevention is for third parties 
to intervene to try to contain escalation. Given that no one knows how far a conflict can continue 
to escalate, the challenge for the practice of conflict prevention is in determining when to 
intervene and, assuming that a decision is made, determining who intervenes and what to do are 
also major considerations. As indicated above, a number of studies have, in addition to the 
substance of the proposals, suggested that timely intervention can reverse escalation in a conflict 
and achieve peace (Zartman, 1985, Harass, 1990). The focus of these studies was however 
mainly on conflicts that have become intractable and were experiencing armed violence. If the 
thesis can effectively demonstrate that ripeness can set in during the period before widespread 
violence in a conflict, the theory will also be a useful doctrinal tool in conflict prevention to nip 
conflicts before they assume destructive levels.  
2.5 Rationalism and conflict resolution 
The ripeness theory whose claims the study seeks to interrogate is informed by rational choice 
and public choice theories which are both variants of rationalism theory (Zartman, 2001). 
Rationalism takes the view that knowledge is acquired through cognitive processes and that 
human beings make decisions based on the benefits that obtain from the intended action 
(Linklater, 1996). With regard to politics, the rationalist takes the view that “political activity 
consists of bringing the social, political, legal and institutional inheritance of his society before 
the tribunal of his intellect” for the common good of society (Oakeshott, 1962). Linklater (1996) 
says rationalism has a cosmopolitan approach, envisaging a world order but not necessarily a 
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world government, in which universal moral principles are taken seriously and the gulf between 
domestic and international politics is reduced or eliminated. Jackson (1990) also says rationalism 
is a conception of humanity as society governed by the rule of law. Wallensteen (2007) says 
rationalism in conflict resolution assumes that actors have their own rationality, form their own 
judgements, make decisions, pursue strategies and thus, initiate processes that lead to war or 
avert it. To the rationalist, if the world is to minimise the occurrence of deadly conflicts, there is 
need for actors to make calculations that end hostilities. The idea that wars arise from rational 
calculations is not novel with realists and neo-realists taking this view but the new twist is to see 
wars being ended this way. Pioneer efforts in this approach to conflict resolution include Pillar 
(1983), a more concerted effort by Zartman from 1985 and Harass (1990). Despite three decades 
having lapsed since the idea was first introduced, the approach which gathered momentum with 
Zartman’s contributions remains topical given the quest to come out with best ways to deal with 
conflicts in an environment where there is no consensus on what could be the best approach to 
effectively deal with conflicts. In using the conflict situation in Zimbabwe as a case, the study 
seeks to confirm whether the rationalist view that the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
should be the guiding principle of conduct or put in other words, whether the notion that actions 
are right if they are useful or for the benefit of citizens at large were upheld. In this regard, the 
main assumption is that the conflict that raged in Zimbabwe in the period of study was neither 
useful nor for the benefit of the majority of Zimbabweans and resolving it was a major priority.  
Rational choice theory is one of the dominant approaches in economics in which actors are said 
to always seek to maximise utility (or expected utility) based on the information at hand which 
they use to make their decisions (Gunther, 2011). Pollack (2006) says rational choice should be 
understood as a broad approach to social theory, capable of generating an array of specific 
theories and testable hypotheses about a range of human behaviours. He further says it is a 
second-order theory concerned with the ontological and epistemological questions such as: the 
nature of human agency and its relationship to social structures; the role of ideas and material 
forces in social life; and, the proper form of social explanations, among others (Pollack, 2006). 
Second-order theories are substantive, domain-specific about particular social systems and derive 
from the first-order theories. An example of a first-order domain–specific theory is the ripeness 
of conflicts theory that is specific to predicting conditions for resolution in conflict situations. As 
a second-order theory, rational choice theory relies on fundamental assumptions about the nature 
of individual actors and of the social world that they constitute. At this broadest level, rational 
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choice is a methodological approach that explains both individual and collective social outcomes 
in terms of individual goal-seeking behaviour (Snidal, 2002). Pollack (2006) says rational choice 
encompasses under its umbrella first order theories that share common assumptions and 
methodology including: methodological individualism; goal seeking or utility-maximisation; 
and, the existence of various institutional or strategic constraints on individual choices. 
Methodological individualism is the assumption that social situations or collective behaviors are 
the result of individual actions alone, with no role for larger institutions (Ester, 2007). Pollack 
(2006) asserts that as a second-order theory, rational choice cannot be supported or falsified by 
empirical evidence and it is rather the first-order or middle range theories of politics derived 
from it including the conflict ripeness theory that the study interrogates using the conflict in 
Zimbabwe as a case that do or do not provide testable hypotheses.  
Kahler (1998) says rational choice theory appeals to three distinct elements in the choice 
situation: the set of all courses of action which rationally satisfy various logical, physical and 
economic constraints; the causal structure of the situation which determines what courses of 
action will yield what outcomes; and the subjective ranking of the feasibility alternatives ranked 
from expected utility in which to act rationally would be to chose the highest ranked element in 
the feasibility set. The basic idea is that patterns of behaviour in societies reflect the choices 
made by individuals as they try to maximise their benefits and minimise their costs. The 
‘rationality’ assumed by rational choice theory is different from the philosophical use of the 
word. Typically, the ordinary meaning of ‘rationality’ refers to acting ‘in a thoughtful clear-
headed manner’. Rational choice theory however uses a specific and a narrower definition of 
‘rationality’ that says an individual uses cost-benefit analysis to decide on an action that 
maximises personal advantage (Kahler, 1998). The theory has its roots in early neo-classical 
economists’ accounts such as that of William Stanley Jevons who advanced the view that agents 
make consumption choices to maximise their happiness. Later refinements of the rational choice 
theory eliminated such presumptions by narrowing its scope to just a consistent ranking of 
choice alternatives ignoring the origins, nature, or validity of the vast array of human motivations 
of human desire (Friedman 1953). An offshoot from rational choice theory is public choice 
theory which is “the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science” 
(Tullock, 1987). Zartman uses rational choice and public choice interchangeably to qualify his 
ripeness of conflicts theory.  
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Due to the fact that the assumptions and the behavioural predictions of rational choice theory 
have sparked criticism from various camps of scholars based on the difficulties of having all the 
information required timely, data-processing and decision-making associated with many choices 
in economics, political science and sociology, and that individuals do not always act rationally, 
modern approaches in rationalism choose the concept of bounded rationality to replace the 
‘absolute rationality’ of rational choice theory in order to get a more accurate view of human 
decision-making (Albin, 1998). Bounded rationality hopes to be more psychologically plausible 
without completely abandoning the idea that reason underlies the decision-making processes. 
First proposed by Herbert A Simon (1957), bounded rationality is the idea that in decision-
making, the rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive 
limitations of their minds and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision. In Models 
of Man, (1957), Simon points out that most people are only partly rational and are irrational in 
the remaining part of their actions, and describes a number of dimensions along which classical 
models of rationality can be made as limiting the types of utility functions, recognising the costs 
of gathering and processing information and the possibility of having a multi-valued utility 
function. Gigerenzer & Selten (2002) say a way to look at bounded rationality is that, because 
decision-makers lack the ability and resources to arrive at the optimal solution, they instead 
apply their rationality only after having greatly simplified the choices available. Thus the 
decision-maker is viewed as one seeking a satisfactory solution rather than the optimal one. 
While there are many reasons that have been advanced supporting the use of rational choice 
theory approaches, the most important for the social sciences is that assuming humans make 
decisions in a rational rather than a random manner implies that their behaviour can be modelled, 
and thus, predictions can be made about future actions even if they are based on satisfactory 
solutions as opposed to optimal ones as called for by traditional rationalism. Further, there is 
nothing about rational choice theory that says scholars should reject other methods of 
investigating questions about the economy and society, such as the sociological determination of 
individual tastes, an argument that gives credence to the approach chosen in this research of 
using a methodology from another paradigm to check an existing theory using an approach 
obtaining from a competing paradigm. Buchanan & Tullock, (1962,) outline methodological 
qualifications of using rational choice approaches saying: 
Even if the model (with its rational self-interest assumptions) proves to be useful in 
explaining an important element of politics, it does not imply that all individuals act in 
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accordance with the behavioural assumption made or that any one individual acts in this 
way at all times… the theory of collective choice can explain only some undetermined 
fraction of collective action. However, so long as some part of all individual behaviour… 
is, in fact, motivated by utility maximisation, and so long as the identification of the 
individual with the group does not extend to the point of making all individual utility 
functions identical, an economic-individualist model of political activity should be of 
some positive worth (p. 30). 
The individual in a choice situation also faces the dilemma of choosing between what is good for 
him/her and what is good for society. Where gains at the individual level outweigh gains at the 
collective level, the individual is likely to choose a course that benefits him/her at the expense of 
society. There are however benefits from belonging to a society that compel individuals to 
choose in the interests of society in lieu of the collective benefits.  The research thus sought to 
establish how institutional and strategic constraints, perceptions and actions of actors, acting 
rationally, all combine to limit choice leaving one attractive option to all players in a conflict in 
the process creating conditions of ripeness. Attempts to predict human behaviour have been 
criticised in rationalism as untenable (Spegele, 1980) and as such, the study seeks to contribute 
to the ability of ripeness theory to predict, not human behaviour, but conditions that count for 
ripeness in conflicts situations. Should the theory prove to be plausible and taking that ripeness 
as a dynamic state in a conflict, the thesis advances the idea that parties acting rationally should 
always look out for conditions of ripeness to enable timely interventions for constructive 
resolution of disputes.  
2.6 Conflict Ripeness Theory  
Chapter 1 briefly touched on the ripeness theory saying a conflict becomes ripe for resolution 
when the parties realise that the status quo (no negotiation) is a negative sum (lose-lose) 
situation, not a zero-sum (lose-win) situation and that to avoid the mutual loss, they must 
consider negotiation in an attempt to reach a positive sum (win-win) outcome (Zartman, 2003). 
In its original formulation, the two major determinants of ripeness were the ‘hurting stalemate’ 
and later the ‘imminent mutual catastrophe’ (Zartman, 1985 and 2001). Smyth (2007) gives a 
detailed account of the early development of ripeness theory showing that since its introduction, 
a serious scholarly debate ensued focusing on its nature and plausibility. In a search for greater 
explanatory value and applicability of the ripeness theory, Mitchell (1995)  introduced the 
‘enticing opportunity model’ in which he said ripeness occurs when leaders find themselves 
presented with new options that offer them an opportunity to achieve their goals at costs less than 
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their previous investments in the conflict. The approach broadens the defining variables to 
include the original ‘hurting stalemate’ and the ‘imminent catastrophe’ models similar to the 
earlier propositions made by Zartman but differing in that each set of circumstance can produce 
ripeness on its own. To these two variables, Mitchell (1995) adds another two, the ‘entrapment 
model’ that suggests that leaders generally would not want to negotiate if the gains do not offset 
initial investments in the conflict and that of the ‘enticing opportunity’ suggesting there could be 
factors that at times attract parties to seek resolution of a conflict. The ‘entrapment model’ first 
introduced by Edmead (1971) suggests that because of initial investments (including damages 
sustained) in a conflict, parties will settle for nothing less than complete victory. This is because 
the anticipated future costs of continuing the conflict cannot outweigh costs incurred in the past 
so the conflict continues unabated (Smyth, 2007). Mitchell (1995) however suggests that this 
situation can change at a turning point in a conflict when a major re-assessment of strategy 
occurs with the help of outsiders and leaders shift from justifying past sacrifices to salvaging 
what they can in the present changed circumstances. The most valuable dimension added by 
Mitchell (1995) is the fact that his model operates both at the systemic level, searching for 
conditions of ripeness from the structure of the conflict itself and at the micro-level, focussing on 
the dynamics affecting decision makers in the conflict.  
Another improvement to the ripeness theory came from Pruitt (2005) who introduced the 
concepts of ‘readiness’ and ‘motivation’ in finding how a situation can ripen up for resolution.  
Before introducing these models, Pruitt (2005) first observed that additions to the idea of 
ripeness by Zartman and others failed to address the fact that decision makers are not always 
rational and as such his additions specify: the impediments to recognising or acting on objective  
elements of ripeness; and, conditions that remove those impediments, thereby allowing a return 
to rationality. On the factors that remove impediments to rationality, Pruitt (2005) specifies the 
‘shock theory’ which assumes that there will be a return to rationality when a sudden striking 
event, not necessarily a recent or impending catastrophe but any other event in the conflict or its 
environment, jolts the mind and stimulates a rethinking. In the conflict in Zimbabwe, the 
announcement of the election results in 2008 could have produced such a shocking effect with 
ZANU PF realising all of a sudden that it no longer had a majority in parliament and the MDC 
also discovering that its hopes for a landslide victory were doomed forcing the two parties to 
reconsider their positions, leading to the negotiations.  
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Pruitt (2005) adds another dimension that centres on the opportunities that obtain in a conflict 
when a credible third party intervenes and makes the adversaries agree to engage in talks 
meanwhile working to induce ripeness by applying various strategies. An investigation into 
Thabo Mbeki’s philosophy, personality and his type of leadership was critical to understand his 
role and tact as the SADC facilitator in the negotiations and a book of his speeches (Mbeki, 
2002) and his autobiographies by Gevisser (2007) and Roberts (2007) give clear insights of his 
mental disposition and style of leadership. A reading of the three books show a leader who is 
cool-headed and methodical, a pan-Africanist determined to fight for Africa’s position in the 
world by correcting historical imbalances and improving governance and economic development 
on the continent without condoning or ignoring the need to curb local excesses. Despite these 
qualities, Mbeki only managed to get an agreement in Zimbabwe as late as 2008 suggesting that 
in addition to the qualities of the intervener, there are other important requirements that will 
make success possible in conflict resolution and the changes in the structure of the conflict that 
took place in 2008 could be instructive. 
Pruitt (1997) also suggests that the ‘central coalition theory’ can help improve ripeness theory by 
viewing belligerents who are working together from all sides of the conflict as members of a 
coalition whose purpose is to find a common solution to the conflict beyond party politics. The 
model does not assume that the parties see eye to eye but only that they are willing to engage in a 
common task of seeking agreement. In the conflict under study, the interaction between ZANU 
PF and MDC members in the constitution-making process appeared to have created some form 
of coalition across parties in which a significant number of those involved from the three warring 
parties became committed to the success of the exercise. The study was thus interested in 
establishing whether coalitions emerged across the conflict divide to find solutions to all issues 
in the conflict or only affected parts of the conflict. Pruitt (2005) argued that the best way to 
address the issue of ripeness is to look at its components separately, identifying readiness in each 
party to which he said negotiations can only start when both sides are ready. His ‘readiness and 
motivation theory’ complements the ripeness theory and assumes that motivation and optimism 
are psychological variables that encourage a party to be ready for negotiation obtaining from a 
perception that the conflict is dysfunctional or from third party pressure. While the notion of a 
dysfunctional conflict feeds from the same parameters that obtain from the core ripeness theory, 
third party pressure was not part of it and, arguably, should be (Zartman, 2001).  
 50 
 
A number of studies have sought to test the ripeness theory including Stedman (1991) who did 
in-depth studies of four cases analyzing three unsuccessful ones and the negotiated settlement of 
the Rhodesian War in 1979 which was a success. Stedman’s (1991) study found out that none of 
his examples complied with Zartman’s criteria for ripeness and concluded that for ripeness to be 
said to be present, some of the parties must fear a deterioration in the situation if it is not 
resolved, that there is need to be a change in power relations, and that the internal politics of the 
conflicting parties and the ability of the mediators to learn from past mistakes are critical. He 
also observed that not all parties to a conflict must perceive the ‘hurting stalemate’, that patrons 
rather than all the parties may be the agents of perception, that the military element in each part 
is the crucial aspect in perceiving the stalemate and that spoilers can wreck the process. Contrary 
to Stedman’s (1991) addition that not all parties need not perceive a ‘hurting stalemate’ in a 
conflict for ripeness to occur, ripeness appeared to have started to erode the moment ZANU PF 
regained legitimacy with the signing of the GPA and the incorporation of opposition members in 
government.  
Anstey (2007) carried out a case study focusing on the crisis in Zimbabwe from 2000 and argued 
that complex internal conditions and a divided international community over the crisis made it 
not “ripe for resolution”. For Anstey (2007), the situation in Zimbabwe could never be ripe for 
resolution for as long as “despotic democracy” remained in place with South Africa continuing 
with its policy of “quiet diplomacy”. Anstey gave a lengthy description of excesses by ZANU PF 
under the presidency of Robert Mugabe and concluded that former president Thabo Mbeki had to 
preside over the negotiations when the ruling party was bent on entrenching a one-party state. 
After dismissing the elections held in Zimbabwe after 1980 as not credible, Anstey (2007) 
concluded that the country was characterised by a despotic pseudo-democracy in which there 
was a power asymmetry between ZANU PF and the MDC. He concluded that because of the 
perception that it was invincible, ZANU PF would not be willing to negotiate in good faith. On 
the international dimension of the conflict, Anesty (2007) argued that the international 
community was divided over the crisis in Zimbabwe with the West seeking to achieve a regime 
change agenda but opposed by the AU, China and most of the developing countries. He said the 
South African ‘quiet diplomacy’ did not work either, because it sent signals of a South Africa 
that condoned ZANU PF rule. He concluded by calling for “principled mediation” and 
maintaining dialogue whilst waiting for the situation to ripen, and to him, that moment would 
come with Robert Mugabe’s death, a coup or a split in ZANU PF (Anstey, 2007). Contrary to 
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Anstey’s conclusion however, ZANU PF with President Robert Mugabe still at its helm, agreed 
to enter into dialogue with the opposition that culminated with the GPA of September 2008. It 
should also be noted that Zimbabwe has a history of negotiated settlements and the precursors 
were the 1979 Lancaster settlement (Stedman, 1991) and the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU 
PF and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) that ended the civil unrest of the early 
eighties,16 though it has been argued that these were always to the political advantage of the 
former.  
Kleiboer (1994) presented the strongest critique of ripeness arguing that its diagnosis can only be 
done in retrospect benefiting from hindsight and concluded that: “Ultimately, this quest to get to 
at the roots of ripeness leads to a reduction ad absurdum, an elusive quest for the ‘holy grail of 
ripeness.’”  Drawing an analogy between the ripening of a fruit to that of conflict, she observed 
that the latter does not follow the natural process followed by the former and argued that ripeness 
as conceived by Zartman was not a fruitful notion. To her, ripeness is subjective and should be 
called ‘complete willingness at a certain moment,’ when all important parties are willing to 
search for a peaceful settlement in which the willingness is a minimum requirement for 
resolution and not the sine qua non that this will happen (Smyth, 2007). Smyth (2007) observed 
that the ripeness model was applied in the Northern Ireland situation to establish whether it was 
time to address injustices committed in that conflict and ripeness was not detected and wondered 
whether an appropriate model of ripeness or readiness was used. Whilst the appropriateness of a 
model is important to consider, the absence of ripeness in a conflict at a particular time of 
checking for it as was done by Anstey (2007), Smyth (2007) and Stedman (1991) cannot be the 
basis of dismissing the theory because the negative result can also obtain owing to the reason that 
ripeness at that time was not present or that the identification was not well done lacking in 
sufficient intelligence, among other reasons.  
It is neither here nor there that the theory is called ripeness, readiness or willingness but rather 
what is important is a realisation that the notion is associated with that point in a conflict where 
intervention is likely to meet with success. What is evident from all the models suggested by 
                                                    
16
 Soon after Independence in 1980, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe 
and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo fell out and the result was an insurgency 
in which government was accused by the Catholic Church Commission of heavy-handedness in suppressing the 
uprising. In the absence of official records, media reports suggest as many as 20 000 people (civilians and militants) 
died in the conflict. 
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different contributors to the idea of ripeness is that the notion is wider and deeper than the 
components that have separately been suggested so far and thus cannot be pinned down on one 
or two variables. Ripeness is influenced by both the developments in a conflict structure as well 
as the perceptions that develop in the parties. Mitchell (1995) observed that all the scholars 
seeking to model ripeness acknowledge that fundamentally whatever the imperatives of the 
structural conditions creating conditions of ripeness in a conflict, it is ultimately the 
interpretation of these conditions by the leaders that determines whether the time is ripe. This 
suggests that even if the materiel conditions for settlement are in place, it requires a positive 
subjective assessment by the leaders of those conditions creating an environment conducive for 
resolution to then say a situation is ripe (Smyth, 2007). This important observation however does 
not discount the importance of how changes in the structure of a conflict trigger ripeness. The 
search for ripeness should therefore begin in the structure of the conflict and once its elements 
have been observed, go on to check whether parties are recognising it, and if not, third parties 
should work to help the parties to see it as well as improve it if possible. Ripeness becomes 
consummated when the parties develop perceptions that a settlement is possible for without them 
it cannot be exploited, though perceptions alone without ripeness first appearing in the structure 
are not likely to yield success.  
In a Masters dissertation, Gunther (2011) proposes what he called a ‘Combined Ripeness Model’ 
that integrates all possible sources of ripeness in a conflict to improve the theory’s predictive 
capacity. He does this by fusing the original Zartman theory with the other theories that 
contribute to explaining ripeness beginning with the work on structural ripeness done by Harass 
(1990) that emphasises: the need for a shared perception of the desirability of an accord; that 
leaders must either be sufficiently strong to permit compromise or sufficiently weak that 
compromise cannot be avoided; that leaders must be able to persuade their constituents that the 
national interest will be served in the agreement; and, that the process used to negotiate the 
agreement must be acceptable to all parties involved (Gunther, 2011). The issue of a shared 
perception that an accord was desirable in 2008 was evident as much as both President Robert 
Mugabe and the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, appeared to have been sufficiently strong 
leaders that could carry their constituencies in the agreement. Harass’ (1990) model is not 
contingent on solving the entire conflict in one process in order to declare success, but that it is 
broken into smaller achievable parts. This approach is consistent with what SADC did in 
Zimbabwe as it did not aim for complete resolution at once. With the external dimension 
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showing signs of resistance, SADC chose to be pragmatic and put more efforts towards 
addressing the internal dimension of the conflict. Gunther (2011) adds the political stability 
model by Druckman & Green (1995) which provides another way to evaluate ripeness in the 
absence of a mutually hurting stalemate. The theory states that when the combination of power 
and legitimacy of a group, in relation to the other, meets with certain combinations of the power 
and legitimacy on the other group, ripeness will be reached and the parties (the groups) will be 
prompted to enter into negotiations. Varying levels of both will cause parties to choose one of 
several options including, negotiation, continuance with the conflict or movement from one stage 
of the conflict to another, say from political activism to armed resistance or vice versa. The 
model also suggests that the outcome of political interaction is based on the balance of strength 
between the actors as measured by the difference between their power and legitimacy. Gunther 
(2011) also adds Mitchell’s (1995) four models and Pruitt’s (1997) readiness (discussed above) 
and the ‘central coalition theory,’ the shock theory and new leader theory (Pruitt, 1997) and 
turning points (Druckman, 2001).  
Gunther’s (2011) model adds an interesting dimension in improving the applicability of the 
theory though it becomes too complex with too many variables required to explain the notion of 
ripeness. The author was however aware of the weakness and put a caveat saying not all the 
variables need to be acting in a conflict at a particular time but any number could be depending 
on the circumstances and the environment. This study became interested in establishing whether 
the list of variables so far identified was exhaustive and it appears more can still be added. Doyle 
& Sambanis (2006) argue that civil wars, though at times they seem linked to bad leaders, are 
often “linked to bad neighbourhoods or bad external influences by neighbouring states or by 
major powers” (p. 51). The actions and pronouncements by external powers are thus also 
important to consider in ascertaining ripeness in a conflict. Zartman (1989) says if a party to a 
conflict were strong in its external position, it would not have to make compromises and that its 
presence (external influence) or lack of it is a necessary and important condition but not a 
sufficient one to determine ripeness in a conflict situation. The extent to which perceptions and 
actions or lack of them by external players in the conflict in Zimbabwe influenced the notion of 
ripeness is thus another target area of the study. 
All the approaches discussed above emphasise the identification of certain conditions under 
which conflict can be resolved. Smyth (2007) summarises the themes that are associated with the 
identification of ripeness from various scholars as: the hurting stalemate, deadlines, a shared 
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perception of the desirability of an accord, the abilities of the leaders to agree, agreements that 
are saleable to all the constituencies, agreed procedures for dealing with the conflict in future or 
new opportunities such as new resources or changes in leadership. To this list one can add the 
media, the external environment and rationalist explanations for war discussed in the next 
section. In a practical illustration of the abstract model, the diagram in Figure 3 overleaf shows  
FIGURE 3: THE CONFLICT RIPENESS MODEL 
 
Source: Modified from Gunther (2011).  
the variables that can help in detecting ripeness. As pointed out by Gunther (2011), the diagram 
is not meant to be a continuum or a spectrum, but merely a consolidated representation of the 
various concepts which are not necessarily interdependent of each other, though in many cases, 
they may be complementary. In ascertaining which variables are acting in a conflict, one starts 
with a check list of all possible causes of ripeness and looks out for signs by deeply studying the 
conflict and selects and describes those that will be acting or have potential to act on ripeness for 
exploitation by the parties and a third party. Third party and turning points are at the centre 
because they affect both the structure and perceptions in the conflict. The incorporation of all 
these variable as possible causes or impediments of ripeness is in line with Steinberg’s (2002) 
arguement that its occurrence or disappearance results from fundamental changes in the structure 
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of the conflict, definition of interests, perceptions, psychological attitudes, and domestic and 
international processes in a conflict. This suggests contextual ripeness and the research sought to 
establish how far true this was and which of the array of possible causes of ripeness were present 
in the conflict and to what extent they influenced the resolution process in Zimbabwe. 
Zartman (2001) says ripeness is only a condition, necessary but not sufficient, for the initiation 
of negotiations. He adds that it is not self-fulfilling or self implementing. More importantly, 
Zartman (2001) says finding a ‘ripe moment’ requires research and intelligence to identify the 
objective and subjective elements. Within the SADC region, this research and intelligence 
gathering can be done by the mediator but the better placed institution in the case under study 
was the SADC’s OPDSC. To this end, the study sought to establish whether the AU, SADC and 
former President Thabo Mbeki saw the signs of ripeness at the time leading to the settlement. 
The study also sought to establish whether the SADC’s institution for conflict resolution was 
fully operational and how much capacity it had to provide close monitoring of the conflict 
situation to identify variables that were at play and the ripe moment in order to arm the mediator 
with information required for planning and good decision-making to resolve the conflict. 
2.7 Rationalist explanations for war 
To help in the analysis of the conflict situation that obtained in Zimbabwe to establish the effects 
of ripeness, the research also considered rationalist concepts that explain what may lead to war or 
resolution in a conflict. Fearon (1995) carried out a study entitled ‘Rationalist explanations for 
war’ that mainly focused on international conflict but that also apply to intra-state wars and 
argues that rational parties that consider the risks and costs of war may end up fighting 
nonetheless. He observes that while war is costly and risky, rational states and in this thesis, 
parties to a conflict, at times prefer the gamble of war and calls for coherent ‘rationalist 
explanations for war’ that give reasons why armed conflicts might appear an attractive option to 
rational parties. Fearon (1995) identifies the following rationalist arguments on the causes of war 
which he lists as: anarchy; expected benefits greater than expected costs; rational preventive war; 
rational miscalculation due to lack of information; and, rational miscalculations or disagreements 
about relative power. According to him, all these causes fail to explain what prevents rational 
leaders from using diplomacy or other forms of communication to avoid war and instead 
identifies causal logics that he says explain why parties avoid a mutually negotiated settlement 
(Fearon, 1995). He says incentives to misrepresent information about relative capabilities or 
resolve can cause war where, in the context of the conflict in Zimbabwe, as the MDC was 
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publicly demanding dialogue ostensibly to resolve the problems the country was facing, in reality 
it was committed to removing the ruling party from power by any other means possible. 
Similarly whilst ZANU PF was saying it was committed to negotiations with the opposition to 
find an inclusive solution, in reality it may have been buying time with plans to silence the 
opposition by other means at a later date. Viewed from another angle, despite the opposition and 
Western countries persistently claiming that they were promoting democracy in the country, 
there was no guarantee, in the mindset of most of the liberation party membership, that the 
countries they perceived as hostile and the opposition would recognize any future election won 
by ZANU PF no matter how free and fair it could be. The study thus sought to establish whether 
the parties misrepresented information or were genuine in their pledges and how this impacted 
on the negotiations and agreement implementation. 
The second factor that Fearon (1995) discusses was that of ‘commitment problems’ which refer 
to situations where mutually preferable bargains are untenable because one of the parties has an 
incentive to renege on the terms. At the time the opposition in Zimbabwe was negotiating an 
agreement with ZANU PF, it was not clear whether the liberation party would commit itself to 
the required democratic reforms and, on the other end, ZANU PF was not sure whether the 
opposition would meet its side of the deal and call for the removal of sanctions imposed on the 
country by Western countries at the latter’s instigation. ZANU PF was relieved to find a way out 
of its dismal performance during the 2008 elections through a power-sharing deal but given its 
subsequent recovery and the opposition’s poor showing in the Inclusive Government, it appears 
as if there was no enduring motivation for the ruling party to continue to commit to the full 
implementation of the GPA.  
Park (2011) did a study to establish the implications of ceasefire agreement implementation 
based on commitment and information problems. The empirical findings from 50 civil war 
agreements from 1989 to 2008 suggest that while internal efforts to strengthen commitment and 
reduce uncertainty fail to decrease the likelihood of agreement interruption, external efforts to 
strengthen commitment and reduce uncertainty lead to greater likelihood of agreement success. 
These findings resonate with the implementation of the GPA in Zimbabwe where internal 
mechanism to improve adherence by the parties including through the Joint Monitoring 
Committee (JOMIC) met with little success and the continued involvement of the parties to the 
process could best be explained by other factors such as the nurturance of the process by SADC. 
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The research thus sought to establish the degree of commitment across parties, what caused it, 
how long it lasted and its links to the notion of ripeness and agreement implementation.  
The third rational explanation for war presented by Fearon (1995) but that he found less 
compelling though logically tenable was that of ‘issue indivisibility’. This stems from the fact 
that some issues, by their nature, will not admit compromise. If Morgan Tsvangirai had sought to 
become president of the republic in 2008 given President Mugabe’s insistence that he should 
remain at the helm, no agreement could have been reached. Toft (2006) says contrary to Fearon’s 
scepticism of how issue indivisibility can be a real rationalist explanation for war, public 
perception can lead to it. In the context of the conflict in Zimbabwe, the repeated 
pronouncements by senior members of the military beginning with General Zvinavashe’s 
statement that the Zimbabwean presidency was a ‘straight jacket’ and other pronouncement by 
the military that a person with no liberation credentials could not be president brought to the fore 
the factor of issue indivisibility bordering on perceptions of who could be allowed, especially by 
the security sector, to rule in Zimbabwe irrespective of an election outcome. Anstey (2007) and 
Muchemwa (2012) also argue that for as long as President Robert Mugabe was seen by the 
majority of Africans as a hero who fought against white oppression and was pursuing policies to 
consummate the liberation of his people, he would be uncompromising in his dealings with the 
opposition, seeing himself justified to rule for as long as his party wanted him to.  
Toft (2006) adds a fourth element, that of ‘asymmetry of time horizons’ among actors, that she 
says can influence the risk of war if both or one of the parties discount the present and see their 
unilateral fate provided for in a future outcome. An example in the conflict in Zimbabwe would 
be the opposition willing to sacrifice by opting for protests and violence instead of an agreement 
in lieu of the benefits of a wholesale takeover of power in the long run. Based on time horizon 
considerations, ZANU PF could have been motivated to use brute force against the opposition 
with the hope that it would succeed in eliminating it from the political stage before an 
international outcry. Of interest to the study was establishing how changed circumstances that 
came with the passage of time created different time horizons and the latter’s effect on the 
ripeness in the conflict from the time the GPA was signed up to its end in 2013. 
Medina (2004) also argues that based on theory and data, rational choice theorists deny the 
existence of a link between objective grievances and civil conflict citing ‘collective action 
problems’. The argument is that the provision of justice that follows a rebellion is a public good 
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and so faces acute collective action problems where potential participants may not be 
incentivised for lack of individual benefits in the post-rebellion period unless a player is 
compensated by selective incentives. Using econometric calculations, Medina (2004) however 
argues that everything else constant, grievances make revolts more likely but cautions that in real 
life, we never hold all other variables constant. In the conflict in Zimbabwe, with the citizenry 
facing economic hardships including a hyper-inflationary environment that wiped off all 
pensions and savings coupled with collapsing social services, one would have taken the view that 
it would have risen against the government in the period leading to the GPA of 2008. Instead, 
despite the unbearable situation as from 2000, the worst of which was experienced in 2008, a 
number of strikes called for by the opposition failed to draw the majority of Zimbabwean 
workers owing, not only to the heavy-handedness of the police, but more because of the timing, 
collective action problems and the realisation that strikes were destroying the country even 
further to no one’s advantage. Collective actions by the public in a conflict can affect the 
exploitation of ripeness and as such their effects in the conflict in Zimbabwe were an important 
area that was also interrogated. 
2.8 Seeking complementarity from an alternative paradigm 
It was pointed out in chapter 1 that most of the studies that have sought to test ripeness theory 
have mostly relied on rational choice approaches. Green & Shapiro (1994) did a study that 
focused on empirical applications of rational choice models and argued that they were subject to 
a syndrome of fundamental and recurrent methodological failings which call into question the 
contribution of the rational choice enterprise to the study of politics. Some of the major 
weaknesses that the authors identified include considerations that: rational choice theories are 
often formulated in abstract and empirically intractable ways with heavy reliance on 
unobservable factors and insufficient attention paid to operationalising the hypothesized 
variables; the theorists’ assumptions are manipulated to fit the data and no further effort is made 
to test the resulting model with respect to data other than those used to generate the model; the 
gathering of empirical evidence is usually aimed at evidence that confirms the proposed model 
using cases that are likely to yield the desired outcome; the tendency is usually to ignore the 
alternative accounts and competing explanations; as well as, the tendency to ignore theory 
infirming evidence (Green & Shapiro, 1994). 
Whilst the second order theories from which ripeness obtains have generated these questions, 
Kleiboer’s (1994) study to ascertain whether ripeness theory was a fruitful notion also noted 
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more or less the same methodological weaknesses suggesting that Zartman, Harass and Stedman 
who looked at the theory extensively all tended to leave the reader puzzled by the conceptual and 
empirical basis of their ideas as well as the criterion they used in selecting their cases. After a 
thorough analysis of the factors that account for ripeness in a conflict situation, Kleiboer (1994) 
came to the conclusion that although objective elements may give some indications on the setting 
in of the ripeness, emphasis should be placed on the subjective elements of the theory which are 
the perceptions and the dispositions of the parties involved in the conflict. Although rational 
choice theorists have made their counter-arguments to these allegations (Pollack, 2006), claiming 
that the criticisms result from a misunderstanding of the theory and an overlooking of its 
achievements, the reservations raised about the empirical applications of both the rational choice 
and ripeness theories inspired the idea of seeking methodological complementarity from 
interpretivism to see whether ripeness holds firm when viewed through a different set of 
epistemological lens. 
The approach envisaged by the research brings to the fore the issue of paradigmatic wars which 
Taylor & Medina (2013) say dominated scholarly research during the late 20th century bordering 
on ontological and epistemological considerations in which supporters argued fiercely for the 
superiority of their chosen approach. Harrits (2011) argues that the notion of a research paradigm 
is not without ambiguity saying since Kuhn (1970) introduced the concept, it has assumed 
different connotations including: referring to a set of ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, that is, a set of shared beliefs about the nature of social reality and the way we 
come to know this reality; or a common research practice, existing within a research community, 
and carrying with it a shared identity as well as a set of problems that are regarded as particularly 
significant in relation to the advancement of knowledge. Although the debates on paradigms 
reached their peak towards the end of the 20th century, Hjørland, (2004) says questions 
concerning the nature of knowledge and inquiry go far back into civilisation and names Plato 
(429 – 347 BC) and Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) as important in distinguishing between different 
approaches especially rationalism and empiricism which have a bearing on this study. Plato 
emphasised logical intuition (rationalism), while Aristotle, to a much larger extent, emphasised 
empirical investigation (empiricism). A caveat is needed here to distinguish between empirical 
research in gathering evidence which is common to both approaches and empiricism which is a 
philosophical approach that emphasises explaining universalities from the particulars of 
experience.  
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Rationalism, the umbrella paradigm that informs ripeness of conflicts theory is a philosophical 
movement that was initiated by René Descartes (1596–1650) and carried on with varying 
degrees by Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716) 
(Hamlyn, 1987). In its original form, rationalism is a theory or method in which the criterion of 
the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive (Uddin & Hamiduzzaman, 2009). Hjørland 
(2004) says in its extreme form, rationalism does not recognise the role of experience arguing 
that sense perceptions are illusory and that it is not even possible to argue that something is of 
the colour red if you are not in possession of a system of concepts, including colour concepts. 
Thus according to this view, all knowledge is a priori, meaning human beings are born with it. In 
all its forms, rationalism’s epistemological approach emphasises the role of conceptual clarity 
and evidence preferring deductive rather than inductive methods in which any problem is 
approached from pre-established categories analysed using a top-down analysis and reduced to 
what cannot be questioned. 
Empiricism is an ontological and epistemological standpoint that observations and sensory 
experience should be regarded as the most important, or in its extreme form, the only method to 
gain knowledge about the world outlook. Taking the position that all knowledge stems directly 
from experience, Alston (1998) brings out the fundamental precepts of empiricism in the 
following quotation: 
Empiricism always assumes a stratified form, in which the lowest level issues emerge 
directly from experience, and higher levels are (abstractions) based on lower levels. It has 
commonly been thought by empiricists that beliefs at the lowest level simply ‘read-off’ 
what is presented in experience. If a tree is visually to me as green, I simply ‘register’ this 
appearance in forming the belief that the tree is green. Most of our beliefs – general 
beliefs for example – do not have this status but, according to empiricism, are supported 
by other beliefs in ways that eventually trace back to experience. 
Empiricists thus believe that newly-born babies are born with no knowledge (tabula rasa) and 
that complex concepts are created in the mind by the combination of simpler conceptual 
constructs that emanate from simple sensations (Hjørland, 2004). In practice, the scientific 
process is viewed as the collection of verified observations and as generalising from such a 
collection through induction. The basic assumption that other approaches are in strong 
opposition to is that sensations and experiences are regarded as given in which what we observe 
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as our experiences is independent from theories, conceptualisations, culture and political 
preferences. 
Although Aristotle is generally viewed as the father of empiricism, he is also attributed with the 
earliest attempts to merge Platonic rationalism with his own emphasis on empirical observation 
laying the foundation for later efforts that sought to combine in one way or another, the two 
contending epistemological approaches (Chia, 2002). It was Emmanuel Kant however who went 
a step further in seeking to reconcile rationalism and empiricism arguing that whilst knowledge 
itself comes from experience, the mind uses reason to structure knowledge making a distinction 
between a priori knowledge which is independent of all experience and a posterior knowledge 
derived from experience (Kenny, 1994). Kant identified two pure forms of what he called 
sensible intuition serving as principles of a priori knowledge as time and space which he said are 
presupposed by and not derived from experience; that we imagine space and time without 
objects, but not objects without space and time, and that there is a single space and a single time, 
infinite in each case (Kant 1781). He thus came to the conclusion that there was a metaphysical 
exposition of a priori knowledge deriving from the philosophical project which devises theory of 
the nature or structure of reality and transcendental exposition underpinned by the belief that 
God stands outside and independent of the universe of which he is a creator (Marshall, 1994). 
The implication is that we do not need to experience a thing to know that it exists and the 
reasoning set the stage for Kant’s proposition that both empiricism and rationalism are 
approaches that complement each other in knowledge creation. 
Logical positivism or logical empiricism, which is also referred to as commonsense realism 
represents one of the more recent attempts at synthesizing rationalism, empiricism and 
positivism drawing substantially from the Aristotelian approach of combining logic and 
rationality with empirical observation (Chia, 2002). The theoretical approach’s premise is that 
reason and logic are critical to theory building even if the truth-claims generated must, in the 
final analysis, be empirically justifiable. According to Hjørland (2004), logical positivists argue 
that sensory knowledge is the most certain kind of knowledge and so any concept not directly 
concerning sensory experience should be translatable into observational concepts. This claim led 
to a dualist view of science as both an observational and theoretical product with an inclination 
towards the realm of logic and science that is value free in its considerations of what constitutes 
truth. Chia (2002) however says the positivistic method of adjusting for the inadequacies of 
empiricism has been criticised for bringing in unnecessary and unaccountable factors which 
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further detach research from reality since observations made are always ‘guided’ observations 
and hence not truly empirical; making positivism a kind of ‘false empiricism’. 
This thesis finds resonance with moderate rationalism whose standpoint is that reason has 
precedence over the ways of acquiring knowledge as opposed to the more extreme position that 
reason is the unique path to knowledge because senses to some extent also contribute to 
knowledge building. Neither does the thesis take the extreme view of empiricism that says 
experience is the sole source of knowledge because abstraction which is the main feature of 
rationalism is also an important aspect of knowledge creation. Following this argument, 
interpretivism thus can be used to build a theory using the inductive method but can also be used 
to prove or disprove existing theory claims emanating from it or from other paradigms including 
those theories arrived at through the deductive approach. The thesis thus uses interpretivism to 
gather evidence that will be abstracted to higher constructs that are used to interrogate ripeness 
theory claims whose formulation was informed by rational choice theory. 
According to Cohen & Crabtree (2006), the interpretivist paradigm developed as a critique of 
positivism in the social sciences and in general advances the following beliefs about the nature of 
knowing and reality: relativist ontology assuming that reality as we know it is constructed inter-
subjectively through the meanings and understandings developed socially and experientially; and 
transactional or subjectivist epistemology assuming that we cannot separate ourselves from what 
we know and that the truth is negotiated through dialogue. Hjørland (2004) says for 
interpretivism, findings or knowledge claims are created as the academic investigation proceeds, 
that all interpretations are based on a particular moment, located in a particular context and open 
to re-interpretation. Cohen & Crabtree (2006) further say the interpretivist methodologies which 
include phenomenology, ethnography and constructivism among others, rely heavily on 
naturalistic and qualitative methods such as interviewing, observation and text analysis as its data 
collection techniques. Elliot & Timulak (2005) posit that although previously qualitative 
researchers believed that it was better to go into the field without first reading literature to avoid 
bias, it is better to start with some form of conceptual structure by examining available 
knowledge and theory, what Strauss & Cobin (1998) call ‘theory sensitivity’. In this study, 
ripeness theory claims guided the initial conceptual structure of the study and interpretivism was 
used to check the validity of those claims. Having set the stage for the theoretical premise of 
using interpretivism to interrogate a rationalist based theory, the methodological approach will 
be presented in greater detail in chapter 3. 
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2.9 Conclusions 
The chapter presented a literature review on the political situation in Zimbabwe in the period 
2000 to 2013 and revealed that conflict as defined by other scholars was present and had all the 
signs of wanting to escalate to the next higher stage in the conflict cycle; that of widespread 
violence and/or armed confrontation with the possibility of creating a failed state. It was in this 
context that the review sought to advance the case for the study’s quest to contribute to the 
conflict prevention discourse as a way of finding effective means of stopping nascent violent 
conflicts from turning into full-scale armed conflicts. The intervention by SADC in 2008 at the 
instigation of the AU somehow provided a temporary reprieve which created favourable 
conditions for finding a solution to the political, social and economic crises. Based on available 
literature on resolving conflicts through dialogue, Zartman’s ripeness theory and its 
improvements offered attractive options in identifying the right time and form of intervention as 
well as what to propose as a formula for resolution. Rationalist explanations for war suggested 
by Fearon (1995) can impinge or improve ripeness in a conflict depending on how they are dealt 
with. The study took these as important in determining how long ripeness would last in a conflict 
depending on the form and degree of their impact. After briefly discussing some of the 
contending paradigms that have been at the centre of guiding research and bringing out the 
methodological weaknesses associated with rationalism and its sub-variant rational choice 
theory, the chapter argued for using interpretivism to interrogate ripeness theory claims.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methodology used in the study. It presents the research 
approach, the research design, the data collection methods, the research instruments that were 
used, the sampling method and the data analysis techniques. The research interrogates an 
existing rational choice informed theory (ripeness of conflicts theory and related concepts) using 
interpretivism based on a sequential explanatory design. The research did not attempt to fuse 
rationalism and interpretivism in one research as it accepts the gulf between the two based on 
their ontological and epistemological differences. Neither did the study design entail using more 
than one methodology which would amount to two research projects in one. Rather, the study 
took an existing theory generated in a particular paradigm as a given from literature and 
subjected it to an analysis using constructs arrived at through interpretivism as a way of attaining 
paradigm complementarity. The sequencing was in as far as the ripeness of conflicts theory 
claims that were identified in the literature review chapter were considered as the first stage, the 
abstraction of higher-order constructs based on evidence collected using interpretivism as the 
second stage and the comparison of the ripeness of conflicts claims with the constructs emerging 
from empirical evidence as the third stage. The research was thus a qualitative single case study 
of the conflict and the resolution process in Zimbabwe aimed at establishing whether ripeness of 
conflicts claims hold true when viewed from another approach without necessarily getting 
bogged down by the incommensurability (perceptual and real) of the two paradigms. 
3.2 The Research Approach 
Ormrod & Leedy (2005, p. 4) define a theory as: “… an organized body of concepts and 
principles intended to explain a particular phenomenon”. Tavallaei & Talib (2010) say that the 
relationship among concepts, constructs and propositions as components of a theory is 
significant to muster if one is to understand a particular theory. In Chapter 2, it was explained 
that theories are a product of either the deductive or inductive method in which the former 
method identifies with rationalism and the latter with empiricism. In the inductive method which 
uses the bottom-up approach, the observed phenomena produce concepts which are words 
assigned to events, distinguishing one event from another and when they cluster in a logical way, 
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form a unit of thought called a construct and beyond that, further abstraction leads to higher 
constructs called propositions expressing the relationship amongst a number of constructs 
(Anfara & Mertz, 2006). It is the relationship amongst propositions that forms a theory which in 
turn help us to understand the experienced world. On the other end, scholars using the rationalist 
or positivist approaches start knowledge creation from the top, the deductive method, beginning 
with hypotheses (propositions) which they want to prove and then gathering evidence (the 
observed phenomena) to prove or disprove the theory. Although the study began by identifying 
existing ripeness of conflicts theory propositions, it held them in abeyance and adopted the 
inductive method to see how the higher-order constructs arrived at using the bottom-up 
approach, would at the analysis stage, explain the ripeness theory claims.  
When compared to natural sciences, social sciences have more competing theories available 
because the phenomena they study allow for multiple perspectives. It is for this reason that 
Tavallaei & Talib (2010) argued that there is no clear agreement made in qualitative research 
regarding the role and significance of theory. Anfara & Metz (2006) identify three distinct 
understandings about the role of theory in qualitative researches including: the researcher’s 
chosen methodology and epistemologies underlying it; that qualitative research theory, compared 
to other methodologies, has a relatively more broad and extensive role; and that, theory does not 
have a solid relationship with qualitative research. One can therefore conclude that unlike in 
positivist studies that begin with a hypothesis to prove, in qualitative interpretive research, one 
can start with or without a theory and the objective is not to test a hypothesis but to describe, 
analyse and interpret the constructive aspects of the social world (Tavallaei & Talib, 2010). 
Although qualitative approaches can produce a theory, this can only emerge after the phenomena 
has been analysed. Whilst the inductive method has been the dominant approach in generating 
theory in qualitative studies, that approach however can also be useful in describing, analysing, 
interpreting and explaining the constructive elements of an existing theory within a given setting. 
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that the study adopted a middle ground taking the view that while 
the views of targeted informants gathered using the interpretivist approach can be a source of 
first order constructs, some degree of abstraction to higher order constructs is still needed in 
theory building or testing as postulated by Immanuel Kant (1781). The overlap between the two 
approaches in generating knowledge which appears to have failed to forestall the  paradigmatic 
wars between rationalism and empiricism, forms the basis of believing that unlike in theory 
formulation where one needs to choose between either the bottom up or top down approach, in 
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interrogating an existing theory, there should be no reason why a theory generated using the top-
down approach cannot be verified at the analysis level using the bottom-up approach and vice 
versa without necessarily fusing the founding paradigms. Further, because theories operating 
within the confines of their domains across the whole range of the paradigmatic divide have their 
own ontological and epistemological limitations, robust scientific research might emerge from 
approaches that look across the whole array of the available contending approaches to generate 
inclusive better-yielding and more conclusive research outcomes. 
Impithuksa (2010) asserted that as theories of politics and international relations, rational and 
public choice variants vigorously claim to predict the political outcome in the future. Chai (2010) 
argues that there are five major strands that can be discerned in rational choice approaches: 
whether the main purpose is prediction, prescription, or interpretation; whether it is formal and 
quantitative, or informal and qualitative; whether it is ‘thick’, incorporating assumptions about 
beliefs, or ‘thin’ leaving these unspecified; whether the concept of ‘rationality’ should  be solely 
linked to optimisation, or can also be viewed as a set of heuristics; and, whether the primary unit 
of analysis should be seen as individuals, groups or entire societies. In using the rational choice 
approach to generate or confirm theory, Fearon & Wendt (2002) suggest the following recipe: 
that one starts with an action or pattern of actions to be explained; posits a set of actors with the 
capacity to take the actions in question including others who can take actions that may bear on 
their considerations; proposes a structure of interaction and a sequence of choices for the actors 
so identified to embed the pattern of actions to be explained in a larger universe of possibilities; 
makes arguments about the actors’ preferences over the universe of possible outcomes; and 
finally shows how or under what conditions, the outcome or pattern of actions in question would 
emerge if the actors were choosing rationally. This recipe for explanation described above may 
be pursued informally, in ordinary qualitative language or formally, in the language of game or 
decision theory. Snidal (2002) made an observation that one of the criticisms of rational choice 
theory is that it developed a fetishism over formal mathematical techniques and went on to argue 
that while formalisation has been widely used in the approach, it is not the sine qua non of 
rational choice theory but only a tool and non-mathematical approaches have been equally 
central in the development of the theory. Snidal (2002) also argued that there is no singular way 
to model rational choice theory and suggests that the proper model choice, including the level of 
formalisation, depends on the substantive problem being analysed.  
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Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel (2003) say rational and public choice’s methodical individualism 
treats individuals as the basic units of social analysis and both individual and collective actions 
applied in rational choice theory and their outcomes are explicable in terms of unit-level 
properties. These properties are on one hand, transitive, fixed and given (exogenous) preferences 
over possible outlooks of the world and on the other, information and beliefs about the causal 
connections between actions and outcomes of the real world. While rational choice typically 
offers no theory of preferences, it often deploys exogenous preferences in explaining individual 
and social choices (Jupille, et al., 2003). While individual agents are the centre of explanatory 
power in rational choice theory, they act within exogenous constraints (structures) that also exert 
causal effects. These constraints can be material, informational, institutional, events or even 
social within which agents and structure combine to produce individual behaviour and collective 
outcomes.  
Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal & Weingast (1998) coined the term ‘analytical narratives’ to 
describe a more systematic use of rational choice as a qualitative empirical research tool for 
individual case studies and in their study used the theory to guide the description of their case in 
terms of actors, preferences, choices, environmental constraints and strategic dependencies. Such 
an approach assumes that there is a way to conduct research in rationalism using qualitative 
empirical methods but not necessarily implying the use of empiricism or interpretivism. This 
however is a denial precipitated more by the so-called paradigm wars, in particular the view 
suggested by Teddlie & Tashakkori (2006) that paradigms equate with theory and bear the 
researcher’s ontological, epistemological and methodological premises which direct the conduct 
of research in which the researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a framework theory 
(ontology) that specifies a set of questions (epistemology) that is examined in specific ways 
(methodology). Harrits (2011) suggested that often when scholars talk of mixed methods 
research, they will be referring to the combining of qualitative and quantitative research methods 
(small and large N) in a single research and this may be in the form of a nested analysis, 
Praxeological Knowledge or sequential design in which the choice of design depends on whether 
it is the small or large N that is intended to be the dominant one in the study. Hall (2012) also 
pointed out that the term ‘mixed methods’ has come to be used to refer to the use of two or more 
methods in a research project yielding both qualitative and quantitative data and that 
combinations of methods which yield data of the same kind are referred to as ‘multi-methods’. In 
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his view, multi-methods do not have the same paradigmatic problem as do mixed methods since 
they can adopt a paradigm appropriate to the single type of data being collected.  
The challenge for this study however was when one is seeking to explain an existing theory from 
one paradigm using an epistemological approach from another paradigm in which both 
approaches depend on qualitative data, would that be called a mixed method or a multi-method. 
If multi-methods assume several methods in the same paradigm, that would mean that, say 
within an interpretive paradigm based study, using both phenomenology and ethnography in that 
study can easily be called a multi-method design. The fact that this study does not mix 
qualitative and quantitative designs suggests that the approach used in this study does not qualify 
to be called a mixed method design. It therefore can be argued that the approach used in this 
study of using interpretivism to see how it can explain a rationalist-based theory needs a term to 
describe it and we suggest ‘paradigm complementarity research’ in which an existing theory 
generated using a particular methodology consistent with a particular founding paradigm, done 
by a different author and in a different study, is subjected to an explanatory and confirmatory 
interrogation based on evidence generated using a methodology from another paradigm, even 
though the data relied on in both cases is qualitative. In this case, the paradigm complementarity 
does not presume that one has to undertake empirical research for the two paradigms in one 
study, but only that evidence is gathered based on one of the paradigms and abstracted to higher-
order constructs to be used as a basis of checking the plausibility of the theory claims being 
interrogated. 
Although scholars that have grappled with the philosophical premise of mixed methods 
approaches at times refer to qualitative and quantitative approaches as paradigms (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004), we find this problematic and instead, the thesis takes rationalism, 
empiricism, positivism, post-positivism and interpretivism as paradigms and prefers to call the 
former, ‘approaches’, because they are the immediate determinants of the methods used in 
research though the ‘approaches’ themselves are informed by paradigms. Guba & Lincoln (1994) 
argued that mixed methods employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches are not 
possible due to the incompatibility of the paradigms underlying them and by implication mixing 
two paradigms in a research would also not be feasible. The theoretical discussion in chapter two 
revealed that ontological differences are often difficult to bridge but the overlap in 
epistemological approaches suggests that the possibility for collaboration in that segment exists 
and the one area showing great potential is that of ‘paradigm complementary research’ suggested 
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here. The reasoning is that scholars should be capable of standing above the paradigm wars and 
use cross-paradigm approaches as a way of triangulating knowledge claims. When it comes to 
confirming an existing theory, there is no reason why one cannot use a paradigm, complete with 
its distinct ontological and epistemological standpoints such as positivism, to initiate a study 
using its methods to see whether a theory generated say in the interpretivist paradigm by an 
approach such as grounded theory really explains what it purports to do in the same way 
qualitative and quantitative approaches have been mixed to complement each other. 
The increasing number of scholarly works that use mixed methods suggests that, when properly 
mixed, qualitative and quantitative approaches can combine in various ways to yield fruitful 
research and by extension this also should also apply to properly combined cross-paradigm 
approaches but taking precautionary measures to avoid spoiling the research through the 
problems that obtain from an attempt to reduce the competing paradigms to conform 
ontologically and epistemologically. In making a case for using various approaches to ascertain 
the validity of a theory, Boring (1953) argued: 
As long as a new construct has only the single operational definition that it received at 
birth, it is just a construct. When it gets two alternative operational definitions, it is 
beginning to be validated. When the defining operations, because of proven correlations, 
are many, then it becomes reified (p. 222). 
Webb, Campbell, Schwartz & Sechrest (1966) also are of a similar view positing that:  
Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement 
processes, the uncertainty of its interpretations is greatly reduced. The most persuasive 
evidence comes through a triangulation of the measurement process. If a proposition can 
survive the onslaught of a series of imperfect measures, with all their irrelevant error, 
confidence should be placed in it. Of course, this confidence is increased by minimising 
error in each instrument (p. 3). 
 
The researcher is of the view that the ‘paradigm complementarity research’ can borrow a number 
of concepts from the way mixed methods have developed over the years to explore ways in 
which paradigms could talk to each other for the benefit of scientific research. Denzin (1978) 
said the greatest value obtaining from mixed method was the idea of triangulation which he 
defined as the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon and identified 
four types: data triangulation which implies use of a variety of sources in a study; investigator 
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triangulation involving use of more than one researcher, theory triangulation which is use of 
multiple perspectives and theories to interpret the results of a study; and, methodological 
triangulation involving use of multiple methods to study a research problem. In this thesis, we 
propose a cross-paradigm interrogation of a single theory without necessarily mixing up and 
confusing the different epistemological approaches but only saying when viewed from an 
interpretivist lens, do ripeness theory claims formulated in the rationalist paradigm stand their 
ground. 
Teddlie & Tashakkori (2006) did a study to establish typologies of mixed methods and their 
research presented a methods-strands matrix that shows that there is a proliferation of mixed 
methods typologies. In the mixed method typology, they discovered that these generally fall into 
four design families: sequential; concurrent, conversion; and, fully integrated. Hall (2012) 
suggested that there are three possible ways mixed method researchers can take to adopt a 
paradigm for their study and listed them as: a-paradigmatic which ignores the paradigm issue 
altogether; multiple paradigm stance which claims researchers can draw from more than one 
paradigm; and, the single paradigm stance which uses pragmatism and the transformative 
approaches. The multiple paradigm stance is the one which finds resonance with the approach 
chosen for this study and according to Teddlie & Tashakkori (2003), it can take any of the 
following three forms: the ‘complementary strengths thesis’ where a researcher uses both 
paradigms but keeping them separate so as to draw on the strengths of each; the ‘dialectical 
thesis’ which claims that insights can be gained from mixing ‘mental models’ where a ‘mental 
model’ is the set of assumptions, understandings, predispositions, values and beliefs with which 
social inquirers approach their work; and, the ‘multiple paradigm model’ which says that the 
mixed method design being pursued determines the appropriateness of a paradigm choice. The 
study found the ‘complementary strengths thesis’ as the most viable way of making paradigms 
talk to each without necessarily violating their supposed incommensurability.  
Hjørland (2004) has argued that rationalists at times use evidence gathered from people’s 
experiences. If rationalists at times use qualitative methods to search for evidence that support 
their theoretical claims with the main difference being that they do not start from the bottom 
(from data) but from the top with an hypotheses, in essence they are using empirical research to 
find evidence which is also acceptable to interpretivists though the latter start from the bottom 
with data. The idea that knowledge cannot be built by intuition alone nor can theory be 
constructed from experiences without higher-order abstractions suggests an epistemological 
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overlap. Instead of pretending that qualitative data is being used for something else other that 
empiricism/interpretivism, this research sought to establish the possibilities that obtain in 
research when one openly acknowledges that they are using a methodology from a competing 
paradigm. Since theories claim to explain reality, they cannot hold true only when subjected to 
tests that conform to the precepts of one paradigm approach and not others and should be 
confirmed or falsified using other approaches no matter how hostile that approach used maybe to 
the founding paradigm.  
Merriam (1998) says often qualitative studies are done because there is lack of theory, or existing 
theory fails to adequately explain a phenomenon. Thomas (2005) argued that based on prior 
knowledge and theory, a single criterion case can confirm or refute existing theory. While the 
conflicts ravaging the African continent have many similarities suggesting that a cross-case 
analysis can yield better empirical evidence, it is also a fact that each conflict has its own unique 
attributes warranting an in-depth contextual analysis, a view that is consistent with the 
interpretivist view that reality also depends on context. Soy (1997) says critics of the case study 
method believe that the study of one or a small number of cases can offer no grounds for 
establishing reliability or generality of findings, that the intense exposure to the study of the case 
biases the findings and that it is only useful as an exploratory tool. These reservations however 
cannot offset the value of the findings the study aims to get from a carefully crafted instrumental 
case study designed to interrogate the applicability of the ripeness theory in a given conflict 
given that ripeness has already been applied in many other cases that can be used as a basis for 
comparison.  
Greenaway (2012) says an instrumental case study involves using one case to gain insights into a 
particular phenomenon where there is also an explicit expectation that such learning can be used 
to generalise or further develop an existing theory. Harling (2002) and Baxter & Jack (2008) add 
their voice to this view asserting that an instrumental case study design is used to provide 
insights into an issue or refine a theory using the case to facilitate our understanding of the 
phenomenon. Such a case should be analysed in depth, its context scrutinised and its ordinary 
activities detailed. Rose & Mackenzie (1991) said studies of this nature may be termed the proto-
typical form where a topic is chosen not because it is representative but because it is expected to 
become so. The idea of interrogating the plausibility of an existing rationalist-based theory from 
stated propositions is consistent with Yin (2008) who argued that unlike other qualitative 
designs, the case study research needs an identification of a theoretical perspective at the 
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beginning of the study because that will affect formulation of the research questions, analysis 
and interpretation of the findings.  
3.3 Research Design 
The research examines the conflict in Zimbabwe to ascertain whether Zartman’s ripeness theory 
explains the SADC intervention and the resolution process. Aspers (2009) has posited that often 
an interpretivist design involves the following steps: defining the research question; conducting a 
preliminary study; choosing a theory and using it as a scheme of reference; studying first order 
constructs and bracketing the theories or concepts; constructing second order constructs, 
checking for unintended effects; and finally relating the evidence to the scientific literature and 
the empirical field of study. Specifically, the research proceeded as follows: first, established the 
ripeness of conflicts theory propositions from literature; second, consciously held those 
propositions on standby whilst using interpretivism’s qualitative approach to gather evidence 
from interviewees selected by a sample purposefully targeted as well as from observation, 
official documents and media reports; third, still keeping ripeness propositions on hold, 
abstracted higher-order constructs from the evidence obtained in the field; and fourth, compared 
the higher-order constructs with the propositions of the ripeness theory to establish whether the 
emerging evidence confirmed or disconfirmed the theory; and fifth, drew implications for the 
conflict, ripeness theory and the resolution process. 
As argued by Yin (2003) that single cases are used to confirm or challenge a theory and in view 
of the foregoing undertakings, the researcher took the view that the study to interrogate ripeness 
theory should best be done as a qualitative case study which Merriam (1998) says is an intensive, 
holistic description and analysis of a bounded phenomenon such as a programme, an institution, 
a person, a process or a social unit. Yin (1984) and Schell (1992) also said the case study 
research method is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. The case was the conflict and the resolution 
process in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2013. The phenomenon studied in the conflict and the 
resolution process in Zimbabwe was contemporary with the boundaries between the context (the 
conflict) and the phenomenon (ripeness of conflicts) not clear.  
Zainal (2007) said the category of case study design best suited to interrogate a theory is the 
explanatory design that examines data both at the surface and deep level in order to explain the 
phenomena. For this study, surface data emerged from qualitative evidence and were abstracted 
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to higher order constructs that became the deep level used to explicate phenomena and establish 
the implications for ripeness theory. Following Merriam (1998) and in step with the interpretivist 
view that each case has its own context, the study was both descriptive and explanatory seeking 
to describe the case context and then elucidate on the conflict, ripeness and the resolution 
process. As suggested by Yin (1994), a research design of a case study should have the following 
components: unit of analysis; the study questions; its propositions; the logic linking the data to 
the propositions; and, the criteria for interpreting the findings. The unit of analysis where the 
data came from which, according to Miles & Huberman (1994) is “a phenomenon of some sort 
occurring in a bounded context,” was the conflict and its resolution process bounded by place 
(Zimbabwe) and by time from 2000 to 2013.  
The questions to be answered by this study were listed in chapter 1. Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & 
Passeron (1991) hint that often social scientists produce spontaneous sociology because of their 
inherent familiarity with the research object. To circumvent this problem, they suggest that the 
best way is asking informants questions that do not directly reveal the research objectives. In line 
with this reasoning, informants were asked questions that were formulated in a way that did not 
reveal the intention to investigate the notion of ripeness. Whilst the research objectives sought to 
interrogate ripeness and its implications on the conflict and the resolution process, the questions 
to the informants merely asked the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ aspects of the conflict, the GPA, the 
negotiations and its implementation leaving the link between the empirical data and the notion of 
ripeness to be established in the analysis stage. This approach of not revealing the phenomenon 
(ripeness) being interrogated to the respondents does not violate research ethics since the overall 
goal of seeking to understand the conflict and the resolution process were revealed to the 
respondents as suggested by Bourdieu, et al. (1991).  
After presenting the case context in chapter 4 from evidence that was gathered from literature 
and fieldwork in the preliminary stage of the research, the study proceeded by way of searching 
for signs of ripeness in the period just before the signing of the GPA in 2008 and just before the 
elections of 2013 and carried out process-tracing from 2009 to 2013 to see how the notion of 
ripeness affected the resolution process over time. Although the ripeness propositions that were 
gleaned from literature could be referred to as hypotheses which according to the positivist 
approach would guide the data gathering to prove or disprove them, for this study, the 
propositions were bracketed as the research turned to interpretivism to use the bottom-up 
approach to come up with higher order constructs. The ripeness of conflicts propositions that 
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were synthesised from the ripeness theory in the context of the Zimbabwe conflict case are 
summarised below: 
 There was a mutual hurting stalemate in Zimbabwe in the period following the disputed 
election of 2008 that blocked the parties’ unilateral positions in the conflict and made a 
negotiated solution the only way out of the political impasse. 
 The debilitating economy became an impending catastrophe in the conflict in Zimbabwe 
in the period soon after the elections that compelled the parties to seek a way out. 
 If conditions creating ripeness in a conflict affect the various parties involved differently, 
they create partial ripeness.  
 Rationalist explanations for war: issue indivisibility; information problems; commitment 
problems; and, time horizons, act on a conflict situation in manner that induces or 
eliminates ripeness.  
 The AU resolution of 2008 in Sharm El Sheik offered ‘an enticing opportunity’ to the 
parties in the conflict as a ‘viable and attractive way out’ of the 2008 political stalemate. 
 The political conditions creating conditions for ripeness in a political conflict threatening 
to become more violent provide a clue to coming up with a formula for resolution. 
 A formula for resolution that has benefits for all the parties is much likely to meet with 
success.  
 Exploiting partial ripeness in a conflict can transform the conflict for better or for worse.  
 The staying power of ripeness in a conflict over time is dependent on circumstances not 
changing. 
 Committing to the terms of the agreement over time is a function of the continuing 
presence of effective ripeness in the conflict. 
 The form of intervention, the disposition and manner in which the mediatory team 
approaches a conflict can reduce or increase the degree of ripeness in a conflict. 
3.4 Data collection methods  
Baxter & Jack (2008) say a hallmark of qualitative case study research is the use of multiple data 
sources, a strategy which also enhances data credibility. The study thus followed Wadham 
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(2009) who said the major data collection methods employed in a qualitative case study include 
observation, document analysis and interviews. Yanow, Schwartz-Shea & Freitas (2008) say 
field research-based studies engage in observation understood in an ethnographic sense, meaning 
that the number of ‘observations’ – persons spoken with, conversations conducted, events or 
interactions seen and participated in, documents read – are not co-terminus with the number of 
locations in which the study is carried out. Consistent with this observation, the study was 
carried out in Zimbabwe, South Africa and at the SADC Secretariat in Botswana targeting 
institutions, summits, meetings, documents and persons that had the required data.  
The case study of the conflict and the resolution process in Zimbabwe generated a multitude of 
qualitative-interpretive within-case observations reflecting patterns of interaction, organisational 
practices, social relations, routines and actions that offered valuable data required for the study. 
Marshall (2006) says observation entails the systematic noting and recording of events, 
behaviours, and artifacts (objects) in the social setting chosen for study. This method assumes 
that behaviour is purposeful and expressive of deeper values and beliefs. Observation can range 
from a highly structured, detailed notation of behaviour guided by checklists to a more holistic 
description of events and behaviour. Observation was conceived as one of the data collection 
strategies at the beginning of the research seeking to take advantage of the researcher’s closeness 
to the conflict and the resolution process. The exercise was carefully planned and systematic 
based on the ripeness propositions and the priori codes which directed the researcher on what to 
look out for. The activities that were observed were either planned or presented themselves by 
chance and included: all the elections that were held in Zimbabwe since 2005 which were 
covered by the researcher as a government information officer; SADC and Troika summits that 
were held in Windhoek, Namibia on 20 May 2011 and in Sandton, South Africa from 11 to 12 
June 2011; as well as almost all the mediation meetings that were held in Zimbabwe. The 
researcher also attended most conferences and seminars on the conflict that were held in 
Zimbabwe in the period 2008 to 2013. Of benefit to the study was the involvement of the 
researcher in the SADC Standby Brigade’s peacekeeping training Exercise Golfinho whose 
meetings and exercises took place in Botswana, Angola Mozambique and South Africa 
respectively beginning 2008 providing an opportunity of observing the functioning of the SADC 
Secretariat and the OPDSC in loco and in the field. To address ethical issues, the researcher 
would point out to the organisers of the events that although he was attending invited as a 
government official, he was also observing the proceedings for research purposes and undertook 
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not to refer to participants in these private meetings by name in the final report (except for those 
who were eventually interviewed and agreed to be acknowledged by name). 
As indicated above, the other data source was document analysis. Wharton (2006) says 
document analysis is a detailed examination of documents produced across a wide range of 
social practices, taking a variety of forms from the written word to the visual image. He further 
says the significance of the documents may be located in the historical circumstances of 
production, in their circulation and reception of the item and also the social functions, 
interpretations, effects and uses that may be associated with them. To get started, the document 
collection was influenced by the thematic areas that obtained from the research questions. 
Documents were hard-copied or downloaded from online sources. These included minutes of 
meetings, reports, discussion papers, SADC summit resolutions, letters and media reports on the 
conflict and the resolution process. As a media officer, the researcher conducted electronic media 
monitoring and received all the print media publications that circulated in Zimbabwe daily 
during the period of study and this provided an opportunity to record television programmes and 
make newspaper cuttings of all reports that addressed the chosen themes beginning in 2008. The 
ethical considerations included seeking permission to use the information for research purposes 
from the offices where the documents came from as well as relying on official websites of the 
publishing institutions for online material to avoid the dangers of using fake information. 
Interviews were also used to gather data from purposefully targeted informants. Tellis (1997) has 
argued that a case study is done in a way that incorporates the views of the ‘actors’ in the case 
under study. Qualitative interviewing provides a method for collecting rich and detailed 
information about how individuals experience, understand and explain events in their lives (Yin, 
2003). The interview method was therefore chosen because interviews provide greater detail and 
depth than the standard survey, allowing insight into how individuals understand and narrate 
their experiences. In the interviews, the study followed Nicholas (1991) who said the personal 
interviews should be intensive targeting a small sample averaging 30 to 50 people, usually 
lasting from one to three hours and using open ended questions to allow the respondents to 
answer freely. The initial sample was a maximum variation sample targeting key people in the 
conflicting parties at various levels in society. Although the size of the initial sample was 30 
people, a number reached after the consideration that a sample should not be too large that it is 
difficult to extract thick rich data and at the same time not too small that it is difficult to get all 
the desired information (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007), the researcher managed to interview 21 
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informants  chosen in a manner that ensured representativeness across all the sectors that were 
considered critical in unpacking the conflict and the resolution process. To this end, the study 
followed Glaser & Strauss (1967) and relied on purposeful sampling to identify potential 
interviewees based on the significance of the role played by the targeted individuals and their 
presumed knowledge of the issues about the conflict and the resolution process. The list of 
interviewees is attached as Appendix 2. As a senior officer in government, access to 
Zimbabwean politicians across the political divide was almost guaranteed affected only by their 
availability. The Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs also wrote a request to the SADC 
Facilitation Team and the Secretariat requesting for interviews and documentation which was 
helpful in opening doors.  
Qualitative interviews can range from highly exploratory inquiry to addressing specific 
hypotheses (Yin, 2003). Interviews ranged from loose conversations to structured exchanges in 
which all interviewees were asked the exact same set of questions with variations only on follow 
up probing the latter of which depended on what needed further clarification. The idea was to 
ensure that all interviewees addressed the same questions for future comparison of the responses 
to increase likelihood of generalising the findings so as to come out with higher order constructs. 
Less structured interviews were preferred in the initial stages of the study because they allowed 
exploration of the issues to illuminate the topic. More structured interviews were then designed 
for the formal data collection that came at a later stage. The interview schedule was based on 
open ended questions designed to seek data that would fit the thematic areas.  
Although informal interviews where done in the preliminary stage of the research, formal 
interviews began in January 2012 and were continuing during the compilation of the final report 
affected by the availability of the targeted individuals. To minimise loss of information, all 
interviews were tape-recorded. Some of the interviewees appeared uncomfortable with the tape-
recorder in the early stages of an interview though in most cases they quickly forgot its presence 
as they got immersed in explaining their viewpoints. Where possible, a second person attended 
also taking notes that would be cross-checked with the researcher’s notes and the information 
captured on tape to ensure accuracy in the compilation of each final interview script.  The 
recordings and the scripts were kept as a record. Ethical considerations for qualitative research 
with regard to case studies arise from the fact that often the approach deals with contemporary 
matters of public interest for which there may be neither public nor ‘scholarly right to know’ 
(Stake, 1995). Ethical issues that were addressed thus included seeking consent from the 
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interviewees and their organisations and asking permission to record them and to quote them by 
name in the final report. The reporter was always committed to respecting the sensitivity or any 
legal requirements of using availed information given that the untimely revelation of some of it 
might have jeopardized the actual conflict resolution process. 
3.5 Data analysis and presentation 
This section begins with a quote from Patton (2002, p. 432) who said: “Qualitative analysis 
transforms data into findings. No formula exists for that transformation. Guidance, yes. But no 
recipe (sic). Direction can and will be offered, but the final destination remains unique for each 
inquirer, known only when - and if - arrived at”. Qualitative data analysis is more of an art of 
extracting meaning from the data collected in a study guided by the purpose of the study, 
research questions and the theoretical framework (Kawulich, 2004). Once evidence was fully 
collected, the research finalised the analysis which had begun with the onset of data collection 
and this was then followed by the presentation of the evidence in chapters 5 and 6. In line with 
the interpretivist approach, the data collection and the abstraction into higher order constructs 
was first allowed to proceed without much influence from the ripeness of conflicts’ theoretical 
propositions though there was an alertness to identify linkages with the thematic areas in the 
ripeness of conflicts propositions as a way of identifying codes. Stake (1995) says data analysis 
in qualitative research is an iterative and reflexive process that begins as data are being collected 
rather than after collection has ceased because the process of reading through the data and 
interpreting them continues throughout the project. The process also involved what (Parlett & 
Hamilton 1976) termed progressive focusing in which the researcher adjusted the data collection 
process when it began to appear that additional concepts needed to be investigated or new 
relationships explored. Consequently, through an iterative process, the research questions kept 
being reviewed as more data became available and new relationships emerged.  
For this study, data analysis was enabled by transcribing each piece of the data from all the data 
sources and typing the text (from interviews, observational notes, memos, etc.) into word 
processing documents.  The next stage was coding; dividing the data into meaningful analytical 
units (i.e., segmenting the data). Black (2009) says in constant comparison, data are collected 
and comparatively analysed simultaneously through a process of coding, description and 
categorisation. Coding is defined as marking the segments of data with symbols, descriptive 
words, or category names (Kawulich, 2004). Most scholars on qualitative research (Glasser & 
Strauss 1967, Stake 1995, Yin 2003, Merriam 1998) suggest that codes should emerge from the 
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data analysis process. However for this study that sought to interrogate an existing theory, it was 
more attractive to begin with priori codes but leaving room for the development of more codes 
as analysis progressed.  Priori codes are codes that are developed before examining current data. 
Following Yin (1994), the study relied on the research questions to arrange data into thematic 
areas according to the propositions aligned to each area. This helped to focus attention on certain 
data and ignore other data. Mills, Bonner & Francis (2006) say there are three forms of coding: 
open coding which is the initial stage of theoretical analysis and involves developing codes from 
the data and ends when it locates a core category; theoretical codes are the conceptual connectors 
that develop relationships between categories and their properties; and constant comparative 
coding which describes the method of constant comparison and imbues both open and theoretical 
coding.  
Although the research began with a position that propositions would be parked to allow for the 
gathering of data and making independent constructions, in the constant comparison of data the 
parking became theoretical in some respects as the sought-after themes were always available in 
the mind of the researcher and became a factor that influenced the data categorisation and the 
basis for throwing away that which was deemed irrelevant. The priori codes thus came from the 
ripeness of conflicts theory propositions and other conflict resolution concepts that had a bearing 
in making a situation ripe or unripe for resolution gleaned from literature. These were: parties to 
the conflict, incompatibilities, hurting stalemate, impeding catastrophe, entrapment, enticing 
moment, perception of a way out of the conflict, benefits for all, power and legitimacy, third 
party leverage, readiness, motivation, coalition theory, shock theory, agreed procedure for 
dealing with the conflict, commitment problems, information problems, turning points, time 
horizons, collective action problems, issue indivisibility and spoilers. As analysis progressed, 
other codes began to emerge and these included: the media’s impact on the conflict, third-party 
acceptability, third-party aptitude and tact, buying time, the external factor and sovereignty 
versus the resolution process, among others. 
The study used the framework approach which according to Crowe, Cresswell, Robertson, Huby, 
Avery & Sheikh (2011) involves five stages: familiarisation with the data; identifying a thematic 
framework which was done with constant reference to the propositions made on the ripeness 
theory; coding; mapping; and, interpretation. Following Davies & Beaumont (2007), the 
evidence collected through observation, document analysis and open ended interviews was 
categorised using pattern matching and stored in formats (both hard copy and electronic) that 
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were easy to retrieve. As research progressed, recurring patterns of behaviour and relationships 
began to emerge and data became more and more context-sensitive. Charmaz (2006) says the 
‘abductive’ reasoning process begins by examining the data, entertaining all possible 
explanations for what is observed and linking it to the hypothesis to confirm or disconfirm until 
the researcher arrives at the most plausible interpretation. To organise data for easy reading of 
the picture, the researcher used matrix tables and diagrams as appropriate both in hard copy and 
electronically, grouping data-sets to build the higher-order constructs. Following Tellis (1997), 
the study then used pattern matching to compare the empirical pattern emerging from the field to 
confirm or disconfirm the propositions. 
Once data had been analysed and higher order constructs in place for all the thematic areas, the 
challenge became how to present the voluminous evidence without compromising the structure 
of the report. The most efficient way became that of presenting it in the form of a narrative. The 
narrative picked lower order constructs that were deemed important in highlighting how the 
higher order constructs had been arrived at. The source of the data – literature, interviews, 
personal communication, observation, documents and media reports – were cited in the narrative 
as and when they were used. The narratives for the major themes which were linked to the 
research questions were followed by a summary of the higher order constructs which in turn 
where followed by a discussion on their implications for the study. Ponterotto (2006) says thick 
description refers to a researcher’s task of both describing and interpreting observed social action 
(or behavior) within its particular context. Where possible, thick description of the phenomenon 
was used to accurately describe observed social action and assign purpose and meaning to the 
evidence. Thick description in the study was also used to capture the thoughts and feelings of 
participants as well as the complex web of relationships among them to illuminate the basis for 
coming out with the higher order constructs. Shenton (2004) says thick description is an 
important provision for promoting credibility as it helps to convey the actual situations that have 
been investigated and, to some extent, the contexts that surround them. The thick description was 
in this research expected to lead to thick interpretation which in turn was expected to lead to 
thick meaning of the research findings. Following Shenton (2004), it was also anticipated that the 
thick description, interpretation and meaning of findings would lead readers of the final product 
to a sense of verisimilitude, wherein they would be expected to cognitively and emotively place 
themselves within the research context.  
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3.6 Rigour 
Gibbert & Ruigrok (2009) suggest that the most influential model to ensure rigour of case study 
research adheres to the natural science model which calls for construct validity, internal validity 
and reliability. Researchers are however generally agreed that methods used to ensure rigor in 
the hard sciences including quantitative approaches cannot be exactly the same as in the social 
science’s qualitative approaches (Golafshani, 2003). While the hallmark of quantitative research 
is objectivity in which researchers dissociate themselves as much as is possible from the research 
process, qualitative researchers have come to embrace their involvement and immersion into the 
research as a strength that can guarantee rigor. Because of the need for subjectivity in qualitative 
studies, Guba & Lincolin (1981) substituted reliability and validity commonly used in 
quantitative methods with the parallel concept of ‘trustworthiness’ of the study containing four 
aspects: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability – as well as other strategies 
for demonstrating qualitative rigor such as the audit trail and member checks when coding, 
categorising, or confirming results. To achieve rigour, the aim was to ensure that the research 
does what it claims it will do (construct validity), that its evidence would be verifiable, that it can 
be replicated by others (reliability) and that the approximate truth about inferences regarding 
cause-effect or causal relationships (internal validity) are the best possible.  
Construct validity was achieved by a carefully crafted topic properly aligned to the objectives 
and the research questions. To align the phenomenon being investigated to the research 
questions, the study was thus iterative with the researcher moving back and forth between design 
and implementation to ensure congruence among question formulation, literature, data collection 
strategies and analysis. Analytical generalisation which is generalisation from empirical 
observation to theory, rather than to a population (Yin, 1999) was another important 
consideration in which the main object was to see how the evidence related to the conflict and 
the ripeness theory. Alverman, O’brien & Dillion (1996) asserted that one neglected component 
in qualitative research is an explanation of the role, perspectives and biases of the researcher 
because these can affect both construct and internal validity. Internal validity is especially 
problematic in case study research because of potential investigator subjectivity but following 
Yin (1994), the study took the view that insider knowledge, when applied in an objective 
manner, adds value to evidence gathering and interpretation. Since the study was designed to 
mainly interrogate a theory without much attention being paid to making value judgements, a 
commitment was made to consider data as objectively as was practically possible, a feat that was 
achieved through an effort to always make conclusions after the major dissenting views of an 
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argument had been presented. Some of the strategies used to improve internal validity in the 
study included: (1) asking informants questions that did not refer to the notion of ripeness 
directly but only seeking explanations on the actual developments that took place in the conflict 
and the resolution process; and (2) using pattern matching which Tellis (1997) says involves 
linking data to the thematic areas that build the constructs and then later on relating those 
constructs to the propositions and included comprehensive data treatment which demands that all 
cases of data are incorporated in the analysis. Both Yin (1994) and Stake (1995) stress the 
importance of effectively organising the data to ensure cause-effect inferences are the best 
possible and avoiding mixing up issues.  
Morse, Barret, Mayan, Olson & Spiers (2002) recommend that in qualitative studies, verification 
should be done to check, confirm and make sure that the process of research is incrementally 
contributing to ensuring reliability and validity by weaving these mechanisms in every stage of 
the study. The research followed Silverman (2005) who suggested that reliability can be 
increased by various means including tape recording all face-to-face interviews, carefully 
transcribing these tapes as well as presenting long extracts of data to speak for itself in the 
research report. Further, triangulation was used at two levels: first, at the methodology level in 
which an approach from a different paradigm was used to interrogate an existing theory 
originally formulated using an approach from another paradigm; and secondly, data triangulation 
by corroborating evidence gathered through the three data collection methods – observation, 
document analysis and interviews – all combined to gather evidence and build constructs based 
on what (Shenton, 2004) calls the principle of idea convergence and confirmation of findings. 
Explanation followed Yin (2003)’s explanation building starting from lower order constructs 
going up to higher order constructs and then the discussions. In report writing, the study 
followed Baxter & Jack (2008) who said that the goal of the report is to describe the study in 
such a comprehensive manner as to enable the reader to feel as if they had been an active 
participant in the research through thick description of the phenomena.  
3.7 Conclusions 
The study used a ‘complementary paradigm research’ approach in which an instrumental 
qualitative single case study was interrogated through a sequential explanatory design that roped 
in a methodology from an alternative paradigm (interpretivism) to interrogate an existing 
rationalist-based theory; ripeness of conflicts theory, in which the conflict and the resolution 
process in Zimbabwe was the unit of analysis. It checked and found ripeness present in the 
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period soon after the disputed elections of 2008, went on to examine how the conditions that 
created ripeness influenced the search for a formula to resolve the conflict. Process-tracing was 
used to establish the staying power of ripeness and the impact of the conditions creating ripeness 
on the subsequent negotiations and the implementation of the GPA. Data triangulation was 
achieved at the methodological and data collections levels. Analysis was hinged on priori 
coding, matrices and iterative interpretation. Thick description was applied to ensure thick 
interpretation and thick research findings. Data presentation took the form of a narrative to build 
a case for the emergent higher order constructs, their presentation in summary form and a 
discussion for their implication for each thematic area in the study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE CONTEXT OF THE ZIMBABWEAN CONFLICT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Bercovitch et al. (2009) say a discussion of the contextual variable with particular reference to 
the degree of differentiation, social organisation, collective identity and nature of social change 
is indispensible in developing an integrated approach to the study of conflict. The authors 
referred above who included William Zartman highlight the importance of the contextual 
variable despite the fact that contextualism breeds relativism, a view that is not consistent with 
rationalist approaches. This stems from a realisation that every conflict has its own environment 
and context with certain attributes that are unique though there are other aspects that allow for 
generalisations across cases. Whilst generalisations are important in the study of conflict 
especially in theory building, each conflict unravels in its own peculiar circumstances which also 
need to be understood through conflict mapping as a precursor to the search for ways to resolve 
it.  
Treating conflict cases as if they do not have this differentiation is likely to result in 
generalisations that breed theories that fail to fully explain all aspects of a conflict. In making 
this point, it is not suggested that theories are contextual in their applicability but only that when 
certain patterns have been observed to be true across cases warranting the formulation of a 
conflict theory, that theory should also be understood in the sense of how unique aspects peculiar 
to different conflicts impinge on it. The conflict that has kept Zimbabwe under siege since the 
turn of the current millennium cannot therefore be fully understood without resorting to 
historicism to illuminate the contextual environment in which it took place. The chapter first 
examines the continental conflict setting which the Zimbabwean situation is a part to and then 
delineates Zimbabwe’s historical background and, the domestic and external environments that 
have a bearing on the conflict.  
4.2 Conflict in Africa 
The African continent has a checquered history that includes many centuries of being victimised 
through enslavement of its people, close to a century of colonialism and a tumultuous post 
colonial experience. Jackson (2002) asserts that Africa has the uncanny reputation of being the 
world’s leading theatre of poverty, disease, instability, conflict and war. The granting of 
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independence which often came after bitter liberation struggles ushered in a ray of hope that the 
liberated countries would see equality, peace, stability and prosperity for their citizens. Alas, 
those aspirations have often been shattered by destructive conflicts that have resulted in many 
deaths, human displacements, destruction of infrastructure and dysfunctional economies. Africa 
in the postcolonial period has been riddled by conflicts that often degenerate into civil wars with 
far-reaching ramifications on the wellbeing of its citizens. The causes of conflict have been 
wide-ranging. These include: inequalities along racial lines with regard to access to wealth; 
oppressive systems that were inherited from discriminatory colonial systems; and, interference 
by external powers, especially the former colonial masters that appear determined to continue 
enjoying the benefits they used to access during colonial times well after the granting of 
independence exacerbated by world structural deficiencies that relegate African countries to 
peripheral roles in the global political economy. The situation is made worse by the fact that 
often independence was granted before the citizens of African states had adequate preparation 
for self-rule, a situation that often militated against good governance, democracy, upholding of 
the rule of law and democratic practices. Generally, African countries have also failed to come 
up with enduring and viable home-grown ideologies as the continent found itself torn between 
those that were pushing for total freedom against brothers and sisters who believed that 
development could come from being pawns in the neo-liberal agenda championed by the 
powerful countries despite the fact that in recent history the same countries were responsible for 
Africa’s marginalisation. The main question amongst conflict resolution scholars has thus been 
centred on how conflict on the continent can be minimised or at least transformed so that African 
states can fully pursue a developmental agenda that pulls its peoples out of their current 
wretchedness.  
Wallensteen & Sollenberg (2001) carried out a study of armed conflicts in the world in the 
period 1989 to 2000 and their findings revealed that annually, conflict occurrence was highest in 
Africa and Asia, most of the areas referred to as the developing world, each averaging 14 
conflicts whilst Europe had five, the Middle East six and the Americas four. In the year 2000 
alone, of the 33 conflicts recorded globally, two were interstate, one was intrastate with foreign 
intervention and 30 were intrastate. A study by the African Centre for Development and 
Strategic Studies (ACDSS) also focusing on conflict in Africa found out that in the mid-1990s, 
half of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were characterised by relative political stability, 
twelve countries were experiencing prolonged political crisis and turbulence and twelve others 
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were engaged in armed conflict or civil strife (Adedeji, 1999). The Head of the Peace Support 
Operations Division in the AU Peace and Security Commission, Sivuyile Bam (2015) said 
currently 75 percent of the UN work on conflicts is on Africa whilst 70 percent of the UN 
peacekeeping operations take place on the continent. The AU Mediation Support Handbook 
(2014) howver stated that over the past 15 years, political violence rates in Africa have generally 
stayed stable although 2011 and 2012 witnessed dramatic increases in violence. While this was 
partly due to the emergence of violence in normally stable states mostly in North Africa, 
violence at large continued intermittently in big and unstable states, including Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, among others. 
The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001) noted that in Africa, the failure to prevent 
outbreaks of violence, war and genocide leads to enormous losses of human lives, lifelong 
physical and mental injuries both to the victims and the perpetrators and devastates social 
structures and networks. It further observed that the economic losses in terms of capital, the 
destruction of material assets and economic stagnation, were in the order of billions of dollars. It 
recommended early preventive action to signs of potential violence and war. For Africa, the 
greatest threats to peace in the majority of states came from domestic conflict driven both by 
internal and external factors. While some people and organisations may benefit from armed 
conflict, no meaningful development can be realised in the region when half of the countries on 
the continent are in turmoil. Mbeki (2002) said while good governance and sound economic 
policies are critical in lifting Africa from its current malaise; the precursor should be peace and 
stability. The experiences of the last two decades however show that violent conflict in Africa is 
a reality and is taking the continent backwards. 
One view suggests that the prevalence of conflict in Africa in part derives from failures in 
statecraft by the newly independent states17. Statecraft, which is the way in which a nation 
organises itself for its well-being, requires an agreement by its citizens on a constitution, a 
system of government with a credible electoral framework, and an ideology, policies and 
programmes that are spearheaded by those elected to provide for the nation’s well-being. This 
includes internal dynamics that propel the national survival effort in a competitive global 
environment. Wallensteen (2002) said the state controls resources including territory and the 
                                                    
17
 African countries only started gaining independence beginning in the late 1950s and Zimbabwe got its 
independence as late as 1980. 
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ideology the country pursues as well as holding a monopoly on force and that makes it an actor 
in conflicts as well as an object. As an object of conflict, the state is thus an attractive entity to 
control18. He further said that a state collects revenue, and to do that, it needs a credible legal 
system and a reliable police system and to be able to collect that revenue, a state needs to have 
effective control over its territory and this requires police and military resources. The great 
Indian thinker, Kautilya and the Italian, Niccolo Machiavelli, who both wrote extensively on 
statecraft, argued that a state that does not have full control over its revenue base is likely to meet 
with difficulties that include the inability to preserve itself (Kautilya 2010, Radin, 2013). Critical 
however is the consideration that too weak a state fails to carry out its functions and too strong a 
state may be resented for its excesses on the citizenry. Wallensteen (2002) said that the balancing 
act in statecraft is not easy and its interplay is robust and entrenched in rich nations while in poor 
countries as in most of Africa, remains a far cry. The problems are further compounded by the 
desire by some African leaders to run countries they lead as if they were their personal property 
with allegations of monopolising access to the national cake and refusing to relinquish power in 
some instances in contravention of their countries’ constitutions. At the international level, it is 
about how the state positions and steers the national effort towards international competitiveness. 
Malfunctioning at the domestic level in terms of governance and economics, international 
interference including occupation by a foreign power, or being subjected to sanctions or unfair 
trading practices as has been the case in Zimbabwe in the last decade, have potential to weaken a 
state and cause conflict. Although state formation in Africa goes far back into history, the 
process was interrupted by colonialism and often states that emerged in the post-colonial era had 
no direct connections with the pre-colonial formations. Consequently, dislocation resulting from 
internal failures, structural deficiencies of the international order, external interference and the 
enduring vices from the colonial era continue to wreak havoc on the emergent states and play a 
major role in creating and escalating conflict. 
The practice of African politics does not show an impressive record with regards to the respect 
for accountability, transparency, human rights, good governance and upholding the rule of law, 
in short all facets of what is generally referred to as good democratic governance. While it is 
pertinent that more be done to improve in these areas, the dilemma for Africa has been that those 
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 This is particularly true in Africa where long years of oppression under colonialism impoverished many of 
the indigenous people and control of the state is the shortest route to wealth accumulation. 
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countries particularly in the West that in the post-colonial period champion the entrenchment of 
these values in African politics in the name of good governance were during the times of slavery 
and colonialism, either paying a blind eye to the obtaining injustices or were the actual 
perpetrators of oppression and racism. Whilst African countries find themselves weak and 
heavily dependent on aid, Bach (1993) argued that European governments impose democratic 
conditions on bilateral aid, demanding accountability and transparency which were not hallmarks 
of colonial rule. He further posits that while the West is behaving as if it has solutions to African 
problems, it is in reality part of the causal structure, for both in the historical and contemporary 
terms, it has been at the centre of marginalisng African people. If Africa is to eradicate conflict, 
democracy cannot be imposed from above or from outside, but should develop through the 
interplay of society and the state. In the post-colonial period in Africa, it becomes difficult to 
separate those advocating for genuine peace and development from those seeking to perpetuate 
domination as a form of neo-colonialism. 
Focusing on southern Africa, Oluwi & Mukwena (2003) argued that the project of permanent 
white settlers in most parts of the sub-region during the days of colonialism meant that a 
governance regime that would legitimise the inequalities associated with the colonial system had 
to evolve. This laid the basis for the principle of separate development and the existence of dual 
cultures that became encrusted in law in the form of apartheid. Apartheid laws extended not only 
to public services but also to access to land, jobs and credit. While not condoning the violent 
nature of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme, Oluwi & Mukwena (2003) observed that a 
situation where 5000 large-scale white commercial farmers occupied 45 percent of the arable 
land while six million black African peasants lived on highly populated but marginal, infertile 
and drought-prone areas was unsustainable. Unfortunately, societal dualism along racial lines 
that developed as a result of discriminatory policies often continued into the post-colonial period 
and the efforts to dismantle it to address the attendant injustices to improve equality and 
equitable access to resources often created opportunities for conflict occurrence. 
Analysing the security situation in southern Africa, Ohlson, Stedman with Davies (1994) 
described the period from the 1980s as an interregnum where “the old is dying, and the new 
cannot be born”. This was in view of the fact that although colonialism was dying, African 
nations were failing to take off mainly due to conflict. For the revolutionaries who took up arms 
to undo the unjust colonial systems, the challenges that emerged after independence became the 
justification for a continuing struggle that had to be won at all costs if liberation was to be 
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consummated. In countries such as Zimbabwe, it was partly the efforts to reverse colonial 
injustices that not only created chaos but also invited the wrath of Western countries, prompting 
Britain and America in particular, to pursue a regime change agenda thus contributing to the 
conflict that rocked Zimbabwe since 2000. Despite the ending of wars for independence and the 
end of apartheid in South Africa, the possibility of large scale intra-state violence remained a 
great possibility in most countries in southern Africa mainly due to societal inequalities along 
racial lines. Ohlson, et al. (1994) cite Angola and Mozambique as good examples where between 
1980 and 1988 wars there led to 1.2 million and 1.9 million deaths respectively and a combined 
7.5 million people displaced with war-related damage to the economies of the region running at 
about $90 billion and concluded that: 
In southern Africa, change must confront the structural and institutional legacies of 
apartheid and colonialism as well as the mental models and social repertoires of the past 
that people carry with them into the future (p. 10).  
 
In most of the African states, the state itself has also been the greatest threat to the security of its 
citizens as it grapples with the challenges wrought by both exogenous factors and internal 
inadequacies. Jackson (1990) tackled the African security and economic problems from a 
sovereignty point of view saying African states are not states in the European sense but quasi-
states. He said while sovereignty is a legal, absolute and unitary condition, it is a game of liberty 
in which states are the only qualifying entities and the issue of recognition as a player is very 
important. He thus argued that from the 19th century until WW2, only Europeans or their 
descendants held the title apart from a few important isolated exceptions19. The end of WW2 
however saw the rules of recognition being changed to accommodate former colonies that were 
hitherto considered as appendages colonising nations.  
Jackson (1990) however posited that this new recognition did not put the former colonies in the 
same league as Europeans in that while classical sovereignty existed to order the relations of 
states, prevent damaging collision between them and to regulate conflict and restore peace, 
guaranteeing the rights of citizens and protecting the state from external threats, attributes which 
he claimed are well established in European nations, the rest of the new states wanted only rights 
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 In Africa, Ethiopia, Liberia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were the only countries that in varying 
degrees managed to maintain sovereignty during European colonialism. 
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but not the obligations. This, he called “negative sovereignty” in which Third World states want 
recognition but resist the norms and responsibilities that come with it. Jackson (1990) said 
consequently, most Third World countries fail to protect human rights of their citizens 
adequately in a situation in which their demands for socio-economic rights add moral force to 
their development claims yet distracting attention from their questionable conduct with regard to 
civil and political rights. He concluded that most of the detentions, beatings, political killings, 
torture, terror, political prisoners, disappearances, refugees, death squads and destruction of 
livelihoods are at most perpetuated by sovereign African governments because decolonisation 
did not result in the expansion of human rights but increased the opportunities for their violations 
(Jackson, 1990). Deng (2000) was of the same view arguing that living up to the responsibilities 
of sovereignty is the best guarantee against intervention by other states. While these scholars’ 
assertions about ‘negative sovereignty’ in Africa appear to be true, they conveniently ignored the 
fact that the weak position that Third World countries find themselves in was fostered through 
centuries of slavery, many years under colonialism, and after independence, continued 
marginalisation through unfair trade practices and external interference in the form of neo-
colonialism.  
Arguably, the disparity and contradiction between the North collectively, and the South 
collectively, are the greatest threat to peace in the world today. It is for this reason that Hansen 
(1989) argued that for Africa, the minimal condition for peace conceptualised as merely the 
removal, resolution and management of conflict leaving the social and material settings which 
cause tension and lead to conflict intact is unacceptable. He said the question of peace should 
also be conceptualised and perceived in the sense of creating material conditions which provide 
for the mass of the people a certain minimum condition of security, economic welfare, political 
efficacy and psychic well-being. These basic needs cannot be provided for by hand-outs in the 
form of reactionary foreign aid that is underpinned by conditions but by re-ordering the 
ownership of the means of production to empower the formerly marginalised people to begin to 
participate in the international economic community from a position of comparative strength and 
sustainability. Given that the international system is anarchical, African states cannot expect 
outsiders to re-order the world for them but need to take full responsibilities to do what they can 
to improve their well-being as individual states and collectively. Hansen (1989) however 
suggested that it appears countries in the developed world share a basic consensus that the 
present international economic and power arrangements which militate against African 
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developmental efforts should be maintained. In this regard, the national struggle is understood 
primarily as a struggle between the various internal classes and groups when actually, it is to a 
large extent a continuing struggle for national liberation from the vices wrought about by 
imperialism and neo-colonialism. Tandon (1987) was also of the view that what underlies policy 
vacillations in Africa are fundamental contradictions between imperialism and the peoples of 
Africa. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) also argued that the basic thrust of neo-colonialism was for the 
exiting imperial powers to grant independence of the colonial territories while retaining control 
over their economies in order to keep these countries within the capitalist system as indispensible 
sources of raw materials and cheap labour as well as markets for finished products. 
Consequently, leaders in Africa found that the political and economic structures left behind by 
the exiting colonial powers heavily circumscribed their freedom to create their own policies. It is 
for these reasons that on the surface, the conflict in Zimbabwe appeared as a struggle for power 
between the party that brought liberation and the opposition yet underneath lay more complex 
structural deficiencies.  
In 2014, Afrobarometer, a continental think-tank sponsored by Western countries published a 
report which listed Zimbabwe among a host of African countries including, Cameroon, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo and Uganda that were accused of experiencing a deficit of democracy in 
which a popular demand for democracy greatly exceeded the amount of democracy that political 
elites were willing or able to supply (Bratton & Houessou, 2014). In his quest to understand what 
democracy is, Karl Popper (1966) abandoned the question of who should rule and said the focus 
should be on: “How can we so organise political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can 
be prevented from doing too much damage” (p. 121). Popper (ibid) said this was a fundamental 
question of institutional design and to him democracy happened to be the best type of political 
system because it goes a long way toward solving the problem by providing a non-violent, 
institutionalised and regular way to get rid of bad rulers by voting them out of office. Experience 
in Africa has however shown that this has not been an easy feat to achieve owing to the structure 
of the state which in most cases remains dominated by oppressive systems often inherited or 
slightly modified from colonial systems exercabated by greed and primitive accumulation in 
which the ruling elite often collaborates with the former oppressors. While democracy is 
desirable, the first step that will guarantee universal human rights is, according to Nzongola-
Ntalaja (1987) the destruction of imperial domination for this will resolve the national question 
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and transform the economies of formerly colonised countries so that they serve the interests of 
the marginalised citizens.  
With regards to conflict resolution, Burton (1990) argued that until underlying causes of conflict 
are treated, especially contradictions caused by imperialism and neo-colonialism, there cannot be 
any meaningful resolution of conflicts in Africa. Bedjaoui (2000) quoted Lester Pearson, a Nobel 
Peace Prize Laureate in his acceptance speech of the award in 1972, who said: 
There could be no peace, no security, nothing but ultimate disaster once a few rich 
countries whose population was a small minority of the world’s peoples, were alone 
having access to the new formidable and terrifying world of science and technology as 
well as to a material high standard of living while the vast majority of people lived in 
deprivation and need, cut off from any possibility of complete economic development (p. 
35). 
Bedjaoui (2000) concluded that when a state is lacking in every kind of necessary resource, it is 
by definition incapable of protecting the first human right, the right to life, with all it implies by 
way of rights to social protection, work, health, education and so on. When conflict arises in such 
a society, calling for the respect of human rights and even conflict resolution itself will most 
likely fail because the deep-rooted causes of the debilitation of the social fabric have not been 
addressed. 
 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (1998) sought to answer the question whether the quest for democracy is an 
externally driven initiative or a genuine demand of the African people and found that the 
continent is a repository of human values that are fully compatible with the foundations of 
democracy as a political concept. Nzongola-Ntalaja (ibid) said democracy is a political concept 
founded on three underlying ideas, namely: democracy as a value, a process and a practice. As a 
value, democracy is an imperative which is a permanent aspiration of human beings for freedom 
and a better social order. As a moral imperative, democracy implies tolerance for all forms of 
diversity, including physical differences among people. As a process, Nzongola-Ntalaja (ibid) 
said it is a continuous process of promoting equal access to fundamental rights and civil liberties 
for all: the rights of the human person to life, security, religious freedom, assembly, expression, 
association, and economic, social and self determination. Central to this is the notion that a good 
political order is one in which the state is capable of satisfying the material and spiritual needs of 
its citizens.  
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As a practice, Nzongola-Ntalaja (ibid) said democracy is a specific manner of organising and 
exercising power in accordance with certain universal norms and principles. The principles he 
listed include: the idea that legitimate power or authority emanates from the people who exercise 
it through elected representatives who come into office as a result of free and fair elections; 
doing things in conformance with the concept of the rule of law; the right to organise politically; 
independence of civil society from the state; and, the right of the people to change a government 
that no longer serves their interests (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998). He identified institutions and 
procedures necessary for democracy as free and fair elections, representative government, 
independent judiciary and a vibrant civil society. Du Pisani (2010) followed up on these tenets of 
democracy and argued that people are not always agreed on what the right values are, that the 
process of achieving democracy is hampered by the declining capacity of most African states and 
that there is always a gap between practice and what can be termed desirable democracy, and 
called these ‘democratic deficits’. He concluded that the notion of democracy was closely related 
to human security in which state security was not an end in itself but another way of enhancing 
the former and argued that the ‘democratic deficits’ were impinging on human security in 
southern Africa.  
While observing that the democratic movement in Africa is often a justified and imperative 
social protest against the failure of the post-colonial state, Nzongola-Ntalaja (1998) argued 
instigation for it by foreign powers through a dogmatic assertion of the virtues of the market in 
the face of growing inequalities and social exclusion, even in developed capitalism, is a sign of 
an undemocratic tendency to discourage open debate on alternative models. He concluded that 
external powers intervening in Africa are more interested in furthering their interests than 
democracy and that the effort to subjugate Africa to the logic of global capitalist expansion is 
contrary to the requirements of democracy. Nzongola-Ntalaja (ibid) identified the following as 
obstacles to democracy in Africa: the political immaturity of the democratic forces including an 
opposition made up of deserters from the ancien regime, lack of respect of the constitutional 
order, weakness of the means of subsistence and its exploitation by the ruling elite, monopoly of 
the public media by the incumbent regime and violence.  
Ake (1994) distinguished between ‘liberal’ and ‘social democracy’ in which he favoured the 
later saying it was better positioned to provide both social security and sustainable development. 
Ake (ibid) also argued that, often, well wishers of African democracy in the West have been led 
astray by insensitivity to local conditions and erroneous theories that include a fixation on 
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structural adjustment programs that have for a very long time failed on the continent. African 
countries are generally poor and weak and consequently find themselves forced to tow a line 
alien to their desired developmental paths because of their dependence on foreign aid. Further, 
while African countries cannot influence politics in the developed world in a way that furthers 
their own agendas, the powerful countries sponsor African think-tanks, political parties and civil 
society organisations whose main objectives are to further the interests of the sponsoring 
countries. Powerful countries are also eager to deploy their military and economic might to force 
weaker countries to conform. It is partly for this reason that most incumbent African 
governments (especially former liberation movements) view opposition parties in their countries 
with suspicion and go to great lengths including the reliance on torture, violence and other 
inhumane practices arguing that heavy-handedness is justified to stop the opposition from getting 
into power supported and sponsored by hostile nations that are viewed as wanting to reverse the 
gains of liberation. To leftist Africans, it is better to suffer the consequences of poor governance 
than to allow the exiting colonial powers through the backdoor provided by opposition forces.  
4.3 Zimbabwe’s historical highlights from pre-colonial times to 2000 
Issues that shaped the current Zimbabwean political landscape leading to the conflict including 
the demographics of the country, racial and tribal relations, the land and economic issues, 
relations with neighbouring countries, relations with the former colonial power Britain in 
particular and Western countries in general are better understood with reference to their 
historical contexts. Zimbabwe had a population of slightly over 13 million people as of a 2012 
national census and is geographically mainly a large plateau sandwiched between the Zambezi 
River to the north and Limpopo River to the south bordered by Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, 
Mozambique and South Africa. It is greatly endowed in natural resources including vast fertile 
agricultural lands, world class tourist attractions including one of the wonders of the world, the 
mighty Victoria Falls, and an array of high value mineral deposits including iron, chrome, gold, 
platinum, emeralds and diamonds. Zimbabwe holds the second largest reserves of platinum after 
South Africa in the world and was expected to account for 25 percent of global diamond 
production in future (Jamasmie, 2014).  
The country derives its name, Zimbabwe, from man-made stone structures called ‘Great 
Zimbabwe’ (houses of stone), the largest in Africa after the pyramids of Egypt (Garlake, 1982). 
The name was chosen both as a way of acknowledging the country’s heritage as well as 
symbolising the Zimbabwean people’s resilience in fighting colonialism to build a new nation 
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(Ruzivo, 2013). Great Zimbabwe is the main relic of the Shona people’s civilisation which lasted 
for six hundred years ending around 1400 AD and evidence of its extent have been found at 
Khami, Dhlodhlo, Nalitale and 250 other sites in present day Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana 
and Mozambique though by the 19th century, this Shona empire had disintegrated into numerous 
principalities and chiefdoms (Garlake, 1982). Towards the end of 18th century, a powerful 
kingdom emerged in KwaZulu Natal under King Shaka and upheavals in that region drove one 
of his generals, Mzilikazi, and his people northwards until they settled in the western part of 
Zimbabwe in 1836 after subduing the local Shona chiefs (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1973), giving birth 
to the subsequent realities of co-existence: cooperation, collaboration and power struggles 
between the Shona and the Ndebele people in nation building.20  
European penetration into Zimbabwe began with Christian missionaries who befriended King 
Mzilikazi in 1858 and were then followed by fortune hunters, soldiers, and land grabbing settlers 
(Todd, 1966 and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1973). Atieno-Odhiambo (1973) said Cecil John Rhodes 
and his British South African Company negotiated the Rudd Concession from King Lobengula 
(Mzilikazi’s son and the last Ndebele King) on behalf of the Queen of England ostensibly for 
mining purposes, but in no time his Pioneer Column raised the Union Jack at Harare Kopje and 
declared the country, then a private property of the British South Africa Company, a colony in 
the British Empire towards the end of the nineteenth century. Thereafter, Rhodes declared war on 
King Lobengula and overthrew him and named the country Southern Rhodesia. As a British 
colony, Southern Rhodesia was characterised by a massive land grabbing exercise which drove 
thousands of Africans, often at gunpoint, from over 50% of the country’s prime farming lands 
into designated areas called reservations, (now communal lands) that lay in mostly infertile, 
rocky and drought-prone areas (Chambati 1973, Patsanza 1988). Land was taken without 
compensation to the owners and given to white Rhodesians settlers and migrating white veterans 
of the two world wars of the 20th century mainly from England. This racial land tenure system 
was consolidated by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Husbandry Act of 1969 
which demarcated land and allocated it along racial lines prohibiting blacks from owning land in 
white areas (Patsanza, 1988). Efforts to consolidate white domination of the sub-region saw the 
creation of a federation made up of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia 
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 The 2012 census estimates the Shona people to constitute about 80% and the Ndebele people around 15% 
of the total population. 
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(Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) that saw many citizens of the other two countries being forced 
to migrate to Southern Rhodesia for labour (Todd, 1966). The majority of these migrants settled 
permanently in the country.  
From 1960 onwards, major contradictions developed between the colonial policy in London 
which wanted change in favour of improved black participation in the politics of the country and 
the settler administration which opposed black enfranchisement, resulting in the collapse of the 
Federation and the subsequent Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 1965 by the 
Rhodesian white settlers led by Ian Smith (Todd, 1966). Despite judgments by the highest courts 
in Rhodesia and England that the rebellion was illegal and treasonous, the British government 
refused to send troops to quell the rebellion though it imposed economic sanctions against the 
settlers (Patsanza, 1988). The Rhodesian white minority settlers would however bust the 
sanctions with the help of apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe and before then 
Southern Rhodesia) continued to trade with Western countries including having a High 
Commissioner in London at par with the representatives of other former British dominions 
(Kurebwa, 2012 and Patsanza, 1988). From the establishment of the colony, the white settlers 
pursued a policy of separate development with their black counterparts in which Africans were 
denied the right to vote, stand for parliament or to hold high office in the army, police or the 
public service as well exclusion from the best schools, residential areas, and other amenities, 
which were reserved for whites only (Todd, 1966, Patsanza, 1988). A note addressed to Garfield 
Todd21 by the Rhodesian minister of Law and Order read in part: 
But unlike you, we intensely dislike the natural personal uncleanliness, filth, dirt, low 
class levels and presumptive arrogance generally prevalent in most of the black race you 
so closely associate yourself with – a race which in 100 years from now could never be 
taught otherwise, no matter what is given them in money, housing and education by any 
government anywhere – it is instinct and inbred to and in this race to be just what they are 
today (sic) (Todd, 1966, p. 30). 
As a result of such attitudes towards blacks by the white settlers, Rhodesia became a mirror 
image of the apartheid system that was prevailing in South Africa laying the foundations of the 
enduring political similarities between the two countries. 
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 Garfield Todd was one of the white settler leaders who strove to improve the conditions of blacks in white 
dominated Rhodesia. 
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Although King Lobengula was defeated in 1893, Africans in both Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland took up arms in the First Chimurenga War of 1896-97 but the uprising was 
brutality suppressed by the white settler administration with support from Britain (Ranger, 
1967). For the following 60 years, there was no armed opposition to British minority rule 
although political, labour protests and unrest continued. Following the UDI, the Africans 
launched the second war of liberation 22  (Ranger, 1985). Although early efforts to achieve 
political organisation by the Africans were brutally suppressed by the white settler regime, 
blacks still managed to form the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in 1960 under the 
leadership of Joshua Nkomo (Patsanza, 1988). In 1963, following differences in strategic 
approaches, a splinter organisation that called itself the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) emerged from ZAPU (Ranger, 1985). Following the split, generally ZAPU became the 
vanguard for Ndebele people political organisation whilst ZANU was for the Shona although a 
sizable Shona component remained ZANU whilst some Ndebele belonged to ZAPU. The two 
political parties eventually formed liberation wings, the Zimbabwe African People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) that 
began to wage an armed struggle for independence supported by mainly Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and also by China and the Soviet Union (Patsanza, 1988).  
In 1975, efforts to unite the two liberation movements saw the creation of the Patriotic Front 
(PF) under whose banner the liberation movements participated in the negotiations to end the 
war including those at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 at which the settler regime and 
the British government granted majority rule (Martin & Johnson, 1981). The Lancaster 
negotiations were agonising stalled mainly by disagreements over how to resolve the land 
question and guarantee security for the minority white settlers. Following verbal guarantees by 
Britain and the US to fund land reform, an agreement on the reservation of parliamentary seats 
for whites and a proviso that the constitution would not be tempered with in a period of ten 
years, an agreement was finally reached leading to Zimbabwe’s independence on 18th April 
1980 (Martin & Johnson, 1981, Moyo, 2000). The British superintended the talks that ensured 
the perpetuation of white domination through a flawed Lancaster House constitution that 
entrenched white minority rights for a further decade after the granting of political independence 
to the majority blacks.  
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 The second round of uprising against white settler rule in Rhodesia was called Second Chimurenga.  
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Voting in the general elections of 1980 was however mainly along tribal lines in which ZANU 
managed 57 seats, ZAPU 20 and the United African National Congress (UANC) three (Martin & 
Johnson, 1981) as ZANU swept all the Shona-speaking areas and ZAPU most of all the Ndebele-
speaking areas. Robert Mugabe became the Prime Minister with Canaan Banana as a ceremonial 
President and although the whites had feared a ZANU victory in the elections because they 
viewed the former as a hard-core communist, the newly elected Prime Minister declared a policy 
of reconciliation. Speaking about the future relations of blacks and whites on the eve of 
Independence, Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister-elect said:  
If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today we have become friend and ally with the 
same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties … If yesterday you hated me, today you 
cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. The wrongs of the past must 
now stand forgiven and forgotten (Mugabe, 1980).  
De Waal (2002) called Robert Mugabe’s attitude a “miracle and a demonstration of human 
maturity so far rarely equalled in our world”. Whilst a sizable number of whites that were 
uncertain about their future under a government controlled by the blacks or feared retribution for 
the atrocities perpetrated by the former white regime on the African people left the country 
leading to a drop of the white population from 250 000 to 100 000, Huyse (2003) argued that 
although the whites that remained gratefully believed Robert Mugabe’s promise, reconciliation 
was bound to fail because it was imposed from above without historical, restorative or economic 
justice. Although land ownership had been one of the main causes of the liberation struggle and 
the Lancaster Talks had stalled on a number of occasions because of disagreements on how to 
resolve it, the skewed land tenure system persisted after independence with about 6 000 whites 
continuing to hold onto 39% of the land amounting to 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-
ecological farmland, whilst one million black households remained consigned to 16.4 million 
hectares (41.4%) of peripheral and mostly infertile and drought-prone areas (Moyo, 2004). 
Huyse (2003) had this to say about why reconciliation eventually failed in Zimbabwe: 
The Lancaster House Agreement created a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe, 
based on majority rule. However, (at the instigation of the British who superintended the 
talks) it granted the white Zimbabweans significant minority rights: 20 seats out of 100 in 
the first parliament and, even more important, a strict and detailed protection of 
commercial farming land. Rhodesian perpetrators of human rights violations were 
allowed to go unpunished (p. 35).  
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Muzondidya (2010) pointed out that whites that remained in Zimbabwe quickly forgot that the 
armed struggle had been waged to address inequalities between black and white and 
concentrated on consolidating their hold on to the economy. Mandaza (1991) said formal power 
had been ceded to a black petty-bourgeoisie, who together with the emerging black middle class 
shared it with the established white settler capital. Consequently, the economy’s agricultural, 
industrial and mining interests remained wholly owned by local white and foreign capital, under 
monopoly conditions. According to (Moyo, 2004), reconciliation had been a post war partnership 
consisting effectively of an effort, not between races, but with capital in which white minority 
(3%) controlled approximately two-thirds of national income; while the black majority (97%) 
took the remaining one-third. In discussions on the continuing white privileges after 
independence, blacks began to jokingly tease each other saying that had the whites known that 
all that blacks wanted was to raise the Zimbabwe flag under a black government, they would 
have granted independence far earlier than 1980. Taking advantage of its political control, the 
new Zimbabwe Government however steadily consolidated its control of the state apparatus by 
deploying veterans of the struggle in the army, police, civil service and other arms of 
government, setting the stage for the enduring alliance between the liberation party and the state 
machinery. 
Zimbabwe was born in an insecure regional environment at a time when whites in apartheid 
South Africa were at the peak of their political and military power though the latter was the 
former’s biggest trading partner. Machingura (Interview, 2015, Feb 13) argued that Zimbabwe 
had amongst other reasons delayed its land reform programme on the advice of then presidents 
Kaunda and Nyerere who feared that the threat of losing land might harden the resolve of whites 
in South Africa to resist majority rule. In accordance with the pan-African spirit, Zimbabwe took 
a position to support the liberation movements that were still fighting white settler domination in 
Namibia and South Africa, a decision that riled the apartheid government in South Africa. In 
response, South Africa pursued a policy of Total Strategy that sought to destabilise Zimbabwe 
and other neighbouring states in its quest to uphold the idea of white supremacy (Johnson & 
Martin, 1986). More than 10 000 Zimbabwean troops had to be deployed in Mozambique for 
seven years in support of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government and to 
protect Zimbabwe’s lifeline to the sea along the Beira Corridor against the rebel movement 
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Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), supported by South Africa as a way of keeping 
Zimbabwe in check by forcing it to be dependent on the South African economy23.  
Internally, Zimbabwe went through a period of unrest during the first decade of independence 
when rebel soldiers aligned to ZAPU waged a terror campaign in which many civilians in 
Matabeleland were killed or abused by both government forces and the rebels (Huyse, 2003). 
Although the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe invited Joshua Nkomo and some ZAPU 
members into government at Independence 1980, antagonism between the Shona and Ndebele 
people along political party lines that had briefly surfaced during the split in 1963 became an 
issue again from 1982. Huyse (2003) suggested that matters came to a head when allegations 
(partly fostered by apartheid South Africa) of a ZIPRA plot to overthrow the ZANU PF 
Government saw ZAPU leaders dismissed from government structures resulting in a mutiny in 
the army in which ex-ZAPU commanders were arrested and some charged with treason and 
detained without trial. As the conflict degenerated into some form of undeclared civil war with 
the rebels causing menace in the southern parts of the country, Government deployed a military 
formation, 5 Brigade, which had been trained in North Korea and the resulting military 
skirmishes saw thousands of civilians killed, tortured or displaced (Ncube, 1991). It took 
government forces three years to suppress the revolt during which the security forces were 
accused of using excessive force. Although the Chihambakwe Commission whose results were 
never publicised was set up to investigate claims of 1800 deaths of civilians, the Catholic 
Commission for Peace and Justice put the number of those killed or missing in action at 20 000 
though the figure has never been officially confirmed. Most of the rebels however surrendered 
their arms when ordered by the then ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo following the signing of the 
Unity Accord of 1987 which resulted in the merging of ZAPU and ZANU into the Zimbabwe 
African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) with President Mugabe as President, and 
Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda as Vice Presidents. In one of his public addresses to the 
nation, President Robert Mugabe called the episode a “moment of madness” (Mudenda, 2014). 
Although the Unity Accord ushered in a period of peace and tranquility, the trauma experienced 
by the predominantly Ndebele population had sown seeds of dissent which to a great extent 
negatively affected that region’s subsequent political support to ZANU PF.  
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 Ironically, RENAMO had been created by the Rhodesia regime to destabilise Mozambique and to fight 
against Zimbabwean liberation fighters that were operating from that country and was handed over to the white 
apartheid regime at independence in 1980 (Salomao, Interview, 2015, Mar. 4).   
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In governance, significant constitutional changes occurred in 1987 when the post of prime 
minister was abolished in favour of an executive president and the 20 parliamentary seats that 
had been reserved for whites who constituted less than three per cent of the electorate were 
abolished. Zimbabwe became a fully fledged democracy albeit with a skewed land tenure system 
that continued to favour whites who also continued to dominate the economy. Despite the 
challenges that the country faced in the first two decades of independence including ZANU’s 
tinkering with the idea of forming a one party state, the unresolved land issue and the infamous 
Matabeleland disturbances, ZANU PF enjoyed warm relations with the former colonial power 
Britain with President Robert Mugabe receiving royal attention from the Queen on state visits to 
England including being knighted in 1997 as well as receiving a number of honorary degrees 
from Western universities (Muzondidya, 2010). 
On the thorny issue of land redistribution, Government in 1981 created the Department of Rural 
Development (DERUDE) for the purposes of resettling 162 000 families on nine million hectares 
within three years but by the end of 1987, only 45 000 families had been settled on two million 
hectares (Moyo, 2000, Moyo & Yeros, 2004). Slower progress was made in the next 12 years 
and by the end of 1999, a total of 90 000 families had been settled on three and half million 
hectares. The main impediment to land reform included the restrictive legal framework 
buttressed by the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ Lancaster Constitution clause and partially 
fulfilled promises for monetary support by the international community (Huyse, 2003). The US 
$2 billion promised for land acquisition/resettlement by the UK and US governments at the 
Lancaster House Peace Conference as an inducement in the peace talks did not materialise24. 
American money pledged by President Carter never came arbitrarily stopped by the successor 
Ronald Reagan administration. Some British money was paid to the Zimbabwean government 
between 1981 and 1995 totalling 33 million pounds (Moyo, 2004) though British accounts say 
75 million pounds was paid. The British Labour government however stopped further payments 
after 1996, saying it no longer recognised colonial commitments to Zimbabwe; an announcement 
that was made through the infamous Clare Short letter (Short, 1997). Moyo, (2004) stated that 
the pace of land reform was painstakingly slow, indicating that between 1980 and 1985, about 
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 Bronnert (Interview, 2013, May, 7), the British ambassador to Zimbabwe, dismissed the idea that there had 
been a secret deal promising to fund land reform outside the terms of the Lancaster Agreement though President 
Robert Mugabe repeatedly said that the Lancaster Talks were saved by an unwritten promise by the British and the 
Americans that they would fund land reform in Zimbabwe. Ambassador Bronnert said Zimbabwe could not expect 
British taxpayers to pay for the compensation of land in Zimbabwe. 
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430 000 hectares were acquired and between 1985 and 1992 the pace of acquisition fell to below 
75 000 hectares per annum whilst between 1992 and 1997, 158 000 hectares were acquired per 
year. The total land acquired by 1986 was about 3.4 million hectares (29% of agricultural land) 
with a substantial amount of that land being accounted for by illegal occupations by the land-
hungry blacks. As a result, a total of 70 000 black households were resettled which fell far short 
of the targeted 162 000 families.  
Beginning in 1991 after the expiry of the ten year buffer period imposed by the British 
government through the Lancaster constitution, the Government of Zimbabwe introduced legal 
amendments that sought to quicken the pace of resettlement. Resistance to full-scale land reform 
persisted and as from February 2000, over 60 000 liberation war veterans and other landless 
Africans occupied 1 700 farms owned by white farmers as a demonstration of their anger and 
frustration at the continuation of the racially skewed ownership of land in the country (Moyo, 
2004). Although Western governments called for the respect of property rights which would 
have seen government protecting white land-owners,25 in July 2000, government embarked on a 
“Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme” (FTLRP) acquiring over 3 000 farms and resettling 
about 100 000 families in six months (Moyo & Yeros, 2004). The stated target at the beginning 
of the FTLRP was to acquire a further 5 million hectares and to resettle approximately 110 000 
families (Moyo, 2004). The land resettlement programme became an on-going programme, 
whose aim Government said was to meet the land desires of Zimbabweans and by 2008, 162 000 
families had been resettled (Moyo, 2004). Although government initially had pledged to pay for 
improvements done on the farms, as the economy continued to decline under sanctions imposed 
by embittered Western countries, the ZANU PF government assumed a war mode and 
compensation was stopped further straining relations between the Government of Zimbabwe and 
the former white commercial farmers backed by their countries of origin.  
On the economic front, Zimbabwe in 1980 began with five year development plans whose main 
focus was to improve the social welfare of the formally marginalised blacks and as a result, 
government scored a number of positive achievements in the social services sectors. There was 
rapid expansion in secondary and tertiary education (Badza, 2005). Whilst at independence, only 
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 Bronnert (Interview, 2013, May, 7) reiterated the British position that land reform was a Zimbabwean issue 
but as a British government they expected that the pledge made in 2008 by the parties to the GPA to do a land audit 
would be fulfilled, that a tenure system would be put in place and that there would be proper compensation from the 
Government of Zimbabwe for those who lost land. 
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40% of children went to primary school, by 1985, over 93% were attending school and in the  
health sector, government achieved a significant shift of facilities and resource allocation from 
urban to rural areas and from curative to preventive health care (Kanyenze, et al., 2011). The 
USA ambassador to Zimbabwe, Bruce Wharton acknowledged the gains by ZANU PF and 
President Mugabe’s policies in education and health saying:  
The country has extraordinary intellectual capital. (President) Robert Mugabe invested 
very well in education and health from the very beginning from 1980 forward and the 
result is that you got an extraordinarily very well-educated population – the highest 
literacy rate in sub-Saharan Africa. Culturally, Zimbabweans work hard, they are honest, 
they are ethical – they are extra-ordinary people (Wharton, 2013).  
Despite the long term benefits of these policies, the massive channelling of resources to social 
services to achieve equity without a significant expansion of the national income began to choke 
the economy through an ever-growing balance of payment deficit (Kanyenze, et al., 2011). 
Government was forced to adopt the International Monetary Fund ESAP in return for budgetary 
support (Mwanza, 1999). The IMF programmes however failed to spur economic growth as the 
country’s external debt continued to grow and the austerity measures began to erode living 
standards (Badza, 2005).  
Towards the end of the second decade of independence, war veterans began to demand 
compensation for their involvement in the liberation struggle culminating in the 1997 
Zimbabwean $50 000 dollars lump sum gratuities and monthly allowances to every surviving 
war veteran though the money had not been budgeted for and was one of the main reasons 
behind the crash of the Zimbabwean currency in the same year. In 1998, following the invasion 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by rebels supported by Rwanda and Uganda, the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) intervened to assist Laurent Kabila’s Government at the 
latter’s request under the auspices of SADC though some of the member states took a back 
seat26. Nathan (2013) said during the formative years of the OPDSC, President Mugabe who was 
then its chairman made decisions without consulting member states in his contest for power with 
then President Nelson Mandela who was the SADC chair and this included the decision to 
intervene in the DRC. Kanyenze et al. (2011) say these developments drained the Zimbabwean 
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 In SADC, only Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe sent forces to the DRC and the rest of the countries 
became by-standers though at a Troika meeting in Victoria Falls, a number of them (South Africa and Tanzania for 
example) had pledged support for the intervention (Charamba, 2014, Jun. 3). 
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economy and mostly the urban workers who were bearing the brunt of the decline and the ESAP 
reforms became increasingly disenchanted and organised strikes for improved working 
conditions that were suppressed by security forces. Owing to the growing disenchantment 
amongst the urban middle class, an alliance was formed between the workers union, former 
white commercial farmers and civil society groups leading to the creation of an opposition party, 
the MDC with support from Western countries that had been miffed mainly by land reform and 
other ZANU PF nationalist policies setting the stage for the political conflict that then ensued. In 
a survey of what went wrong from 1980 to 1997, Muzondidya (2009) presented a similar account 
observing that Zimbabwe undoubtedly made some limited economic and social progress in the 
early years but concluded that: 
Some of these advances helped the country to become more competitive internationally 
and had a lasting legacy, but most were short-term and targeting welfare improvement. 
Many programmes were unsustainable, and did not adequately address the serious 
challenges of land and economic-resource ownership, justice and equity, the 
reconfiguration of the nation state, political inclusiveness and openness, or issues of 
nationhood and citizenship. …centrally there was little radical reform of the colonial 
economy or of the legacy of inequality. Many of the inherited tensions and divisions 
based on race, ethnicity, regionalism, class and gender were therefore not resolved. The 
unresolved tensions and divisions widened towards the late 1980s and beginning in the 
1990s, the economy began to contract seriously and government increasingly struggled to 
meet its delivery targets as social problems for the poor began to mount (p. 199).  
4.4 Establishing what went wrong in Zimbabwe leading to the conflict from 2000 
Bercovitch et al. (2009) have argued that whilst conflict resolution has at most been seized with 
finding expedient solutions to prevailing conflicts, the total resolution of those conflicts should 
come from eliminating their root causes. Another important consideration about the total 
resolution of conflicts is fed by the consideration that solutions come from doing what is morally 
right. Determining what is right and wrong in a conflict requires an objective and deep 
understanding of the problems creating the conflict. The problem is further compounded by the 
fact that in any conflict, people are more inclined to take sides aligning with the parties in the 
conflict depending on their ideological orientation, value systems and their interests in the 
conflict. Parties to the conflict also tend to want to always project themselves in good light, 
blaming their perceived enemies as the ones causing the conflict. These contradictions were at 
play in the conflict in Zimbabwe making conflict mapping a very difficult undertaking. Stone 
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(2007) said an analysis of the issues creating the conflict was made contentious by the framing of 
Zimbabwe’s problems since 2000. Diagram 1 presented the conflict map in Zimbabwe as of 
February 2007 showing the parties, their alliances and the conflicting pattern and reveals how 
complex the conflict was. Polarisation along political party lines which fitted well in the global 
ideological stand-offs as a direct consequence of the developments in the country since 2000 was 
a dominant feature. A review of the historiography about the situation in Zimbabwe shows that it 
was in the main fed and dominated by two opposing views: the neo-liberal view on one hand and 
the anti-imperialist view on the other. 
The neo-liberal view contends that the problems in Zimbabwe were centred on a dictatorship that 
clang to power through crude anti-imperialist rhetoric designed to divert blame for problems of 
its own making. This view finds resonance with the elite theory; the idea that a small group seeks 
power for power’s sake and manipulates the public through lies and rhetoric to stay on top 
(Gowans, 2008). Consequently, those that stand for this view typically argue that President 
Robert Mugabe is a ruthless dictator who undertook land reform to reward his allies, intervened 
in the DRC to profit from the rich mineral resources of that country and implemented measures 
to increase black Zimbabwean ownership in the economy when the real motive was to enrich his 
allies (Raftopoulos, 2006). In his analysis of the crisis in Zimbabwe, Moore (2001b) said it is 
‘political,’ arguing that ZANU PF instigated land reform when it feared losing the 2000 elections 
and concluded that the source of the crisis lies in three intricately tied problems: the impasse of 
primitive accumulation, the dilemma of state formation and the dialectic of democratisation. 
Holland (2009) argued that President Mugabe is a liberation fighter who turned into a tyrant 
owing to his obsession with power as well as the intransigence of Britain over its obligations as a 
former colonial power Britain. Those that present an opposing view argue that President Mugabe 
is a hero who undertook land reform to address colonial imbalances and has been a target of 
Western countries because of his efforts to advance the welfare of his people. The issues that are 
generally raised about what went wrong in Zimbabwe, depending on which side one is, include: 
lack of a clear ideology, failure to reconfigure the state, failure to redress colonial inequalities, a 
failed reconciliation, bad governance, mismanagement of the economy, exploitation of the 
liberation legacy, unbudgeted for payouts to liberation war veterans and the military intervention 
in the DRC, among other factors. 
Zimbabwe has been ruled by ZANU PF since 1980 although there was an Inclusive Government 
that included the two MDC factions as junior partners from 2008 to 2013. In 1980, the ZANU-
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PF Government officially declared itself to be socialist in ideological orientation, implying that it 
was committed to principles of building a nation based on an equitable redistribution of 
resources for the benefit of the formerly disadvantaged social groups such as blacks, women, 
peasants and workers (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2002). Although the ZANU PF Government took this 
ideological stance at independence in 1980, in practice the socialist ideology was super-imposed 
on a capitalist system as the white-dominated economy was allowed to continue in the spirit of 
reconciliation (Mandaza, 2005) and possibly a lack of an immediate viable alternative. Mushava 
(2014) argued that although ZANU PF and its armed wing (ZANLA) had gained an upper hand 
in the struggle due to its adoption of Maoist doctrine which placed the masses at the centre of its 
strategy and after independence remained firmly committed to empowering those masses, its 
politics was communist in structure but capitalist in behaviour and this created contradictions. 
From a production perspective, the Government of Zimbabwe failed to propagate socialist modes 
of production in support of its chosen ideology. Although a Ministry of Cooperatives was 
established, the concept soon fizzled out as the capitalist economy continued to thrive. The 
contradictions between socialist oriented policies and the capitalist white-dominated economy 
would soon impose a heavy cost on the economy as noted by Ndlovu- Gatsheni (2011) that: 
The main flaw of the early economic and developmental policies was their dependence 
on redistribution of what was available without clear strategies for increasing production. 
The early policies were geared towards large expenditures on education, health and 
welfare, and rural development, subsidisation of essential commodities such as food and 
fuel, subsidisation of state corporations to keep the prices of goods and services they 
supplied down, training and deployment of black Zimbabweans in senior positions in all 
areas of the public sector, upward adjustment of wages and salaries to bridge the gap 
between black and white earnings and a limited programme to encourage the emergence 
of a black rural and urban petit bourgeoisie (p. 66).  
 
As noted earlier, the efforts to improve the welfare of the formerly marginalised blacks did pay 
off as social services greatly improved but down the line the economy began to fail to sustain the 
huge welfare expenditure and the only option was to rely on extensive borrowing in the process 
ballooning the national debt and forcing the country to turn to international financial institutions 
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to get balance of payment support27. The ESAP period saw the country being pushed more 
towards economic liberalisation. After the failure of the ESAP regime, the country continued 
with mixed economic policies seeking to implement price controls, promoting the participation 
of the state in the economy and maintaining subsidies in selected sectors parallel to the 
prevailing capitalist economy. Without judging the choice of ideology at independence given the 
social inequalities that prevailed and in view of the eventual failure of communism as an 
alternative global political economic model, it was also the failure to articulate and ground the 
chosen socialist ideology in all facets of statecraft in the early years of independence that saw 
Zimbabwe becoming more vulnerable to the Western capitalist system to which it had long 
historical links when it then decided to take a course of pursuing total emancipation for the 
majority blacks.  
From 2000 onwards, ZANU PF adopted a more robust anti-imperialist ideology modelled around 
liberation ethos, national sovereignty and resource nationalisation that was accompanied by the 
propagation of those ideas in most state programmes and communication channels (Charamba, 
Interview, 2014, Jun. 5). Raftopoulos (2003), Ranger (2004) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) 
suggested that ZANU PF’s ideology since 2000 was based on rhetoric inspired by a desire to 
achieve regime security in the face of waning political fortunes. The onset of land reform and the 
hostilities it generated in the West however drove ZANU PF into a siege mentality forcing it to 
find greater resonance with its founding ideas that crystalised around self-determination, social 
equity and nation-building. It was for this reason that President Mugabe called his cabinet after 
the 2005 elections a ‘war cabinet’ and gave it a main mandate of steering the country in the fight 
against Western countries. Despite the West’s claims that the ZANU PF ideology was empty 
rhetoric, the Zimbabwe government’s anti-imperialist and anti-neo-colonial credentials under 
ZANU PF rested on the following policy positions: 
In the 1990s, intervening militarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo on the side of 
the Government of Laurent Kabila, to counter an invasion by Rwandan and Ugandan 
forces backed by the US and Britain; rejecting a pro-foreign investment economic 
restructuring programme established by the IMF as a condition for balance of payment 
                                                    
27
 Chihuri (interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said that one of the monumental mistakes Government did after 1980 
was to allow the same foreigners that had condoned colonialism to be at the forefront of planning for government 
within the ESAP framework. In his view, ESAP was not introduced to improve the welfare of Zimbabweans but to 
make citizens to turn against their government as happened in Zambia when Kenneth Kaunda was removed from 
power following food riots that were a direct consequence of the economic reforms. 
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support after initially accepting it; the expropriation of farms owned by settlers of 
European origin as part of a programme of land redistribution aimed at benefiting the 
historically disadvantaged African population; and, the enactment of foreign investment 
controls and other measures aimed at increasing black ownership of the country’s natural 
resources and enterprises (Gowans, 2008). 
Zimbabwe was in 2014 listed by the BBC together with Afghanistan and Syria as one of the 
countries where it was very difficult to do business citing unfavourable tariff policies, foreign 
investment controls, subsidies and discrimination against foreign investors in favour of an 
indigenous controlled economy. What put a wedge between the ZANU PF Government and 
Western countries were the former’s policies that did not safe-guard foreign ownership rights, 
foreign investment and export opportunities. Although ZANU PF adopted a more robust 
nationalistic and anti-imperialist ideology in the face of increasing hostilities from the West, the 
resultant drying up of traditional funding from the West and the reluctance by China28 to provide 
meaningful financial support to Zimbabwe without mortgaging the country’s resources hampered 
the full implementation of ZANU PF’s envisaged economic and social programmes. 
The empowerment policies that ZANU PF pursued were also in some cases manipulated by 
those in positions of authority as the resources intended to benefit the poor ended up being 
diverted by the elite. Consequently well-meaning programmes that were intended to spur 
agricultural productivity such as the mechanisation and inputs support schemes were in certain 
instances manipulated for the benefit of those that were well connected with The Herald of 15 
March 2012 reporting that the then Vice President Mujuru complained that some senior 
government officials were stealing farming inputs 29 . Economic difficulties that Zimbabwe 
experienced as a result of the negative effects of ESAP, Western sanctions, drying up of foreign 
investment, lack of adequate funding for its economic programs and corruption were some of the 
reasons why ZANU PF support was declining leading to its poor showing in the 2008 elections 
(Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb. 17).   
                                                    
28
 Although China was in public claiming to be a close ally of ZANU PF, for the greater part of the conflict 
period, monetary assistance was more based on economic considerations than benevolence insisting that previous 
loans should be serviced before more injections could be made. 
29
 A ZANU PF Politburo member, Sikhanyiso Ndlovu was quoted in the Southern Eye newspaper of 26 May 
2014 saying that if corruption in ZANU PF was not stopped, it would kill the political organisation. 
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The dominant alternative ideological viewpoint in Zimbabwe emanated from the MDC 
especially the faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai and gravitated around liberalism calling for 
closer ties with the West, the need to attract foreign direct investment, greater reliance on 
Western donors, job creation and respect for private property (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 
16). Coltart (2008) gave a detailed account, from an MDC perspective, of what went wrong in 
Zimbabwe since independence saying at the root of Zimbabwe’s problems was a corrupt political 
elite that had, with considerable international support, behaved with utter impunity for some two 
decades. To Coltart (2008), ZANU PF was determined to hang on to power no matter what the 
consequences, “lest it be held to account for the genocide in Matabeleland in the early 1980s and 
the wholesale looting of Zimbabwe that followed a mismanaged land reform in 2000” (p. 2). His 
suggested solution to the problem in Zimbabwe was a new political dispensation and the 
alternative would come from the MDC. A former active member of the MDC and now a pro-
opposition academic, Brian Raftopoulos (2006), added that it was the breakdown of norms of 
governance, the anti-colonial agenda and the politics of human rights that were the major factors 
underpinning the crisis in Zimbabwe and took the position that issues pertaining to 
democratisation and human rights could not be sidelined to the periphery in the crisis. 
There is a striking difference between what the opposition MDC says it stands for on paper and 
its policy propositions in practice. The MDC constitution (2000) that was adopted at 
Chitungwiza under a section titled aims, values and objectives says among other things:  
3.1. It shall be a Social Democratic Party whose core values shall be solidarity, justice, 
equality, liberty, freedom, transparency, humble and obedient leadership and 
accountability. 3.2 The MDC shall pursue social liberation policies aimed at completing 
the unfinished business of the national liberation movement and in particular shall strive 
for the democratic structural economic liberation, empowerment and transformation of 
Zimbabwe. 3.3 The MDC shall seek the mandate of the people to govern the country and 
work for; (a) A dynamic economy built on the principles of a mixed market economy 
with a strong social conscience. (b) An open democracy, in which national government is 
accountable to the people through the devolution of power and decision-making to the 
provinces and local institutions and structures ...” (p. 1). 
The MDC’s envisaged national programmes presupposed being bankrolled by Western countries 
through aid and as such most of its proposed policies were greatly influenced by the liberal 
policies of the West’s capitalist system. Chigora, Guzura & Mutumburanzou, (2011)  argued that 
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the major problem that faced the opposition since its formation was lack of a clear ideology and 
strategy to deal with the political situation in Zimbabwe including a failure to come up with 
home-grown programmes that would convince the majority of the people. The following 
quotation supports the view: 
As a political party, the MDC was created by a coalition of civic groups that were united 
more by distaste for (President Robert) Mugabe and ZANU-PF than by any unity of 
political programmes. It can be argued that the MDC came into being because the 
unifying vision of the liberation struggle had broken down, and the ‘democratic deficit’ 
and the failing economic environment had emerged as major challenges to the actual 
experience of liberation. It was therefore apparent even before the recent discord in the 
opposition camp came to a head that the MDC might struggle to keep these different 
social forces unified under its leadership, and that it might, in future, become divided on 
ideological grounds and fundamental differences in policy. Some observers point out that 
‘it was the MDC’s belief that the issues of ideology and participation would be 
negotiated once (President) Mugabe’s regime had been dislodged from power’ 
(Maroleng, 2004).  
Despite identifying the party as a social democratic party bent on completing the unfinished 
business of national liberation in Zimbabwe, the MDC failed to attract to its membership those 
that participated in the war of liberation amidst claims that Morgan Tsvangirai actually ran away 
from the armed struggle. With the war veterans fully behind ZANU PF, the opposition became a 
declared enemy of the liberation veterans leaving it with little or no room to take the project of 
national liberation further as it alienated itself from the liberators. In addition, the opposition 
established strong links with the former colonial power Britain, former Rhodesians30 and most of 
the civic groups that were regime change projects funded by Western powers to propel the 
regime change agenda.  
The opposition and Western powers were agitating for security sector reforms (SSR) in 
Zimbabwe, arguing that the security establishment was ZANU PF to the core and would not 
                                                    
30
 Roy Bennett (MDC T party treasurer), Ian Kay (a former MDC T Member of Parliament), Giles Mutsekwa 
(MDC T shadow minister of defence) and Martin Rupiya (a former MDC T security advisor to Tsvangirai) were 
members of the Rhodesian security forces who held senior positions in the opposition providing a sense of a 
reincarnation of the failed Rhodesian project in independent Zimbabwe.  
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countenance the transfer of power to a party with no liberation credentials31. Chikuhwa (2013) 
suggested that the problem in Zimbabwe was that President Mugabe was under siege from his 
own system especially the securocrats who were now telling him what to do. The view that the 
members of the security forces might have been biased against the opposition became more 
entrenched when General Zvinavashe announced just before the 2002 presidential elections that:  
We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations 
will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, 
traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe’s 
hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this 
end, let it be known that the highest office in the land (the presidency) is a straitjacket 
whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will 
therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that 
threatens the very existence of our sovereignty (Zvinavashe, 2002). 
Tendi (2008) observed that although the statement which came two months before the 2005 
elections was interpreted to have been meant for Morgan Tsvangirai and at that time securocrats 
increased their leverage over the various organs of the state, the economy, legislature, party and 
government structures, and it was argued that they were behind the ZANU PF refusal to concede 
defeat in 2008 by orchestrating a nationwide campaign of violence and intimidation to ensure 
victory for President Mugabe in the re-run,32 the real motive behind the general’s statement was 
a culmination of a strong sense of siege that was partly bred by what he saw as a false domestic 
and international media coverage, and hostile foreign policies by Western powers towards 
Zimbabwe. The general cited as examples the false coup that was reported by Ray Choto and 
Mark Chavhunduka in 1999 in The Standard newspaper; the claim by Grace Kwinje that a 
soldier killed in combat in the DRC had been buried without his head; reports of looting by the 
military in the DRC war; allegations of political victimisation by prison officers and reports that 
the Joint Operations Command (JOC) had advised President Mugabe to go (Tendi, 2008). It is 
for this reason that the statement concluded with the following words:  
                                                    
31
 Chihuri (Interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said the police is part of the security establishment charged with 
maintaining law and order in Zimbabwe and just like is the practice anywhere in the world, it would not allow 
anyone to create lawlessness as a way of wanting to use unconstitutional means to gain political power.  
32
 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) suggested that the Army, Police and Intelligence Services were 
actually viewed as a source of insecurity in the country by the opposition. 
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Over the past two years, there has been a marked increase in speculative, imaginary and 
false articles by the so-called independent media both internally and internationally, on 
the status of the national security organisations. These statements have caused insecurity, 
uncertainty, confusion and have in the main tarnished the credibility of the national 
security arms of the state of Zimbabwe. All these machinations have prompted the 
convening of this press briefing (Zvinavashe, 2002).  
 
More importantly, the general did not say that any person who had not participated in the 
liberation struggle would not rule Zimbabwe but that “the security organisations will only stand 
in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs 
for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests” (Zvinavashe, 2002). The key words were 
on leaders who pursue Zimbabwean values including upholding the gains of the liberation 
struggle. Then Brigadier General, Douglas Nyikayaramba later on repeated similar sentiments 
more explicitly saying that the security forces and ZANU-PF were inseparable (Chikuhwa, 
2013). He reiterated that he would not serve under the leadership of anyone who did not have 
liberation war credentials and that the security forces would do anything possible to make sure 
President Robert Mugabe remained in power until they felt the threat was over. Nyikayaramba 
was quoted saying: 
Tsvangirai doesn’t pose a political threat in any way in Zimbabwe, but is a major security 
threat. He takes instructions from foreigners who seek to effect illegal regime change in 
Zimbabwe. This is what has invited the security forces to be involved because we want to 
ensure we protect our national security interests. When he said Mugabe must go 
peacefully or else forcefully, was that democratic or constitutional? Daydreamers who 
want to reverse the gains of our liberation struggle will continue daydreaming. They can 
go to hell … they will never rule this country. We cannot keep quiet. We will continue 
speaking and as the security forces, we will not sit back and watch things going wrong 
(Nyikayaramba, 2011, p. 1). 
Charamba (Interview, 2014, Jun. 5) supported this view arguing that the pronouncements and the 
actions of the security sector in support of ZANU PF had to be understood from the premise that 
the officers who were holding various ranks in the security establishments were the very people 
who fought for the liberation of Zimbabwe under ZANLA and ZIPRA and an attack on ZANU 
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PF was an attack on the liberation ethos and their persons as they are part and parcel of the 
liberation movement.  
 
To illustrate the relationship between the military of a nation and its political and economic 
aspirations, a lengthy quote from the remarks that were made by one of the USA’s most 
decorated retired marine four star officer, General Smedley Butler who wrote in the magazine 
Common Sense in 1935 on the role of the United States Armed Forces (USAF) in furthering 
economic interests of the US is instructive:  
It may seem odd for me, a military man to adopt such a comparison. Truthfulness 
compels me to. I spent 33 years and 4 months in active service as a member of our 
country’s most agile military force - the Marine Corps. I served in all commissioned 
ranks from a second lieutenant to Major-General. And during that period I spent most of 
my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the 
bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. I suspected I was just part of a racket 
at the time. Now I am sure of it. Like all members of the profession I never had an 
original thought until I left the service. My mental faculties remained in suspended 
animation while I obeyed the orders of the higher-ups. This is typical of everyone in the 
military service. Thus I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American 
oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City 
Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American 
republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify 
Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers 1909 -12. I brought 
light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make 
Honduras ‘right’ for American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927, I helped see to 
it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested (Butler, 1935). 
If the views from this decorated general are anything to go by, the USAF fights to further the 
security, political and economic interests of the US. This is normal practice by all states in an 
anarchic world order where national survival comes first on any country’s national interests list 
and the Zimbabwean security apparatus could not be an exception.  
In the minds of the members of Zimbabwean security forces and the War Veterans in particular, 
Zimbabwean independence and liberation ethos are the nation’s number one value 
(Nyikayaramba, Interview, 2015, Feb. 13). When one takes the freshness of the brutal and 
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oppressive white settler rule into account, removing ZANU PF from power supported by forces 
that were behind colonialism was tantamount to reversing the gains of the liberation struggle33. It 
was not surprising therefore that ZANU PF was interlocked and inseparable with its security 
establishment. The security sector thus naturally viewed the MDC T agenda as a threat to 
Zimbabwean national security by seeking to go into bed with the same Western countries that 
created conditions of inequality, disenfranchisement and poverty through colonialism34. Writing 
in The Sunday Mail, Munyaradzi Kereke (2012), a former advisor to the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe Governor said if Morgan Tsvangirai wanted to rule the country, he needed to 
appreciate and value the contributions made by the security sector in Zimbabwe, both in terms of 
liberating the country from colonialism and to ensuring that he could present his candidature 
wanting to be president as a free citizen. This followed an attack on the security forces by 
Morgan Tsvangirai alleging that they were stifling democracy and looting state resources. Obi 
(2008) also buttressed the point saying that in Zimbabwe, the local conditions were that the 
system entrenched in power had its roots in the liberation struggle and that fact could not be 
ignored. It thus would have been folly for ZANU PF to deploy anti-establishment people in key 
security posts after independence as much as the opposition security apparatus was dominated by 
former Rhodesian soldiers whose opposition to black self-rule dated back to the time when Ian 
Smith was fighting to maintain white political and economic domination of the black majority. 
Most of the literature that seeks to explain what went wrong in Zimbabwe presents the viewpoint 
that land reform was implemented by ZANU PF in response to its waning popularity. To the 
contrary, the failure to implement land reform in the first two decades of independence can be 
attributed to the ‘sunset clause’ that was in the Lancaster constitution which barred the post-
colonial government from changing the constitution and protected white ownership of the land 
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 Chihuri (Interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said the greatest security threat facing Zimbabwe since 2000 came from 
elements that were manipulated and sponsored by foreign powers, especially Britain and the USA that sought to 
weaken state institutions as a way of achieving regime change under the guise of fighting for democracy. The 
Commissioner General said security sector reforms were aimed at removing people who support the liberation party 
from positions of authority as a way of penetrating the system to achieve regime change in the country. 
34
 Chihuri (Ibid) suggested that the reason why Western countries had so much interest in Zimbabwe was 
because they have looted resources in the country for a very long time and would want to continue to do so adding 
that in Morgan Tsvangirai, the West had found a willing puppet who would do everything possible at the expense of 
his countrymen to please his masters. He said as former liberation fighters, they were not ashamed of serving the 
liberation party in government loyally the same way the British South African Police was not ashamed to serve 
settler governments in Rhodesia. 
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through the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ provision and the quest to avoid derailing prospects for 
majority rule in South Africa and Namibia. Asked in an interview to mark his 90th birthday in 
February 2014 by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) why the liberation 
movements had agreed to end the war with the land reform still unresolved, President Robert 
Mugabe said that former presidents Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, who were key 
supporters of the liberation struggle had said it was better to accept political independence first 
because economic independence would follow later. Protected by the constitution, the whites 
held on to their prime land and resettlement marginally took place in the infertile regions that 
were mostly prone to droughts. Two major developments happened in 1997 and scuttled the 
efforts to resolve the land question amicably. The first one was the coming into power by a 
Labour government in Britain after which Clare Short, the Secretary of State for International 
Development wrote to the Zimbabwe government stating that: 
… I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to 
meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new Government from diverse 
backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as 
you know we were colonised not colonisers. We do, however, recognise the very real 
issues you face over land reform. We believe that land reform could be an important 
component of a Zimbabwean programme designed to eliminate poverty. We would be 
prepared to support a programme of land reform that was part of a poverty eradication 
strategy but not on any other basis. I am told Britain provided a package of assistance for 
resettlement in the period immediately following independence. This was, I gather, 
carefully planned and implemented, and met most of its targets. Again, I am told there 
were discussions in 1989 and 1996 to explore the possibility of further assistance. 
However that is all in the past … (Short, 1997). 
While the letter acknowledged that the initial package of assistance meant for land reform had 
been properly implemented, as noted in the preceding sections, that phase of the land reform 
programme failed to have any meaningful impact on the land question.  
The second development was a meeting convened at Dhirihori Business Centre when a group of 
about 30 people from Svosve Communal Lands in Mashonaland East led by their late Chief 
Svosve, Enock Zenda, unanimously agreed that the reclamation of the land that was forcibly 
taken away from them by white settlers should begin in earnest and became the first group of 
Zimbabweans to move into formerly white-owned farms by force under the FTLRP. They 
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embarked on a spirited land reclamation exercise that came to be popularly known as “jambanja” 
that soon spread to other parts of the country like a wild fire. Although some called them 
“looters” while others gave them such derogatory names as “land grabbers, land invaders or even 
murderers,” the then reigning Chief Svosve, Lovemore Zenda, was quoted by The Sunday Mail 
saying: 
When the white men came in 1897, they drove the Svosve people from the land that had 
good soils and that received high rainfall. The indigenous people of this area were driven 
to mountainous areas that are not fit for human habitation … We had about three white 
farmers who were supportive of the Government’s development initiatives. Their farms 
were spared and up to this day we are closely working with them. The late vice-president 
Cde Simon Muzenda came here and addressed us. We told him frankly that all what we 
wanted was land and we were not going back on the exercise. The late Cde Kumbirai 
Kangai, who was then the minister responsible for lands, also came here and we had a 
fruitful discussion with him (Chara, 2013). 
With the passage of time, many more people including war veterans led by the late Dr Chenjerai 
Hunzvi joined in the cause to reclaim land and Government soon realised that the new pace of 
the revolution now playing out through land ownership could not be ignored and officially 
coined the term FTLRP for it.  
The Government of Zimbabwe however agreed to a Donor Conference on land which was held 
in 1998. In his opening statement, President Robert Mugabe underscored the importance and 
urgency of resolving the land question in Zimbabwe and warned that if nothing was done, more 
people would invade the farms as had been done by the Svosve people and government would 
find it difficult to stop them (GoZ, 1998). He reiterated Government’s commitment to acquire 
five million hectares in five years to resettle about 150 000 families and stressed that the 
objective of the Land Reform Programme would be to establish a more efficient and rational 
structure in farming, achieve optimal utilisation of land and natural resources and provide 
equitable access to land to all Zimbabweans irrespective of colour, gender or creed (Mugabe, 
1998). The donors unanimously endorsed the need for land reform and resettlement in Zimbabwe 
and affirmed that it was essential for poverty reduction, economic growth and stability. President 
Mugabe later announced that the Government of Zimbabwe abandoned the recommendations of 
the conference because of the conditions that came with the package including the call for a pilot 
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project that was to last 24 months which he said was not feasible given the pressing demand for 
land by the blacks.  
Western countries urged government to restrain the land occupiers but the latter refused saying it 
would face a revolt from the people35. The MDC condemned the FTLRP exercise saying that it 
violated property rights and most of the seized land was benefiting the elite in ZANU PF putting 
the opposition in the same corner with former white commercial farmers and Western countries 
that were opposed to the programme36. In an interview with the BBC’s ‘Hard Talk’ programme 
in 2000, a senior MDC official, Fidellis Mhashu, said if voted into power, his party would return 
land to former white farmers (Tendi, 2010). Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation 
Development Minister Joseph Made however said about land reform: “We were defeated by the 
British. So we took up arms to fight for that right to vote, which was denied to us, and the right 
to reclaim our land. It was a fight to reclaim what was rightfully ours. It’s not denying anything 
to anybody on racial grounds” (Made, 2013). More forcefully, President Mugabe (2001) said: 
… Land was the prime goal for King Lobengula, land was the principal grievance for our 
heroes of the First Chimurenga and thus principal definer of the succeeding new Nation 
and State of Zimbabwe. Indeed we know it to be the core issue and imperative of the 
Third Chimurenga which you and me are fighting, and for which we continue to make 
such enormous sacrifices (p. 92). 
The US ambassador to Zimbabwe Bruce Wharton did not totally agree saying:  
They have a sovereign right to do that (reclaim the land from whites) but there are 
consequences. If you do it in a way that looks to the outside world like it is chaotic, like 
the rule of law has been suspended, like there is no real plan about making sure poor 
people get land as well as the wealthy people, there are consequences. Investors will walk 
away, tourists will stay away and that’s the sort of reality (Wharton, 2013). 
 
Western countries responded with sanctions with the US passing ZIDERA in 2001 and the EU, 
pressured by Britain, following suit with what it called ‘targeted measures against people and 
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 Chihuri (Interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said whilst land invasions were technically illegal, the police did not act 
against the perpetrators because it was the will of the majority of Zimbabweans and stopping them was likely to 
create civil unrest since the programme was a people’s revolution.   
36
 Mutambara (Interview, 2013, Jun. 20), then president of the smaller MDC, said the greatest mistake that the 
MDC T did was to be uncritical of the support they were getting from European countries.    
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entities that were hampering democracy in Zimbabwe’37. Although Britain over the years denied 
that land was at the centre of its row with Zimbabwe, the Danish ambassador to Zimbabwe Eric 
Brogger Rasmussen was more forthright saying: “The (cause of hostilities was the) land reform 
programme and the breakdown of the rule of law that followed it. The abuse of human rights did 
not make us happy, in protest we then closed our embassy here in 2002 … we slammed the door 
(on Zimbabwe) because we were not happy with the way land reform had been implemented” 
(Rasmussen, 2014). Mutambara (Interview. 2013, Jun. 20) said although Western countries said 
they were concerned about democracy, their real worries were about the fate of European settlers 
– mostly the British kith and kin in Zimbabwe -, and that if successful, the land reform idea 
would spread to other regions in the world.  
The white farmers stripped of their livelihood, became vehemently opposed to ZANU PF and 
joined hands with the opposition with some of them lodging complaints with the courts and 
when that failed, a group of 80 approached the SADC Tribunal also seeking redress (Nevin, 
2013). Although the Tribunal ruled in favour of the former white commercial farmers, the 
Government of Zimbabwe refused to be bound by the ruling and began to lobby for the 
Tribunal’s disbandment which eventually occurred in August 2012 in a SADC Summit that 
decided that the court would only resume operations when a new protocol limiting its 
jurisdiction to cases between member states had been passed (Nevin, 2013). Some of the former 
white farmers also made efforts to lodge complaints in foreign countries including in South 
Africa, Britain, France and the USA seeking to attach properties or intercept funds owned by the 
Government of Zimbabwe as compensation for their lost properties but the latter remained 
unfazed (Charamba, Interview, 2014, Jun. 3). Moyo (2005) argued that although the international 
community felt as if the programme was being used to bolster a faltering regime, the fear that 
state-led land reform would bring about economic collapse was unfounded given the social and 
political implications of a failure to address the land question from 1980. Mkodzongi (2010) 
agreed with Moyo (2005) asserting that although ZANU PF grabbed the opportunity to boost its 
dwindling popularity in 2000 and despite the negative ramifications of land reform in Zimbabwe, 
the programme was inevitable given the persistence of a skewed dual ownership structure 
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 Chihuri (Interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said most of the sanctions were crafted with inputs from members of the 
opposition which was treasonous. 
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decades after independence in a country where the struggle for liberation crystallised around the 
land issue.  
 
Despite the criticisms against land reform, Scones et al. (2010) carried out research focusing on 
the period 1997 to 2010 and said their findings debunked five myths about the programme: 
Zimbabwean land reform had been a total failure; the beneficiaries of Zimbabwean land reform 
had been largely ‘cronies;’ there was no investment in the new resettlements; agriculture was in 
complete ruins creating chronic food insecurity; and the rural economy had collapsed. They 
concluded that there was no single, simple story as presented by the media but that Zimbabwe 
had experienced a radical change in its agrarian structure and the programme was to a large 
extent a great success that was transforming the lives of most Zimbabweans arguing that:  
In the international media and beyond, the accepted wisdom has been that land reform in 
Zimbabwe has been a tale of unmitigated disaster. Images of chaos, destruction and 
violence have dominated the coverage. However, research into the controversial policy 
and its effects challenges this view (Scones, et al., 2010).  
An observation done by the researcher38 on the Land Reform Programme from 2011 to 2012 
revealed that despite these recorded successes of land reform, the programme did not address its 
conflictous elements with most of the former white farmers who were resisting eviction and were 
often kicked out by force losing farms and infrastructure without compensation because of the 
Government of Zimbabwe’s lack of resources and Britain’s uncompromising stance. Further, 
most of the former farm workers were left stranded on the farms setting the stage for clashes 
with the new land owners. Although offer letters were issued and later an effort was made to 
issue leases, so far there is no clear tenure system to guarantee permanent ownership leaving the 
possibility of perpetual land struggles open and a national land audit to determine who exactly 
got what still to be done. 
Politics also played a part in precipitating the crisis situation in Zimbabwe though it was difficult 
to draw a clear distinction between economic and political causes as they were neatly 
interwoven. Zamponi (2005) said a neo-patrimonialist analysis or the personal rule paradigm that 
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 Starting with almost nothing, the researcher got 154 hectares of land in 2002 and in 2012 borrowed a loan 
from the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe and installed irrigation infrastructure on 40 hectares and now, among other 
farming activities, the plot produces an average of 100 tonnes of soya from the 40 hectares every summer season 
and 100 tonnes of wheat from the 20 hectares of the irrigable area in winter, a piece of evidence that supports 
Scoones, et al.’s (2010) findings.   
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was advanced by the progressive scholars to explain the Zimbabwean crisis did not permit 
adequate debate on the complexities and on the difficulties encountered in the construction of the 
nation-state, on economic development and, above all on the redistributive policies after 
independence that sought to address the constraints brought about by the legacy of colonialism. 
One of the major issues that dominated the discourse on the political situation in Zimbabwe was 
that of legitimacy. The ZANU PF rule since 1980 can be divided into two distinct phases: the 
first one being the period from 1980 to 1997 in which it embraced a policy of reconciliation with 
the former oppressors in the process allowing the continuation of settler and foreign economic 
interests as well as pursuing broad social developmental programmes that guaranteed support 
from both the domestic constituency and the international community; and second, the period 
from 1998 to 2013 when it jettisoned reconciliation, attacked the settler and foreign domination 
of the economy and embraced the land reform programme in the process polarising the domestic 
constituency and attracting the wrath of Western powers. It was thus not surprising that elections 
that were held in the first phase were widely accepted by Western countries as democratic yet all 
those that were held in the second phase beginning in 2000 were routinely condemned, 
suggesting the issue was more than elections. The repeated condemnation of the electoral process 
in the second phase created legitimacy problems for ZANU PF that when coupled with other 
social and economic factors discussed above crystalised into a governance crisis. 
Literature focusing on the conflict in Zimbabwe in the period under study showed that most 
researchers tended to focus more on the long period President Robert Mugabe has been in power 
and his ways of governance, (Moore 2001, Sachikonye 2002, Niekerk 2003, Bratton, Chikwana 
& Sithole 2005, Krigger 2006, Raftopoulos 2006 and Anstey 2007). To Moore (2001), it was 
President Robert Mugabe’s bad governance which was at the core of the crisis. To Sachikonye 
(2002), Zimbabwe had a good start but lost it along the way when President Robert Mugabe 
resisted democratisation by authoritarianism and implemented populist malfunctioning policies 
concluding that the struggles for political space by the MDC was democratisation under severe 
test. Niekerk (2003) made a strong case for land reform in Zimbabwe viewing it from an 
axiological perspective. He however concluded that the way land reform was done in Zimbabwe 
precluded values both Western and African saying ZANU PF was responsible for the crisis. 
Bratton, Chikwana & Sithole (2005) followed through the crisis in Zimbabwe focusing on 
propaganda and public opinion and identified the contest ideologically in terms of the clashes 
between ZANU PF’s anti-Western views versus MDC pro-Western views. They also saw the 
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problem in terms of a ZANU PF party that does not want to relinquish power. It was also the 
same with Anstey (2007) whose views were discussed in chapter 2. 
African leaders that stayed in power for very long periods including Hosni Mubarak, Mammar 
Gaddafi, Mobuto Seseko and Kamuzu Banda did so enjoying the support of Western countries 
up to a point when they fell out of favour after tempering with the interests of those countries or 
began to be viewed as no longer useful allies. Until President Robert Mugabe allowed the 
FTLRP to proceed unabated from around the year 2000, he was a great statesman in the eyes of 
the West. Although President Mugabe’s rule came to be challenged for a number of reasons 
including his failure to balance between the early social redistributive policies and a settler 
economy left intact at independence, accepting ESAP that brought austerity hardships, the 
disruptions that came with his Government’s subsequent attack on settler and foreign economic 
interests as well as an increasing reliance on the state security apparatus and the war veterans 
when ZANU PF’s hold on to power was under attack, he remained a great hero to many of the 
formerly oppressed Africans for standing up against the West and restoring land rights to his 
people. The same reasons why the West saw him as a villain were in reverse the same reasons 
why some Africans viewed him as a great hero. Baffour Ankomah, the editor of the New African 
magazine gave an interview in which he said: 
 I have looked throughout history – both the pre and post independence history of Africa 
… He is the only African leader still standing, after 10 years of sustained and intensive 
assault by the combined might (and I use ‘combined’ advisedly) of the imperial powers. 
While progressive people worldwide congratulate President Mugabe for his consistency 
and unwavering stance in defence of Zimbabwean legacy and values, some wish him 
dead (Manzvanzvike, 2011). 
The hero perception was consistently confirmed by the standing ovations and wild applauses that 
he received in most African countries that he visited.  Landsberg delivered a speech in which he 
said:  
Some people think there is no opposition to Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe and some of us 
even believe that Mugabe is hated by his people. Only foolish people will believe this … 
Do you know how much Tsvangirai and Biti get from America every month? Do you 
know how much Madhuku and other so-called activists get from England? America 
thinks it’s driving for democracy in Zimbabwe yet they are busy fattening some clever 
people … When they (MDC formations and civil society leaders) are in their houses, they 
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know that Mugabe is a good leader. When they are within their families they even join us 
to pray for God to give Mugabe many more years of great wisdom (Landsberg, 2012). 
The real challenge to President Mugabe and ZANU PF’s hold on to power came after 1999 with 
the formation of the MDC and the negative effects of ESAP. Mutambara (Interview, 2013, Jun. 
20) said whilst ZANU PF had a case on the land issue, its greatest undoing was the failure to 
acknowledge the national outcry for democracy when it viewed all those who were making the 
call as puppets of the West. Consequently elections became a source of conflict in the country in 
the quest to control the state. Although the Senate existed in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1989 and 
was reintroduced in 1995, analysis will be confined to the House of Assembly which was always 
the most powerful political body in the country. The House of Assembly results of elections held 
between 1980 and 2013 are shown in the table on Appendix 1. Although numerous parties began 
to mushroom from 1995 onwards, the political landscape was dominated by ZANU PF, PF 
ZAPU and Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) from 1980 to 1990, by ZANU PF to 2000 
and by the united ZANU PF and the MDC from 2000 to 2013 with the rest of the smaller parties 
failing to manage even a single seat in all the plebiscites, except for ZANU NDONGA, whose 
highest achievement was two seats since 198039. In 2000, the MDC garnered 57 against ZANU 
PF’s 62 seats and in 2005 ZANU PF regained ground and garnered 78 seats with the MDC40 
managing 41 seats (IEC of Zimbabwe Report, 2000, 2005). The repeated failure by the 
opposition to change the political landscape through the ballot saw the electorate losing 
confidence in elections which manifested itself as voter-apathy. The table at Appendix 1 shows 
that whilst voter turnout was highest in 1980 at 84.1% owing to the black voters being excited by 
the prospect of voting for the first time in a free Zimbabwe, the turnout dropped to 75.47% in 
1985 reaching its lowest level of 25.98% in 1995. The emergence of the opposition saw the turn-
out rising marginally to 43.46% in 2000, 47.7% in 2005, 42.8% in 2008 and rising sharply to 
61.09% in 2013, suggesting the voters were once again keen to make their will heard through the 
ballot after the period of the Inclusive Government. ZANU PF lost its majority in the House of 
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 The enduring ZANU PF hold on political power in Zimbabwe since 1980 has seen a proliferation of 
political parties that by 2013 had numbered over 40 showing the determination to remove the liberation party from 
power through the ballot. Other than the MDC challenge, most of the parties have failed completely to make an 
impression as shown in the table on Appendix 1.  
40
 The MDC split into two parties with Morgan Tsvangirai leading the MDC T and Arthur Mutambara the 
other faction which retained the name MDC.   
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Assembly in the 2008 Harmonised Elections with MDC T garnering 100 against ZANU PF’s 99 
and the MDC, 1041 . Kurebwa (Interview, 2015, Feb. 17) argued that it was the effects of 
sanctions, a failing economy and ZANU PF excesses that drove the people towards the 
opposition in 2008.  
Those that blamed the long stay in power by ZANU PF as the main cause of the problems in 
Zimbabwe argued that ZANU PF managed to do so through violence, intimidation and rigging. 
It is true that political violence was used as a political weapon in Zimbabwe in the period after 
2000. Although those opposed to ZANU PF have attributed political violence to the ruling party, 
the fact of the matter was that both the ruling party and the opposition deployed violence as a 
means to political ends (Chihuri, Interview, 2013, Apr. 10). Whilst Magure (2009) argued that 
ZANU PF used collective memory framed around the liberation ethos to justify its hold onto 
power, the opposition since 2000 also used every trick in the book to depict itself as a victim of 
political violence even in instances where its members had initiated clashes. It should be 
observed that most of the intimidation that was deployed by those that support ZANU PF was 
centred on reminding the voters that ZANU PF had brought independence through the barrel of a 
gun and as such people were not expected to vote in manner that would reverse the gains of 
liberation. On rigging allegations, Gowans (2008) argued that if ZANU PF had been rigging 
elections since 2000, then its rigging capacity was appalling given that on two occasions, in 2000 
and in 2008, it nearly lost power to the opposition42. Feltoe (Interview, 2015, Feb. 20) who was a 
ZEC Commissioner during the Inclusive Government was of the view that it was not about 
outright rigging per se but rather the creation of an environment that would allow free and fair 
election to take place. Judging by the 2008 harmonised elections that were described as 
“generally free and fair” by most of the observers (EISA, 2008) and despite the pressure of 
sanctions and Western condemnation, the population was roughly equally divided between the 
two opposing parties.  
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 Following the split of the MDC in 2005, Tsvangirai’s group became known as MDC T and other party 
retained the name MDC initially led by Welshman Ncube and deputised by Gibson Sibanda (both Ndebele) who 
later roped in Arthur Mutambara as leader and got support mostly in the Matabeleland region where most of the 
seats came from. 
42
 The argument however fails to appreciate that that the degree a party can rig is limited to the extent that 
circumstances allow. 
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The conflict in Zimbabwe was political as much as it was economic without clear-cut boundaries 
in which it was obscure as to whether the political crisis caused the economic crisis or vice versa. 
From an economic viewpoint, Kanyenze et al. (2011) say following the failure of ESAP, 
subsequent policies were generally characterised by irrational controls, inconsistencies and 
reversals. The successor policy to ESAP was the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and 
Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) which targeted to cut the budget deficit by 6.5 percent of 
GDP by 2001, reduce inflation to five percent by the end of 2000, envisaged a GDP growth rate 
of 6 percent per annum and the creation of 42 000 jobs (ZIMPREST, 1998). These impressive 
targets were never achieved as the economy continued to deteriorate. Economic matters came to 
a head with the crash of the Zimbabwe dollar on 14 November 1997 triggered among other 
factors by the unbudgeted payouts to war veterans, the involvement in the war in the DRC in 
1998 and a salary increase by between 69 to 90 percent to pacify the increasingly restive civil 
servants in 2000 (Kanyenze, et al., 2011). The major knock to the economy came with the onset 
of the FTLRP in 2000 which disrupted agricultural activities and the whole downstream 
industries and also resulted in a significant number of donors and investors deserting the country. 
The situation was worsened by a massive propaganda campaign by Western countries which 
made the country appear an unsafe destination for foreign capital.  
 
The massive depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar and misaligned exchange rates between the 
black market and the official exchange rate reduced the Zimbabwean economy’s external 
competitiveness and the budget deficit continued to deteriorate growing from 6 percent of GDP 
in 1998 to over 18 percent by the end of 2000 (Mutambudzi, 2007). Government was forced to 
borrow to support current expenditure rather than investments and this continued to choke the 
economy. The country accumulated arrears on its external debt repayments which had grown to 
$1.3 billion by 2002 ballooning to $6 billion by 2009 (Kanyenze et al., 2011). US Ambassador to 
Zimbabwe Bruce Wharton said some of the problems that Zimbabwe was facing were self-
inflicted:  
One of the things I hear Zimbabweans saying is Zimbabwe never did anything wrong. In 
fact, I think there were some mistakes. I’m not saying that was wrong (paying large sums 
as compensation to war veterans), but when they did that, the currency blew up. I think 
they made a mistake in 1999 when they walked away from their debts to the IMF – they 
just stopped servicing those debts. That cut them off from new credit and debt relief 
(Wharton, 2013). 
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As a result of slow export growth, increasing imports and lack of meaningful external financing 
and investment, the balance-of-payment position also deteriorated from a deficit of $200 million 
in 2000 to reach a staggering figure of $1.9 billion in 2009 (CSO, 2009).  
The situation was aggravated by the sanctions applied by Western countries denying the country 
the much needed balance of payment support, investment and foreign lines of credit. By 2008, 
the economic situation had become dire with hyperinflation making the Zimbabwe dollar almost 
useless with no commodities in supermarket shelves and a massive import bill as Zimbabweans 
were forced to flock to neighbouring countries to look for household commodities. Gideon Gono 
as a central bank governor appointed at the end of 2003 to preside over one of the country’s most 
difficult economic situations and faced with a hostile economic environment, began to depart 
from conventional central bank functions of playing oversight on monetary policy issues arguing 
that the ‘desperate situation called for desperate measures’ (Gono, 2010). The central bank’s 
interventions took the form of quasi-fiscal activities funded through the printing of money, 
monetary operations to mop up foreign currency, subsidised credit, subsidised exchange rates for 
selected government purchases, support to agriculture and bailing of troubled banks (Gono, 
2010). Inflation escalated as a result of the rapid money growth, speculative activity in financial 
markets and the severe supply constraints in the economy and at the last count in February 2009, 
the official rate had reached a staggering 231 million percent (Nyakazeya, 2009). Consequently 
economic growth suffered, dropping from a high of 9.7 percent in 1996 to reach a nadir of – 14.8 
percent in 2008 (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The unprecedented economic downturn brought about 
increased poverty which in turn saw the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. The 
percentage of the population employed in the formal sector declined from 14 percent in 1980 to 6 
percent by 2007 with a huge skilled labour migration to foreign countries, mainly South Africa, 
the United Kingdom and Australia. Capacity utilisation in industry dropped to below 10 percent 
with the economy virtually coming to a standstill by 2008 (Kanyenze et al., 2011). Whilst the 
mass migrations can be attributed to those fleeing ‘voting with their legs,’ the failing economy 
was also a major factor. 
While land reform was long overdue, government can be criticised for allowing the programme 
to roll out at a time when the economy was in decline having lost the initiative whilst pursuing a 
policy of reconciliation with the former Rhodesians and Western capital. More importantly, 
economic policies failed dismally to address the structural distortions that were prevalent in the 
economy. As the economic crisis deepened, government became increasingly reactionary 
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adopting conflicting policies and imposing irrational price controls that affected viability further. 
Western countries ceased providing aid through Government channels, choosing instead to 
provide handouts through non-governmental organisations most of which were hostile to ZANU 
PF and sympathetic to the opposition. Although China through the Zimbabwe Government’s 
Look East Policy came in with grants, loans and capital investment, interventions that allowed 
the country to somehow pull through the difficult period and contributing to the sustenance of 
the ZANU PF government in power, the input failed to significantly offset the damage done to 
the economy to spur full recovery.   
The media also played a role in the conflict in Zimbabwe. The communication revolution that 
has enhanced the role of the media in society has driven international relations out from behind 
closed doors and on to the television screens and moved public opinion into the centre-ring of 
policy-making so that journalism and diplomacy are more closely linked than ever before (Oneil, 
2000). Oneil (2000) said in conflict resolution, effective communication is critical to pick up and 
relay the first signs of trouble and called for early-warning approaches to news coverage as a 
systematic and continuing effort to patrol ahead to give warning of impending problems. He was 
however of the view that often modern day television and radio is behind the escalation of 
hostilities by spreading ethnic hatred citing what happened in Yugoslavia in 1991 and during the 
post-election crisis in Kenya (Oneil, 2000). Just as the powerful institutions such as the UN 
Security Council are dominated by powerful countries, so is the media. In addition to vilification 
and demonisation by the CNN and the BBC, the ZANU PF Government had to suffer the effects 
of propaganda from pirate radio stations that included the Voice of America’s (VOA) Studio 7 
and the Voice of the People (VOP) that were set up by Western governments under the auspices 
of giving a voice to the opposition in clear violation of International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) regulations governing broadcasting43.  
The result on the ground was the tightening of media laws and stricter control on state media as a 
way of countering the perceived threat. A survey of articles published by media houses in 
Zimbabwe in the period under review showed polarisation with the state controlled media 
articulating the ZANU PF position and the private press digging in on the side of the opposition. 
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 Chihuri (Interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said the West also sought to shut out President Mugabe by refusing him 
international platforms to articulate the Zimbabwean question to the World and as such had to rely on the UN 
General Assembly meetings. 
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The media became both an extension as well as an instrument of division, cultivating and 
escalating tensions and polarisation, a development that may have negatively impinged on 
ripeness in the conflict. Soon after beginning his tenure as Minister of Information, Media and 
Broadcasting Services, Jonathan Moyo (2013) said he was committed to bridge the divide 
between the private and state media explaining that the polarisation which had characterised 
Zimbabwean society since 2000 and was running deep in the media had not been beneficial to 
anyone and its greatest achievement was to spur underdevelopment and poverty as the country 
was consequently viewed as an unsafe investment destination. 
The polarisation that ran deep in the Zimbabwean society also extended to civil society groups 
that were either state sponsored and aligned to the Government, or receiving sponsorship and 
guidance from Western countries and aligned to the opposition. Writing in a weekly column, 
“The Observatory” in the Financial Gazette, Hungwe gave an in-depth analysis of civil society 
groups in Zimbabwe saying:  
Most civil society organisations, although purporting to represent and mandated by the 
ordinary citizens of the country, are actually entities owned and run by individuals … 
Looking through the management and board structures of most of the civil society 
organisations, the same individuals seem to emerge in all governance structures. There is 
a clique of civil society leaders that have maintained a sole grip of the sector. Many of 
these leaders have led their organisations for more than a decade, failing to replicate the 
leadership renewal that they are demanding from politicians … whenever developing 
countries go through socio-economic and political challenges and conflicts, the civil 
society sector normally transforms into a sub-economy which effectively feeds the 
middle class and elites, while disenfranchising and misleading the poor and sub-
structures of society … some civil society organisations become mechanisms of 
sustaining the crises as their mere existence is at times justified on the prevalence and 
intensity of the conflict” (Hungwe, 2013).  
Commenting on the role of civil society groups in the conflict in Zimbabwe, the EU ambassador 
to Zimbabwe, Aldo Dell’Ariccia said: “The civil society has a role to play but I have the 
impression that you are a little anchored in the past where instead of seeing NGOs one perceives 
AGOs, (Anti-Government Organisations)” (Guvamatanga, 2014) adding that the challenge was 
how to transform most of these organisations that were founded in the midst of a crisis into a 
positive force to champion national development. Despite the economic challenges Zimbabwe 
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was facing from 2000 that included drastic reductions in FDI, Charamba (Interview, 2014, Jun. 
3) said NGOs became the fastest growing sector in the country suggesting they were being 
funded for a purpose other than their usual developmental role in society. 
To demonstrate how civil society groups were hearing no evil and seeing no evil when it came to 
the political party they were aligned to, a document analysis of the Human Rights Watch reports 
between 2000 and 2008 revealed that all of them blamed all forms of political violence on 
ZANU PF and after 2008, while identifying both ZANU PF and MDC supporters as perpetrators,  
always concluded that the MDC acts of violence were in retaliation to ZANU PF supporters’ acts 
of violence (HRW Report, 2008), clearly demonstrating their bias in the conflict. The researcher 
who was an information officer charged with among other roles promoting news gathering in 
urban centres witnessed that both the ruling party and the opposition supporters were at some 
point or another guilty of initiating political violence during the conflict.44  
With the opposing parties to the conflict each strongly determined to prove to the outside world 
that it was the legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean collective interests, every election 
since 2000 would raise tensions and would be accompanied by high levels of political violence, 
litigation and disagreements on most governance issues. The Police Commissioner General 
asserted that it was the intransigence of the opposition supporters underpinned by public claims 
of victimisation that prompted the police to produce a dossier on opposition-initiated violence 
including the petrol bombing of a police station in Mutare in 2009 that severely injured female 
police officers (Chihuri, Interview, 2013, Apr. 10). As tensions continued to rise, there was an 
increase in police clampdowns on members of the opposition who in some instances disobeyed 
the law by holding rallies without notifying police as required. The climax was the beating of 
Morgan Tsvangirai in the high density suburb of Highfields in 2007 after he allegedly refused to 
obey police orders to abandon addressing a rally that had not received prior police clearance. The 
opposition cried foul accusing the police of being pro-ZANU PF and claimed its supporters 
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 Chihuri (Interview, 2013, Apr. 10) 2013 confirmed that all the political parties in Zimbabwe had cases in 
which their members had resorted to the use of violence as a means to political ends. 
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were, since 1999, being rounded up on the basis of flimsy excuses and brutalised whilst in police 
custody (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 16)45. 
4.5 The external environment 
It is the role of the West in support of the opposition on one hand and the support ZANU PF got 
from countries like China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela on the other that 
characterised the international dimension of the conflict in Zimbabwe. Hassan (2008) said the 
British and the U.S. governments condemned and demonised the Zimbabwean Government of 
President Mugabe and imposed sanctions claiming that they were committed to democracy, 
human rights and ending the suffering of Zimbabweans. Western interests in Zimbabwean affairs 
began with colonialism. Realising that colonialism was no longer sustainable, Harold 
MacMillan, the then British Prime Minister gave his famous ‘winds of change’ speech in which 
he called for the granting of independence to Africans including Zimbabwe. Charamba 
(Interview, 2014, Jun. 3) argued that the British sense of decolonisation was that of granting 
political independence and not economic independence and its stance toward Zimbabwe was best 
explained by a desire to safeguard neo-colonialism in which it would continue to enjoy economic 
benefits from the former colony in the aftermath of granting political independence to the 
natives.   
The British Government was not a foreigner to the value of Zimbabwe as a colony as Rhodesia 
then was initially viewed as the second Rand, and when that failed, the British and the settlers 
turned to land. Britain after WW2 mortgaged Zimbabwean minerals and resettled its veterans on 
lands confiscated from the blacks (Charamba, Ibid). If Britain was really concerned with human 
rights in Zimbabwe, it could have gone to war against the settlers after their UDI in 1960 but it 
did not (Patsanza, 1988). Rather, when its economic interests became threatened by the restive 
Africans, Britain began to actively search for a settlement beginning in 1976 and 1977 in Geneva 
to which a breakthrough came in 1979 at Lancaster. Charamba (ibid) said the British assumed 
that the blacks would be content with assuming the reins of power without assuming control of 
the economy and as such deployed a Lugardian template on Zimbabwe following John Lugard 
who in defining British colonial policy in West Africa said let the natives rule themselves but 
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 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) indicated that violence was a self-help measure adopted by 
opposition members as a direct consequence of the security sector impartiality in dealing with them, referring to it as 
state-sponsored violence against citizens.   
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Britain must be “the whisper behind the throne”. That whisper would be aimed at safeguarding 
British economic interests in the former colonies.  
Unfortunately, the British aims were at variance with the aims of the liberation struggle in 
Zimbabwe in which thousands endured difficult conditions in rear bases in foreign lands with the 
promise that “Tichanoguta kumusha” meaning we suffer from hunger now because we shall have 
plenty on going back home after independence (Muchena, Personal Communication, 2012, Nov. 
8). Land as a factor of production was thus a key ingredient to the provision of that economic 
plenty to the impoverished black Zimbabweans and its reclamation and redistribution to the 
formerly landless was an important step towards economic independence. British economic 
interests in Zimbabwe were and continue to be extensive. In 2010 President Robert Mugabe said 
despite the impasse and the imposition of sanctions, there were over 400 British registered 
companies operating in nearly all sectors of the economy (Chinaka, 2010e).  Land reform thus 
directly challenged the British economic interests affecting British companies which were in the 
majority in mining, real estate, agriculture-based production and marketing, and the down-stream 
industries that serviced agriculture or thrived on inputs that came from agriculture. Further, most 
of the dispossessed white farmers were of British origin. It is for this reason that the British 
Government sought to protect white farming interests in Zimbabwe and insisted that land reform 
was to be guided by market forces and was to be done in a way that did not scare away investors 
as its economic interests constituted a major chunk of the Zimbabwean economy.  
When the Zimbabwean Government allowed the FTLRP to roll out, the British Government was 
incensed and immediately took a hostile stance towards Zimbabwe46 . Guvamatanga (2014) 
asserted that the Chatham House which is important to the British establishment in influencing 
strategic doctrine held a meeting in 1999 that was chaired by Richard Dowden focusing on how 
to deal with Zimbabwe following the fallout over land. Subversion of ZANU PF was one of the 
strategies that were suggested with other options being to: cause a military coup to take place; 
build a strong opposition and creating an enabling environment for ZANU PF to be beaten in 
polls; and organising the people to rise against the ZANU PF Government (Guvamatanga (ibid). 
Charamba (Interview, 2014, Jun. 3) said the British policy makers however realised that they 
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 Bronnert (Interview, 2013, May, 7) suggested that the reason why Anglo-Saxophone countries were very 
much interested in what was happening in Zimbabwe was not because of land reform but the country’s poor human 
rights record.  
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could not fight a sole war against Zimbabwe for moral reasons given that it was their colonial 
role that had created the land problem and proceeded by way of: refusing that the row with 
Zimbabwe was over land; mobilising the USA, Europe and former British dominions against 
Zimbabwe; isolating Zimbabwe in international circles; attacking the African basis of 
Zimbabwe’s case, first mobilising the Commonwealth leading to the organisation’s Abuja 
Declaration of 6 September 2001 and pressing for the subsequent expulsion of Zimbabwe from 
the Commonwealth (Charamba, ibid). He further said: Britain also put pressure on the AU and 
SADC using its position as one of the major donors to stifle aid unless Zimbabwe was excluded 
from benefiting; pursued a political endgame of its choice by sponsoring the opposition and civil 
society groups that began to wedge a demonisation campaign against the ZANU PF 
Government; contemplated a direct military attack on Zimbabwe; and, attacked the Zimbabwe 
economy (Charamba, ibid).  
Charamba (ibid.) further pointed out that Britain approached four southern African countries in 
2008 pursuing the possibility of a military assault on Zimbabwe by seeking a launch pad: 
Mozambique which warmed up to the idea but developed cold feet along the way; South Africa 
which flatly refused the request, Namibia which also rejected the idea; and, Botswana which 
accepted given Ian Khama’s anti-Mugabe stance. Mtetwa (Interview, 2015, Feb 19) added that 
Zambia under Mwanawasa also agreed to provide a military launch pad for the British though 
this was quickly became a non-issue when the late Zambian president collapsed and died in a 
meeting with the Angolans who were lobbying him to drop his hostile attitude towards 
Zimbabwe. Zambia, Botswana and Nigeria had successfully been lobbied by the British 
government to attack Zimbabwe at the AU summit (Mtetwa, ibid). Although Britain kept a force 
on stand-by ready to carry out operations in Zimbabwe throughout the period of the transition to 
the GPA47, it abandoned the idea because of the overwhelming opposition by the rest of the 
SADC member states and the fact that the GPA was eventually signed leading to an Inclusive 
Government. The British ambassador to Zimbabwe from 2011 to 2014 however absolved her 
country of any wrongdoing arguing that the former colonial power was only interested in the 
well-being of Zimbabweans through the sponsoring of development initiatives and promoting 
good governance, especially the need for free and fair elections (Bronnert, Interview, 2013, May, 
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 A former Zimbabwe Defence Forces officer who was trained by the researcher and resigned from service in 
2008 to join the British army confirmed on condition of anonymity that he was part of a British Standby Force that 
was set up to intervene in Zimbabwe after the disputed elections of 2008. 
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7)48. According to Bronnert (Ibid), the British posture on Zimbabwe needed to be understood 
from a background of Tony Blair’s Labour Party coming to power in the UK in 1997 calling for 
a human rights-based approach to foreign policy. 
The attack on the Zimbabwean economy that was already in decline from the time of the ESAP 
also included the use of sanctions that were described as targeted measures though in practice 
took the form of: denying Zimbabwe aid including in multilateral organisations to which the 
country was a member; using food security as a political weapon by channelling any form of 
relief handouts through NGOs that were sympathetic to the opposition; vetoing any suggestions 
of debt re-scheduling; and, denying the country access to markets including criminalising its 
exports arguing that the produce was coming from former white owned farms; and, encouraging 
foreign companies to leave (Charamba, Interview, 2014, Jun. 3)49. The involvement of external 
players in the conflict was however difficult to characterise as Western countries, and in 
particular Britain, in public were denying being part to the conflict though in practice they 
engaged in a war of words against ZANU PF, pushed for the international isolation of 
Zimbabwe, refused to recognise election outcomes since 2000 and waged an economic warfare 
against the country. Charamba said about the actions of the Western countries in the conflict in 
Zimbabwe: 
The West attacked the Zimbabwean economy through sanctions, terminated all aid that 
was coming through government channels, vetoed any suggestions of debt-rescheduling, 
denied Zimbabwe access to markets by criminalising most exports from the country, 
denying Zimbabwe access to international financial support including in multilateral 
institutions where Zimbabwe was a subscribing member, encouraged Western  
companies operating in Zimbabwe to close shop, and sought to use aid to divide Africans 
on the Zimbabwe issue. As a result of these efforts, the Zimbabwean economy which was 
already in decline due to the effects of the ESAP experienced further deterioration 
leading to the economic catastrophe of 2008 (Interview, 2014, Jun. 3).  
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 Despite claims by ZANU PF that Britain wanted to further her selfish national interests in Zimbabwe, 
Bronnert (Interview, 2013, May, 7) said Britain wanted to see Zimbabwe grow from a $10 billion to a $100 billion 
economy in the near future. 
49
 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) argued that sanctions were imposed by Western countries in response 
to human rights abuses by ZANU PF. 
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The onslaught on Zimbabwe that was delivered under the mask of a multilateral disenchantment 
by Western countries was made possible by Australia, Canada, the United States of America and 
New Zealand, former British colonies which appeared to have obligations to support Britain and 
the EU and as such could not be seen to be acting against one of its member states50. Charamba 
(ibid) and Mapuranga (Interview, 2015, Feb. 18) said there is a pan-white spirit in the West that 
transcends national boundaries in its dealings with the African continent that began with the 
Berlin conference of 1884-5 that parceled out the continent to European powers. Mutambara 
(Interview, 2013, Jun. 20) said the West’s converging position on Zimbabwe is best explained by 
a common desire to safeguard the position of white settlers as well as a foreign policy solidarity 
deriving from the West’s collective quest for global dominance through the capitalist system. 
Mapuranga (Interview, 2015, Feb. 18) further pointed out that Australia, Canada New Zealand 
and Rhodesia were described as ‘white men’s countries’ in a doctrine that sought to make these 
countries permanent white settlements through the acquisition of land driving the indigenous 
owners into reserves and efforts to boost the population of settlers through migration whilst 
suppressing native population growth through various measures. The former British colonies 
also had their own interests in Zimbabwe especially in mining, with companies that were 
extracting diamonds, nickel, platinum and gold in the country.  
For the United States of America, the acting in concert with Britain is explained by: the historical 
alliance between the two countries in world affairs that included fighting all major wars on the 
same side since World War 1 and America’s self declared hegemonic stance in world affairs 
especially after the collapse of the USSR. Further, George Bush jnr. said “Zimbabwe poses an 
extra-ordinary threat to the USA” at par with the other countries that were perceived as hostile to 
its interests in the infamous ‘axis of evil’ (Bush, 2007). This was not difficult to comprehend 
given that the American project was built on the sanctity of private ownership of property 
without recourse to historical injustices perpetrated against indigenes for their confiscated lands 
and the moment Zimbabwe reclaimed land from whites, it was setting a precedent that attacked 
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 Nathaniel Manheru, a Herald columnist in his weekly installment of 4 October 2014 made reference to a 
meeting between an unnamed Zimbabwean Government official and another from a respected EU country in which 
the latter pledged a real desire to resume ties with Zimbabwe and intimated that: “You know what mate; in the EU 
we proceed by consensus. But we also give precedence to former colonial masters of given countries in dealing with 
the affairs of those erstwhile colonies,” a discussion that suggested Britain was being given room to exercise 
leadership in shaping EU policy on Zimbabwe. 
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the foundations of the American project51 . Mapuranga (Interview, 2015, Feb. 18) who was 
Zimbabwe’s ambassador to the US from 2005 to 2013 was of the view that the US foreign policy 
could not be explained from the point of view of seeking solidarity with Britain alone but that it 
should be read more from the consideration that it had always supported white privilege in 
southern Africa given its then cordial relations with apartheid South Africa and the Rhodesian 
settlers during colonialism. 
Hassan (2008) asserted that years of economic sanctions and Western interference in 
Zimbabwe’s internal affairs degraded the Zimbabwean economy and destroyed people’s lives. In 
November 1998, under pressure from the British and the Americans, the IMF imposed 
unpublicised sanctions against Zimbabwe: warned off potential investors; froze desperately 
needed loans to Zimbabwe; refused to negotiate the country’s debt; and, in September 1999 
suspended its support for the ESAP (Gono, 2010). The argument that Zimbabwe was denied 
access to funding in multilateral organisations such as the IMF because of arrears does not hold 
water given that countries like Rwanda and Malawi that were worse off than Zimbabwe in 
meeting their obligations continued to receive funding despite being accused of human rights 
abuses and corruption. When Zimbabwe discovered diamond fields in Marange, the West sought 
to use the Kimberly Process (KP) to bar the diamonds from trading on world markets even when 
Abby Chikane, the appointed KP monitor, had declared that the country had complied with KP 
requirements better than some diamond producers that were being allowed to trade52. 
Hassan (2008) argued that the West’s cliché of defending human rights and spreading democracy 
was in fact an imperialist fraud aimed at manipulating public opinion and justifying aggression 
against weaker, defenceless nations because from Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and 
Africa, the West’s best friends were the world’s worst dictators with some of the examples being 
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 Leech (2014) made an interesting observation that whilst the US President Barrack Obama announced in 
his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2014 that “We believe that right makes might – that bigger 
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500 000 carats of diamonds valued at around $45 million and belonging to Zimbabwe diamond companies were 
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Zimbabwe that was passed in a Paris-based court of 
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the USA’s links with General Pervez Musharraf’s regime which came to power through a 
military coup in Pakistan and the billions of aid given to the late Hosni Mubarak’s government 
despite being a former military man who held power for a period equal to the time President 
Mugabe has been in power. So even after accepting the argument that there was a democratic 
deficit in Zimbabwe made worse by human rights abuses (real and alleged) perpetrated by 
ZANU PF, the real issue offending Western countries in Zimbabwe was more economic than 
political (Mutambara, Interview, 2013, Jun. 20). The West’s disaffection with Zimbabwe’s 
economic policies were articulated by the Heritage Foundation which complained that 
Zimbabwe’s “average tariff rate is high,” that “non-tariff barriers are embedded in the 
labyrinthine customs services,” that “state influence in most areas is stifling, expropriation is 
common as the executive pushes forward its economic plan of resource redistribution,” that 
Zimbabwe has “burdensome tax rates” and that “privatisation has stalled with slightly over 10 
percent of targeted concerns privatised, that the government remains highly interventionist, sets 
price ceilings for essential commodities and influences prices through subsidies (Gowans, 2008). 
Gowans (2008) argued that of greatest concern to Western countries was Zimbabwe’s investment 
policies in which President Robert Mugabe’s Government demonstrated that it was not a 
facilitator of Western economic interests but was pursuing economic nationalism.  
Mutambara’s (Interview, 2013, Jun. 20) assertions resonated with Gowans (2008) when he 
concluded that it was the Government of Zimbabwe’s pursuit of interests which clashed in 
important ways with those of Western banks and corporations as well as minority populations of 
settlers of European origin that triggered a strong, multi-faceted response from the USA, Britain 
and the EU. Further, there was a pronounced desire by the West to influence politics in the 
country, a point that was confirmed by the US Ambassador who said in his report made public 
through the Wiki leaks release of 2012 that Morgan Tsvangirai as an opposition leader required 
“massive hand holding” by the US government to be a factor in opposition politics (Dell, 2010). 
Although the USA argued that it was applying targeted measures to spur democracy in 
Zimbabwe through ZIDERA in which it pledged to work with progressive forces to promote 
democracy, the Act blocked the country’s access to international credit by stating that:  
“… The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each 
international financial institution to oppose and vote against: 
(1) Any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the 
 Government of Zimbabwe; or 
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(2) Any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe 
to the United States or any international financial institution” (ZIDERA, 2001). 
Mapuranga (Interview, 2015, Feb. 18) and Kurebwa (Interview, 2015, Feb. 17) both posited that 
ZIDERA was political clearly stating that its objective was to ‘restore democracy’ which was a 
euphemism for ending ZANU PF rule. Maziwisa (2014) said the act of imposing sanctions on a 
previously marginalised country like Zimbabwe was like removing a patient gasping for breath 
from life support and still expect recovery. 
 
China whose relations with ZANU date back to the days of the liberation struggle justified its 
cooperation with Zimbabwe saying it was based on willing collaboration, though in reality it was 
after raw materials for its booming economy. Mutambara (Interview, 2013, Jun 20) asserted that 
if Zimbabwe was to get the best out of the rising Asian giant, it needed to make sure that it 
entered into viable deals for itself because the main aim of China was business. What made 
China a lesser evil though was the consideration that Western capital always sought to penetrate 
freely at times by force since the days of colonialism and wanted to perpetuate the wanton 
exploitation of resources in the post-colonial era. It is for this reason that ZANU PF argued that 
the sponsoring of opposition forces in Zimbabwe and the application of sanctions by the USA, 
EU and other Western countries needed to be viewed as coercion by powerful countries to force 
a weaker country to tow their line.  
Most African countries remained silent spectators in the public domain with only few voices 
including Botswana’s Ian Khama, Kenya’s Raila Odinga, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, Thabo 
Mbeki, Desmond Tutu and Jacob Zuma, Zambia’s Levy Mwanawasa and the former Secretary of 
the United Nations, Kofi Annan, at some point or another, voicing concerns about the 
Zimbabwean situation. The reasons for African countries’ indifference included a failure to 
really do anything about the internal political excesses and the unraveling crisis as well as a 
realisation that ZANU PF and President Robert Mugabe had a case against the West mainly over 
the land issue though they could not publicly say that given that most of them depended on 
handouts from the West.  
The internal and external dimensions thus interacted in ways that made it difficult to delineate 
them yet combining to create a poisoned and volatile domestic environment. In the period from 
2000 to 2008, the conflict became a roller coaster as the parties traded unending accusations and 
counter-accusations on who had done what wrong leading to the political impasse and the 
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economic meltdown. Majome (Interview, 2015, Feb. 13) argued that the MDC T viewed the 
problem as a deficiency of democracy and a decay in all aspects of human survival in Zimbabwe 
that were a direct consequence of ZANU PF’s disregard for the rule of law, closing of the 
political space through violent means, superintending flawed elections and implementing poor 
policies inspired by a quest for populism and political expediency at the expense of visionary 
leadership. Mujuru (Interview, 2013, Sept. 5) and Moyo (Interview, 2013, Apr. 8) representing 
views from the ruling ZANU PF party argued that at the core of the problems in Zimbabwe was 
the bilateral dispute with the former colonial power Britain fronted by the opposition over the 
way Zimbabwe had handled the land issue in which Western countries imposed sanctions outside 
the UN Council, sabotaged the economy, sought to isolate the country, and demonised and 
vilified its leadership. Khaya Moyo (ibid) further argued that it was the continued refusal by the 
opposition, supported by Western countries, to accept defeat in free and fair elections as a 
strategy to achieve regime change in the country that denied ZANU PF legitimacy and in the 
process created a perception of a crisis of governance. Charamba (Interview, 2014, Jun, 3), 
speaking on behalf of Government argued that Zimbabwe was facing a conflict arising from its 
desire to attain a sovereign economy and as such got entangled in a bilateral dispute with its 
former colonial power, Britain, which, for moral considerations of not wanting to be seen to be 
directly meddling in the internal affairs of its former colony, sought to participate in the conflict 
though proxies that included the opposition and civil society groups that it sponsored to remove 
ZANU PF from power. 
From a rationalist perspective, the country was roughly equally divided between those that 
believed that their well being would be guaranteed by the anti-imperialist policies that were 
being pursued by the ruling party and another lot that saw no light in this approach and rallied 
behind the opposition as the only possible route to a better life or chickened out fleeing the 
country to become economic refugees in foreign lands. Barring the allegations of rigging and 
intimidation, the election results from 2000 to 2008 confirmed that the voters were roughly 
equally divided between the ruling party and the opposition, a situation that perpetuated the 
contest for power over a very long period with dire consequences for the stability of the country 
and the economy. For the foreign powers involved in the conflict in Zimbabwe, they in practice 
made claims that were consistent with idealism publicly calling for a just and fair society guided 
by constitutionalism and the rule of law in which they sought to encourage the evolution of a 
peaceful and developmental state in Zimbabwe for the common good of its citizens, yet for all 
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intends and purposes, their actions fitted the realist thinking that states are at the international 
level always obsessed by their own national interests in which morality in is not a virtue to be 
pursued. To that end, Western powers appeared to have been comfortable with a Zimbabwe that 
upheld the rule of law, respected private ownership of property and the free reign of capital (as 
happened from 1980 to 1999) without regard to the implications to the majority landless and 
poverty stricken Zimbabweans.  
4.6 Conclusions 
The chapter delineated the conflict environment in Zimbabwe by tracing highlights of the 
country’s historical background from pre-colonial times, the colonial period, the armed struggle 
that led to independence in 1980 and the post colonial period up to the time the conflict set in 
around 2000. It then explored what went wrong leading to the conflict whose zenith was the 
crisis in 2008. The review showed that the problems that began to manifest as a conflict in the 
post-colonial period had most of their origins in the colonial era. Evidence from literature and the 
field converged in identifying the inequalities that were created by the oppressive colonial 
system as the main source of the problems the country later faced after independence. The 
colonial system bequeathed to independent Zimbabwe the following defects: a dual society that 
favoured the white minority in the control of the means of production, especially land ownership 
and the economic enterprise in general; and, an oppressive legal and policy regime that 
guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo and was allowed to continue in the post-colonial 
period. A crisis of ideology at independence and a failure to reconfigure the state further 
compounded the problem in which the post-colonial government envisaged and pursued socialist 
goals depending on the caprice of the minority whites and foreign capital against a background 
of an economy that continued to be dominated by capitalist modes of ownership and production.  
The contradictions between national expenditure predicated on achieving social equity and the 
continuation of the colonial economy saw the economy slowly failing to sustain the equity goal 
and the result was greater reliance on borrowed resources, a move that saw the national debt 
ballooning to unmanageable levels. The ESAP that came towards the end of the second decade 
did more harm than good. More, importantly, the post-colonial Government delayed in 
addressing defects of the social system inherited from the colonial era, partly circumscribed by 
the Lancaster House constitution and the need to balance between total takeover and the 
possibility of destroying the capitalist economy too early into independence.  
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The chapter revealed that it was the citizens that initiated the FTLRP by invading the white 
owned farms and Government had no choice but to acquiesce drawing the wrath of foreign 
powers that had interests in land ownership in Zimbabwe. This development came when the 
economy was already in decline and coupled with sanctions, the social and economic outlook 
began to deteriorate even faster. The emergence of the MDC in 1999 championing the interests 
of especially urban middle class supported by embittered Western governments set the stage for 
the political conflict that further worsened the economic situation. The opposition embraced a 
pro-Western outlook that placed it firmly within the armpits of Western countries. The 
development pushed ZANU PF to re-embrace its liberation ethos fully modeling its defence 
around self-determination, nationalism and black empowerment. All elections thereafter became 
vicious contests for political power in which all kinds of dirty tactics were used including 
violence, intimidation, use of money to manipulate the voters and the refusal to accept election 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE SEARCH FOR RIPENESS IN THE CONFLICT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the author’s findings on: the search for an elusive ripeness in the period 
2000 to 2007; the setting in of ripeness soon after the indecisive and disputed elections of 2008; 
the nature of that ripeness, its impact on the SADC intervention and the formula for resolution; 
and, how the external dimension remained unaffected by that ripeness after 2008. Each section 
begins by presenting the highlights of the first order constructs gathered through interpretivism, 
goes on to give an abstraction of the higher order constructs; and concludes with a discussion on 
how those constructs dovetailed or not with the ripeness of conflicts theory claims that were 
listed in chapter 3.  
5.2 The Search for a solution in the absence of ripeness, 2000 to 2008 
As noted in the preceding section, by 2000 the conflict in Zimbabwe was escalating due to the 
FTLRP that was gathering momentum despite the protests from Western countries and the futile 
resistance by the white commercial farmers and was characterised by increased hostilities 
towards the ZANU PF Government from the same quarters compounded by a spirited fight by an 
opposition that was determined to take over political power. Despite the complexity of the 
conflict, its manifestation was well pronounced inside Zimbabwe. Munyoro (Interview, 2014, 
May, 28) observed that the coming of the MDC on to the political scene in 1999 saw elections 
from 2000 being a hotly contested activity in the quest to control the state. This was the 
environment in which the general elections in 2000, the presidential elections in 2002 and the 
general elections in 2005 were held with each party determined to prevail over the other at all 
costs. The opposition assumed that it had overwhelming support from the electorate and had 
enough resources from its sponsors to remove ZANU PF from power. As such, the MDC 
participated in the elections in 2000, 2002 and 2005 hoping that it would sweep to victory 
(Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 16). ZANU PF on the other hand viewed the opposition as a 
front of the former colonial power to which the latter’s taking over power would be a reversal of 
the gains of liberation struggle. The ruling party thus sought to do everything in its power to 
deny political space to the opposition including the deployment of the state security apparatus. 
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Though pursuing a policy of quiet diplomacy, Mbeki was seized with the situation in Zimbabwe 
from as early as 2000. The Zimbabwean conflict presented Mbeki with a number of foreign 
policy challenges and according to Mhandara & Pooe (2013), he approached the challenges with 
sophistication and pragmatism by seeking a balance between the following imperatives: 
President Mugabe’s support on the African continent in which he was viewed as the only African 
leader who had guts to stand up against the Western excesses on the continent; the South African 
quest to disengage with its apartheid foreign policy; the outcome of having a peaceful and stable 
Zimbabwe being more strategic than the alternative of having to deal with a failed state; the 
history of Zimbabwe and South Africa’s liberation struggles, in particular the relations between 
Thabo Mbeki’s ANC and Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF including the fact that Mbeki had been 
hosted in Zimbabwe during his days in exile. These were some of the reasons that explained 
Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe and his pursuance of a solution through instruments 
of persuasion, mediation, negotiation and peer pressure as compared to a confrontational 
approach. Mbeki took this stance despite pressure from mainly the South African white 
establishment and the governments of the US and the UK to take a tough stance on Zimbabwe 
(Mapuranga, Interview, 2015, Feb. 18). Roberts (2007) said most whites in South Africa feared a 
repeat of the Zimbabwean race experience in the former and sought to circumvent that possibility 
through an enduring criticism of former President Mbeki’s stance on Zimbabwe including 
portraying him as a leader bent on importing President Mugabe’s policies to South Africa. 
Despite taking a public approach that appeared to be in solidarity with the pan-African spirit, 
Mbeki had earlier penned a 37 page discussion document on the Zimbabwe situation at a time 
when the accelerated land reform programme was beginning to gather momentum and soon after 
ZANU PF lost the referendum in 2000. A document analysis of the discussion paper revealed 
Mbeki’s underlying views on the Zimbabwe conflict. In the document that is quoted at length 
below, which seems to have been aimed at giving sincere advice to a fellow liberation movement 
given that it was never made public then, Mbeki warned of the consequences of the route 
Zimbabwe was taking and had no kind words for ZANU PF saying: 
This discussion document is a humble contribution to the work that ZANU PF must carry 
out. … Zimbabwe is confronted by a number of problems that require an urgent solution 
… What went wrong? …The private sector played a minimal role with regard to the task 
of bridging disparities between black and white. … One of the things that went wrong 
was that the programmes adopted to improve the quality of life (of the formally 
 142 
 
oppressed black Zimbabweans) proved to be unaffordable … the national democratic 
state resorted to borrowing, to make up the shortfall in resources available to the 
Government …. In time, the high budget deficit would necessarily lead to the collapse of 
the social services … What had seemed to be the fertiliser that ensured the growth of 
these services would turn out to be the toxic substance that would kill these services. … 
The party of revolution has to decide whether it can afford an unfriendly relationship with 
the IMF at the same time as, in reality, it cannot afford to do without support and 
assistance from the IMF. … (Also Zimbabwe cannot afford to) end up in a 
confrontational position relative to the UK. … Of critical importance … is the obvious 
necessity to ensure that Zimbabwe does not end up in a situation of isolation … 
condemned to sink in an ever deepening social and economic crisis that would result in 
the reversal of many of the gains of the national democratic revolution. … Government 
actions have taken place that have led to accusations about disrespect for the 
independence of the judiciary, the violation of the rule of law, the suppression of the right 
to freedom of expression and the independence of the media and the denial of the right of 
the people of Zimbabwe of their right to freely choose their government. … The party of 
revolution in Zimbabwe must admit that it has created the conditions for others to reach 
these conclusions … (Mbeki, 2001). 
Mbeki’s dual and contradicting positions on Zimbabwe of criticising the country in private and 
publicly accommodating the views of ZANU PF demonstrated that whilst he was convinced that 
the revolutionary party had not been treated fairly by history, the way things were going were 
equally not good for the country.  
As things turned out, ZANU PF did exactly as Mbeki had cautioned against and proceeded with 
land reform that precipitated its stand-off with Western countries. Charamba (Interview, 2014, 
Jun. 3) was of the view that Mbeki saw the problem in Zimbabwe as resulting from the 
unresolved land question, and initially and behind the scenes, sought to encourage Western 
governments to support the programme meanwhile in public pursuing a policy of quiet 
diplomacy to avoid a clash with a fellow liberation movement given the consideration that South 
Africa also faced similar post-colonial challenges that eventually would need to be dealt with. 
Mbeki was also of the view that the problems in Zimbabwe should be first and foremost be left 
to the Zimbabweans themselves failure to which SADC and the AU would be the legitimate 
bodies to help find a solution (Zhuwarara, Interview, 2014, Oct. 20). He thus used his position to 
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block the Zimbabwean crisis from being internationalised meanwhile pressing for an internal 
dialogue between the antagonistic political parties. Consequently Mbeki’s approach resulted in 
Western governments and the opposition losing confidence in his ability to handle the situation 
to their desired end-state and was subjected to immense criticism (Mapuranga, Interview, 2015, 
Feb. 18).  
 
Mwonzora (ibid) said signs that the opposition was gaining popularity came with the electorate’s 
refusal of the ZANU PF sponsored constitutional referendum in 2000 which sought to deal with 
the problems that were arising from the land reform programme as well as to increase executive 
powers of the president among other proposals53. The election results of 2000 in which the 
opposition came close to offsetting the ZANU PF majority in Parliament garnering 57 seats with 
ZANU PF managing 62 gave the latter a scare but failed to tilt the balance and there was nothing 
to stop ZANU PF from forming the next government (Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb. 17). With 
the state security apparatus fully behind ZANU PF and any opposition efforts to make the 
country ungovernable kept in check, the latter had few options other than to challenge the 
election results in court meanwhile waiting for the next plebiscite. It was the same thing in the 
presidential election of 2002 in which President Mugabe garnered 1 685 212 against Morgan 
Tsvangirai’s 1 258 401 (Registrar General, 2002, Mar. 26) with the former proceeding to be 
sworn in as head of state congratulated by most African leaders.  
 
Western countries and the opposition dismissed the election as a sham and the former responded 
by way of widening the scope of sanctions that were claimed to be targeted on those perceived to 
be stifling democracy, cutting off aid and closing their embassies. The opposition also 
challenged the results in court though Mwonzora (ibid) claimed that it was baffling that no 
determination has ever been made on the case since54. It also accused ZANU PF of using all 
                                                    
53
 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) then spokesperson for the MDC T said that ZANU PF responded to 
the result of the referendum harshly and began to champion an accelerated FTLRP and closing all space in the media 
to opposing views. 
54
 Mwonzora (ibid) said to Morgan Tsvangirai and his supporters, Robert Mugabe was after the elections of 
2002, a disputed President whose legitimacy and authority was questionable but managed to prevail favoured by the 
Supreme Court that refused to make a determination on the matter. Following the release of a damning report on the 
2002 elections made by two South African lawyers that the South African Government refused to make public until 
compelled by a court order in 2014, The Herald (2014, Nov. 16) reported that a court determination of the case had 
been made against the MDC T. It quoted Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo, dismissing the report as water under 
the bridge and that compiled by two lawyers in the comfort of their hotel suites, it could not have been credible 
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means at its disposal including intimidation, torture, manipulation of the voters’ role and the 
resort to emergency legislation to enforce law and order (Mwonzora, ibid). Whilst some of the 
accusations were true, the opposition tended to exaggerate some of its claims to gain sympathy 
from the international community (Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb. 17). As usual, the 2002 
election dispute drew diametrically opposed views from commentators. The National 
Coordinator of the Commonwealth International Solidarity Group (CISG), Ozi-Ametu Akerele, 
attacked President Mugabe for letting Zimbabwe degenerate but also had no kind words for the 
role played by Western countries in the country:  
There is no doubt that Britain and other European countries have contributed in no small 
measure to the problems presently being encountered in Zimbabwe. Britain’s lack of 
commitment in resolving the land issue is a case in point; the Abuja peace plan that 
mandated Britain to amongst other things release funds for the peaceful and orderly 
resettlement of the white farmers was blatantly ignored and left un-implemented. Britain 
has continuously chased shadows on the Zimbabwe question in alliance with other 
European Union members, the sanctions option has never resolved problems in Africa 
over the years - rather it has always been a stumbling block to the further development of 
the average citizens in the recipient country. Hence the present sanctions that have been 
dangled on Zimbabwe should be set aside and all efforts should be geared towards the 
strengthening of the civil society and consolidation of Morgan Tsvangirai of the 
Movement for Democracy Change (MDC) and all his allies to enable them to achieve 
more in the struggle for the liberalisation of the Zimbabwean polity (Akerele, 2002) 
 
The Commonwealth attempted to use its assumed clout over Zimbabwe by virtue of the latter 
being its member and pressed President Mugabe and ZANU PF to negotiate with the opposition 
(Chimbindi, Interview, 2015, Feb. 19). The attempts fell on deaf ears since ZANU PF felt it 
could form a government on its own and dismissed the Commonwealth as an organisation that 
had no business in Zimbabwe. The UK Telegraph carried an article that echoed feelings in the 
British Government circles about the situation in Zimbabwe at the time reporting that:  
Meanwhile the Presidents of South Africa and Nigeria left Zimbabwe empty-handed last 
night after failing to persuade Mr. Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, his rival, to work 
                                                                                                                                                                       
report ahead of AU and SADC observer missions that had large numbers of officials who were deployed in the field 
and whose reports had said the elections were free and fair. 
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together in a government of national unity. The talks represented a last-ditch attempt by 
African leaders to force a compromise on Mr. Mugabe, who most international observers 
believe stole victory in the presidential election 10 days ago. The diplomatic focus now 
shifts to London today with a ground-breaking Commonwealth meeting to determine 
whether it is possible to bridge the growing rift between Africa and the West. Observers 
said the next two days represent the toughest test yet of Thabo Mbeki’s presidency and 
the willingness of South Africa to play its rightful part as the regional leader (Butcher, 
2002). 
The then British Prime Minister Tony Blair said the credibility of the 54-nation Commonwealth 
was an issue if the organisation failed to do the right thing after the Zimbabwe elections, adding:  
There can be no question of (President) Mugabe being allowed to stay in power with a 
rigged election. That’s been Britain’s position throughout. What I say to those countries 
that have been ambivalent about (President) Mugabe is: If Africa wants a decent future, 
this type of behaviour has got to stop (Dutter, 2002). 
With President Mugabe and ZANU PF refusing to budge and no progress made in finding a 
solution to the crisis, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe for twelve months on condition 
it could be re-admitted if it carried out electoral reforms, repealed laws that were deemed 
oppressive, entered into party talks with the MDC and engaged the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) on land redistribution (Chimbindi, Interview, 2015, Feb. 19). The ZANU 
PF Government pulled out of the Commonwealth dismissing it as nothing other than a ‘tea 
drinking grouping’ whose values gravitated around the preservation of the British colonial 
empire (Charamba, Interview, 2014, Jun. 3). Chimbindi (Interview, 2015, Feb. 19) said the 
efforts to find a lasting solution began in 2002 when the Commonwealth sought to press the 
ZANU PF Government to tow its line and formed a Triad made up of former President Thabo 
Mbeki, who had hitherto pursued a policy of quiet diplomacy, then President Olusegan 
Obasanjo, the incoming chairman of the Commonwealth and then Australian Prime Minister, 
John Howard. Owing to the resistance by the ZANU PF Government and the eventual fall-out, 
the Commonwealth failed to have any impact on the conflict and the involvement of the last two 
leaders fell on the wayside though Mbeki continued engaged in the efforts to find a solution 
more from his liberation credentials and his position as the President of South Africa.  
In 2003, the US Secretary of State, Collin Powell also aired views that showed his country’s 
displeasure with President Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF’s hold on power saying: 
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President Mugabe and his Politburo colleagues have absolute monopoly of coercive 
power but no legitimacy or moral authority. In the long run President Mugabe and his 
minions will lose, dragging their soiled record behind them into obscurity. But how long 
will it take? ... The United States and the European Union has imposed a visa ban on 
Zimbabwe’s leaders and frozen their overseas assets. We have ended all official 
assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe. We have urged other governments to do the 
same… But our efforts are not likely to succeed quickly without greater engagement by 
Zimbabwe’s neighbours. … ZANU PF and the opposition party can, together legislate 
constitutional changes to allow for a transition. With the President gone, with a 
transitional government in place and with a fixed date for elections …. The United States 
of America would be quick to pledge generous assistance (Powell, 2003). 
In 2004, Jendayi Frazer soon after her posting as the first female US ambassador in South 
African called for ‘a coalition of the willing’ to remove ZANU PF from power saying: 
Put the boot on the ground and give (President) Mugabe 48 hours to go … So we have 
got to re-look at the approach that South Africa is taking in terms of quiet diplomacy … 
it’s not evident that it’s working at this point. We have always talked about coalitions of 
the willing and I, for one, believe that coalitions of the willing are going to be the new 
force in global affairs … (Peta, 2004).  
Frazer urged SADC to do more and argued that South Africa had the leverage to force ZANU PF 
to conform. Mbeki however refused to heed the call and continued with his quiet diplomacy 
towards Zimbabwe.  
 
Due to mounting criticisms, ZANU PF was increasingly withdrawing into a defensive mode to 
fight real and perceived hostilities from Western countries and against the opposition 
machinations to take over power.  The ruling party reverted to fully embracing liberation ethos 
both by way of encouraging public discourse and the mobilisation of the state security apparatus 
and the masses around the Chimurenga (struggle for independence) ideals that it said sought to 
complete the process of self-determination (Mutambara, Interview, 2013, Jun. 20). At a funeral 
to bury the former governor of Matabeleland South, Mark Dube, at the National Heroes Acre, 
President Mugabe said the problem in Zimbabwe was Britain: 
The great suffering of our people, the oppression that took place, the loss of our land, the 
suppression of our freedoms…. That enemy was Britain … and its allies. They can never, 
ever, be our friends, indeed never our friends. Whatever they do, however they think, 
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they remain colonial enemies. … Take care … that we do not place this country in the 
hands of those who are ready to sup with the enemy. Those who are ready to rush to the 
enemy and call him a friend, forgetting that yesterday, he was the cause of the bloodshed 
in this country (Mugabe, 2004).  
Just before the elections of 2005, with the opposition making fresh accusations that the political 
playing field was tilted in ZANU PF’s favour, the then United States nominee for the post of 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, said before the US Congress about Zimbabwe: 
To be sure, in our world there remain outposts of tyranny and America stands with 
oppressed people on every continent ... in Cuba, and Burma, and North Korea, and Iran, 
and Belarus, and Zimbabwe. The world should apply what Nathan Sharansky calls the 
‘town square test’: if a person cannot walk into the middle of the town square and express 
his or her views without fear of arrest, imprisonment, or physical harm, then that person 
is living in a ‘fear society, not a free society. We cannot rest until every person living in a 
‘fear society’ has finally won their freedom (Rice, 2005). 
Then President Thabo Mbeki on a visit to Britain in 2005 gave an interview to the Financial 
Times in which he criticized the United States for listing Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny 
saying: 
I think it’s an exaggeration and I think that whatever (the US Government) wants to do 
with regard to that list of six countries, or however many, I think it’s really somewhat 
discredited. To put all these countries together and say Zimbabwe is one of these outposts 
of tyranny, how do you justify that? It doesn’t mean that there is nothing that went wrong 
in Zimbabwe ... We agree that there must be land redistribution in Zimbabwe but the 
manner in which it is being handled is incorrect, and the way the conflict has arisen 
between black Zimbabweans and white Zimbabweans is not what we want. But you see, 
to take a posture which would say – which I think would be quite easy – we would sit 
here and say we going to shout at the Zimbabweans, that’s the beginning and the end of 
any contribution we would make (Gowers, White & Reed, 2005). 
 
Although SADC said the election results of 2005 reflected the will of the people, the West and 
the opposition condemned the elections once more and ratcheted up pressure on ZANU PF that 
included widening the scope of the sanctions and pressing Mbeki to do more. In an interview 
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with the BBC a few months later, Mbeki once more reiterated his view of how he saw the 
Zimbabwean conflict being resolved saying:  
It lies in the hands of Zimbabwe leaders; fundamentally, it is not Pretoria, or London, or 
New York, the solution (sic). So this is what we have been saying to the leaders of 
Zimbabwe, both the ruling party and the opposition, you have to get-together and sort out 
your problems … (Kearney, 2005). 
Soon after the elections of 2005 and the refusal by President Mugabe to negotiate with 
Tsvangirai saying he would rather talk to the then British premier Tony Blair, the opposition 
leader called for an international approach to the conflict saying: 
I can accept the fact that Mbeki wants to be part of the solution and we also want him to 
be … But he should accept that the situation is now beyond the capacity of South Africa 
alone. We need an international approach which includes the African Union, SADC, and 
the UN because this crisis has assumed that position. President Mbeki therefore needs 
some complementary efforts from other international bodies to solve this crisis 
(ZimOnline, 2005). 
The efforts to bring in other bodies in the mediation included the failed attempt by the then UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, who had hitherto made known his dislike of how ZANU PF was 
handling the situation in Zimbabwe. Annan held a meeting with President Mugabe on the 
sidelines of the African Union summit in Banjul, Gambia in 2006 and despite his demonstrated 
enthusiasm to be involved, emerged from it saying:  
President Benjamin Mkapa has been working quietly with President Mugabe. You do not 
need two mediators. I told him (President Mugabe) I was committed to helping 
Zimbabwe and the people of Zimbabwe and would support the work of the mediator. We 
both agreed that he (Mkapa) should be given the time and space to do his work (Tromp, 
2006). 
As it were, the former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa had been mandated by SADC to 
find common ground between ZANU PF and the British government through an announcement 
on 22 August 2006 by the then regional bloc’s chair and Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha 
Mosisili. Given the wide rift between Britain and Zimbabwe, the effort eventually fizzled out 
without any tangible results and once more left Mbeki as the only mediator who remained 
somehow committed to finding a solution in the conflict. In a bid to demonstrate that he was in 
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control of the situation, Mbeki in 2006 nearly torpedoed his informal mediation effort when he 
incensed the opposition in Zimbabwe by saying:  
I have no reason to think that anybody in Zimbabwe will militate in any way so that the 
(next) elections will not be free and fair. … I don’t know what has happened in 
Zimbabwe that is in violation of the SADC protocol, because as I know things like the 
independent electoral commission, things like access to the public media, things like the 
absence of violence and intimidation, those matters have been addressed (Muleya, 2006). 
The opposition and civic society groups viewed Mbeki’s pronouncement as wanting to legitimise 
a future ZANU PF electoral win irrespective of the means used. Lovemore Madhuku, the then 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) president said: 
It’s clear Mbeki wants to endorse the election result which he knows will be in favour of 
ZANU PF. He is trying to secure legitimacy for (President) Mugabe’s rule. That is why 
he was anxious to bring the MDC back to the electoral process after it threatened to 
boycott the (next) election. Now that the MDC will contest, he wants to use that to say 
the election was legitimate (Muleya, ibid). 
 
In 2006, the MDC authored a paper in which it suggested a roadmap for the resolution of the 
crisis that was envisaged to be implemented before the 2008 elections that suggested the 
following: negotiations and agreement between ZANU PF and the MDC on the framework of the 
roadmap; negotiations between ZANU PF and MDC on a transitional authority; negotiations 
between civil society, ZANU PF, the MDC and other political formations on the involvement of 
civil society in various transitional bodies including a constitutional conference; the enactment 
by parliament of a constitutional conference act and the necessary amendments to the 
Zimbabwean constitution to cater for a transitional authority and Cabinet; the drafting of a new 
constitution by the constitutional conference; and the holding of free and fair elections under 
international supervision (MDC Roadmap, 2006). The roadmap was dismissed by ZANU PF as a 
non-starter. With most of the SADC member states not willing to openly criticise President 
Mugabe and the South African government making efforts to shield the conflict from being 
internationalised, the conflict continued unabated. Meanwhile, the ZANU PF government was 
not hesitant to use force to deal with the internal threats to its hold on power as well as 
employing a diplomatic offensive in the international fora against its perceived external enemies 
(Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb. 17). Most Western countries also adopted a strategy of 
continuously condemning ZANU PF buttressed by the application of sanctions by the USA, the 
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European Union and other former British dominions. Badza, (2008) said between 2000 and 
2007, there were numerous SADC and Troika summit meetings that tried and failed to find a 
solution to the Zimbabwean conflict. Consequently, the conflict continued with the West and the 
opposition hoping that a future election would result in an opposition win whilst the ruling party 
hoped that its anti-imperialistic policies and its vice-grip hold on the state apparatus would 
eventually see the opposition fading into oblivion.   
The Machiavellian approach by the ZANU PF government however was the one that eventually 
created an opportunity for Mbeki to have greater leverage in his involvement in the conflict 
when Morgan Tsvangirai and other opposition figures were brutalised by security forces at a 
prayer rally in Harare in 2007 (Masunungure, 2009 and Majome, Interview, 2015, Feb. 13). A 
report on the opposition members and Tsvangirai’s treatment at the hands of security forces that 
came out in the Mail and Guardian showed the gravity of the situation:  
Using sjamboks, army belts and gun butts, the soldiers attacked Tsvangirai until he 
passed out. One of the soldiers poured cold water all over Tsvangirai to resuscitate him. 
Tsvangirai regained consciousness again around 1.30am … One vicious woman was left 
to work on him. She removed an army belt from her waist and used it to assault 
Tsvangirai until he passed out again (Mail and Guardian, 2007). 
The pictures of Morgan Tsvangirai’s brutalised body made headlines in most media outlets and 
the international reaction compelled SADC to convene an extra-ordinary summit and 
commissioned Thabo Mbeki to be formally involved in the conflict to, among other things, bring 
the parties together to end violence and put in place a framework for the holding of free and fair 
elections (Badza, 2008, Majome, Interview, 2015, Feb. 13). The first signal that SADC would 
seek to improve its approach in the wake of the opposition beatings came from the then President 
of Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, who thereafter gave a very strong condemnation of the political 
and economic crisis in Zimbabwe for the first time saying:  
As I speak right now, one SADC country has sunk into such economic difficulties that it 
may be likened to a sinking Titanic whose passengers are jumping out in a bid to save 
their lives. Quiet diplomacy has failed to help solve the political chaos and economic 
meltdown in Zimbabwe … (SADC) will soon take a stand. It is tragic for the reputation 
of Africa when Zimbabwe is allowed to remain in the state it is (Mwanawasa, 2007). 
Despite the insolent criticism of the situation in Zimbabwe, the regional extra-ordinary summit 
that followed President Mwanawasa’s statement that took place in Tanzania however recalled 
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that free, fair and democratic presidential elections had been held in Zimbabwe in 2005, appealed 
to Britain to honour its land compensation obligations made at Lancaster and called for the 
lifting of sanctions against the country (Gore, 2007). This was the first time that SADC had 
collectively called for the lifting of the sanctions and a document analysis of the communiqué 
suggested that whilst taking a firm decision to deal with the conflict in view of the dire political 
developments in the country, it also wanted to give ZANU PF a face-saver by recognising its 
concerns in the conflict. The opposition was however not happy with the fact that whilst placing 
its faith in Thabo Mbeki to help the parties to find a solution, the summit had also balanced its 
communiqué by acceding to ZANU PF demands. This prompted Tendai Biti, then MDC T 
secretary general to say:  
SADC’s view of our crisis is totally dishonest and mendaciously constructed. It is not 
honest to say Britain must pay compensation for the land when the land has actually been 
acquired from white commercial farmers. … We saw him (Thabo Mbeki) in 2002 when 
Zimbabwe was still part of the Commonwealth.  … Mbeki was again involved in the 
collapsed talks between the MDC and ZANU PF. We have faith in President Mbeki but 
have no faith in (President Robert) Mugabe. As long as we have guarantees that come 12 
March 2008, Mugabe quits, it’s ok. We would love to say goodbye to uncle Bob (Biti, 
2007). 
 
Despite the opposition’s misgivings, Masunungure (2009) said following the extra-ordinary 
summit, some measure of progress was realised when piecemeal changes to the laws that were 
deemed to be an impediment to free and fair elections were either created or existing ones 
amended albeit with resistance from ZANU PF and the state machinery. In particular, the SADC-
facilitated dialogue led to the enactment of Constitutional Amendment number 18 that provided 
for the harmonisation of the presidential, house of assembly, senatorial and local government 
elections as well as electoral reforms (Badza, 2008). Despite these developments, Tsvangirai on 
a visit to Britain in 2007 criticised Mbeki’s role in the conflict saying his approach was not 
yielding much and welcomed suggestions from the media that Kofi Annan was due to visit 
Zimbabwe and possibly get involved in the conflict. He was quoted by New Zimbabwe saying:  
The Secretary General of the United Nations has authority to intervene in any 
international issue and Zimbabwe is an international issue. I hope that this is not just 
rhetoric and that he (Annan) will take the opportunity to talk to President Mugabe. When 
your house is on fire, you need your neighbours to help you. … Zimbabwe is a failed 
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state. It cannot continue on auto-cruise to self destruction. It is a human rights crisis. 
There are global implications (Lovell, 2007). 
Mbeki’s involvement after the brutalisation of opposition leaders only went as far as nudging the 
parties to create an environment conducive for the holding of future elections since there was 
nothing in the structure of the conflict that could make the sharing of political power a 
possibility. 
 
The MDC had little room to manoeuvre in pushing for its demands and neither could it escalate 
the conflict beyond its rhetoric against the ruling party owing to its lack of military means and 
will power to challenge ZANU PF (Cawthra, 2010). Although the West, and in particular Britain, 
was not happy with the way things were unfolding in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2007, 
especially the continued stay in power by President Mugabe, it could not mount a military 
operation against the country for moral reasons given its public pronouncements that it had 
nothing to do with the unfolding conflict as well as lack of support from SADC countries. 
Although the economy continued to deteriorate, causing untold suffering to the citizenry, ZANU 
PF remained adamant that it was doing the right thing. While the non-recognition of the ZANU 
PF victory in the elections by the opposition and Western countries denied the ruling party full 
legitimacy, the recognition and support from most African countries, Iran, China and Russia 
gave ZANU PF hope that it would, with time, triumph against the Western countries’ onslaught 
and the opposition challenge (Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb. 17). In explaining the long stay in 
power by ZANU PF, Muzondidya (2010) presented the following argument: 
Conscious of the historical and contemporary contestations around post-colonial redress 
and the native settler dialect in post-colonial Africa in general, from the 1990s ZANU PF 
slowly began to redirect popular anger towards its government and capital (foreign and 
white dominated) by focusing on the unresolved questions of belonging, citizenship and 
economic rights and appealing to notions of exclusive black nationalism. It skillfully 
shifted the political debate about Zimbabwe into a more complicated ‘native-settler 
question’ (p. 2). 
 
Further, the opposition and the Western countries’ pre-occupation with the long period President 
Mugabe had been in power helped to reinforce ZANU PF’s call for the defence of the country’s 
sovereignty and President Mugabe, who in an interview with Daphne Barak broadcast on Sky 
News and also carried by Britain’s Sunday Times newspaper in 2005 had indicated that he would 
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leave office at the expiry of his term in 2008, began to indicate his determination to continue in 
office arguing that he needed to complete the emancipation of Zimbabweans and that it was the 
people of Zimbabwe and not foreign powers that would force him to retire from office. In a UN 
speech in the General Assembly meeting held in September 2007 President Mugabe had this to 
say about the problems in Zimbabwe: 
I lost eleven precious years of my life in the jail of a white man whose freedom and well 
being I have assured from the first day of Zimbabwe’s independence. I lost a further 
fifteen years fighting white injustice in my country. Ian Smith is responsible for the death 
of well over 50 000 of my people. I bear his scars of tyranny which Britain and America 
condoned. I meet his victims every day. Yet he walks free. He farms free. He talks freely 
under a black government. We taught him democracy…. He would have faced a different 
fate here and in Europe if the 50 000 he killed were Europeans ... The British and the 
Americans have gone on a relentless campaign of destabilising and vilifying my country. 
They have sponsored surrogate forces to challenge lawful authority in my country. They 
seek regime change, placing themselves in the role of Zimbabwean people in whose 
collective will democracy places the right to define and change regimes (Mugabe, 2007). 
 
The empirical evidence so far presented suggests that all the efforts from 2000 to bring the 
domestic players on the negotiating table to find a solution failed. It was only in 2007 that a 
window of opportunity opened up with the brutalisation of opposition members that gave 
impetus to Mbeki’s involvement in the conflict. The period failed to bring about any form of 
settlement of the conflict. The higher order constructs abstracted from the evidence so far 
presented on why there was no settlement in the period from 2000 to 2007 are as follows:  
 Each party in the conflict was pursuing a unilateral path to acquire and monopolise 
political power in the period 2000 to 2007. 
 The election outcomes between 2000 and 2005, each time gave ZANU PF margins that 
allowed it to form a government which it always did despite protestations from the 
opposition and Western countries. There was nothing that appeared in the conflict during 
this period that had the oomph to block ZANU PF’s unilateral hold on to power. The 
verbal condemnations by Western powers that were accompanied by sanctions but 
without any other coercive action provided the ZANU PF Government with a room to 
manoeuvre as it wished using those very same sanctions to galvanise its political support. 
ZANU PF remained convinced that it was a party that had brought democracy and that 
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countries that had condoned oppression during colonialism had no moral grounds to 
intervene and stop it from completing what it viewed as the consummation of the 
liberation struggle to economically empower the majority blacks. There was also a sense 
of belief amongst the ZANU PF leadership that the generality of Zimbabweans were only 
temporarily disenchanted by hardships but were in the main supportive of the path the 
liberation party was taking. Further, the support that the liberation party had from the 
state apparatus gave it confidence that the opposition would never be able to take over 
power. 
 As discussed in chapter 4, the printing of money and the stop-gap measures that were 
being done by the Ministry of Finance and the central bank and the hope that the Look 
East Policy would yield quick results, gave ZANU PF hope that the economic downturn 
would be reversed with time. 
 Efforts by President Thabo Mbeki that were characterised by a policy of quiet diplomacy 
were not effective enough to compel ZANU PF to change course yet playing a critical 
role in shielding the resolution effort from being internationalised. 
 In 2002, ZANU PF dismissed the Commonwealth as discredited and biased to intervene 
and as such Zimbabwe was expelled from the organisation. 
 The UN was viewed by ZANU PF as vulnerable to manipulation by the powerful 
countries in the Security Council and in the absence of a genocide or threat to 
international security and, despite opposition calls for it to be involved, remained at most 
a spectator only helping to ameliorate the suffering masses through humanitarian relief. 
 An African effort through former President Benjamin Mkapa to find common ground 
with the former colonial power reached a brick-wall given both the British government 
and ZANU PF’s uncompromising positions in the conflict. Most African leaders 
appeared not sure which position to take and remained indifferent, not happy with the 
way the situation was unfolding in Zimbabwe but at the same time not gathering enough 
strength to pressure ZANU PF to change course given the feeling that somehow ZANU 
PF and the Zimbabwean people had been wronged by history. 
 The involvement of Mbeki from 2007 only went as far as making the environment 
conducive for the holding of future elections. 
Consequently, throughout the period 2000 to 2008, both the Western countries and the 
opposition were clamouring for dialogue and ZANU PF was refusing. In essence, there was 
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nothing in the conflict that would compel the stronger party in the conflict, ZANU PF, to accept 
dialogue with the opposition. We now turn to the ripeness of conflict propositions discussed in 
chapter 2 to see how they fit with the empirical evidence gathered for the period 2000 to just 
before the announcement of the election results in 2008. As noted in chapter 2, Zartman (2001) 
argued that parties to a conflict seek resolution only when they are ready to do so, especially 
when unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they 
are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. It was however clear that the period from 2000 
to the elections of 2008 had only one party, the opposition which was the weaker player in the 
conflict, that was favouring dialogue. Stedman (1991) suggested that not all the parties need to 
feel the Mutual Hurting Stalemate (MHS), yet in this case whilst the opposition wanted dialogue 
because it was feeling that all other options were blocked, ZANU PF did not feel that way and so 
did not. It should be noted however that the opposition preferred dialogue not on the premise of 
wanting to share power but as a precursor to its future takeover of political power. A critical 
component of ripeness thus appears to be that both parties’ unilateral positions in a conflict need 
to be simultaneously blocked for ripeness to be present.  
Zartman (2001) also suggested that another factor that induces ripeness is a recently experienced 
or impending catastrophe which should provide a deadline or lesson indicating that pain can 
increase sharply if something is not done about it at that point. Despite the economic and social 
hardships that were being felt by Zimbabweans from 2000, ZANU PF did not have a sense that 
there was an impending catastrophe to justify its acceptance of opposition demands, but instead, 
viewed the hardships as an unavoidable part of the struggle to achieve total emancipation. 
Putting it in another way, Zartman (2001) described the stalemate as resembling a plateau, a kind 
of a flat unending terrain without relief with the possibility of a precipice at the edge of the 
plateau providing the catastrophe which required a change of course to avoid the danger. Putting 
it in yet another way, Zartman (2001) said if the notion of the mutual blockade is too static to be 
realistic, the concept can be dynamically stated as a moment in which the upper hand slips and 
the lower hand rises, both hands (parties to the conflict) moving towards equality with both 
movements carrying pain for the parties. From 2000, ZANU PF did not feel the pain of waning 
political fortunes as it continued to garner electoral margins that allowed it to form governments 
despite the opposition claims of unfair elections. Since ZANU PF’s power remained well above 
that of the opposition, it was enjoying the win-lose outcome and thus did not see the need for a 
positive sum outcome. Thus the conflict became an unending flat terrain with distantly spaced 
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high grounds and depressions but lacking an edge in the form of a precipice that would block the 
stronger party’s path. Although the brutalisation of Tsvangirai in March 2007 provided an 
opportunity for Mbeki’s formal involvement in the talks, the fact that the structure of the conflict 
remained unchanged meant that there was no ripeness in the conflict and as such his efforts only 
went as far as encouraging reforms for a better election environment in the future without any 
immediate settlement. 
One can therefore argue that conditions of ripeness were not present in the conflict in the period 
between 2000 to the elections of 2008 as each of the domestic players in the conflict sought to 
pursue a unilateral path hoping to eliminate the other party through popular electoral support 
meanwhile the external players continued to publicly deny direct involvement hoping that the 
deteriorating economic situation, isolation of the country, sanctions and demonisation of the 
ruling party and its policies would sway electoral support against ZANU PF. As ZANU PF 
continued to be shielded by its continued hold on to power and access to state resources, the 
opposition continued to enjoy financial and moral support from Western powers, meanwhile, the 
social conditions were getting worse and worse for the ordinary citizens as the economy 
continued to suffer from the impasse. The polarised and contradictory signals that were coming 
out of Zimbabwe and the perennial inability to decisively deal with the conflict situation by 
African leaders’ indifference and lack of consensus also contributed to nothing being done about 
the situation. 
If one takes Pruitt’s (1997) variation of ripeness that emphasises readiness and motivation, one 
can conclude that there was no readiness and motivation in both parties in the conflict with the 
ruling party seeing no reason to accept opposition demands. The opposition was not ready and 
motivated to the extent that it did not see a solution that included ZANU PF as a player in the 
negotiated outcome but rather one that should negotiate itself out of power. Similarly, the 
development can be explained by Druckman and Green’s (1995) Political Stability Model, in that 
though the opposition gained electoral seats that showed it was becoming an important factor in 
Zimbabwean politics, this alone was not enough to guarantee its political takeover or just to force 
conditions for a negotiated settlement, a situation made worse by the attitude of the state security 
apparatus towards the opposition. Though suffering a legitimacy crisis, for the ruling party, the 
elections outcomes that had clear winning margins gave it a sense of assurance that it could 
proceed unilaterally meanwhile labeling the challenge on its hold on power as the West’s regime 
change agenda. In line with Harass (1990), there was no shared perception of the desirability of 
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an accord from 2000 to 2008. Stedman (1991) said the notion of ripeness should also bear on the 
military, a condition that was not met as the military and war veterans remained loyal to the 
liberation party and would not countenance the idea of having the opposition in power 
contributing to the lack of ripeness. The thesis thus found resonance with Anstey’s (2007) study 
that searched for ripeness in the period between 2000 and 2006 and concluded that Mbeki’s 
‘quiet diplomacy,’ African leaders’ indifference to the crisis, the desire by the opposition and 
some Western countries to remove ZANU PF from power and the desire to hold on to power by 
ZANU PF under the leadership of President Mugabe made the situation unripe for resolution.  
5.3 The setting in of internal ripeness and the SADC intervention 
The period after the announcement of the Zimbabwean election results of 2008 was however 
different in that it eventually witnessed SADC playing a more visible role in the attempts to find 
a solution to the conflict. Motae (Interview, 2013, Aug. 5) confirmed that SADC’s formal 
involvement in the crisis in Zimbabwe that began with the extraordinary summit of the Heads of 
State and Government that was held in Dar as Salaam, Tanzania, on 29 March, 2007 gathered 
momentum after the election stalemate of 2008 and became a reality after the AU passed a 
resolution at Sharm El Sheikh that asked the regional bloc to find a negotiated settlement. The 
decision to appoint Thabo Mbeki appeared to have been the best option available given that he 
had been involved in trying to find a solution and was therefore close to the goings-on, South 
Africa had some kind of big brother role owing to its economic and political leverage in the 
region, and that, although there had been occasional misgivings by the opposition about his role, 
it was felt at the time he had clout to handle the crisis especially when it came to accessing 
ZANU PF and President Robert Mugabe55. It was SADC’s view that what was needed was not a 
change of the mediator but a change in approach given that quiet diplomacy had failed to have 
any meaningful impact.  
Maisiri (2013) posited that the decision by SADC to deploy Mbeki to facilitate internal political 
dialogue in 2007 was precipitated by the deterioration of the political, economic and social 
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 Mwonzora (Interview 2013, Jun. 16) said Thabo Mbeki was very intelligent, competent and committed to a 
resolution though on a fairness score of 1 to 10, gave him 4 alleging that he was favouring ZANU PF arguing that 
this obtained from his poor conceptualisation of the revolutionary trajectory in which to him the revolution in 
Zimbabwe against colonial rule ended with the granting of independence yet to the MDC T, it included the creation 
of a post-liberation democratic dispensation. 
 158 
 
situation in the country including: Operation Murambatsvina of 200556 ; the clampdown on 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the NCA and other civic bodies in 2006; the 
crippling strikes of doctors and teachers and the labour unrests of January 2007; and the arrest 
and violence unleashed at the March 2007 prayer rally that saw the brutal assault on Morgan 
Tsvangirai. As noted in chapter 2, Druckman (2001) came up with the idea of turning points in 
describing events in the resolution process that mark the transition from one stage to another. 
The appointment of Mbeki to mediate that was triggered mainly by the violence of March 2007 
was a turning point in the conflict that witnessed the end of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy as he 
was now formally charged with the responsibility to help the parties in Zimbabwe to end inter-
party violence and put in place a framework that would ensure a credible future election with the 
backing of the regional grouping. Relations between the parties also minimally changed as 
dialogue began albeit with much resistance from the ruling party. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the opportunity to get the parties to engage each other more 
seriously presented itself after the political stalemate that followed the announcement of the 2008 
elections57. The researcher who was seconded to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) 
headquarters as part of the communication team observed the 2008 elections and the 
announcement of the results which was done a month after the voting and well past the legally 
prescribed time frame provided evidence that all was not well58. Mapenzauswa (2008) reported 
in the Mail and Guardian that tensions between the two sides rose sharply fuelled by the delay in 
the announcement of the results and the allegations by the MDC T that the delay was designed to 
rig the elections, the declaration by the MDC T before the announcement that it had won the 
election in violation of the law that prohibited parties to do so before the official announcement 
of the election results and the ZANU PF call for a recount well after 48 hours and before the 
official announcement of the results also required by the law. Responding to the MDC’s victory 
claim, the Presidential spokesman, George Charamba (2008) was quoted by The Telegraph 
                                                    
56
 Operation Murambatsvina was a clean-up operation that was carried out by the GoZ to remove illegal 
structures in urban centres that had in part resulted from the spirit of the land reform where citizens began to 
arbitrarily allocate themselves land even in urban areas.  
57
 Motae (Interview, 2013, Aug. 5) pointed out that the political environment in 2008 was not conducive for 
stability as the elections were characterised by tensions and disagreements and after the announcement of the results, 
all the parties sought to prevail over others by hook or crook. 
58
 Mwonzora (Interview 2013, Jun. 16) said that the delay in announcing the results was clear evidence that 
cheating had taken place. 
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saying “It is called a coup d’état and we all know how coups are handled”. Then MDC T 
spokesman, Nelson Chamisa, responded to the calls for a recount saying:  
It’s illegal; it is impractical to demand a recount. A recount is only asked 48 hours after 
the counting and as far as we are concerned, counting was done last Sunday and they 
should have asked for a recount on Tuesday. We cannot allow ZANU PF to take the law 
into their (its) own hands (sic). They are testing people’s patience. Is it not ridiculous that 
they are asking for a recount of results not yet announced? It betrays their mischief, it 
betrays their shenanigans. Clearly, they are tempering with the ballot boxes 
(Mapenzauswa, 2008). 
 
The delay in announcing the results signaled that ZANU PF had been shocked by the election 
result and at first failed to come out with a quick way of handling the situation. When the results 
were finally announced, the MDC T had for the first time since independence in 1980 offset 
ZANU PF’s majority in parliament by garnering 100 seats against ZANU PF’s 99, the smaller 
MDC with 10 and one seat going to an independent (ZEC Report, 2008). The situation was made 
more difficult by the announcement that Morgan Tsvangirai had won the first round of the 
presidential election but without the 50 percent plus one vote required to take over the 
presidency. Tsvangirai however boycotted the presidential run-off citing widespread violence 
against his supporters and sought refuge in the Dutch embassy in Harare as ZANU PF and MDC 
engaged on massive campaigns that often turned violent due to competition for political space 
between the two major parties. Although the opposition parties that won seats in Parliament had 
a majority when combined together, the refusal by the smaller faction of the MDC led by Arthur 
Mutambara which had 10 seats to form a coalition with either Tsvangirai’s MDC T or Mugabe’s 
ZANU PF choosing to assume the position of kingmaker contributed to the creation of a political 
vacuum. There was no political or legal room for any of the parties that had won seats in the 
elections to form a government unilaterally. Faced with a crisis, there was talk that President 
Mugabe chaired a Joint Operations Command (JOC) meeting which considered options available 
and Talbot quoted an unnamed diplomat as saying:  
In the JOC meeting, there were two options on the table for (President) Mugabe: declare 
victory on Sunday night or declare a martial law. They didn’t consider conceding. We 
understand (President) Mugabe nearly decided to declare victory. Cooler heads have 
prevailed (Talbot, 2008).  
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John Makumbe was quoted in the same report saying: “The (army) Chiefs of Staff were talking 
to Morgan Tsvangirai and they were trying to put in place transitional structures”. Mawick 
Khumalo who led the Pan Africa Parliament Observer Mission in the elections was quoted 
saying: “I was talking to some of the big wigs in the ruling party and they also are concerned 
about the possibility of a change of guard” (Talbot, 2008). The state media however reported that 
the MDC T had made approaches to ZANU PF suggesting that a unity government could solve 
the problem and the latter had turned down the offer. Tsvangirai also claimed that he had been 
approached by some elements within ZANU PF proposing to hand over power but the talks 
collapsed owing to pressure from hardliners (Berger, 2008). 
The white commercial farmers who were the other domestic player in the conflict had placed 
their lot with the original MDC and unlike in previous elections where they had exercised voter 
apathy, as observed by the researcher, in 2008 they came out in large numbers to vote. There was 
talk that whites who had fled the country at the onset of land reform were flocking back to 
Zimbabwe in preparation of regaining control of the farms they had lost after an MDC T win. 
With no clear winner in the elections, white morale slumped as there were no signs that the status 
quo would change. For the majority of black Zimbabweans, Concelia Mswela (Interview, 2014, 
Sept. 24) a lecturer at a tertiary college in Gwanda said there was “utter chaos, disillusionment 
and a very depressing sense of hopelessness that gripped the country owing to the political 
stalemate and the ever-worsening economic situation”. Commenting on the ZANU PF strategy 
after the political stalemate that followed the announcement of the elections in 2008, Mujuru 
(Interview, 2013, Sept, 5) said the period was a difficult one for ZANU PF and the rest of the 
party’s membership had gone through it by placing their faith and hope in the political wisdom 
of President Mugabe to find a way out of the crisis59. The whole nation remained in a state of 
limbo with no one coming out with a workable solution to resolve the impasse. Morgan 
Tsvangirai gave what he called a state of the nation address to the newly elected MDC T 
Members of Parliament on 30 May saying Zimbabwe was in a state of despair and was “an 
unmitigated embarrassment to the African continent” due to its economic situation (Tsvangirai, 
2008). Tsvangirai also said the MDC T was the “new ruling party” and those engaged in 
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 Mujuru (Interview, 2013, Sept. 5) said that through the wisdom of President R. G. Mugabe who swallowed 
his pride, ZANU PF agreed to move one or two steps backwards as a sure way of securing a better way forward 
given his party’s poor showing in the 2008 elections. 
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violence would not receive amnesty from his government, that the MDC T’s legislative 
programme would be based on the return of fundamental freedoms of the people of Zimbabwe, a 
new constitution would follow in 18 months, a truth and justice commission would be 
established, “the army would defend our borders, not attack our people,” while prisons would 
hold only criminals and not innocent people, that the land issue would be completely 
depoliticised and that there would be measures to compensate or reintegrate former white 
farmers (Tsvangirai, 2008). Despite the pronouncement, the MDC T also remained clueless on 
the way forward. 
 
The South African government was advised by Kingsley Mamabolo, the former South African 
ambassador to Zimbabwe and head of the SEOM in the 2008 March elections that a free and fair 
presidential election re-run could not take place under the prevailing conditions (RTT News, 
2008). Mbeki responded by dispatching retired South African generals to Zimbabwe to look into 
allegations of escalating political violence and intimidation but could not do much other than 
nudging ZANU PF to address the situation. The momentum gained through Mbeki’s mediation 
from 2007 was therefore lost in the immediate aftermath of the first round of voting. Following 
the one man presidential race on 27 June 2008 involving President Mugabe after the withdrawal 
of Morgan Tsvangirai, SADC for the first time in the history of Zimbabwe criticised the election 
in a statement on 29 June, saying that the vote “did not represent the will of the people of 
Zimbabwe” and that “the prevailing environment impinged on the credibility of the electoral 
process” (Aljazeera, 2008). Desmond Tutu (2008) said there was “a very good argument” for 
sending “an international force to restore peace” in Zimbabwe. Having previously called for the 
suspension of Zimbabwe from the AU and SADC, on 4 July 2008, Botswana’s Foreign Minister, 
Phandu Skelemani said that his country did not recognise the election outcome and called upon 
the rest of SADC to refuse recognition to ZANU PF and for an “expedited” mediation in 
Zimbabwe within “a defined time frame” that would be based on “mutual trust, good faith and 
equal standing between the parties” (Skelemani, 2008). Western powers also condemned the 
elections as a sham and demanded the isolation of President Mugabe and ZANU PF unless there 
were new elections monitored by international observers. Briefing the Security Council on the 
situation that was prevailing in Zimbabwe soon after the 2008 elections, the Deputy Secretary 
General of the UN said: 
(Observations) clearly indicate that the electoral process leading to the declared re-
election of President Mugabe was seriously flawed. This profound crisis of illegitimacy is 
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further compounded by the paralysis of State institutions. There is currently no 
functioning Parliament. Civil society has been silenced and intimidated. The economy is 
crippled, with annual inflation reaching 10.5 million percent by the end of June and 
unemployment being over 80 percent, and severe shortages of food and basic services 
exist. There is an urgent need to restore the rule of law and to start building public 
institutions (Migiro, 2008, p. 2).  
 
On 30 June, then Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga called for the suspension of Zimbabwe 
from the AU until it held free and fair elections in the presence of peacekeepers (BBC News, 
2008a). At Sharm El Sheikh, the debate over a resolution on Zimbabwe saw the Vice-President 
of Botswana, Mompati Merafhe criticising President Robert Mugabe and the “flawed election” 
saying that Zimbabwe should be suspended from AU and SADC meetings (BBC News, 2008b). 
It was also reported that Botswana deployed a Botswana Defence Force (BDF) contingent along 
the border with Zimbabwe armed with heavy artillery with the aim of intervening on the side of 
the opposition with support from the USA60 and Britain if a civil war erupted in Zimbabwe in the 
aftermath of the 2008 elections prompting President Mugabe to warn its neighbours to “think 
twice” before going to war with Harare (Jonas, Mandiyanike and Maundeni, 2013).  
As noted in chapter 4, the state of the economy did not help the situation either. The Zimbabwe 
dollar that had crashed in 2007 experienced hyper-inflation that eroded to nadir levels the 
pensions for retirees and the general citizenry’s savings and salaries. Queues for basic 
commodities were a common scene throughout the country as local industries were closing shop 
due to the problems of operating in a difficult macro-economic environment, the effects of 
sanctions and ZANU PF empowerment policies which were failing due to inadequate funding 
and corruption. Most people began to survive by speculating and changing money on the black 
market (Munyoro, Interview, 2014, May, 28). A sense of helplessness prevailed amongst the 
Zimbabwean populace. According to one ordinary citizen who fled the country in 2008 and who 
chose anonymity, life was unbearable and became a matter of whether one managed to put 
something on the table for that day with tomorrow having to sort itself out (Anonymous, 
Personal Communication, 2014, Dec. 13). Zimbabweans continued to flee the country in large 
                                                    
60
 The Standard of 5 October 2013 reported that Botswana approached the USA requesting material support 
in anticipation of a war against Zimbabwe but was turned down. 
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numbers. It became certain in the minds of many that the Zimbabwean project that had started 
with great promise in 1980 was under threat. 
The continuing stalemate and SADC inaction resulted in the African Union’s decision at the 
Sharm El Sheik summit in Egypt in June 2008 that instructed the regional bloc to facilitate 
negotiations for an agreement and a document analysis of the communiqué suggested that 
African leaders’ position on the conflict had changed to a more hard line stance as it said:  
Deeply concerned with the prevailing situation in Zimbabwe; deeply concerned with the 
negative reports of SADC, the African Union, and the Pan-African Parliament observers 
on the Zimbabwean Presidential run-off election held on 27 June 2008; deeply concerned 
about the violence and the loss of life that has occurred in Zimbabwe ….; considering the 
urgent need to prevent further worsening of the situation and with the view to avoid the 
spread of the conflict with the consequential negative impact on the country and the sub-
region … recognising the complexity of the situation in Zimbabwe, noting the 
willingness of the political leaders of Zimbabwe to enter into negotiations to establish a 
government of national unity ….To encourage President Robert Mugabe and the leader 
of the MDC Party, Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai to honour their commitment to initiate 
dialogue with a view to promoting peace, stability and democracy and the reconciliation 
of the Zimbabwean people (AU Summit Communiqué, 2008).  
 
Following the AU resolution, SADC did not waste time and convened a summit that mandated 
South Africa to find a negotiated solution through President Mbeki. Mbeki began with separate 
meetings with the parties that were immediately followed by a meeting of all the parties in which 
they all agreed to work towards a negotiated solution. Interviews with members of the opposing 
political players failed to yield a consensus on the real reasons why each party agreed to the 
dialogue. Insider observations however found resonance with most literature on the reasons why 
the parties accepted dialogue as a way out of the impasse. Dzinesa & Zambara (2012) suggested 
that ZANU PF was driven by a combination of factors including the free fall of the economy, 
increasing international criticism and pressure from SADC. Charamba (Interview, 2014, Jun. 3) 
was of the view that the decision to accept the negotiations leading to the GPA was a tactical 
position by all the players in the conflict to avoid mutual ruin given the political and economic 
situation in the country adding that the need for de-escalation was forced by the circumstances 
obtaining on the ground. Charamba (Interview, 2014, Jun. 3) posited that for ZANU PF, the 
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GPA was a way to achieve the following: buy time in order to retool for a longer fight against 
those opposed to its rule in view of its poor showing in the 2008 elections; the best way to unite 
internal forces against external forces, in particular, to expose Western countries’ hidden agenda 
in the conflict; and the most viable route to keep Western countries at bay given their hostile 
attitude towards ZANU PF while the matter was being handled by SADC. Although Mujuru 
(Interview, 2013, Sept. 5) intimated that ZANU PF entered the GPA reassured that the wisdom 
of President Mugabe would see the party prevailing in the end, it was evident immediately after 
the 2008 elections that a sense of helplessness was prevalent in ZANU PF and that if no solution 
had been found, a split could not have been ruled out.  
Although Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) suggested that the MDC T was driven by a 
desire to arrest the deteriorating economic situation to save the country, to reduce violence and to 
draft a new constitution, the other reasons appeared to have been a desire to attain regional 
recognition and the prospect of getting into power61. Moyo (Interview, 2013, Apr. 8) and Mujuru 
(Interview, 2013, Sept. 5) also asserted that ZANU PF’s loss in the harmonised elections of 
2008, condemnation by Western powers and a desire to stabilise the economy were the major 
factors that forced ZANU PF to accept the negotiations with the opposition which it had hitherto 
dismissed as a Western puppet. It was however clear that an attempt to monopolise power by any 
of the two major parties could have triggered an uprising from the supporters of the opposing 
party which may have led to martial law being declared by the military. The smaller faction of 
the MDC then led by Arthur Mutambara appeared to have been driven by a desire to maintain 
political relevance given its poor showing in the elections. In a position paper to clarify the 
smaller MDC party’s position in the talks, Coltart (2009) however pointed out that his party had 
entered into the inclusive government fully aware that the deal was not the best for Zimbabwe 
but was the best way to take the country forward given the realities on the ground.  
Despite several claims by the opposition parties that then President Thabo Mbeki was not an 
impartial mediator, the parties agreed to dialogue and eventually after a lot of haggling and 
bickering, the GPA was agreed on62. The researcher observed the talks that were often long and 
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 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun, 16) intimated that the MDC T had satisfactorily achieved its objectives in 
the GPA though the opposition cried foul when it was beaten by ZANU PF in the 2013 elections. 
62
 Motae (Interview, 2013, Aug. 5) said the GPA was a solution that was suggested by SADC after the AU 
Resolution that called for dialogue in Zimbabwe.  
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agonising because of back-sliding and non-agreement on key issues such as the form of 
government, the power sharing arrangements, sanctions and propaganda against the country. A 
detailed discussion of the negotiations and their outcome will be presented in later sections of 
this report. 
Empirical evidence so far presented suggests that the parties in the conflict in Zimbabwe 
accepted a SADC intervention and agreed to a negotiated solution in 2008 for the following 
reasons: 
 The appointment of Thabo Mbeki to work towards bringing the parties together in 2007 
was a chance opportunity created by the developments in the conflict that helped the 
parties to begin to discover each other, a situation that greatly helped to nurture a measure 
of confidence to develop between the parties as mind-sets began to shift. Progress 
achieved in electoral reforms created conditions that led to a violence-free first round of 
voting though real progress would come after the 2008 elections. 
 A change in the structure of the conflict brought about by the failure by the 2008 
harmonised elections to produce a clear winner created a political stalemate in which 
neither party could proceed unilaterally to form a government with ZANU PF blocked by 
lack of a majority and widespread international condemnation and the MDC T restrained 
by lack of an outright majority and ZANU PF’s hold on the state machinery.  
 The economy which was in a freefall and included the earlier crash of the Zimbabwe 
dollar and a hyper-inflationary environment that resulted in its replacement by the 
multicurrency regime in 2008 threatened the country with an economic collapse and 
compelled the parties to find an alternative approach to save the situation. 
 Despite occasional criticism of his role since 2000, in 2008 Thabo Mbeki managed to get 
the parties to agree to work together to find a solution to the conflict in a manner hitherto 
unparalleled leading to the GPA and the Inclusive Government. If one considers that 
Mbeki had been seized with efforts to find a solution from as early as 2000 but failing, 
one can argue that it was the change in the structure of the conflict after the indecisive 
and disputed election in 2008 and the threat of a failed state both politically and 
economically that triggered a shift in the parties’ positions to want to work for a 
negotiated outcome. 
 The AU Summit of June 2008 gave the parties and SADC an immediate and pragmatic 
way of dealing with the political impasse. 
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 The internal dynamics of the conflict after the 2008 elections were exclusively and 
directly affecting the domestic parties and compelled them to find an internal solution 
leaving the external dimension of the conflict largely unaffected. 
When the internal dynamics that obtained in the conflict in Zimbabwe in 2008 are considered 
from a ripeness of conflicts perspective, it shows the election outcome changed the structure of 
the conflict and blocked the unilateral paths of all the domestic players in the conflict63. The 
conflict had raged on since 2000 characterised by competition for political space that included: 
sporadic acts of intra-party violence;64 vilification and demonisation of each other by the parties; 
lack of meaningful dialogue; a sense of siege felt by all the parties; a rapidly declining economy; 
and a countrywide sense of helplessness on what could turn around the fortunes of the country. 
Despite these problems, the parties continued on their unilateral paths of seeking to outdo each 
other politically and always displayed indifference to the real problems facing the country up to 
the time of the disputed election results in 2008. Change came after the election results which in 
Zartman’s (1985) parlance, as the lower hand (the opposition electoral gains) was rising, and the 
upper hand (ZANU PF electoral losses) was lowering, the movement gravitating towards 
equality, created pain in both parties by way of denying each of them the capacity to monopolise 
power.  
Although there was no pain associated with military gains and losses as suggested by Zartman 
(1985), the results of the elections created a situation in which though the opposition had gained 
seats and offset the ZANU PF majority in parliament, its failure to secure the presidency, its slim 
lead in parliament and a hostile state security apparatus all blocked it from taking over power. 
Similarly, although President Mugabe was declared the winner of the one man election run-off, 
the pain associated with ZANU PF was that its losses in Parliament and non-recognition by the 
international community denied it legitimacy and could also not proceed to form a government 
on its own. Considered from another way of looking at ripeness as presented by Druckman and 
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 Three quarters of all those interviewed were of the view that the GPA became an attractive option to the 
political parties because of the political stalemate that followed the indecisive and disputed 2008 elections and the 
threat posed by the ever deteriorating economy.  
64
 Chihuri (Interview, 2013, Apr. 10) said violence was a common political weapon since 2000 and all the 
parties in Zimbabwe were to blame. On alleged police impartiality, he said the West and the opposition were lying 
by making false allegations claiming that policing for law and order was the same as state violence against citizens 
when in actual fact the opposition would be take to task for offending against the law. 
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Green (1995) in their Political Stability Model, power and legitimacy played an important factor 
in inducing ripeness suggesting an overlap with the hurting stalemate variable. The opposition’s 
power in the conflict was increased by its improved showing in the elections though it remained 
weak to take over power and ZANU PF’s political power was diminished owing to its poor 
showing and was suffering from a legitimacy crisis that barred it from also pursuing its desired 
goal of monopolising power and ripeness set in as the perceptions of the power between the two 
parties was gravitating towards parity. The developments of 2008 could also be easily qualified 
by Harass’ (1990) explanation of ripeness because the helplessness and paralysis that gripped the 
Zimbabwean nation meant all the leaders found it easy to persuade their constituencies that the 
national interest would be served by the negotiations. The leaders were also sufficiently strong to 
permit compromise and there was a shared perception in all the contending parties that an accord 
was desirable. According to Pruitt’s (2005) views on ripeness, there was readiness and 
motivation in all the parties following the 2008 stalemate. The second important dimension that 
militated against parties pursuing unilateral positions was the deteriorating Zimbabwean 
economy which became an albatross that threatened the country with state failure if the parties 
did not find a solution to both the political and economic crises to achieve some measure of 
recovery providing what Zartman (2001) called an ‘impending mutual catastrophe’ that helped to 
knock sense in the warring parties by blocking the way forward. The only viable way out as 
suggested by Zartman (1985) presented itself in the form of an AU resolution which called on 
the political parties to negotiate a coalition government providing a window for intervention by a 
third party, SADC, to help break the impasse65.  
Not less than four models of ripeness theory (Zartman 1985, Druckman & Green, 1995, Haas 
1990 and Pruitt 2005) explained the presence of ripeness in 2008. Commenting on the 
opportunities that were created by the AU resolution at Sharm El Sheik despite all the parties 
initially seeking zero-sum outcomes for themselves before the elections of 2008, Motae (2013) 
said the AU resolution came as relief as all the parties to the conflict became eager to accept the 
SADC intervention to find a negotiated solution and what became an issue was to agree on who 
would be the point man, which parties were to be involved in the negotiations and what to 
negotiate about, though all pointers were on some kind of power-sharing agreement. Following 
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 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) indicated that the AU directive came as a relief to the parties who 
were running short of options after the 2008 elections. 
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Druckman (2001), the resolution made at the AU summit of 1 July 2008 which ushered in more 
concerted efforts to find a settlement was yet another turning point in the conflict resolution 
process signifying another new set of relationships. One can therefore conclusively argue that it 
was the political stalemate brought about by the 2008 election outcome and the beckoning 
economic catastrophe that changed the structure of the conflict and perceptions in the parties to 
force them to come to a realisation that the status quo or no negotiation was a negative sum 
situation and that to avoid that outcome, a positive sum outcome needed to be explored. An 
opportunity to have an intervener involved even before the setting in of ripeness proved to be a 
worthwhile move as it helped to set the stage for a more determined effort when the opportunity 
finally appeared.  
Since ripeness seeks to provide a cue for future action, Zartman (1985) asserted that it must have 
referent points which need to be recognised as its identification is not always obvious. It was 
quite evident that the disputed elections, the political vacuum so created and the degree of 
economic crisis were clear referent points that provided indicators to observers in 2008 that some 
degree of ripeness had set in because clearly parties could not proceed on their unilateral paths 
that they had pursued since 2000. Owing to the fact that the factors that created conditions of 
ripeness were obtaining from internal processes in the country, the ripeness of the conflict was 
evident on the domestic dimension of the conflict leaving the external dimension intact as will be 
shown in the next section. 
5.4 The external dimension of the conflict remains unripe for resolution 
As noted in chapter 4, there was an international dimension in the conflict triggered by the 
manner in which the ZANU PF Government had handled the land issue in Zimbabwe and its 
post-colonial policies that threatened Western economic interests in the country. Although some 
Western powers in public appeared to support a negotiated settlement after the 2008 elections, in 
practice they continued to pile pressure on one party to the conflict, a move that while it helped 
to press the stronger part, ZANU PF, to climb down and accept a compromise, its excessive use 
might have reached a point of diminishing returns and scuttled the mediation efforts. The West 
led by Britain was however prepared to keep on ratcheting up political and economic pressure 
against the ZANU PF Government whilst publicly denying any involvement in the conflict66. 
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 Bronnert (Interview, 2013, May, 7) reiterated that Britain was not part to the conflict in Zimbabwe adding 
that it was a conflict between Zimbabweans. She said the problem was ZANU PF which did not want to listen to the 
wishes of the people.  
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When the election results of 2008 were announced, most Western governments were hostile to 
the outcome and quickly dismissed the plebiscite as not being free and fair declaring that it was 
not legitimate (Mapuranga, Interview, 2015, Feb. 18). There were concerted efforts to use 
diplomatic pressure to deny ZANU PF any form of legitimacy to stop it from unilaterally 
forming a government. Bernard Kushner, the Foreign Minister of France, announced on the BBC 
on 1 July 2008 that the EU would “accept no government other than a government led by Mr. 
Tsvangirai” and Italy chose to recall its ambassador to Zimbabwe (IOL, 2008, Jul. 1). The EU 
parliament voted on 10 July 2008 for a motion calling on EU member states to impose increased 
sanctions on senior ZANU PF members, to actively discourage the presence of European 
businesses in the country and the suspension of Zimbabwe from African continental meetings 
(International Herald Tribune [IHT], 2008a).  
The then British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, called for more pressure to be maintained on 
the Zimbabwean Government on 13 July 2008 adding that Britain would work to broaden the 
scope of sanctions against the country (IHT, 2008b). Immediately after the election, US President 
George W Bush declared on 28 June 2008 that the US would be imposing new sanctions on “this 
illegitimate government of Zimbabwe and those who support it,” called for an international arms 
embargo on the country and imposed travel restrictions on selected ZANU PF members 
(Stolberg & Dugger, 2008). The threat was followed up by the drafting of a resolution for the 
UN Security Council that sought to freeze assets belonging to a number of leading ZANU PF 
political figures and restrict their ability to travel abroad. The British Foreign Secretary, David 
Miliband, immediately made an international plea for countries to “unite behind a tough, strong, 
clear Security Council resolution” against President Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF (Reuters, 
2008a). In addition, Miliband backed Tsvangirai’s call for the appointment of an AU mediator, 
saying that “a clear mix of diplomacy and sanctions” was needed suggesting both the opposition 
in Zimbabwe and Britain had lost faith in the South African mediation under SADC. In line with 
the US and the UK positions, France and Germany expressed support for the resolution but 
Russia, China, and South Africa did not (UN Security Council Report S/PV/5933, 2008). 
Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin argued that the proposed 
resolution could establish a dangerous precedent and South Africa expressed concern that it was 
going to impinge against Mbeki’s mediation efforts (Neil, 2008). Earlier on, G8 leaders at a 
summit in Japan had issued a statement on 8 July that said President Robert Mugabe’s leadership 
was illegitimate and announced plans to “take further steps ... against those individuals 
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responsible for the violence” (G8 Statement, 2008). They additionally urged the Zimbabwean 
Government to co-operate with the opposition and called for a UN envoy to be appointed to 
assess the situation in Zimbabwe. Britain sought to use the Japan resolution to push for tougher 
action against Zimbabwe at the UN saying the G8 statement had “made it clear that we would 
appoint a U.N. envoy and impose new sanctions against an illegitimate regime which has blood 
on its hands” (Aljazeera, 2008c). The then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev did not support 
the British view arguing that: “as yet no concrete decisions on how the United Nations should act 
in this situation (has been taken and) whether it’s necessary to make any special additional 
decisions” (Associated Press, 2008a). 
The UN Security Council officially met on the issue on several occasions. A document analysis 
of the UN Security Council reports on the crisis revealed that on 23 June 2008, a week before the 
27 June presidential election re-run, it heard a statement about the worsening situation and the 
refusal to allow most observers from outside Africa and following an off-the-record meeting 
issued a statement condemning “the campaign of violence against the political opposition” and 
expressing “its concern over the impact of the situation in Zimbabwe on the wider region” (UN 
Security Council Report 5920, 2008). Immediately after the election on 1 July 2008, the UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (UN Security Council Report 5920, 2008) indicated that he 
would “spare no effort to work out a solution” and that it was critical for Zimbabweans to be able 
vote without intimidation suggesting there was a feeling that there could be another re-run. There 
was an attempt by the US and some European countries to push the Security Council to declare 
the election illegitimate but was blocked by South Africa arguing that the Security Council’s 
business was not to certify elections (Aljazeera, 2008a). The US ambassador who was President 
of the Security Council was not happy with the outcome of the Security Council meeting and 
told media soon after that “the holding of the controversial run-off election in Zimbabwe is a 
matter of deep regret” (Neil, 2008). In a move designed to pre-empty the tabling of the UN 
resolution before the Security Council, the Zimbabwean mission to the UN said in a letter dated 
10 July 2008 that the proposed UN resolution sponsored by the US would leave Zimbabwe in a 
state similar to that of Somalia possibly leading to a civil war if it was passed (Worsnip, 2008). 
Further, the letter said Zimbabwe was not a threat to international security and as such there was 
no basis for the proposed resolution. It concluded by saying that the proposed resolution was 
intended to punish Zimbabwe for undertaking land reform and that the US and the UK were 
“ignoring real, entrenched, fundamental and enduring issues that lie at the heart of Zimbabwe’s 
internal politics” (Worsnip, ibid).  
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On 11 July, the US draft resolution seeking to impose personal sanctions against President 
Mugabe and 13 top ZANU PF officials, appoint a mediator from the UN and impose an arms 
embargo against Zimbabwe was put on the agenda of the Security Council and discussed 
(Mapuranga, Interview, 2015, Feb. 18). China and Russia vetoed the resolution whilst Belgium, 
Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, Panama, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States voted in favour and China, Libya, Russia, South Africa and Vietnam voted against it while 
Indonesia abstained (UN Security Council 447, S/2008/447, 2008). Following Medvedev’s cue, 
the Russian ambassador rejected the United Kingdom’s interpretation of the G8 statement saying 
it had not made any reference to actions in the Security Council (Churkin, 2008). He added that 
such an attempt “to take the Council beyond its Charter prerogatives and beyond the 
maintenance of international peace and security... was illegitimate and dangerous” (Churkin, 
ibid). The ambassador for China stressed the importance of dialogue between Zimbabwean 
political parties arguing that the resolution would “interfere with the negotiating process and lead 
to a further deterioration of the situation” (Guangya, 2008). The South African Permanent 
Representative Dumisani Khumalo criticised the resolution for being biased in favour of the 
MDC and against ZANU-PF and urged the Security Council to give Mbeki’s mediation a chance 
without potentially undermining it by imposing sanctions adding that even if sanctions were 
necessary, they were not supposed to be imposed immediately (Neil, 2008). The US Permanent 
Representative Zalmay Khalilzad was sharply critical of the positions taken by China, Russia and 
South Africa and described President Mugabe’s government as a “horrible regime,” pointing out 
that Mbeki’s mediation efforts were a complete failure, that there were no serious negotiations 
taking place and that Mbeki was protecting President Mugabe and at times even working with 
him (Neil, 2008).  
Soon after the Security Council failure to pass the resolution, Zimbabwe’s then Minister of 
Media and Information, Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, released a press statement that expressed 
satisfaction with the outcome of the Council vote and thanked “those who helped defeat 
international racism disguised as multilateral action at the UN” adding that the outcome upheld 
“the principles of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of a UN member state” (Banya, 2008). 
Earlier on, the Zimbabwean Deputy Minister of Media and Information, Bright Matonga, had 
responded to the G8 statement accusing it of trying to “undermine the AU and President Mbeki’s 
efforts because they (G8 leaders) are racist, because they think only white people think better”, 
adding that the draft UN Resolution was “an insult to African leaders” (AFP, 2008a).  
Then President George W. Bush pronounced on 15 July his displeasure with the position taken 
by China and Russia in the Security Council indicating that the US’s Department of State and the 
Treasury were “working on potential US action” (Stolberg & Dugger, 2008). At a Senate hearing 
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later on the same day, the then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi 
Frazer, said that the planned US sanctions would target individuals as well as Zimbabwean 
government institutions although she was of the view that EU sanctions would be more effective 
because the economy of Zimbabwe was more connected to Europe (Reuters, 2008b). Frazer also 
criticised the Russian and Chinese veto ruing that it “enabled Mugabe”. The US Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice also complained that “Mugabe’s tyranny will cause perennial instability 
in southern Africa for as long as it existed”.  
After failing to have their way in the UN Security Council, Western powers considered the use 
of force in Zimbabwe. The then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, went as far as seeking South 
African support to intervene militarily to remove ZANU PF from power but the request was 
turned down (Charamba, Interview, 2014, Jun. 5). The allegation was confirmed by Mbeki who 
was quoted in the British Telegraph saying:  
The problem was we were speaking from different positions. There were other people 
saying ‘yes indeed there are political problems, economic problems, the best way to solve 
them is regime change. So Mugabe must go’. This was the difference. So they said 
‘Mugabe must go’. But we said ‘Mugabe is part of the solution to the problem … There 
is a retired chief of the British armed forces and (he) said that he had to withstand 
pressure from then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, who was saying 
to the chief of the British armed forces ‘you must work out a military plan so we can 
physically remove Robert Mugabe …’. We knew that, because we had come under the 
same pressure, and that we needed to cooperate in some scheme – even to the point of 
using military force, and we said ‘no’ (Blair, 2013)67. 
Although military options against the ZANU PF Government were explored by the Blair 
government (Cohen 2013), the lack of regional support, the moral issues deriving from a former 
colonial power seeking to intervene to stop a post-colonial government from addressing colonial 
injustices, the hope that the worsening economic situation and the perceived overwhelming 
political support for the opposition would with time see ZANU PF and President Robert Mugabe 
losing power stopped Britain from using military force in Zimbabwe (Charamba, Interview, 
2014, Jun. 3). A military intervention in Zimbabwe whose initial conventional phase was likely 
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 The Blair quoted here is not the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Tony Blair (AFP, 2013, Nov. 
28) refuted these claims in a statement issued on 20 November, 2013 and his memoirs deliberately do not mention 
the scheme though a former Zimbabwean military office now in the services of the British army who preferred 
anonymity confirmed confirmed that there was a military force made up mostly of men and officers from southern 
Africa that was on standby in the period around 2008 with the intention of carrying out military operations in 
Zimbabwe.  
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to be won by the former colonial power given its military superiority was however likely to 
degenerate into an asymmetric guerrilla war akin to what obtained in Iraq and Afghanistan 
following the West’s military adventures there in the wake of the September, 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the USA. Asked on the ZANU PF likely course of action if Britain had sought to 
intervene militarily in Zimbabwe in 2008, Air Marshall Muchena (Personal Communication, 
2012, Nov. 8) said despite Zimbabwe’s military inferiority to the West, the war veterans and the 
defence forces in Zimbabwe were not going to sit back and watch the West reversing the gains of 
the liberation struggle. Despite George W Bush labeling Zimbabwe “an extraordinary threat to 
American interests,” the USA government never mentioned the option of using force but 
followed the British cue in dealing with the situation (Charamba, ibid). As such, the United 
States also denied any direct involvement in the conflict though in practice it used its economic 
might to strangle the Zimbabwean economy and was demonising the ZANU PF Government and 
President Mugabe at every opportunity in the international fora.  
 
With the military route appearing unattractive and the UN path blocked, the strategy of Western 
powers became dependent on unilateral action and continental group effort against Zimbabwe 
but working with internal forces to subvert the system. Owing to British pressure, the foreign 
ministers of the 27 EU member states voted on 22 July to add 37 individuals and four companies 
to the sanctions list. In a joint statement, the foreign ministers reiterated the claim that the re-
election of Robert Mugabe was “illegitimate,” that the new sanctions were directed “against 
those responsible for the campaign of violence that marked the elections” and added that 
additional action would follow if President Mugabe remained in power (IHT, 2008c). Making a 
unilateral move on issues it had failed to achieve through the failed UN resolution, the US 
announced through the then President Bush the signing of an order expanding sanctions on 25 
July 2008 adding that: “(If the talks) result in a new government that reflects the will of the 
Zimbabwean people, the United States stands ready to provide a substantial assistance package, 
development aid, and (support for) normalisation (of relations) with international financial 
institutions” (Reuters, 2008c). The US Government began to seize any monies destined for 
Zimbabwe in the international financial system that it could lay its hands on as well as working 
with the opposition and the other so-called democratic forces that were fighting against ZANU 
PF (Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb 17). 
In the immediate aftermath of the second round, Canada also imposed sanctions restricting the 
activities of individual Zimbabwean Government officials in Canada and this was followed by 
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the then Canadian Foreign Minister, David Emerson, announcing more sanctions on 5 September 
2008 aimed at “isolating and maintaining pressure on key members of the Zimbabwe regime,” 
freezing any assets they held in Canada, placing a ban on the export of arms to Zimbabwe and 
banning Zimbabwean aircraft from flying over or landing in Canada (AP, 2008b). Speaking at 
the UN General Assembly three months later September 2008, President Mugabe said: “(We) 
appeal to the world’s collective conscience to apply pressure for the immediate removal of these 
sanctions by Britain, the US and their allies, which have brought untold suffering to our people” 
(Mugabe, 2008). In the speech, President Mugabe described the leaders behind the sanctions as 
“international perpetrators of genocide, acts of aggression and mass destruction” who were not 
qualified to teach Zimbabwe democracy. 
Despite refusing that they were after regime change in Zimbabwe, it became clear from the 
responses to the election outcome of 2008 that Western governments’ case in Zimbabwe would 
only be resolved with the removal of ZANU PF and President Robert Mugabe from power. 
Despite the sanctions continuing to worsen the Zimbabwean economy making life difficult for 
ordinary Zimbabweans, Western governments were in public claiming to be working for the 
good of those Zimbabweans whilst in practice calling for the application of more sanctions 
despite calls from the AU and SADC to give mediation a chance68. Since the conflict (the 
political contest and the economic meltdown) was not directly affecting them, Western powers 
did not feel the same pressures that the domestic parties to the conflict were experiencing in 2008 
and thus collectively or individually continued on their unilateral paths of calling for political 
and policy changes in Zimbabwe. Although the domestic and international dimensions had 
interacted since 2000 in a manner that presented the conflict as monolithic, the political 
stalemate of 2008 split the conflict into two when the domestic parties to the conflict were faced 
with a mutual blockade of their unilateral positions in their pursuance of power whilst the 
international dimension as represented by Western countries’ involvement in the conflict 
remained unaffected. As far as the wider international dimension of the conflict involving 
Western powers in Zimbabwe was concerned in 2008, the conflict had not ripened for resolution 
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 Murithi Mutiga, editor of the Nation Media Group in Kenya wrote on the effect of sanctions in a report 
carried by the Daily News (2013, Nov. 9) saying: “Far from weakening the ruling ZANU PF party, they have only 
highlighted what a blunt foreign policy tool sanctions can be. From North Korea, to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, 
sanctions have hit repressive regimes where it hurts least. In Zimbabwe as elsewhere, ordinary citizens – not the 
cosseted elite – have suffered much from the collapse of government revenue over the last decade and the drying up 
of foreign investments”. 
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since those countries were not directly affected by the internal conditions (the political stalemate 
and the collapsing economy) that created internal ripeness in Zimbabwe in 2008. 
5.5 Internal ripeness and the formulation of the substance of the proposals 
An analysis of the SADC mediation process in Zimbabwe after 2007 shows that it can be 
logically segmented into three phases: the pre-2008 election period; the immediate post-2008 
election period; and the period of the GPA. The pre-2008 election phase covers the period from 
2007 to March 2008 when Mbeki was trying to get the parties to discover each other and institute 
some reforms that would improve the electoral environment in the next election. The immediate 
post-2008 phase saw the setting in of ripeness in which Mbeki facilitated the intense negotiations 
that lead to the GPA on 15 September 2008. The GPA phase which began soon after the signing 
of the agreement lasted up to the 31 July 2013 elections and included subsequent negotiations 
and the implementation of agreed provisions. Despite the SADC success in nurturing the GPA, 
Maisiri (2013) was of the view that all the three phases reflected the typology and methodology 
of the bloc’s mediation, influenced by dynamics of its body politic as they projected the plethora 
of regional mediation constraints premised on limited capacity, spasmodic approaches and the 
precincts outlined by the sensitive, regime-solidarity politics that was prevalent in the region. 
This section will deal with the first two phases and the third phase will be attended to in chapter 
6. 
Mbeki’s mediation role focused on dialogue to resolve the political stalemate including the 
creation of conditions for the holding of a credible future election, addressing the socio-
economic challenges and assisting Zimbabwe to be accepted back in the international community 
(Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb. 17). As indicated by Zartman (2001), the ripeness theory in its 
original formulation sought to determine the right time to intervene in conflict situations and 
suggested that further research was needed to establish what would bind the parties to the 
negotiations and more importantly the idea of coming out with the best formula for resolution. 
One of the objectives of this research therefore was to establish whether there was any link 
between the factors that created ripeness in the conflict with the formulation of the substance of 
the proposals for resolution. Given that the route to attain monopoly of political power for all the 
parties had been blocked by their failure to attain enough votes in the elections to allow them to 
unilaterally form a government (Masunungure, 2009), the need for negotiations to agree on a 
power-sharing arrangement became the most viable option. There were however many other 
internal players including civic society groups, the media, an independent participant, Jonathan 
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Moyo, who had won a seat after rebelling from ZANU PF and those parties that had failed to win 
a single seat in the elections that felt that they had a stake to contribute in those negotiations. 
Taking a cue from the structure of the conflict following the indecisive election, SADC however 
took a decision to only include political parties that had managed to win seats in the elections 
and invited the MDC T which had 100 seats, ZANU PF which had 99 and the MDC which had 
10. Those that were left out were not happy with the decision with the smaller parties arguing 
that the process was flawed since it was not fully inclusive (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 
16).  
Civic organisations were equally not happy and continued to feature at the negotiation venues 
including at SADC summits agitating for their positions although they were eventually met and 
consulted by Mbeki. ZANU PF benefited from the decision to exclude civic organisations from 
the negotiations since most of them were openly hostile to its position. The opposition parties, 
which had support from the civic society organisations, would have preferred their inclusion 
since they were mostly supportive of their cause. The decision to go for power-sharing and to set 
a criterion for inclusion in the negotiations based on election results were a direct logical 
derivation from the factor that had contributed to the ripening of the internal dimension of the 
conflict, a political stalemate obtaining from a hung parliament, and became an easy way out for 
SADC in setting a criterion for involvement. Mutambara (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) argued that 
the inclusion of parties that had failed to win seats and civic society groups would have made the 
negotiations complex and might have delayed the agreement possibly leading to escalation. In 
essence, a more inclusive and therefore a complex arrangement might have resulted in the 
opportunity that had been created by ripeness being lost owing to the need to address varied 
aspirations of the additional participants. Although the Mediation Support Handbook (2014) 
suggests inclusivity as one principle of mediation, the Zimbabwe case showed that it is not a 
blanket involvement of everyone claiming a stake but rather a well thought out plan of who to 
take on board to ensure representativeness of real stakeholders yet striving to avoid crowding the 
processes.  
For the participating parties, the main issue was the status of the parties that had been invited to 
attend the talks. ZANU PF wanted President Robert Mugabe, who had been sworn in within 48 
hours of the disputed presidential run-off, to be recognised as the head of state while the 
opposition was insisting that all parties should be treated as equals. The matter became affected 
by issue indivisibility as suggested by Toft (2006) who argued that rational actors may fail to 
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agree that the issue they are bargaining on is divisible. After realising that the talks faced a real 
chance of collapsing, the opposition was left with no option other than to accept the ZANU PF 
position (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 16), a decision that had far reaching ramifications on 
the implementation of the agreement as will be shown later. Despite clinging to the presidency, 
the power of ripeness in the conflict was demonstrated by ZANU PF’s willingness to surrender 
some of the government posts to the opposition. This was a difficult choice as the decision 
entailed leaving out other party loyalists from Government.  
The state of the economy which was in comatose helped in creating a sense of ripeness and also 
became one of the major agenda items in the proposed solution. With most companies 
suspending operations because of sanctions, disruptions caused by the land reform, hyper-
inflation and reactionary economic policies that saw basic commodities disappearing on 
supermarkets shelves (Kanyenze et al., 2011), all the domestic parties began to see the 
negotiations as the only panacea for stopping the economic decline. Zimbabwe was increasingly 
becoming a laughing stock as its people who a decade earlier were boasting of a powerful 
economy second only to South Africa in southern Africa, were now migrating in large numbers 
to seek greener pastures in foreign lands and those that remained were virtually surviving on 
imports from neighbouring countries and aid handouts. Any party that refused to be part to the 
negotiations risked a reflex reaction from the populace that was now pinning hope in the SADC-
led effort to find a solution suggesting public opinion is a also a critical component in inducing 
ripeness. It was in this context that SADC urged countries to offer monetary assistance and 
pledges were made at a bilateral level with Zimbabwe including a US $70 million line of credit 
from the Government of Botswana, a US$ 50 million facility from Angola and also from the 
South African Government whose quantum was subject to bilateral negotiations (Mhlanga, 
2014). The Government of Botswana signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Government of Zimbabwe in 2012 that could have seen the former releasing 500 million pula in 
lines of credit to rescue Zimbabwe’s struggling companies. 
 
For the conflict situation in Zimbabwe following the indecisive elections of 2008 and the 
worsening economic conditions, the main issue on the minds of most Zimbabweans and other 
progressive elements was what would make Zimbabwe work again. Proceeding from a premise 
that things had come to a standstill on account of the political stalemate and the economic 
situation, the negotiations became focused on a power-sharing agreement, ending of political 
violence, creating a conducive environment for the subsequent holding of free and fair elections 
and the need for a collective effort in finding solutions that would stabilise and revive the 
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economy suggesting the formula came from the factors that had helped in creating conditions for 
ripeness. We borrow from Masunungure (2009) a table listing the policy items for the GPA 
agenda items shown in Table 1 below.  
TABLE 1: THE GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT POLICY AGENDA69 
 
Article Number  Policy Sector 
3 Restoration of Economic Stability and Growth 
4 Sanctions and (restrictive) Measures 
5 Land Question 
6 Constitution 
7 Promotion of Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity 
8 Respect for National Institutions and Events 
9 External Interference 
10 Free Political Activity 
11 Rule of Law, Respect for the Constitution and Other Laws 
12 Freedom of Assembly and Association 
13 State Organs and Institutions 
14 Traditional Leaders 
15 National Youth Training Programme 
16 Humanitarian and Food Assistance 
17 Legislative Agenda Priorities 
18 Security of Persons and Prevention of Violence 
19 Freedom of Expression and Communication   
20 The framework of a new government 
21 to 24 Interim measures and implementation mechanisms 
25 Specifies when the Agreement takes effect. 
Source: (Masunungure, 2009. P. 9) 
 
A document analysis of the GPA and the accompanying constitutional amendments number 18, 
19 and 20 (the new constitution) showed that the specific details revolved around the issues that 
had always separated the parties and by finding common ground on them, it was anticipated that 
                                                    
69
 Article 1 was on Definitions while article 2 was a Declaration of Commitment by the parties to the 
agreement. 
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this would enable power-sharing and provide workable solutions on the economy. From the 
ZANU PF standpoint, the people had rejected it because of a declining economy caused by 
sanctions hence its demand for article 4 on the ‘removal of sanctions and restrictive measures,’ 
seeking to secure all the parties’ commitment to work to have them removed. Charamba 
(Interview, 2014, Jun. 5), echoing President Mugabe’s 2001 statement, said the land question 
could not be separated from the politics of Zimbabwe and since ZANU PF had been the driver of 
the programme, it sought through article 5 on the ‘Land question’ to ensure that the programme 
was not reversible. Although the opposition had earlier indicated that it would return farms to 
white farmers (Tendi, 2010b) and had within its ranks a sizable number of the former white 
commercial farmers, the prominence of the land question amongst the generality of 
Zimbabweans made it difficult for the opposition to argue for a reversal of the programme.  
ZANU PF had always viewed the opposition as a project of the West that did not respect national 
institutions and events and sought through article 8 to achieve that. ZANU PF was also of the 
view that external interference in Zimbabwe by Western powers was strengthening the 
opposition at its expense and so pushed for an article that would see the guarantors of the 
agreement working to shield the country from any such interference through article 9. The 
opposition had resisted the provision arguing that countries that had imposed sanctions and were 
interfering in Zimbabwe, were doing so on their own accord prompted by ZANU PF’s poor 
human rights record. 
The rest of the articles, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 were included at the instigation of 
the opposition which was of the view that because of ZANU PF machinations: there was no 
equality in Zimbabwe; that it was being denied political space; that Government did not respect 
the rule of law, applying it selectively to victimise opposition members and forcefully taking 
land from the whites; that traditional leaders were being manipulated to ensure its hold on to 
power; and that, the National Youth Programme was being used to indoctrinate the youths and 
create a force that would be used to perpetuate political violence against its members. The 
opposition also pressed for the inclusion of provisions to deal with; the use of food aid as a 
political weapon; that the former ruling party was a violent lot that did not respect the security of 
persons hence the need for a guarantee that violence would be eliminated and human security 
guaranteed; that, certain laws like POSA had been enacted to entrench ZANU PF in power and 
thus needed to be repealed or at least amended; that the security sector was highly partisan and as 
such security sector reforms were needed to re-align the sector to accommodate the opposition; 
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and that the domination of the media through acts of Parliament and routine regulation were 
denying the opposition a voice to effectively mobilise for its political goals.  
While parties appeared to be pressing for issues that would make power sharing feasible, in 
essence, they were working to create an environment that would remove obstacles for them to 
win future elections. It was the same thing with the ‘framework of the new government,’ in 
which the main thrust by all parties was to jostle for positions that were viewed as important in 
consolidating each party’s political power. It was for this reason that ZANU PF pressed to retain 
the executive presidency, security ministries, the ministry in charge of the media and that of local 
government. Although a compromise was reached by giving the opposition the premiership 
including the two deputies, one of which was allocated to the smaller faction of the MDC, the 
finance ministry and sharing the home affairs portfolio with ZANU PF, in general, the 
opposition was forced to accept mostly social services and economic ministries making it a 
junior partner in the Inclusive Government (Majome, Interview, 2015, Feb. 13). Despite the 
glaring disparities in the power distribution, Kurebwa (Interview, 2015, Feb. 17) argued that the 
GPA that was agreed upon was the best possible in the circumstances given that each side was 
determined to wring the best for itself out of the agreement and refusal to compromise at some 
point in the negotiations by any of the parties could have easily scuttled progress. 
As already pointed out in chapter 2, Maina (2011) argued that although governments of national 
unity appeared to be a panacea for resolving internal conflicts arising from disputed elections, 
their weakness was that they allowed defeated parties to get into government through the back 
door thus stifling democracy and that the need to accommodate everyone from across the 
political party divide resulted in bloated governments that drained the fiscus. In the case of the 
Inclusive Government in Zimbabwe, the quest to accommodate all parties’ concerns resulted in a 
huge government that had a president, two vice presidents, a prime minister and two deputy 
prime ministers, 31 ministers, over 20 deputy ministers (GPA, 2008), for a country of 13 million 
as per the 2010 census with an economy that was nose-diving. The perks that went with such a 
huge government put a serious drain on an already struggling economy.  
It was however articles 21 to 24 that dealt with implementation, monitoring and evaluation that 
had major loopholes as they failed to specify a clear roadmap and provide enforcement 
mechanisms (Majome, Interview, 2015, Feb. 13). As will be shown in chapter 6, the differences 
over the implementation and monitoring modalities were some of the main issues that created 
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difficulties that saw the inauguration of the new Government delayed by a period of four months 
and would account for the outstanding issues that hogged the subsequent negotiations up to the 
end of the GPA in 2013. Whilst the conditions that had created ripeness - the political stalemate 
and the economic meltdown – fed the formulation of the substance of the proposals for 
resolution, each party’s quest to use the GPA to favourably position itself for the acquisition of 
total political power in the future became the stumbling block that threatened the agreement, 
especially the full exploitation of the internal ripeness that obtained in 2008. 
An interrogation of the nature of the solution that SADC pursued in Zimbabwe was important in 
determining whether it had the scope to eliminate the root causes of the conflict to achieve 
complete resolution as suggested by Bercovitch, et al. (2008). Although land was a major issue 
in the conflict nothing much was said about it other than that it was nor reversible, a promise to 
halt further invasions and that a land audit would be instituted in due course. Issues to do with 
justice to address alleged atrocities were also left untouched. Western countries’ role in 
poisoning the environment in Zimbabwe was also not fully tackled. The main focus of the SADC 
efforts were thus directed towards resolving one aspect of the conflict, the fight for political 
space between the domestic players in the conflict, stabilising the security situation and creating 
conditions for a better future election. The piecemeal approach in the resolution formula created 
a situation in which some of the issues that were left untouched or just scratched on the surface 
remained as potential causes of conflict in the future. Alternatively, it was hoped that those areas 
that had been dealt with would eventually have a positive spill-over effect to the issues that had 
been left out. SADC opted for a pragmatic approach focusing on the issues that had been the 
immediate trigger of the ripeness in 2008 leaving some of the underlying problems and 
differences untouched. Consequently, Western powers refused to heed the call by SADC to have 
the sanctions and pirate radio stations removed and provide support to the process arguing that 
the GPA had no provisions that would guarantee the creation of an environment conducive for a 
future free and fair election. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The chapter managed to present empirical evidence that showed that the conflict in Zimbabwe 
raged on from 2000 unabated mainly driven by the political players’ unilateral pursuance of 
political power and the external interference by Western powers embittered by ZANU PF’s land 
reform programme and its policies that were hostile to capitalist interests. The chapter also 
showed that although the conflict did not degenerate into an armed confrontation, it became 
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complex and was taking a huge toll on the economy and the general well being of the people. 
Ripeness failed to set in the period 2000 to the elections of 2008. The political stalemate that 
followed the election outcome of 2008 and the continuing economic meltdown blocked the 
unilateral paths of the domestic players suggesting partial resonance with Zartman’s (1985) 
ripeness theory by creating an opportunity for the resolution of the domestic dimension of the 
conflict whilst leaving the external dimension to drag on. Despite ZANU PF’s strong support 
from the state apparatus and the opposition’s support from the external powers that had an 
interest in the conflict, the conditions creating ripeness for the domestic dimension of the conflict 
were so strong after the announcement of the 2008 election results that the only viable route 
became negotiations to find an internal political and economic solution which was timely seized 
by the AU through SADC. Conditions creating ripeness fed the formula for resolution though 
parties sought to use the resultant GPA as a means to their pre-2008 unilateral positions of 
wanting to eventually monopolise political power. Other than the unequal distribution of power 
amongst the parties which was seen as the best possible outcome in the circumstances, the GPA 
also created a bloated government structure that militated against the efforts to revive the 
economy. The greatest weakness of the GPA in its formulation however lay in its framework for 
the implementation and monitoring modalities whose effects will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE IMPACT OF A CHANGING DEGREE OF RIPENESS ON THE CONFLICT AND 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In conflict situations, the passage of time can be a great healer as much as it can mean lost 
opportunities. As time moves, circumstances change for the better or for the worse. Bercovitch, 
et al. (2009) say in most cases, implementation of a political agreement cannot wait for the total 
ironing out of all differences for it to commence, and in most cases and especially where a 
general framework has been agreed on as happened in Zimbabwe with the signing of the GPA, it 
can commence as subsequent negotiations continue. The GPA initially set out the broad 
parameters of the proposals for resolution though parties continued to haggle over specific 
details over time. The first indication that the going would not be smooth was in the delay to 
inaugurate the Inclusive Government as parties could not agree on the sharing of posts as well as 
the finer details on implementing and monitoring modalities. The Inclusive Government was 
however sworn in five months later on 11 February 2009. Subsequently, as time lapsed and 
circumstances changed, the attitude and positions of the parties to the conflict began to change 
creating more difficulties for further negotiations and the implementation of the agreement. This 
chapter presents the evidence that obtained from the process tracing of the GPA from 2008 to 
2013 through observations, document analysis and interviews, a discussion of the effects of 
rationalist explanations for war and ripeness on the resolution process, and the state of the 
conflict soon after the elections of 2013. The main focus is to highlight the effects of time and 
changed circumstances on the notion of ripeness and the implications of the dwindling power of 
ripeness over time on the subsequent negotiations, agreement implementation and the conflict.  
6.2 Process tracing of the Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement from 2008 to 2013 
One of the direct and immediate effects of time on the resolution process in Zimbabwe pertained 
to the changes that took place in the South African Government. Salomao (2015, Interview, Mar. 
4) said SADC does not have a fixed template in deciding whether to give facilitation to an office 
or to a person giving the example of Zimbabwe where the South African presidency was 
preferred as opposed to Lesotho and Madagascar where former heads of state were appointed. 
He said the decision is informed by the regional bloc’s perceptions and pragmatic considerations 
of which arrangement it deems as better placed to attain the best results in the circumstances. 
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Soon after the signing of the GPA in September 2008, then President Thabo Mbeki was recalled 
from the South African presidency by the ANC over claims that he was no longer fit to continue 
as head of state (more due to the political power dynamics in South Africa) and Kgalema 
Motlantle was chosen to be an interim president up to the 2009 general elections (Mail & 
Guardian, 2008a). Although Mbeki continued to be involved in the talks on Zimbabwe 
immediately after his recall, and initially indications were that he would continue as facilitator, 
eventually Motlantle took over when it became clear that the facilitation was a responsibility of 
the South African presidency and not Mbeki, the person70.  
When Motlantle took over as president, he more or less continued with Thabo Mbeki’s approach 
on Zimbabwe, in public defending President Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF whilst in his 
facilitation, pushing for the implementation of the GPA. Issues to do with continuity, aptitude 
and touch of the subsequent interveners came to the fore. Asked by a journalist as to what was 
the South African government’s analysis of the key problem in Zimbabwe, then Deputy 
President Kgalema Motlantle’s spokesman, Themba Maseko, said: 
I think it is now public record that there were elections in Zimbabwe …. At the end of 
those elections, the MDC were of the view that those elections were not free and fair. 
Based on the view of the MDC, we then had a situation in Zimbabwe where there was a 
serious conflict arising out of the premise taken by the MDC that the elections were not 
free and fair. It was however the position of the South African Government that the 
recent elections were free and fair (Pressly, 2007). 
The passing of the Constitutional Amendment number 19 and the swearing in of the Inclusive 
Government took place whilst Motlantle was facilitator though he failed to make headway in 
pushing the parties to agree on outstanding issues, and more importantly, to implement the 
contentious provisions of the GPA in full. One among many extraordinary summits was held in 
Johannesburg on 9 November 2008 but after marathon discussions, ended with no agreement on 
the contentious issues. Tsvangirai said: “A great opportunity has been missed by SADC to 
resolve the Zimbabwe crisis. We are shocked and saddened that the SADC summit has failed to 
deal with outstanding issues” (SA News, 2009). To Motlantle’s credit however, his taking over of 
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 According to Motae (Interview, 2013, Aug. 5), the three South Africa presidents all played major roles in 
the conflict resolution in Zimbabwe saying Thabo Mbeki superintended the most difficult phase of preparing 
Zimbabwe for the elections of 2008 and the GPA negotiations, Kgalema Motlantle finalised the GNU and Jacob 
Zuma steered the GPA and the GNU up to the elections in 2013. 
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the facilitation in Zimbabwe did not rock the boat as he managed to keep the GPA on track albeit 
with little progress on the sticking points. 
Motlantle took up the South African presidency on an interim basis. Jacob Zuma who had been 
removed from the vice presidency managed to weather the storm around his corruption charges 
to win the ANC presidency and subsequently the South African presidency in 2009 and 
automatically took over the facilitation role in Zimbabwe. Reviewed from his time as vice 
president, Zuma’s stance on the Zimbabwe conflict was mixed. In an interview with a German 
magazine in 2006, Zuma expressed a sympathetic view of President Mugabe and ZANU PF 
saying: 
Europeans often ignore the fact that (President) Mugabe is very popular among Africans. 
In their eyes, he has given blacks their country back after centuries of colonialism. The 
people love him, so how can we condemn him? Many in Africa believe that there is a 
racist aspect to American and European criticism of (President) Mugabe. Millions of 
people died in Angola, the Republic of Congo and Rwanda… A few whites lost their 
lives in Zimbabwe, unfortunately, and already the West is bent out of shape (Der Spiegel, 
2006).   
As evidenced by the subsequent hardening of President Zuma’s stance towards ZANU PF, his 
comment might have been cast to conform with then President Mbeki’s public viewpoint on 
Zimbabwe given that the former was then his deputy. The realisation that Mbeki’s quiet 
diplomacy was not achieving much and the worsening situation in Zimbabwe could have 
contributed to his change of attitude. By December 2007, Jacob Zuma, though still vice president 
but now having sharp differences with Mbeki and also eyeing the presidency, became more 
vociferous in his criticism of President Mugabe and accused then President Mbeki of being 
lenient with dictators when he said: 
It is even more tragic that other world leaders who witness repression pretend it is not 
happening, or is exaggerated. When history eventually deals with dictators, those who 
stood by and watched should also bear the consequences. A shameful quality of the 
modern world is to turn away from injustice and ignore the hardships of others (Zuma, 
2007). 
Soon after the disputed elections of 2008, President Jacob Zuma became even more forthright in 
his criticism of President Mugabe saying the elections were ‘suspicious’ and later on blamed 
President Mugabe for refusing to step down. Zuma said at a press conference: “We cannot agree 
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with ZANU PF. We cannot agree with them on values. We fought for the right of people to vote, 
we fought for democracy” (Mail and Guardian, 2008b). As a result of these comments, Zuma 
was increasingly seen as sympathetic to the opposition, a view that became more entrenched 
when his son married the daughter of Welshman Ncube of the smaller MDC71.  
In the course of the conflict, President Zuma’s legal adviser, Lindiwe Zulu, who often assumed 
the role of spokesperson on Zimbabwe, became vocal in pressing the parties to the conflict over 
the implementation of the GPA and the timing of the 2013 elections. President Mugabe, without 
directly attacking President Jacob Zuma, threatened that if South Africa was to preside over the 
GPA in a biased way with SADC’s acquiescence, he would pull Zimbabwe out of the regional 
grouping (Charamba, Interview, 2014, Jun. 3). Sensing a serious fall-out with ZANU PF, Zuma 
disowned Zulu’s role as a spokesperson for the Talks and managed to tone down the situation. 
Despite Zuma’s different attitude from Mbeki on Zimbabwe, ZANU PF did not object to his 
facilitation. For his part, President Zuma managed to keep the GPA and the Inclusive 
Government in place, and saw through the constitution-making exercise but failed to achieve 
much in subsequent negotiations on contentious issues as well as in getting the GPA agreed 
provisions to be implemented to the full satisfaction of all the parties in the conflict. It is 
however difficult to gauge whether former President Mbeki could have achieved more than what 
presidents Motlantle and Zuma eventually managed had he continued as the facilitator 
throughout the lifespan of the GPA. 
Following the preliminary negotiations that started soon after the disputed elections of 2008, the 
next turning point as suggested by Druckman (2001) was the signing of the GPA on 15 
September 2008 marking the beginning of the third phase involving further negotiations and the 
implementation of the agreed provisions. Hope was raised in the parties that were directly 
involved in the conflict as well as in the general populace with most people expecting the 
thawing of the hostilities to stabilise the situation and impact positively on the economy. The 
aspiration was captured in article 2 of the GPA which said that the parties declared and 
committed to: 
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 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) said Jacob Zuma was a very straight forward, clear and honest 
facilitator who adhered to agreements and on a fairness score of 1 to 10 gave him 10 saying he created an 
environment that enabled the writing of a new constitution and his road map to the elections was the best though it 
was not followed through due to ZANU PF intransigency. 
 187 
 
... work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally 
acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the 
following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and 
economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country (GPA, 2008).  
Although the parties made this commitment, in practice the resolution was not a once-off 
exercise nor was success automatically guaranteed as the process became stretched over an 
imprecisely defined period with targets that lacked well-defined timeframes and constraints that 
obtained from power asymmetries in the Inclusive Government which militated against the 
comprehensive attainment of the stated objectives. This was despite the then President Mbeki 
saying about the agreement: 
An agreement has been reached on all items of the agenda … all of them [Mugabe, 
Tsvangirai and Mutambara] endorsed the document tonight, and signed it. The formal 
signing will be done on Monday 10 am … The leaders will work very hard to mobilise 
support for the people to recover. We hope the world will assist so that this political 
agreement succeeds (Mbeki, 2008). 
Most media reports that came out in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the GPA 
suggested that opposition members believed that Morgan Tsvangirai, as head of the envisaged 
Council of Ministers, would be the de-facto head of government with Robert Mugabe chairing 
Cabinet that would largely be a consultative body. The South African Business Day however 
captured the real mood within ZANU PF when it reported that President Mugabe would not sign 
a document that would curtail his executive powers (SADOCC, 2008). Tsvangirai thus appeared 
to have signed the GPA convinced that he would head the Council of Ministers as the principal 
decision making body in Government but, as it turned out, the Cabinet chaired by President 
Robert Mugabe remained as the real centre of power.  
The time that lapsed between the signing of the agreement in September 2008 and the eventual 
swearing in of the Inclusive Government on 11 February 2009 as the parties haggled over details 
on outstanding issues, sharing of posts, implementation and monitoring modalities was a 
premonition of the obstacles that lay ahead72. Mutambara (Interview, 2013, Apr. 22) said the 
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 Motae (Interview, 2013, Aug. 5) said the stumbling blocks that SADC faced in the GPA included lack of 
commitment by the parties, a lot of mistrust between the parties, a negative attitude from Western countries that 
were insisting on a regime change agenda, external interference, too much changing of goal posts by the parties and 
hence SADC’s insistence and appeal to the international community to leave the parties to talk on their own.  
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main reason behind the delay in inaugurating the Inclusive Government was that the GPA 
leaders could not agree on how to share posts in government. Once the agreement had been 
signed, ZANU PF became more assertive in blocking those provisions that it deemed 
unfavourable to its hold on to power whilst the opposition sought to press for an environment 
that would guarantee its eventual take-over of power and so kept bringing new issues on the table 
that it considered important in realising its objective. In the early days of the agreement, the 
opposition seemed convinced that it was on course to eventually take over power from ZANU 
PF. Tsvangirai was quoted as saying President Robert Mugabe was on his way out prompting 
then Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa to hit back saying Tsvangirai was bent on a wholesale 
takeover of power, a position he said was out of sync with the election outcome of 2008 which 
had been indecisive73. Consequently, more SADC summits were convened to try and resolve the 
impasse. Although talks resumed in South Africa soon after the signing of the GPA still under 
former President Thabo Mbeki’s facilitation, no progress was made, prompting him to comment 
after as many fruitless meetings that the negotiations were “the same as ever, forward and 
backwards, sideways and around …” (Obisesan, 2008).  
The then Secretary General of the MDC T, Tendai Biti, had earlier written a scathing letter on 19 
November 2008 to Mbeki in which he attacked SADC leaders of being cowards who were 
unable to reign in President Mugabe and declared the resolutions adopted by a SADC 
extraordinary summit of 9 November 2008 a nullity (Biti, 2008). The bone of contention was on 
whether the implementation of the agreement should proceed without Parliament passing the 
Constitutional Amendment number 19 bill into an act of law which would provide a legal 
guarantee to the agreement given the opposition claims that there was lack of sincerity and no 
paradigm shift by ZANU PF. Miffed by the MDC T position, Thabo Mbeki wrote a letter to 
Tsvangirai in which he clarified issues. The researcher subjected both Biti and Mbeki’s letters to 
document analysis. Although Biti’s letter sought to bring out the frustrations that were in the 
opposition camp about the lack of progress and its failure to make headway in its demands, 
Mbeki was not amused and in his response urged Tsvangirai and the MDC T to realise that: 
The MDC T, like other Zimbabwean parties, must, within an Inclusive Government, take 
responsibility of the future of Zimbabwe, rather than see its mission as being a militant 
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 Moyo (Interview, 2013, Apr. 8) said negotiating with Morgan Tsvangirai was not easy as he kept changing 
his positions suggesting he was flip-flopping on decisions that had not been sanctioned by his Western handlers.  
 189 
 
critic of President Mugabe and ZANU PF … Zimbabwe urgently needs precisely the 
agreed Inclusive Government, to: rebuild the state machinery of Zimbabwe; enable it to 
meet the needs of the people; overcome the current socio-economic crisis; end the threat 
of the explosion or implosion of Zimbabwe; end all manifestations of repression, 
intimidation and violence; and, guarantee the democratic rights of Zimbabweans, 
including their political and other formations. … Where conflicts and problems continue 
to persist among the Zimbabwe political parties and the supporters of these, surely the 
framework has now been established for these to engage one another to address the 
conflicts. I am certain that the longer we postpone using this framework, relying on the 
luxury of a facilitator and other informal advisors, the longer we will perpetuate the 
misery that afflicts the people of Zimbabwe … (Mbeki, 2008).  
The tone of the letter suggested that Mbeki was becoming increasingly impatient with the MDC 
T attitude and demands. Mbeki (2008) reminded Tsvangirai of the cost that the region was 
bearing as a result of the conflict and had no kind words to the opposition over its belief that 
Western countries had a major role to play in Zimbabwe: 
You know that, among other things, various countries of our region host large numbers of 
economic migrants from Zimbabwe, who impose particular burdens on our countries … 
the pain your country bears, is a pain that is transferred to the masses of our people, who 
face their own challenges of poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. This 
particular burden is not carried by the countries of Western Europe and North America, 
which have benefited especially from the migration of skilled and professional 
Zimbabweans to the north … Realistically, Zimbabwe will never share the same 
neighbourhood with the countries of Western Europe and North America, … it does not 
help Zimbabwe, nor will it help you as prime minister of Zimbabwe, that the MDC T 
contemptuously repudiates very serious decisions of our region, and therefore our 
continent, describing them as ‘a nullity’. It may be that, for whatever reason, you 
consider our region and continent as being of little consequence to the future of 
Zimbabwe, believing that others further away, in Western Europe and North America, are 
of greater importance. … All of us will find it strange and insulting that because we did 
not agree with you on a small matter, you choose to describe us in a manner that is most 
offensive ... (ibid). 
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Morgan Tsvangirai hit back releasing a press statement that called on Thabo Mbeki to step down 
as facilitator because he was supporting ZANU PF saying: “(Thabo Mbeki) does not appear to 
understand how desperate the problem in Zimbabwe is, and (that) the solutions he proposes are 
too small” (Nkatazo, 2008).  
 
Then President Motlantle however urged the parties on 24 November 2008 to reach an 
agreement cautioning that, if they did not: “the situation will get worse and will implode or 
collapse altogether” (AFP, 2008b). Two weeks later, President Robert Mugabe told the ZANU 
PF Politburo that his party had given the opposition 13 ministries plus the shared home affairs 
portfolio and if the arrangement (the GPA and the Inclusive Government) did not work in the 
next one and half years, there would be an early election (Mugabe, 2008). On 13 December 2008 
however, the draft Constitutional Amendment Number 19 was published in a Government 
Gazette, and then President Motlantle was upbeat saying the development marked a major step 
towards the formation of an Inclusive Government (Xinhua, 2009). On 18 January 2009, 
President Mugabe issued an ultimatum calling on Tsvangirai to either join the Unity Government 
or ‘break from it’ (Mugabe, 2009). The jolt from Mbeki’s letter and pressure from ZANU PF for 
MDC T to take it or leave it as well as a guarantee to its weak position through the Constitutional 
Amendment number 19 bill that was passed into law by both houses on 5 February 2009 saw the 
MDC T to accepting to join government. According to the entrapment model (Mitchell, 1995), 
the conflict had reached a point where the weaker party was compelled to salvage what it could 
jettisoning its previous position of wanting to secure total victory by foregoing some of its 
demands. ZANU PF retained the presidency including the two vices whilst Tsvangirai was to be 
the Prime Minister with Thokozani Khupe from the MDC T and Arthur Mutambara from the 
smaller faction of MDC as the two deputy premiers (Constitutional Amendment Number 19, 
Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun, 16). The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition wrote about the effect 
of the parties’ signing of the GPA on the subsequent implementation of its provisions:  
Backsliding began shortly after the signatures (of the GPA), with unilateral appointments 
by President Mugabe…By 2009, a new Government had not been established and many 
grievances had accumulated … The prospect of a stillborn agreement prompted SADC 
and other international intervention(s), so that the power-sharing government was sworn 
in on 11 February 2009, but with most grievances still unresolved (International Crisis 
Group [ICG], 2011).  
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The signing of the GPA before all issues had been resolved in part became the stumbling block 
to subsequent negotiations and agreement implementation and exposed the limitations that both 
the opposition and SADC had when it came to pushing the stronger party, ZANU PF, to agree let 
alone implement demands it was opposed to74.   
As noted in chapter 5, the institution created to ensure that the parties upheld the terms of the 
GPA was JOMIC. According to Article 22, JOMIC would “ensure full and proper 
implementation of the letter and spirit of the agreement … receive reports and complaints in 
respect of any issue related to the implementation, enforcement and execution of the agreement” 
(GPA, 2008). However, the MDC T representative in the JOMIC described the monitoring body 
as “a toothless bulldog because we do not have legal powers which give us authority to punish a 
party that undermines the GPA” (Khumalo, 2011). The Open Society Initiative of Southern 
Africa (OSISA) said JOMIC’s weakness was that it had no powers to summon a person who 
breached the GPA and relied on persuasion, further observing that the biggest mistake in its 
creation was its composition in which some of the members from the parties implementing the 
GPA were also tasked with checking compliance (Lee, 2011). Without any meaningful measure 
of power to prevail on the political parties, JOMIC throughout the lifespan of the GPA resorted 
to issuing mundane press statements that urged the parties to implement the GPA but which were 
of little or no consequence75 (Zengeni, Interview, 2013, Jan. 4).  
The next turning point in the resolution process occurred in February 2009 when the Inclusive 
Government was sworn in. In the inauguration speeches, all the leaders in the GPA called upon 
their supporters to rally behind the Inclusive Government to rebuild Zimbabwe in a peaceful 
environment and Tsvangirai in his address to the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe called upon 
Western countries to remove sanctions (Zengeya, 2009). Despite his optimism, Tsvangirai was 
booed by Zimbabwean exiles on a visit to Britain in June 2009 when he urged them to return 
home, with the BBC reporting that the exiles did not believe that he was making any meaningful 
political progress by being part of the Inclusive Government (BBC News, 2009). One of the 
requirements for exploiting ripeness (Harass, 1990) is that a leader should be strong enough to 
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 Motae (Interview, 2013, Aug. 5) pointed out that the implementation of SADC recommendations hinged on 
the voluntary willingness of the parties to abide by their pledges because membership is voluntary in the bloc. 
75
 Motae (Ibid) suggested that JOMIC was not as effective as SADC wished it to be because of how it was 
constituted – made up of members from the warring political parties only. 
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carry his constituency yet the MDC T component based in the Diaspora was not convinced 
Tsvangirai was making progress. The failure to carry the diasporan constituency stemmed from 
the fact that those outside the country had not experienced the difficulties of 2008 directly and so 
did not see the imperative of the opposition to join government as a junior partner. In an 
interview with the BBC’s Andrew Marr, Tsvangirai was however convinced he was making 
progress saying: 
I understand that some of them left under circumstances, involuntarily exiling themselves 
because of the circumstances back home then. We are in a new political dispensation and 
we are four months into it. The situation is totally different from what they expected two, 
three, four years ago … Mr. Mugabe has already moved. He has already accepted that 
this is a process of transition and that after two years, we should go for an election … it 
will be a fair election because we are transforming the electoral environment. We are 
transforming the institutions that were used to abuse people … Let’s re-establish normal 
relations between Zimbabwe and the UK, let’s have transitional support because it is 
important to support the transition in order to strengthen the democratic reforms that are 
there (Marr, 2009). 
The main reason for Tsvangirai’s external forays, which also saw him going to the United States 
where he met President Barrack Obama, was to unlock aid for Zimbabwe’s re-construction 
whose capital requirement was estimated at $8.3 billion. The MDC T had promised the electorate 
that once in power it would unlock aid from Western governments. Tsvangirai was however 
advised by Western governments that aid would only be released if meaningful progress was 
made in the GPA implementation, in particular, if political and economic reforms were 
undertaken. In theory, Zimbabwe managed to unlock $2 billion in credit lines, mainly from 
Africa, most of which remained unreleased by the end of the GPA (Chinamasa, 2014).  
Miffed by the lack of positive responses from Western countries, President Mugabe warned that 
Zimbabwe might reconsider its ties with the West saying: 
Allegations of gross abuses of human rights or failure to respect good governance have 
provided fodder for the West and its media as they repeatedly seek blemishes to stick on 
to our country. Our detractors, the same old detractors continue with their sinister efforts 
to divide us (Dzirutwe, 2009). 
Despite the warning by President Mugabe to Western countries, a visit by a delegation that 
included an EU Aid and Development Commissioner Karel De Gucht, the first such top level 
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visit since 2002, came to Zimbabwe between 12 and 13 September 2013 but still made it clear to 
the GPA partners that: “There is urgent need for all the parties to fulfill their obligations under 
the GPA. By doing this the EU can once again fully re-engage with Zimbabwe and help the 
country on its return to normality” (De Gucht, 2009). President Jacob Zuma on his first state visit 
to Zimbabwe in August 2009 also used the same argument urging Zimbabwe’s rival political 
parties to end their feuding in order to win vital foreign aid to rebuild the battered economy and 
also took the opportunity to appeal to Western governments to end sanctions against the country. 
“The Inclusive Government has the responsibility to fully implement the GPA and thus create 
confidence in the process … The achievement of an effective recovery is also dependent on the 
removal of sanctions and other measures that hold up economic development” (Banya, 2009). 
The meetings President Zuma subsequently held with the leaders of the rival parties however 
failed to end the GPA disputes.  
Exactly a year after the signing of the GPA, the VOA’s Studio 7 held a panel discussion on the 
GPA and its review report concluded that Zimbabweans had found relief from the deep 
economic distress and a complex humanitarian emergency underpinned by hunger and a cholera 
epidemic but progress towards a democratic transition was proving far more limited than had 
been hoped for (VOA, 2009). It was evident that the pirate radio station’s appraisal of the GPA in 
terms of whether progress had been made in dislodging ZANU PF revealed that it was after 
regime change in Zimbabwe. The former USA ambassador to Zimbabwe in the period 1997 to 
2001 was quoted in the discussion saying: 
Not only do I think the power-sharing agreement has some very serious problems – 
although it’s certainly better than what it was before, I would acknowledge that – I think 
the jury is very much out on whether this is going to succeed or whether this is just 
another manoeuvre by Comrade Mugabe to yet again stay in power for how many more 
years (McDonald, 2009). 
Africa Action Campaigns (AAC) Director, Briggs Bomba, highlighted that there had been a 
dramatic stabilisation of the economy and an improvement in the quality of life for most 
Zimbabweans with most industries beginning to ‘fire up’ but the greatest disappointment was on 
the political front where he said there had been no progress at all (Bomba, 2009). The 
achievements on the economic front included a radical reduction of the inflation from an official 
all-time high of 231 million percent by July 2008 to a month-on-month rate of one percent in 
July 2009 (Banya, 2009). The IMF Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation said in part: 
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The formation of the Government of National Unity in February 2009 opens the door for 
tackling the difficult economic and humanitarian crisis facing the country. The new 
government has started to address the most pressing short-term economic recovery needs 
and has initiated work on medium-term reforms (IMF Report, 2009).  
The financial institution reported that the Zimbabwe economy which was growing by 3.7 percent 
in 2009 was experiencing the first expansion since 1997 (IMF Report, 2009). Morgan Tsvangirai 
on a visit to Spain in October 2009 to receive a lifetime achievement award also painted a picture 
of progress including on the political front saying while there were some ‘toxic’ issues, he was 
confident of progress: “If you were to have come to Zimbabwe last year between March and 
June, the level of human rights abuses was far higher and now people can live in peace. There 
has been substantive progress, it’s just that you have got one or two incidents and then it spoils 
the (whole) thing” (Webb, 2009). 
From the time the Inclusive Government was sworn in however, ZANU PF appeared to have felt 
a degree of increased security that came from the shared legitimacy and began to be increasingly 
difficult in its dealings with the opposition. Political differences in the GPA came from a number 
of contentious issues that included the fact that the MDC T had chosen Roy Bennett to be the 
Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Bennett had however been implicated in an arms cache that was 
discovered in Manicaland involving him and Peter Hitchman, both former Rhodesians, a 
development that made ZANU PF believe that the pro-MDC T former Rhodesians were planning 
to use the arms for treasonous acts against the state in support of the opposition’s regime change 
agenda (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 16). The situation was made worse by the impression 
that developed in ZANU PF circles that the MDC T had chosen a former white commercial 
Rhodesian farmer who had lost his farms to fill the agricultural post as a strategy to derail 
progress made in the sector since the onset of land reform. President Mugabe thus refused to 
swear in Roy Bennett. Two other contentious issues were that of the appointment of the Attorney 
General and the re-appointment of the Governor of the Reserve Bank. ZANU PF refused to 
budge arguing that the appointments had been done constitutionally before the GPA came into 
effect and further that those appointments were a prerogative of the head of state who might 
choose to consult or not and could proceed as he wished if the consultation was hogged by 
disagreements (Zhuwarara, Interview, 2014, Oct. 20).  It was the same thing with the 
appointment of permanent secretaries to which ZANU PF argued that these were also a 
prerogative of the president in consultation with the relevant commission in the bureaucracy. 
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Once the president made an appointment, even SADC failed to prevail on the liberation party to 
compel a reversal. Reality began to dawn on the opposition that ZANU PF was not fully 
committed to honouring the idea of a shared executive in matters that it considered critical in 
advancing its political fortunes, a situation that was made worse by the fact that legally, there 
was nothing binding the president to always secure opposition agreement because even if he 
consulted as required by the GPA, in the case of differences, he had the power to proceed as he 
wished showing a weakness in the way the agreement had been formulated.   
Issues came to a head when a court in Mutare ruled on 14 October 2009 that Bennett had a case 
to answer on terrorism charges (Dzirutwe, 2009). Tsvangirai held a press conference in which he 
announced that the MDC T was going to disengage from working with ZANU PF by boycotting 
Cabinet saying:  
It is our right to disengage from a dishonest and unreliable partner. In this regard, whilst 
being in government we shall forthwith disengage from ZANU PF and in particular from 
Cabinet and Council of Ministers until such time as confidence and respect are restored 
amongst us (Dzirutwe, ibid).   
The MDC T opted for a limited response of boycotting Cabinet without fully pulling out of 
government indicating it was still committed to the GPA. Although the arrest of Roy Bennett 
triggered the boycott, there were other issues that were simmering below the surface since the 
swearing in of the MDC factions into Government. Tsvangirai wanted President Mugabe to 
appoint several MDC T officials as provincial governors in proportion to his party’s strength in 
Parliament claiming that President Mugabe had agreed to the demand in one of the SADC 
summits. On his part, President Mugabe argued that provincial governors represented him as 
president in the provinces, and as such, it was his prerogative to appoint those he wanted 
(Charamba, Interview, 2014, Jun. 3). On realising that power still lay in Cabinet, Tsvangirai also 
wanted to be allowed to chair it when the president was away arguing that according to the GPA, 
he was the head of government but ZANU PF argued that according to the constitution, it was 
the president who was empowered to chair it and in his absence the acting president, though in 
practice Cabinet was always postponed in President Mugabe’s absence until his return to 
Zimbabwe. The situation was made difficult by the fact that hierarchically, the position of vice 
president was higher than that of the prime minister, an issue that had not been clearly addressed 
during the negotiations on power sharing. The opposition also complained of what it described as 
routine and deliberate prosecution of its supporters that included a significant number of its 
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members of parliament, a move it saw as designed to erode its slim majority in Parliament (The 
Legal Monitor, 2009). To gain sympathy from its Western allies that had not been impressed by 
the opposition’s endorsement of land reform as irreversible in the GPA, the MDC T also called 
for an end to fresh invasions of white-owned farms whilst ZANU PF argued that the white 
farmers that were being removed were those that had been served with eviction letters earlier but 
were refusing to vacate the farms.  
 
SADC carried out a number of engagements in an effort to end the MDC T boycott including 
dispatching a ministerial mission which met with the GPA leaders following which one of the 
officials was quoted saying about their mission: “We are listening to the issues and the views 
being raised by the two parties, and we are counseling them … that it is important that they 
should remain engaged in the interest of the people of Zimbabwe” (Chinaka, ibid). Then SADC 
Chairman Joseph Kabila also passed through Harare on his way from South Africa and met with 
President Mugabe and PM Tsvangirai urging them to find each other. Following a SADC 
summit that was held in Maputo on 5 November, 2009, the MDC T eventually agreed to end its 
boycott though no meaningful progress had been made in securing the demands that had 
triggered it.   
 
The opposition was also of the view that there was need for security sector reforms to end the 
sector’s loyalty and support to ZANU PF before the next elections. Western governments were 
eager to avail funding for research on the viability of security sector reforms in Zimbabwe 
(Cawthra, Personal Communication, 2010, Mar. 10). President Robert Mugabe however 
dismissed the idea of security sector reforms and consequently there was no movement in that 
direction. Following pronouncements by then Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba that 
Tsvangirai was a security threat to the state of Zimbabwe and increasing calls by the opposition 
for security sector reforms before the elections, the State Security Minister, Sydney Sekeramayi 
was also quoted saying about the security forces in Zimbabwe: 
If there is anything that has to be done in terms of the quality of our defence and security 
forces, we are the ones to do it. Nobody should sit in London or elsewhere and tell us to 
do security sector reform, security sector alignment and that type of rubbish. That will not 
be done … These are bodies which are headed by some of our most illustrious 
commanders during the liberation struggle. But because these commanders are the ones 
who piloted the freedom of this country, those that we conquered (sic) don’t want to see 
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them … They don’t want them to be in command positions and we are saying that for all 
intents and purposes it’s a lot of nonsense we will not accept (Bulawayo24, 2013). 
Nyikayaramba (Interview, 2015, Feb. 13) justified his statements that Tsvangirai was a threat to 
national security saying that he took that view because the opposition leader had: threatened to 
remove a constitutionally elected president by violent means; joined forces with Western powers 
that were hostile to Zimbabwe; was using his party to distabilise the country thwarting any 
prospects of economic recovery; and, had called for the imposition of sanctions against the 
country. The general was of the view that it was critical for Tsvangirai’s actions and 
pronouncements to be met by a military response since he was acting against Zimbabwe’s 
national interest by attacking the nation’s survival.  
 
The MDC T was also complaining that ZANU PF was continuing to effect a vice-grip hold on 
the media and refusing to appoint some of its appointees to the boards of the parastatals in the 
sector whilst the latter was counter-arguing that it had access to state media only in a situation 
where the former was backed by the privately owned media, pirate media stations such as VOA’s 
Studio 7 and Voice of the People (VOP), and big foreign media houses such as Aljazeera, the 
BBC and CNN (Charamba, Interview, 2014, Jun. 3). Further, ZANU PF argued that it had met its 
part of the deal by swearing in opposition members into government and what was really 
outstanding was for the MDC T to campaign for the lifting of Western sanctions though the 
opposition pointed out that it had no power over the Western countries that were maintaining 
sanctions (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 16).  
Commenting on media reforms, the pro-ZANU PF Sheunesu Mpepereki commented on the ZTV 
current affairs programme that: “To open up airwaves amounts to opening a huge corridor 
through which enemy troops … can then come in just like vultures and eat all the brains of the 
people” (Mpepereki, 2012)76. Following a meeting between President Mugabe and then Prime 
Minister Morgan Tsvangirai that failed to make progress on the issues dividing the parties, 
Reuters quoted Nelson Chamisa, the MDC T spokesman saying: “If they (President Mugabe and 
ZANU PF) are facing west we are facing east. If that (SADC) mediation fails, unfortunately we 
have to start to prepare for elections because there is no government without the GPA” 
(Dzirutwe, 2009). The following day Chamisa was again quoted saying:  
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 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) argued that one of the greatest causes of conflict in Zimbabwe from 
2000 was the stifling of the media by ZANU PF that limited debate on important national issues.    
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If the (SADC Troika) meeting fails to break the deadlock, we hope there will be a full 
(SADC) summit. If that fails, then the only option will be a free and fair election under 
international supervision. In our forensic audit, we have only implemented a quarter of 
the Global Political Agreement … and there is a danger that ZANU PF may want to 
reverse some of the progress that we have achieved (Chinaka, 2009a).  
Patrick Chinamasa responded by saying: “We are owed more than we are in debt because the 
issues the MDC are raising are not in the GPA that we signed, and some of them are meant for 
propaganda purposes” (Chinaka, 2009b). The pro-opposition John Makumbe was sceptical about 
progress in the GPA saying if things did not change, an economic turnaround would be difficult 
to attain saying:  
For the current stability to be consolidated, all outstanding disputes destabilising the 
government of national unity need to be resolved, that is the main assumption on which 
an economic turn-around is premised. Failure to do that makes all prospects bleak and we 
can forget about attracting investment (Banya, 2009).  
In 2010, the Western countries that had applied sanctions on Zimbabwe including the USA, the 
EU, Canada and Australia were either extending them or widening their scope. In February 2010, 
the EU announced that: “In view of the situation in Zimbabwe, in particular the lack of progress 
in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement signed in September 2008, the 
restrictive measures … should be extended for a further period of 12 months (Felix, 2010). 
Western governments however continued providing aid mostly through Western sponsored 
NGOs and often directed to ministries that were controlled by members of the opposition. One 
good example was the EU release of $10.6 million to support the ailing education sector as well 
as support that was made available to the health sector, especially in augmenting low salaries 
(Reuters, 2010a). 
President Jacob Zuma remained seized with the situation in Zimbabwe and made a number of 
visits to the country to try to press for the full implementation of the GPA but little progress was 
made on the outstanding contentious issues though there was movement in the constitution-
making exercise. Addressing his supporters at a rally, Tsvangirai said about progress in the GPA: 
“We are sick and tired of endless talks. We shall take measures so that there will be no more 
dialogue for dialogue’s sake” (Chinaka, 2010a). Tsvangirai also repeated his call that the next 
elections should be overseen by an international peacekeeping force from the UN, the AU and 
SADC. Despite the Inclusive Government being consistently characterised by bickering amongst 
 199 
 
the parties in the GPA, Tsvangirai addressed the Zimbabwe-Africa Business Opportunities Day 
at which he said President Robert Mugabe was part of the solution to the political equation in the 
country saying: 
If there are skeptics in the United States who think and wish that one day President 
Mugabe will wake up dead then they are mistaken. We need to be rewarded for the 
progress. We are not where we are supposed to be, but certainly, we are where we never 
thought we would be sometime last year (The Herald, 2010).  
In a conciliatory message aimed at rallying the nation behind the GPA in an Independence Day 
celebrations speech President Mugabe also said:  
Your leadership in the Inclusive Government urges you to desist from any acts of 
violence that will cause harm to others and become a blight on our society … Many of 
the key provisions of the Global Political Agreement which is the maker of our Inclusive 
Government, have been and continue to be in the process of being fulfilled. … The 
economic empowerment policies are chiefly designed to redress historic imbalances in 
the ownership of the economy. … No challenge or hardship can overcome our sense of 
freedom, independence and sovereignty (Chinaka, 2010b). 
As the Inclusive Government progressed, President Mugabe was increasingly losing patience 
with the West over the issue of isolation and sanctions. Addressing thousands of his supporters at 
the burial of his sister Sabina Mugabe, he said:  
We say to hell, to hell, hell with them. Sanctions must go, and they must go. They are 
hurting our people regardless of political affiliation. … We are still being treated as if we 
don’t own this country. They want to tell us, do A, B and C of that, remove so-and-so and 
they are now saying Mugabe must go first. Who ever told them that their will is above 
that of the people of Zimbabwe … This is the fight we must fight in an all-Zimbabwe 
way (Chinaka, 2010d).  
In an interview with Reuters in September, President Mugabe became hopeful that Western 
countries would soften up following a change in political leadership both in the United Kingdom 
and the US when he said:  
We never refuse to talk to anybody. But what I understand about the Europeans and the 
Americans is the negative attitude. How do they expect the kind of cold war they decided 
to wage on us, how do they intend it to end? … They have imposed unjustified sanctions 
on Zimbabwe … I am born here and if my people want me to go, I go … We are waiting 
to see what [British Prime Minister David] Cameron and [British Deputy Prime Minister 
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Nick] Clegg will do and [USA President Barrack] Obama also will do in regard to our 
situation and relations. If they decide the relations should remain what they are, then we 
will know that they too are aggressors and not different from their predecessors (Reuters, 
2010b). 
Although inflation had been contained and the economy somehow stabilised with the GDP 
projected to grow by a revised margin of 4.8 percent from the targeted 7 percent in 2010, the 
Finance Minister Tendai Biti said in May 2010 Zimbabwe remained a high risk investment 
destination. “What I am really worried about is the lack of capital, foreign investment of bilateral 
credit lines. The reason is largely because of the perception of high risk. In our macro-economic 
foundations, we are doing better than most African countries, but we got a baggage … a 
hangover from our years of conflict” (Cocks, and Valdmanis, 2010). The main problems were 
centred on the continuing sanctions and policy differences between the parties in the Inclusive 
Government especially over the empowerment policy and how to control diamond revenue 
which the opposition was bitter about, complaining that it was not going directly into the fiscus, 
but being controlled by ZANU PF outside state financial structures. Major policies that were 
crafted under the Inclusive Government included the indigenisation and economic empowerment 
policy; diamonds policy; mid-term economic policy statements, governance policy papers whose 
announcements were all characterised by disagreements along party political lines.  
 
A combination of document analysis of the policies and an observation of their implementation 
revealed that even after some of the policies had been adopted by government, disagreements 
over their appropriateness and efficacy continued to dog their implementation along political 
party considerations. Consequently, as ZANU PF pursued empowerment-based initiatives in 
Government, the MDC T was highly critical and in competition came up with its “Jobs, 
Upliftment, Investment, Capital and the Environment (JUICE)”, lead-authored by a businessman, 
Eddie Cross, and a UK-based consultant, Lance Mambondiani, which was a poor attempt to 
duplicate previous government’s economic policies under the guise of new terminology 
(Musarara, 2013). The MDC T blueprint envisaged turning around the economy through foreign 
direct investments from the West and employment creation but was dismissed by ZANU PF as 
being divorced from reality and its failure was completed by the opposition’s inability to unlock 
meaningful aid from its Western allies.  
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Despite the difficult relations between the coalition partners, the constitution-making exercise 
started on 9 April 2009 envisaged to end by 9 October 2010 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). 
Its official launch was in June 2010 at which President Mugabe said: “Let’s support the exercise 
and the freedom of our people to be heard. We are one people and we have one destiny” and 
Tsvangirai also talked against violence and intimidation saying: “There will be no violence 
during this process. Only when people are able to truly express themselves and to take part in the 
process will we be able to set our country on a path of democracy” (Chinaka, 2010c). Although 
the GPA leaders publicly declared support for the constitution-making process, its 
implementation was fraught with disagreements as each side sought to prevail over the other on 
what to include and was delayed by inadequate funding. Because of the continuing differences 
on how to proceed with the constitution-making exercise and over the GPA, former President 
Thabo Mbeki, at the launch of his Thabo Mbeki Foundation, encouraged the parties to remain 
committed to the GPA saying it was the only option that would bring peace and stability to 
Zimbabwe: “I would hope people are faithfully implementing what was contained in the GPA. 
And really what was contained in it was that they would put in place various measures which 
would help overcome the causes of conflict that had taken place in Zimbabwe and create a basis 
for reconciliation” (Radio VOP, 2010).  
The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) carried a report on its website that reviewed the GPA 
saying since its signing, the three parties to it had only managed to legalise their stay in office 
because none of the 21 out of 27 outstanding issues had seen the light of day (Muzulu, 2011). A 
letter written by then Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara to the SADC facilitator, 
President Zuma, said the three principals in the GPA had reviewed the implementation matrix for 
agreed GPA issues at a meeting on 8 June 2010 and amongst the things agreed to be tackled 
within a month from 4 August 2010 were media reforms, that JOMIC and the Cabinet Re-
engagement Committee would deal with the issue of pirate radio stations by appealing to 
countries that sponsored them to close them down, the setting up of a Land Audit Commission, 
the establishment of the National Economic Council (NEC), the Human Rights Commission 
(HRC) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (Muzulu, ibid). By as late as July 2011, none of 
these targets had been achieved though they had been some movement in the appointment of 
media boards, but instead a storm was brewing between Tsvangirai and Mutambara with the 
former accusing the latter of misrepresenting facts by claiming that principals in the GPA had 
agreed that the issue of the appointment of the governor of the central bank and the Attorney 
 202 
 
General was linked to the issue of the removal of sanctions. The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition 
chairman, Jonah Gokova, was quoted saying about the GPA progress: “Our experience with the 
GPA negotiators has shown that ZANU PF has no qualms with giving in to certain concessions 
but dithers on implementation. We can celebrate the agreement, but we should expect problems 
in the implementation” (Muzulu, ibid). Giving an assessment of the GPA in 2011, Lovemore 
Madhuku who was then the president of the NCA said: 
They did not produce any timetable leading to fresh elections. It’s only time frames and 
we know they will not implement anything when one examines what has happened in the 
past. They simply said everything hinged on the constitutional review process which in 
itself is not clear when it will be brought to an end (Muzulu, ibid). 
 
Despite the bickering in the GPA and the stalling of the constitutional process, the members of 
the team driving the process somehow found each other at times cooperating across the party 
political divide in a manner that in some instances drew criticism from the sponsor parties and 
worked to produce a document that was endorsed by a 75 percent majority in a referendum77. 
The development confirmed Pruitt’s (2005) Coalition Theory that in a conflict, members across 
the conflict divide might find themselves forming a coalition necessitated by a desire to resolve 
issues in a conflict. The development however showed that the coalition was not on the overall 
resolution of the conflict, but in dealing with a specific aspect of it. The adoption of the new 
constitution was however one major development that happened in the life of the GPA and 
triggered positive signals from the EU.  
With the constitution in place, ZANU PF however became increasingly emboldened and began 
to call for elections arguing that whatever had not been resolved or implemented in the GPA 
would be dealt with by the party that won the elections. Another factor that gave confidence to 
ZANU PF was that the MDC T support was declining after failing to impress during the life of 
the Inclusive Government. The CFU’s Charles Taffs criticised the MDC T for lacking coherent 
policies and the subsequent lack of popular support saying:  
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 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) said the Constitution Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) members 
worked together well for the good of the country though at times when he was seen socialising together with 
Munyaradzi Paul Mangwana of ZANU PF, their parties felt that the two had sold out. 
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What is the MDC’s policy on indigenisation, mining and land? It concerns us that all they 
want to do and will hinge their election campaign is to remove President Mugabe and 
ZANU PF from power. That’s what they have been trying to do for the past decade. At 
least ZANU PF programmes are clear cut and well known (Manheru, 2012). 
The Financial Gazette carried a commentary from Zenzele Ndebele that summed the 
Zimbabwean opposition’s faring in the Inclusive Government in which he said:  
It might be accurate to say that they have lost support, but what is certain is that the MDC 
that is there now is no longer the one that the people and masses knew before they went 
into Government. The gravest mistake the MDC made was to take service ministries and 
leave ZANU PF with all strategic ministries (Ndebele, 2012). 
In a presentation at SAPES Trust on 11 June 2012, then Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa said 
“After Luanda (summit), what is next for Zimbabwe? My answer is elections. The coalition 
government is not working and I think you agree with me that coalition governments have never 
worked anywhere the world over” (Newsday, 2012). After the lapse of the two years that had 
been earmarked as the duration of the GPA, ZANU PF was ignoring demands for more reforms 
from Western countries and the opposition and began to increasingly call for elections saying the 
Inclusive Government was not working owing to ideological and policy differences.78  In a 
situation where ZANU PF was feeling that it had regained ground politically and desperately 
wanted elections to end the GPA, it got a shot in the arm when Jelousy Mawarire, the executive 
director and founding trustee for the Centre for Elections and Democracy in Southern Africa 
(CEDSA), in his capacity as an ordinary citizen, took the head of state to the Constitutional 
Court demanding that elections be held in the shortest time possible because their continued 
deferment was impinging on his constitutional right as a citizen (Ndlela, 2013).  
The grounds for Mawarire’s case were that: in terms of the constitution, the life of parliament 
and that of the governing bodies of all local authorities were expiring on 29 June 2013; the 
minimum time legally required to proclaim the election date had run out in the light of the 
impending dissolution of Parliament; neither the outgoing constitution, nor the new one allowed 
Zimbabwe to be governed by the Executive and the Judiciary only without Parliament; and that 
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 In a wide ranging interview on the BBC’s HardTalk on 4 April 2013, the then Justice Minister Patrick 
Chinamasa claimed that Tsvangirai was not consulting his partners in the GPA in his meetings with NATO generals 
suggesting he was seeking support from Western countries to effect regime change in Zimbabwe and as such 
elections were the only legitimate and legal way to dispense with the GPA since it was Zimbabweans and not 
Western countries, who had the right to choose their leaders in the country. 
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the life of Parliament in Zimbabwe could only be extended for specified periods when the 
country was either at war or when there was a constitutionally declared state of emergency 
(Ndlela, 2013). Subsequently, the Constitutional Court ruled that:  
It is declared that the failure by the first respondent (President Robert Mugabe) to fix and 
proclaim dates for the harmonised general election to take place by 29 June 2013 is a 
violation of the first respondent’s constitutional duty towards the applicant to exercise his 
functions as a public officer in accordance with the law and to observe and uphold the 
rule of law in terms of section 18 (The Herald, 2013a). 
The MDC T responded to the ruling saying: “The party (MDC T) reiterated that the date of the 
election must be process driven. In other words, it must be dependent upon the completion of key 
processes that have a bearing on the freeness and fairness of the election” (Makova, 2013) and 
Tsvangirai was also quoted saying “In the true spirit of separation of powers, an election date 
remains a political process in which the executive has a role to play” (Makova, Ibid).  
The MDC T’s flip-flopping on the holding of elections to end the GPA did not help things79. 
Commenting on Tsvangirai’s refusal to have elections, Welshman Ncube of the smaller MDC 
said:  
Let me disclose this to you, we were invited to South Africa … together with other 
political leaders in the GPA, we spoke with President Zuma regarding when elections are 
to be held. Tsvangirai and his team said we must hold elections by June 29 or the latest 
being July 15 (2013). We argued about it but they were adamant saying Government after 
that period would be illegal …Now he has changed saying elections should be held in 
October and you journalists have failed to tell the world that previously he wanted polls 
to be held in June (Daily News, 2013). 
Lovemore Madhuku, a former ally of the MDC T but who was increasingly becoming 
sympathetic to ZANU PF towards the 2013 elections attacked the MDC T for refusing to go to 
the elections saying:  
It is wrong for some people to dream that there is going to be a summit to decide an 
election date for this country. Zimbabwe is a sovereign nation with enough capacity to 
                                                    
79
 Ironically, during the negotiations for the GPA, ZANU PF had argued that the Inclusive Government 
should last 36 months while the MDC formations were insisting that it should last only 12 months and SADC 
suggested a compromise of 24 months (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013) though in practice the Inclusive 
Government lasted until the expiry of Parliament that had been elected in 2008 with the acquiescence of all the 
parties in the GPA. 
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run this country. It is our conviction as the NCA that elections are due and they must be 
held according to our laws. It does not help anyone to postpone the elections (Madhuku, 
2013). 
The then SADC Executive Secretary, Tomaz Salomao, also made comments that demonstrated 
the regional bloc’s weakness in influencing the election date decision saying: “We are waiting to 
hear the ruling of the Supreme Court, and as SADC we will be there to support … We are 
basically waiting for the announcement of the day of the election so that we move this process 
forward” (Zvayi, 2013b). Salomao (Interview, 2015, Mar. 4) said it was important for SADC to 
respect national institutions and there was no way it would have opposed the court’s ruling. 
Following the court ruling compelling President Mugabe to set an election date for the elections, 
Lovemore Madhuku, a constitutional law expert, hailed the judgement saying:  
The NCA welcomes the judgment as sound in law, good to the country and an exercise in 
constitutionalism. In particular, the Constitutional Court has made three critical principles 
which must guide our nation now: that at all times we must have the three organs of state 
in place. Under no circumstances may this country be under the rule by the Executive 
only …; any individual citizen, whatever his or her station in life, female or male, rich or 
poor, educated or uneducated has a right to approach the courts and insist on the country 
being governed in accordance with the law; the timing of elections is not an exclusive 
terrain of self-serving politicians. The Constitutional Court will always ensure that 
elections are held when due. This protects our nation from the tyranny of dominant 
politicians of the day (Ndlela, 2013). 
President Robert Mugabe dismissed the demands that elections be postponed saying: “Some 
people do not wish for elections at all, they have enjoyed riding on the GPA chariot … I am not 
delaying anything. I will not accept that anymore. That’s their wish. We should forget this period 
and to forget it is to sink it by an election so we drown it out of memory and say we will never 
do this again. It’s filthy, it’s filthy, it’s filthy” (Chikova, 2013, Jun. 2). The MDC T was seeking 
a postponement of the election date arguing that little progress had been achieved in leveling the 
political playing field though some believed that this was because it was not prepared for the 
next plebiscite.  
The curtain came down on the GPA at the expiry of the term of parliament that began in 2008 
triggering the holding of elections in June 2013. The elections of 2013 were held in an 
environment in which Western countries continued to uphold sanctions against Zimbabwe 
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mostly targeted at ZANU PF entities and in which pirate radio stations sponsored by the same 
countries were churning out propaganda hostile to ZANU PF in violation of the GPA terms, a 
situation that favoured the opposition. As with previous elections, ZANU PF refused to accept 
most of the observers and monitors from Western countries in the 2013 plebiscite arguing that 
countries that were maintaining sanctions against it were interested parties and as such would not 
be welcome. This did not go down well with some of the Western countries that had been 
excluded and they tried in vain to argue that the time was not yet ripe for the holding of credible 
elections in the country because no meaningful reforms had been undertaken. Despite arguing 
that conditions were not right for a free and fair election, the opposition agreed to be dragged 
along leading to its participation in the elections.  
With the opposition failing to convince the electorate during its five years in Government that it 
provided a better alternative to ZANU PF rule, the 2013 elections yielded stunning results for it 
and its supporters. The outcome however had been predicted by several opinion polls including 
those historically known to always anticipate and ‘predict’ an opposition victory. Commenting 
on the impending 2013 elections, Susan Booysen predicted a ZANU PF win saying: “The MDC 
T lost moral ground in urban areas and its constituencies and they are no longer able to say they 
will win an election provided it is free and fair. The MDC T has little chance of victory on two 
main grounds: lack of preparedness and the voters roll which really can, it seems, be used for 
manipulation” (Booysen, 2012). The 2012 Freedom House survey found out that support for the 
MDC-T had plummeted from 38 percent in 2010 to 19 percent in 2012, while support for 
ZANU-PF had grown to 31 percent, up from 17 percent, over the same period (Booysen, ibid). In 
September 2012, a UK-based pro-MDC-T group, the Zimbabwe Vigil, also reported that the 
MDC-T was likely to lose the harmonised elections because of rampant corruption within its top 
leadership, among other issues (Zvayi, 2013). Even the British Guardian known for its anti-
Mugabe rhetoric also reported that:  
Opinion polls in recent months have repeatedly shown that Tsvangirai’s popularity has 
been hurt by divisions within the opposition and his own scandalous love-life, putting 
him neck and neck, with the wily President even edging in front on occasion. This is a 
long-winded way of saying that (President) Mugabe is looking good to win the elections 
(The Guardian, 2013). 
An NGO, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, that had closely worked with the MDC-T since 2001 
acknowledged through the chairperson of its South Africa branch, Brian Raftopoulos, who said 
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that ZANU PF had better chances of winning the 2013 elections, arguing that there would be 
three possible scenarios to emanate from the elections: “A ZANU PF victory coming through 
ZANU PF riding on a restructured political economy, the threat of violence and rigging” (The 
Herald, 2013c). He further said a win by the MDC-T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, was likely to 
face resistance from the military, while the third scenario was another Inclusive Government as a 
result of another hung Parliament.  
In line with these opinion polls, out of the 210 House of Assembly seats that were contested, 
ZANU PF managed to win a majority in Parliament garnering 160 seats, the MDC T 49 and one 
going to an independent as shown at appendix 1. The smaller MDC T led by Welshman Ncube 
failed to get even a single seat leaving ZANU PF and the MDC T as the only two major political 
players in the country after 2013. In the presidential election, President Robert Mugabe won with 
2,110,434 votes, giving him 61% of the total votes cast and the MDC-T leader, former Prime 
Minister Morgan Tsvangirai 34% (ZEC, 2013). 
This section presented the evidence from a process tracing of the GPA and the Inclusive 
Government from 2008 to 2013. The next section discusses the effects of rationalist explanations 
for war and ripeness on the resolution process during the GPA period. 
6.3 Rationalist explanations for war, ripeness and the resolution process  
Ripeness, according to Zartman (2001) is not a static condition and when it sets in, it can last for 
long as circumstances creating that ripeness remain unchanged. Empirical evidence reinforced 
this view showing that once ripeness set in, it became a fluid phenomenon whose magnitude and 
effect depended on the unfolding events in the conflict environment. Whilst all the parties felt 
circumscribed by the indecisive election results of 2008 and the threat of a failed economy 
suggesting the highest possible degree of ripeness had set in and ripeness remained at that peak 
level up to the signing of the GPA, it declined beginning with that very signing of the agreement. 
Ripeness took another dip with the swearing in of the Inclusive Government by February 2009 
and fluctuated until it became non-existent by the time of the elections in 2013. Instead of 
ironing out contentious issues and seeking immediate implementation at a time when ripeness 
was at its peak and parties at their weakest positions ever, the facilitator and the parties opted for 
an easy way out of agreeing on a broader framework leaving out important and difficult details to 
be dealt with in due course.  
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Fearon (1995) and Toft’s (2006) ‘rationalist explanations for war’ discussed in chapter 2 
included issue indivisibility which was dealt with in chapter 5, private information problems, 
commitment problems and different time horizons. Whilst war is the highest order in the line of 
conflict projection, it is reached through a process of escalation and the opposite, which is peace, 
through de-escalation (Zartman, 2001). If rationalist explanations for war account for what leads 
to war or peace in conflict situations, it is thus a given that how they are dealt with in an 
agreement to end hostilities can either lead to escalation or de-escalation of that conflict. The 
research was thus interested in establishing how Fearon (1995) and Toft’s (2006) rationalist 
explanations for war affected the notion of ripeness and the GPA over time.  
Private information problems arise because rational actors in a conflict have incentives to 
conceal or misrepresent their true interests and risk preferences (Fearon, 1995). This can easily 
result in miscalculations that can lead to the option of escalating the conflict. The GPA was thus 
riddled by private information problems as pointed out by Toft (2006) to the extent that the 
opposing sides did not reveal their real intention of wanting to use the GPA as a means to 
achieving their unilateral goal of monopolising political power. While the opposition saw the 
GPA as a transition, ZANU PF saw it as an opportunity to regain lost ground yet during the 
negotiations, the parties did not reveal their actual intentions of accepting the GPA and with time 
they began to show their true colours as they failed to remain committed to seeing through all 
their pledges to achieve win-win outcomes. Rather, as soon as the impediments that had been 
created by the political stalemate fell by the wayside through some semblance of working 
together in the GPA and the economy was on a rebound, parties began to use the opportunity that 
came with being in the GPA to consolidate their unilateral positions, especially the pursuance of 
acquiring total political power.  
 
The notion of commitment to the spirit of the agreement is closely related to private information 
problems in that as long as parties do not reveal their actual intentions in a conflict and the 
resolution process, they will be doing that because sooner or later they want to abandon the 
agreement to pursue their unilateral positions. Toft (2006) pointed out that commitment 
problems describe situations where parties to a conflict have genuine desire to seek resolution 
short of violence, but the weaker side may not be able to trust the stronger side to keep its side of 
the bargain. Although ZANU PF as the stronger party in the conflict appeared to have 
transgressed more in the GPA implementation, the opposition parties also failed to commit and 
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honour all their pledges in the agreement. If a peace agreement is to hold and succeed, it calls for 
all the parties, rather than the dominant one as suggested by Toft (2006), to commit to their 
pledges to build confidence in the process.  
 
As noted in the preceding section, the GPA’s weakest part was in the section that detailed 
provisions for the implementation of the agreement as well as in monitoring compliance in a 
situation where ZANU PF had greater leverage in shaping how the GPA would play out by its 
dominant control of executive power in the Inclusive Government. Private information problems 
and commitment problems affected the agreement and by extension the internal ripeness of the 
conflict over time in that ZANU PF could accept any demands by the opposition fully aware that 
it had an unparalleled power in controlling the implementation process80. While the opposition 
gave in to the ZANU PF demand that the swearing in of President Robert Mugabe as head of 
state was not to be reversed, the former’s hold on to the presidency became its strongest 
advantage and leverage in the GPA. Consequently, although negotiations over several issues in 
the GPA often saw ZANU PF being pressed by the regional bloc to compromise on some issues 
it was opposed to, no much headway was made. If the regional bloc’s pressure became 
unbearable, ZANU PF had the option to block the demand citing sovereignty or to accept the 
terms fully aware that implementation still needed to be triggered by the head of state. In 
situations where ZANU PF was not keen to comply with the demands of the opposition 
including in the cases where it had granted concessions, the former stalled the process by simply 
not doing anything or doing something but without consulting the premiership since the 
envisaged consultation by its nature was not legally binding (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 
16). This was also the case with the opposition which pledged that it was going to work to have 
sanctions removed and pirate media stations eliminated but failed to fulfill the pledges more 
from its lack of power to prevail over the countries that were applying sanctions and sponsoring 
pirate radio stations suggesting that although the Western governments were publicly suggesting 
that they were supporting the opposition as a democratising force, in reality they had their own 
grievances different from those of the opposition that hinged on working to end the ZANU PF 
rule. 
 
                                                    
80
 Mwonzora (Interview, 2013, Jun. 16) said the GPA had not been properly written as it lacked time frames 
and talked about agreed provisions without laying out the implementation modalities. 
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Consequently, despite the parties agreeing in the GPA negotiations that there was going to be a 
sharing of the posts of governors, ZANU PF delayed their appointment till the GPA came to an 
end in 2013. The GPA articles dealing with the appointment of governors, repealing of certain 
pieces of legislation, the position on traditional leaders and the security sector were all issues 
where ZANU PF was not keen to give in to the demands of the opposition. Accepting and 
implementing opposition demands on these issues would have weakened its ultimate goal of 
wanting to regain and consolidate its hold on power, the unilateral path it was pursuing before 
the onset of the GPA. These and others became the outstanding issues in the implementation of 
the GPA that the parties continued to haggle over in each SADC summit convened on the 
Zimbabwe Talks but which ZANU PF, by control of the executive, refused to concede much 
space on.  
 
The opposition also sought to create conditions that would place it on a firm footing to revert to 
its unilateral path of completely taking over power from ZANU PF and did not only describe the 
GPA as ‘a transition to democracy’ but tried in vain or with little success to press for the 
implementation of the outstanding issues that it viewed as critical in clearing its way to power. 
Although there were some items on the agenda of the GPA in which progress was made as 
indicated in previous sections, it was in the exercise of executive power over substantive issues 
of governance as well as on the application of the law in accordance to the spirit of the agreed 
provisions and amendments on contentious issues that the GPA stalled. Whilst ripeness 
presented itself in 2008, the form and scope of the agreement - without clear-cut time frames, its 
reliance on voluntary compliance, and lack of effective monitoring modalities - became 
inducements for the parties to deviate from the win-win route that was envisaged by the 
agreement the moment parties felt they had overcome the difficulties brought about by the 
political stalemate and the threat of a failed economy. There was a failure to strike the metal 
when it was still red-hot. The result was an erosion of the perception of ripeness with the passage 
of time especially within ZANU PF as its members increasingly began to see the party’s position 
being strengthened by ending the GPA whilst the opposition, which had failed to achieve much, 
wanted more time in the GPA with the hope of eventually improving its lot. When ZANU PF in 
2013 eventually felt that it was time to proceed unilaterally, it began to press for the ending of 
the GPA through elections despite opposition from the other parties in the Inclusive Government 
and by SADC. The Supreme Court ruling gave ZANU PF the ammunition it needed under the 
guise of sovereignty to proceed unilaterally with the proclamation of the election date, arguing 
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that it could not be seen to be going against a ruling by a court of law. Owing to the principle of 
sovereignty, SADC could not do much to stop the process beyond just urging that more time be 
given to allow for the full implementation of the agreed reforms and consequently elections were 
held as per the time-table that was desired by ZANU PF. 
 
The erosion of ripeness in the conflict leading to the unilateral proclamation of the election date 
in 2013 can also be explained in the context of Toft’s (2006) time horizons which she said take 
effect at the time of negotiating the agreement where on looking into the future, parties can see 
different time frames on the possible attainment of their unilateral goals and thus opt for a route 
that will see them attaining their unilateral objective and refuse negotiations. The review of the 
GPA however showed that even in instances where an agreement is reached, when circumstances 
change over time, those changes can create different time horizons in which parties begin to see 
a new timeframe divorced from the resolution process resulting in the erosion of ripeness as the 
parties begin to feel that resorting to a unilateral position can yield a zero-sum win in their 
favour.  
As the GPA dragged on partially implemented, ZANU PF became more and more confident and 
worked to push for its policies that set it apart from the opposition seeking to project itself as the 
only viable political party in the country (Zhuwarara, Interview, 2014, Oct. 20). With the 
economy’s downward slide somehow stopped and inflation contained due to the introduction of 
a multicurrency regime and the main MDC T failing to attract massive foreign aid as it had 
promised and suffering from an image crisis brought about by Morgan Tsvangirai’s 
inconsistencies in decision making on important matters of governance and his personal life, 
ZANU PF’s time horizon in the lifespan of the GPA became different to that of the opposition as 
it began to see elections as a sure way of doing away with the MDC T threat81.  With members of 
the opposition having failed to change the electoral environment in the five years they had been 
in government in which they were accused of mostly being preoccupied with enjoying the good 
living that came with the offices they held in the Inclusive Government, many in the electorate 
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 Mziwandile Ndlovu wrote an article in the Southern Eye of 14 July 2014 which aptly presented the factors 
that worked against Tsvangirai in the GPA arguing that he was his own enemy who missed a lot of opportunities to 
create conditions for his party to govern by failing to court African leaders to his side and was always calling upon 
Europe and America to take action on Zimbabwe, that during the political stalemate of 2008, he turned down an 
offer by ZANU PF doves to form a government that would include ZANU PF MPs as ministers, failed to keep his 
party intact and in the Inclusive Government, soiled his reputation by portraying himself as a morally loose leader.  
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began to see the opposition’s unending call for reforms as a way of wanting to continue to enjoy 
the benefits of being in power (Nyikayaramba, Interview, 2015, Feb. 13). Despite the shared 
legitimacy that obtained from the Inclusive Government, once the circumstances changed 
impinging on conditions that had compelled the parties to accept a GPA as the only way out soon 
after the elections of 2008, time horizons between the parties also changed and began to erode 
the notion of ripeness in the conflict.  
Faced with a situation in which the dominant party in the conflict was invoking national 
sovereignty, the weaknesses of regional blocs in dealing with member states’ internal matters 
became evident as SADC failed to prevail on the issues the parties were failing to agree on. 
When President Zuma sought to press for a “no elections before reforms” position, ZANU PF 
through President Mugabe in March 2013 threatened that Zimbabwe’s membership in SADC 
was voluntary and would pull out if it felt the regional organisation was not serving the country’s 
interests, in this case read as ZANU PF’s interests. “We are in SADC voluntarily. If SADC 
decides to do stupid things we can withdraw”, President Mugabe announced at the launch of his 
party’s manifesto in Harare (Mugabe, 2013). SADC’s position on the degree of sovereignty a 
country in a crisis and under its spotlight can enjoy are not clearly defined in its founding and 
subsequent protocols and thus is a clear weak link in its quest to preside over conflict situations 
in its member states. Salomao (Interview, 2015, Mar. 4) said SADC’s strategy was characterised 
by facilitation in which voluntary acquiescence was the norm. Without clearly articulating and 
exercising some degree of authority over member states by limiting the degree of sovereignty a 
country on its conflict resolution agenda can enjoy, the SADC conflict resolution framework 
faces a huge gap in its ability to enforce positions and ripeness can easily be lost as 
circumstances change in the conflict and one party begins to feel that it is time to walk out of the 
agreement and pursue a unilateral path because new conditions in the conflict have begun 
favouring it.  
Although the introduction of the multi-currency regime to replace the Zimbabwe dollar was a 
major climb-down on the part of ZANU PF as the move dealt a major blow to the country’s 
sovereignty, it helped to stabilise the economy by reducing inflation and allowed the 
Zimbabwean economy to start ticking again. The hyperinflation that had ravaged the country up 
to 2008 was reduced first to a negative percentage and then stabilised at slightly less than five 
percent per annum by the end of 2009 according to Zimbabwe’s Central Statistical Office 
(ZIMSTAT, 2013). Although other problems that afflict dollarised economies including periodic 
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liquidity crises and limited control over the monetary policy regime as well as the failure to 
unlock meaningful capital investment flows would eventually take their toll on the economy, at 
least the economy went on a rebound and some social services began to be restored. Although 
the economy had averaged 5% GDP growth rate throughout the 1980s, it declined from 2000: 
experiencing a 5% decline in 2000, 8% in 2001, 12% in 2002 and 18% in 2003 (Richardson, 
2013). From the formation of the Inclusive Government in 2009, the Zimbabwean economy 
began to show signs of recovery or at least arresting the perennial decline as the GDP grew by 
more than 5% in the years 2009 to 2011 and the IMF described the Zimbabwean economy in 
November 2010 as “completing its second year of buoyant economic growth” (IMF, 2010). 
Instead of encouraging the parties to remain committed to the GPA and do more for the country, 
ZANU PF and the MDC T got involved in a contest in which each sought responsibility of 
having caused the economic turn-around (Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb. 17). The economic 
rebound eliminated the threat of more devastating consequences that would have come with an 
economic collapse and parties, especially ZANU PF, became more difficult in further 
negotiations and in implementing the agreement suggesting the marginal economic recovery 
contributed to the erosion of ripeness over time.  
Although the economy somehow stabilised in the first two to three years of the GPA, by 2013 it 
was showing that its full recovery was still a long way to come. In its last two years of its 
existence, the Inclusive Government superintended an economy that was periodically suffering 
liquidity crises and experiencing little capital inflows. Although Government put in place 
measures to resuscitate the economy, indications from Treasury were that the country needed a 
substantial financial injection to resume real economic growth. The implication for conflict 
resolution given that the state of the economy was a major factor that had contributed to the 
setting in of ripeness after the 2008 elections was that SADC failed to use an economic rescue 
package as a carrot in the resolution process as suggested by the AU Mediation Support 
Handbook (2014) although the idea was muted in the formulation of the GPA. Salomao 
(Interview, 2015, Mar. 4) indicated that channeling the promised rescue package within a 
regional framework was not an attractive and viable option given the challenges of creating a 
bureaucracy to handle it and was best left to the individual countries making the pledges to make 
bilateral arrangements with Zimbabwe. The promised lines of credit that had been offered under 
the auspices of the Talks that led to the GPA were thus bilateral arrangements between 
Zimbabwe and the offering countries. The Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa (2014) 
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indicated that the GPA expired whilst the modalities for the release of much of the funds were 
still being negotiated with little or no pressure from the regional bloc beyond encouragement.  
Zartman (2001) suggested that sticks and carrots can be used to keep parties committed to the 
resolution path in a conflict that is experiencing some kind of ripeness. To ensure that the funds 
would be disbursed in time and to have leverage in the resolution process, SADC should have 
put in place a multilateral structure at the regional level linked to the facilitation process that 
would have superintended the disbursement and operationalisation of the rescue package 
according to set resolution targets inducing or reinforcing good behaviour to achieve full 
implementation of the GPA. The failure by SADC to pursue that route might have been driven 
by the fact that most SADC countries had their own economic priorities and could not afford to 
raise enough funds that would have meaningfully impacted on the Zimbabwe economy let alone 
availing those little funds through a regional structure in the absence of an institutional 
framework to handle them. The fact that the last years of the GPA saw the Zimbabwean 
economy stalling and failing to realise meaningful growth provided a leeway which the regional 
body failed to exploit to its full advantage. Faced with a reluctant West and a SADC that could 
not raise enough resources and still failed to ensure that the pledged little lines of credit were 
released, ZANU PF was increasingly looking to its traditional ally, China, for a bailout thus 
hardening its resolve to pursue a unilateral route and denying SADC the leverage and influence it 
greatly needed.  
 
The conduct of the facilitator and his team can also over time affect the degree of ripeness in a 
conflict if one or some of the parties begin to lose faith and begin to perceive that their condition 
in the agreement and the conflict will become more unfavourable because of the actions and 
pronouncements of the former. The process was also affected by a situation where the facilitators 
changed not as per the demands of the resolution process but because of independent political 
developments in South Africa that were not related to the conflict situation in Zimbabwe. 
Although ZANU PF continued to place confidence in South Africa’s facilitation, the direct attack 
on the conduct of Lindiwe Zulu by President Mugabe clearly demonstrated how important the 
conduct of the facilitation team was to its continued acceptance in the negotiations (Charamba, 
Interview, 2014, Jun. 3). As much as SADC nurtured the GPA providing some degree of 
leadership on the negotiations and the implementation of the GPA, the change-over of the 
facilitators that followed the leadership changes that took place in South Africa during the 
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lifespan of the GPA revealed that SADC faces a dilemma in handling conflict situations in 
member states when it comes to deciding which position to adopt in a conflict and in the context 
of the Zimbabwe resolution effort, that decision was left to depend to a great extent on the 
personal inclination of the person who was in charge albeit with little guidance from the regional 
bloc. Whilst Thabo Mbeki was viewed as being pro-ZANU PF, Zuma in particular came to be 
viewed as favouring the opposition (Charamba, ibid) in a situation where the credibility of the 
SADC formula for resolution to a large extent lay in its ability to determine which party between 
ZANU PF and the opposition was the main offender. In an effort to display impartiality, the 
regional bloc tried to walk a middle path, at least in most of its public pronouncement, avoiding 
showing bias towards any one of the parties.  
Although Bercovitch, et al. (2009) suggested that some situations may demand that the 
intervening party takes a position at times against one party and favouring another in the interests 
of doing what is morally right, doing so carries the risk of offending one party in the agreement 
risking its possible withdrawal from the process. In a situation where the continuance of the 
negotiations and even the whole inclusive arrangement depended on the voluntary willingness of 
the parties, it meant that any of the parties could have decided to pull out, leaving the regional 
bloc with few or no options as happened when the MDC T decided to disengage from Cabinet in 
2009. The likelihood of achieving success thus lay in the staying power of ripeness and its timely 
exploitation which to a great extent hinged on the aptitude and conduct of the facilitation team. 
To remain a credible and effective intervener, SADC used a firm but fair approach in the conflict 
balancing regional expectations with the sovereign expectations of the country which was not an 
easy task.  
As noted in chapter 2, Pruitt (2005) observed that in a conflict situation, coalition theory suggests 
that parties in a conflict that have agreed to work together may see a situation developing in 
which members across the divide may find themselves agreeing on common positions to move 
the process forward because they have developed some form of understanding that is 
underpinned by a collective desire to achieve progress. This appeared to be the case when the 
members who were charged with spearheading the constitution-making process developed good 
working relationships across the political divide based on the need to see the exercise 
succeeding. The parties’ representatives to the exercise across the political divide remained 
committed and eventually came out with a document that was put to the people through a 
referendum and for the first time, both the factions of the MDC and ZANU PF campaigned for 
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one position in favour of the new constitution. Although the NCA initiated a no-campaign 
against the new constitution, this was to no avail as the nation overwhelmingly endorsed the new 
constitution, demonstrating some coming together across the political party divide in the conflict 
and in the nation on a matter of national interest. Once the constitution was finalised however, 
political parties returned to their initial positions of seeking to use that very constitution to better 
their condition in the GPA, especially the quest to secure favourable future election outcomes for 
themselves confirming the view that all the parties’ major objective in the resolution process was 
to position themselves to take over power at the end of the Inclusive Government. A document 
analysis of the new Constitution revealed that although its creation followed the gathering of 
views from the people, the fact that it was superintended by parties that were competing for 
political space resulted in the final document being overloaded by issues in a quest to address all 
the parties’ interests. It was not surprising therefore that The Sunday Mail (2015) reported that 
the new Constitution was a drain on the fiscus as it provided for a huge legislature (270 National 
Assembly and 80 Senate members), the creation of seven independent Commissions and their 
secretariats and the setting up of provincial and metropolitan councils at a time when 92 percent 
of revenue was going to recurrent expenditure such that in 2015 ZANU PF was again 
considering amending the provisions it considered unsustainable. 
In an environment where each party in the conflict was in the GPA with the hope of improving 
its standing in preparation for a future political dispensation, it meant that there was a compelling 
need for an effective monitoring and enforcement of the GPA process by SADC, the regional 
body that had the mandate to exercise oversight to ensure that parties remained committed to 
implementing their pledged responsibilities. As it turned out, SADC was strong in calling for 
summits that sought to deal with the conflict albeit based on persuasion and counseling but 
proved to be handicapped when it came to enforcing compliance of the agreed terms. Motae 
(Interview, 2013, Aug. 5) said that whilst SADC wanted to have a strong monitoring mechanism, 
ZANU PF insisted on having a self-monitoring mechanism and the result was the JOMIC to 
which each party seconded its members according to an agreed criterion. Dzinesa & Zambara 
(2012) argued that JOMIC was flawed in that the political parties became the players and the 
referees at the same. Consequently, the political contest was transferred wholesale to JOMIC 
since the same political players who were seeking a better footing for their party in the whole 
agreement were some of the players that were also charged with playing the role of umpire 
(Zengeni, Interview, 2013, Jan. 4).  
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The other major weakness of the GPA was that the desire by the political parties to gain mileage 
at the expense of the other GPA partners meant that governance decisions became a contested 
issue. With President Mugabe firmly at the helm, in no time power began to show where it 
exactly lay in the Inclusive Government for when ZANU PF wanted to push for a particular 
governance position, it would prevail irrespective of whether the opposition parties were against 
it. In instances when the opposition attempted to push for a governance position to which ZANU 
PF was opposed and proceeded to try to implement on its own, it was rendered useless by lack of 
support from the latter because of its control of the state machinery. Important governance 
decisions were thus marred by disagreements driven by party political considerations82. Further, 
the socio-politico-economic meltdown that accompanied the conflict in Zimbabwe from 2000 
saw policy-making being characterised by interventionism in which political expediency and 
survival rather than long term socio-economic development were the main objectives (Zhou & 
Hardlife, 2012). The policy interventions that were witnessed during the GPA were thus mainly 
driven by political grandstanding and the need to safeguard political turf of the party advancing 
the policy. This made policy making highly unpredictable, contradictory, temperamental, 
exclusive, top-down and short-range in focus (Zhou & Hardlife, ibid).  
 
Another factor that aggravated the GPA problems was a situation in which the members of 
parliament were not sure of how long their term would last after the expiry of the two years that 
had been set as the time frame of the agreement and most members across the political divide 
became pre-occupied with the idea of making sure that they secured the full benefits that went 
along with their positions in government. Despite Zimbabwe suffering from an economy that 
was failing to recover to full capacity, the country found itself spending millions of dollars in 
meeting the material expectations of the bloated government confirming Maina (2011)’s 
assertion that inclusive governments by their nature tend to be larger than is normal imposing a 
heavy burden on the fiscus. 
 
Whilst the opposition saw the Inclusive Government as a way of preparing itself to take over 
power from ZANU PF (Mwonzora, Interview, 2013, Jun. 16), its involvement in the GPA put it 
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on the national spotlight that eventually worked against it. This image was further reinforced by 
the “get rich quick attitude” that was displayed by opposition leaders both in Government and 
local authorities amidst media allegations that Tsvangirai fraudulently double-dipped and 
received over $3 million to refurbish his official residence instead of the earmarked $1.5 million. 
Media across the editorial-divide reported that a number of opposition office-bearers in the GPA 
including the Chitungwiza town council were embroiled in scandals involving corruptly 
allocating themselves urban stands and buying expensive cars at the expense of resuscitating and 
improving social services83. Further, the MDC T image was dealt another major blow when its 
leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, was reported in the local media to have impregnated not less than 
two women after the death of his wife in a car accident, a development that portrayed him as an 
irresponsible leader who paid $300 000 as a divorce settlement to one of the four women who 
publicly declared having an affair with him at a time the country was failing to increase the 
salary of an average civil servant from $230 per month (Harare24, 2012).  The opposition’s time 
in the Inclusive Government thus left it exposed and its image battered. Further, the opposition 
was buoyed by the electoral gains it made in 2008 and parked the electorate concentrating on the 
new-found glory in power wrongly assuming that its support would remain the same or even 
grow and did little to retain and strengthen its political support base (Gwisai, 2013). To the 
contrary, Charamba (Interview, 2014, Jun. 3) and Zengeni (Interview, 2014, Jan. 4) said soon 
after its humiliating experience in 2008, ZANU PF went back to the drawing board and began 
strategising on how it would win the next election. While some Western countries sought to 
diminish ZANU PF’s political support by continuing to isolate the country and blocking capital 
inflows, this played to the advantage of the latter as its continued call for internal solutions to the 
economic and political problems facing the country premised on taking full control of the 
country by indigenous Zimbabweans once again began to find credence amongst the electorate 
(Kurebwa, Interview, 2015, Feb 17).  
 
With the opposition’s political fortunes clearly in decline, ZANU PF began to call for elections 
beginning from the time the GPA was supposed to expire at the end of 2011. The opposition 
persistently called for the deferment of the elections, arguing that the situation was not yet 
conducive for the holding of free and fair elections. The perception of an internal ripeness in the 
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conflict, especially within ZANU PF, thus continued to decrease from the time the agreement 
was coined and was completely non-existent in the period just before the elections of 201384. To 
ZANU PF, there was no more need for the SADC mediatory role in Zimbabwe after the 2013 
elections yet the opposition which had lost ground wanted to use the regional bloc as a way of 
opening further dialogue with ZANU PF with the hope of getting a second bite on the cherry 
since the election route had failed. It was thus not surprising that the then ZANU PF spokesman, 
Rugare Gumbo, immediately thereafter made the following announcement: “We believe that 
(President Robert) Mugabe’s landslide victory has put an end to facilitation. There is no need for 
facilitation anymore” (Allafrica.com, 2013). Khadiagala (Personal Communication, 2015, Feb. 
5) asserted that conflict resolution practitioners are ever seized with ideas about when to get 
involved, what to do when they get in but less about when to pull out adding that as much as 
there is a ripe moment for intervention, there should also be a ripe moment for pulling out. This 
he said is that point when the intervener feels all that could be done to exploit ripeness has been 
done and makes a decision to leave the transformed conflict on its own to see whether it can cool 
off for the better. Salomao (Interview, 2015, Mar. 4) said SADC felt that it had done all it could 
do in Zimbabwe just before the elections of 2013 and it was the time to pull out. Consequently, 
SADC was declaring that its facilitatory role in Zimbabwe was over soon after the election 
results had been announced. 
 
As captured in chapter 5, the external dimension of the conflict was not affected by the internal 
ripeness that obtained in Zimbabwe in 2008 because external players were not in a significant 
way affected by the negativities that were associated with the conditions creating that ripeness. 
Depending on how the ripeness was exploited in the resolution process, one hoped the 
opportunity created by the internal ripening of the conflict would extend to the external 
dimension during the lifespan of the GPA, but this was largely not the case. Evidence showed 
that there was minimal spillover of the notion of ripeness from the internal to the external 
dimension of the conflict during the period of the GPA as ZANU PF remained defiant against the 
West and most of the Western countries continued with their unilateral paths of pushing for the 
removal of ZANU PF from power and the stand-off continued unabated. Despite the opposition 
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later in the GPA acknowledging that sanctions were hurting Zimbabwe and to a lesser degree 
adding its voice to that of ZANU PF, SADC and the AU in calling for their removal, the West 
remained adamant, tying the removal of the sanctions to progress made in the GPA; especially 
on legal reforms, the constitution-making exercise and the implementation of the agreement, 
issues the opposition was pressing for as outstanding in the GPA suggesting a congruency of 
positions and strategies between the West and the opposition.   
6.4 The conflict in Zimbabwe after the expiry of the GPA in 2013 
The MDC T carried out its own parallel vote counting in the 2013 elections and as soon as it 
emerged that ZANU PF was heading for a landslide victory, former Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai began to shuttle between Western embassies in Zimbabwe seeking direction on how 
to proceed, culminating in the press statement of 1 August 2013 in which he dismissed the 
elections as a “huge farce” (Chigubhu, 2013). Earlier the same day, the Zimbabwe Election 
Support Network (ZESN), a USAID/IRI sponsored organisation which prior to the elections had 
received $4 million from the Fishmonger group85 and a further $3 million together with Crisis in 
Zimbabwe Coalition and the Election Resource Centre (ERC) from USAID for monitoring the 
elections also condemned the elections as farcical (Chigubhu, 2013). Soon after the 
announcement of the election results, Morgan Tsvangirai and some of his party’s leadership held 
another press conference in which he dismissed the elections as fraudulent and deeply flawed. 
“The fraudulent and stolen election has plunged Zimbabwe into a constitutional, political and 
economic crisis. Instead of celebration, there is national mourning,” said Tsvangirai (Smith, 
2013). He added that the MDC would boycott Government institutions and “pursue peaceful, 
legal, political, constitutional and diplomatic remedies”, including in the courts and called upon 
the African and regional bodies to meet as a matter of urgency “to restore legitimacy in 
Zimbabwe” by demanding a fresh election (Smith, ibid). ZANU PF dared the MDC to challenge 
the result in court. Asked about the lack of popular revolt, Tsvangirai replied:  
Why should there be? Our people are disciplined. You don’t solve problems by creating 
violence. In fact, we are at this stage because of the discipline of our people. If it was any 
other country, they would burn down the building (ZEC offices). They have not chosen 
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to do that because they know at the end of the day we don’t want any violent resolution 
of this crisis (Smith, ibid). 
 
Soon after the election, the outspoken Lindiwe Zulu who had been critical of ZANU PF 
especially on the implementation of the GPA and in particular over the election dates said:  
I stand guided by SADC’s position that these elections were free, fair and credible. Also 
as a person who was part of the process going to the elections, I can also say the elections 
were free and fair … Obviously, I think for them to have won the election they did the 
right things that led the people to express their will. I say congratulations to them and I 
wish them well in Government … I think now Zimbabwe should come first ahead of 
anything else. To those that lost the elections, I urge them now to look ahead and do what 
is best for their country and wait for the next elections. It may be difficult to accept the 
results, but the will of the people of Zimbabwe should exceed anything else (Zulu, 2013).  
The researcher did a document analysis of both the SEOM and AUEOM 2013 election reports. 
The following lengthy quotation from the SEOM showed SADC’s official disposition on the 
elections and the conflict after the election outcome:  
In the main, the electoral process was characterised by an atmosphere of peace and 
political tolerance. Political parties and candidates were able to freely undertake their 
political activities unhindered. SEOM wishes to take this opportunity to congratulate the 
people of Zimbabwe for turning up in large numbers to exercise their democratic right to 
choose their political leaders. A new chapter in the process of consolidation of democracy 
in the Republic of Zimbabwe has been opened and we hope that the people of Zimbabwe 
will work together to build their country. This is a major step in the implementation of 
the GPA and I therefore would like to take this opportunity to urge the political 
leadership and all the people of Zimbabwe to uphold peace and stability. SEOM wishes 
to implore all Zimbabweans to exercise restraint, patience and calm. The future of your 
country is in your hands. More importantly, SEOM would like to call on all political 
parties to respect and accept the election results as will be announced by the 
constitutionally mandated Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). Whoever is 
aggrieved with the results, should not resort to violence, but rather should go to the court 
of law, or engage in dialogue … (Membe, 2013). 
Although describing the elections as free and peaceful, SEOM in its preliminary report avoided 
using the word fair to describe the conduct of the elections citing the failure to release the 
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electronic voters’ roll as required by the law governing elections in Zimbabwe as well as the 
logistical challenges that the ZEC had faced in conducting the elections.  
 
Tsvangirai however worked with Western envoys to persuade AUEOM and SEOM heads, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo and Deputy Minister Bernard Membe respectively to rubbish the 
elections but the two refused leading the former to say to AUEOM members: “we are in trouble 
now; they are forcing me to do what they want. The elections were free and fair, they are 
pressing me to beat ZANU PF. I am not a voter, people voted” (Chigubhu, 2013). The AUEOM, 
while noting irregularities that included the failure to avail the electronic voters’ roll for 
inspection, large numbers of assisted voters and the problems encountered in the special voting 
exercise, concluded that the elections had been professionally and successfully conducted and 
were generally a great improvement from the previous polls (AUEOM Report, 2014). After 
highlighting the efforts that had been done to improve the electoral environment since 2005, the 
report also noted that the environment before, during and after the elections had been marked by 
tranquility. The AU’s 15 member Peace and Security Council (PSC) called for the ‘immediate 
and unconditional’ removal of all sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe: “In the case of Zimbabwe, 
Council further called for the immediate and unconditional lifting of all sanctions imposed on the 
country” adding that the lifting would “contribute to socio-economic recovery for the benefit of 
the long suffering population of the country” (PSC Resolution, 2013). 
Contrary to the reports by the AUEOM and the SEOM that had observers and monitors on the 
ground, Western countries that had been denied the opportunity to deploy observers as usual 
followed the MDC T example and dismissed the election as a farce citing the irregularities that 
these bodies had cited. The British Foreign Secretary William Hague, American Secretary of 
state John Kerry, Australian foreign Minister Bob Carr, the EU Foreign Policy chief, Catherine 
Ashton, the Botswana government and the MDC T issued statements on 3 August 2013 
condemning the elections, calling for a re-run and the inclusion of the elections on the next 
SADC summit agenda. US Secretary of State John Kerry was of the view that Zimbabwe’s 
elections were ‘deeply flawed’ saying: 
In light of substantial electoral irregularities reported by domestic and regional observers, 
the United States does not believe that the results announced today represent a credible 
expression of the will of the Zimbabwean people. Though the United States was 
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restricted from monitoring these elections, the balance of evidence indicates that today’s 
announcement was the culmination of a deeply flawed process (Kerry, 2013).  
The UK Foreign Secretary William Hague talked of ‘grave concerns’ over how the Zimbabwean 
election was conducted. In a statement released by the Foreign Office, Hague commented:  
People around the world are watching events in Zimbabwe, following the announcement 
by the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission that President Mugabe has won the 
presidential elections, as well as the indications of possible legal challenges. I commend 
the people of Zimbabwe on holding peaceful elections. However we have grave concerns 
over the conduct of the election. The preliminary statements of the AU and SADC 
observation missions, and those of the domestic observer groups, have outlined many of 
these significant concerns, and I hope that their final assessments of the elections will 
take into account the full impact of these irregularities on the outcome (Hague, 2013). 
The then UK ambassador, Deborah Bronnert, also told Sky News on the same day that the UK 
Foreign Office had released a statement condemning the election saying that in an unnamed 
constituency, 10,000 voters out of 17,000 had been assisted, adding: “That means somebody else 
went in with them into the voting booth raising some big questions around the secrecy and 
security of the vote” (Bronnert, 2013). Challenged later by Zimbabwean media, she failed to 
name the constituency. The same claim was repeated by MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai in an 
affidavit filed with the Constitutional Court challenging the election results but like Ambassador 
Bronnert, did not name the constituency where this took place, drawing fire from President 
Robert Mugabe in his replying affidavit in which he accused the opposition leader of “bringing 
before the court an unsworn founding affidavit to parrot a false British claim without a factual 
basis” (GoZ, 2013).  
The Financial Times however wrote about the outcome of the 2013 elections summarising the 
reality that had dawned to the world:  
Unpalatable though it is, President Mugabe has emerged from his country’s recent 
election with more than his domestic power consolidated and the opposition in disarray. 
He has been welcomed back into the African fold by the very leaders the West had been 
hoping would denounce the conduct of July’s election – Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s 
President, and General Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former President and head of  the 
African group of observers … As the prime mover in a strategy that has failed to deliver 
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after a decade of trying, Britain should take the lead in an effort to break the deadlock and 
recover its influence in a country at the strategic heart of southern Africa (Holman, 2013). 
Commenting on the continuing Western sanctions after the 2013 elections in a speech at the UN 
General Assembly, President Robert Mugabe said:  
If these sanctions were imposed to effect illegal regime change, well, the results of the 
recent national elections have clearly shown what they can do. Moreover, these illegal 
sanctions continue to inflict economic deprivation and human suffering on all 
Zimbabweans … Our small and peaceful country is threatened daily by covetous and 
bigoted big powers whose hunger for domination of other nations and their resources has 
no bounds … Shame, shame, shame to the United States of America. Shame, shame, 
shame to Britain and its allies. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans, so are its resources, please 
remove your illegal and filthy sanctions (Mugabe, 2013). 
Former President Thabo Mbeki was not impressed by the West’s insistence that there were 
problems with the elections in Zimbabwe and said: “We have a common responsibility as 
Africans to determine our destiny and are quite ready to stand up against anybody else who 
thinks that never mind what the thousand African observers say about elections in Zimbabwe, we 
sitting here in Washington and London are wiser than they are” (Mbeki, UNISA Speech, 2013). 
The former President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, also added his voice in condemning Western 
governments on their stance on Zimbabwe saying: “The exploiters are now very hard on 
Zimbabwe because of the immense resources your country has … Lets continue fighting for our 
interests in Africa” (Mutiga, 2013).  
Speaking in a ZANU PF Politburo meeting, in his first public address after being declared 
winner of the 2013 elections, President Mugabe said: “We are very happy that we dealt the 
enemy a blow, and the enemy is not Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai is a mere part of the enemy. The 
enemy is he who is behind Tsvangirai. Who is behind Tsvangirai? The British and their allies 
(sic). Those are the ones who were the real enemies” (Reuters, 2013). Commenting on the 
opposition performance in the elections two weeks later, President Mugabe said:  
You are better off working with a ignorant person who is aware of his ignorance …But if 
you are ignorant of your ignorance, it is a challenge … people voted for them in 2008, 
not knowing that such level of ignorance cannot run this country. But today, people have 
realised that they (MDC T) do not have life and direction and voted for ZANU PF. 
During the Inclusive Government, it required a lot of patience to work with them. We had 
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very diverse views and it was difficult to negotiate with them because they are very 
ignorant (Mugabe, 2013). 
 
Addressing thousands of people that came to witness his inauguration at the National Sports 
Stadium, President Mugabe was however full of praise for his GPA partners reserving harsh 
words for the Anglo-Saxon bloc saying: 
I want to pay tribute to my partners in the GPA for joining hands in these peace-building 
efforts. Equally I salute church and community leaders who prayed for it … Except for a 
few Western dishonest countries, our elections have been hailed as peaceful, free, fair and 
credible. SADC, COMESA, The African Union, the ACP, the United Nations as well as 
many nations of goodwill have praised our elections here. We welcome this positive 
spirit, this encouragement which will see us do even better, move faster as a nation … 
having struggled for our independence, our fate has irrevocably orbited out of colonial 
relations, indeed can no longer subsist in curtsying and bowing to any foreign 
government, however powerful it feigns itself to be and what ever filthy lucre it flaunts 
… Today it is Britain, and her dominions of Australia and Canada who dare tell us our 
elections were not fair and credible. Today it is America and her illegal sanctions which 
dare raise a censorious voice over our affairs. Yes, today it is these Anglo-Saxons who 
dare contradict Africa’s verdict over an election in Zimbabwe, an African country. Who 
are they, we ask? Who gave (them) the gift of seeing better than all of us? (Mugabe, 
2013). 
Soon after the 2013 elections, the MDC T were suggesting that there be another form of 
Inclusive Government by calling for the inclusion of some of its members in Cabinet but 
President Mugabe dismissed the idea saying not only had the opposition refused to concede 
defeat but ZANU PF had won a majority and as such had a mandate to form cabinet on its own. 
At a function to celebrate his party’s victory President Mugabe said: 
Are you saying when a party wins, it must necessarily have members of the opposition 
included in Cabinet? That is a matter that should be discussed between the parties. You 
must agree. When we had the results of the elections, the MDC T started saying it does 
not recognise the elections. It does not recognise even the President and as far as they are 
concerned, the elections were rigged. And once you have an opposition with that attitude, 
what do you do? (Mugabe, 2013). 
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Although the opposition and Western governments rubbished the 2013 elections, it was evident 
even amongst some opposition members that the electorate in Zimbabwe had voted for ZANU 
PF. Eddie Cross, a senior MDC T official reviewed the performance of his party in the Inclusive 
Government and the elections saying: 
We left parliament two months ago – then holding a majority in the Lower House, have 
come back as the opposition with 72 seats in a House of 270 Members. Unable to block 
legislation, … After 13 years of struggle, five elections and four years in the Government 
of National Unity, we are no further forward than we were in 2000, in fact we are further 
back than we were then (Cross, 2013). 
Roy Bennett was even more direct, accusing Morgan Tsvangirai of failed leadership that had led 
to the dismal performance by the MDC T in the elections (Munyukwe, 2014). Munyaradzi 
Gwisai, a former MDC member of parliament, wrote an article soon after the elections in which 
he accused the MDC T of: saving ZANU PF by providing it with legitimacy soon after the 
indecisive elections of 2008 through the GPA; ignoring the electorate throughout the period of 
the Inclusive Government whilst ZANU PF was busy strengthening its party structures; 
imposing candidates whilst ZANU PF held the most democratic primary elections ever to choose 
its candidates; adopting a neo-liberal offensive strategy to turn around the economy based on the 
concept of “We eat what we kill”86 which brought austerity measures that alienated it from the 
populace; watched as ZANU PF managed to use the GPA period to re-position the party around 
land, indigenisation, economic empowerment and African nationalism whilst it had no known 
pro-poor ideology and strategy; and, doing nothing to counter ZANU PF populist programmes 
just before the elections that were aimed at recovering popularity amongst the poor (Gwisai, 
2013). He concluded that the MDC T had been beaten fair and square because “Ma Chefu e 
MDC akarara pabasa achinakirwa ne tea ku State House (MDC bosses slept on duty enjoying 
tea at State House)” (Gwisai, 2013). Tendi (2013) was of the view that the MDC T was very 
much aware it had beaten fairly in the elections and its condemnation of the election was only a 
way of managing its disillusioned supporters and its external allies87. Welshman Ncube, who was 
now the president of the smaller MDC faction said the opposition had failed to make any 
                                                    
86
 A statement made by Tendai Biti as Finance Minister arguing for austerity measures. 
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 See also M. Tendi (2013) Why Robert Mugabe scored a landslide victory in Zimbabwean elections, The 
Guardian, 5 August 2013, K. Chitiyo (2013) Inconvenient truth about the elections, NewZimbabwe.com, 7 August 
2013, A. Shand, (2013) Inconvenient truths in Africa, adamsh.wordpress.com/2013/08/18/inconvenient-truths-in-
africa/, J. Mapaura Tsvangirai took electorate for granted of 8 August 2913. 
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headway in Zimbabwe because it had wrongly focused on removing President Robert Mugabe 
from power saying: “This ‘Mugabe must go’ mantra has become a convenient shield behind 
which we cynically deceive people. We (opposition) must change the way we do business of 
politics” (Ndlovu, 2014). 
A document analysis of the application by Morgan Tsvangirai to the Constitutional Court 
seeking the nullification or setting aside of the results of the 2013 elections and President 
Mugabe’s responses to it revealed more on the after election contest. The application cited 
President Robert Mugabe as the first respondent, the ZEC as the second respondent, the ZEC 
chair as the third respondent and the chief electoral officer as the fourth respondent. The petition 
challenged the results on the following grounds: that the proclamation of the election date had 
been done without consultation as required by the GPA; the closure of the registration exercise 
had disenfranchised 750 000 potential voters; there had been a failure to avail an electronic copy 
of the voters roll to the participating parties; the voters roll had 870 000 names in duplicate; the 
special voting system and the postal vote had been abused; that although there was no overt 
physical violence, the election had been characterised by psychological violence carried over 
from the 2008 violence; that up to 750 000 voters had been turned away at the polling station for 
various reasons; that there had been rampant and illegal use of voting slips that had names that 
were not appearing on the voters roll; ZEC had printed 35 percent more voting slips compared to 
five percent internationally acceptable; that ZANU PF had been involved in vote buying; and 
that, the media had been biased towards ZANU PF (Tsvangirai Presidential Petition, 2013).  
ZEC’s opposing affidavit provided the following counter-arguments: that ZEC had acted as an 
independent commission in accordance with the laws of Zimbabwe and not as a ZANU PF 
agent; Morgan Tsvangirai had not advanced any grounds to support his allegations; the 
proclamation of the election date had been done in line with directives of the Constitutional 
Court; ZEC had been in constant consultations with all political parties including Morgan 
Tsvangirai and at no time before the announcement of the results had he indicated that the 
measures being taken by ZEC were flawed; that ZEC was prohibited to open ballot papers as 
demanded by Morgan Tsvangirai without a court order; that the 30 day registration period had 
run its course as required by the law and that the Registrar General had increased the registration 
time; that a full explanation on the failure to avail the electronic voters roll in time had been 
settled in a preceding electoral court; that Morgan Tsvangirai had failed to demonstrate how the 
disenfranchised voters could have affected the result outcome given that there was no proof these 
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could have voted for him alone; that the special vote numbering 600 000 and postal votes only 
92 could not have affected the election result given that President Mugabe won the poll by more 
than one million votes; that assisted voting had been done to help those that needed it in 
accordance with the law; the printing of 35 percent extra ballots was to ensure adequate voting 
material in view of the logistical constraints ZEC would face if they were inadequate; and that, 
ZEC had received only one complaint against the media from Morgan Tsvangirai which it had 
proceeded to rectify (AUEOM Report, 2013).  
Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew his petition on 16 August, 2013 citing the non-availability of 
election material after failing to secure a court order to compel ZEC to avail them as required by 
the law (AUEOM, 2013). The Constitutional Court however proceeded to preside over the case 
as required by the law and dismissed it on the following grounds: that an election petition 
challenging a presidential election was unique in that it could not be terminated by a withdrawal 
in terms of section 93 of the new Constitution; Zimbabwe’s 31 July Harmonised Elections were 
held in accordance with the laws of Zimbabwe, in particular the new Constitution and the 
Electoral Act Chapter 2: 13; the election was free, fair and credible and the result a true 
reflection of the will of the people of Zimbabwe; and that, Robert Gabriel Mugabe was a duly 
elected President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and declared winner of the 2013 elections 
(AUEOM, 2013). 
Although both the SEOM and AUEOM had noted irregularities which are a common feature of 
elections held in most countries, especially in Africa, they were both agreed that the elections 
had been a great improvement from the way elections had been conducted before 2013. The 
behaviour by ambassadors of Western countries of attending a press conference convened by one 
party in the election, and their issuing of statements making demands similar to those of the 
MDC T exposed their bias and unwavering support to the opposition. The desire by Western 
envoys to influence election outcomes in African countries was exposed in Kenya when Luis 
Moremo Ocampo, the former International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor who initiated the 
cases against President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto, commented about the 
two’s prosecution: “There were some (Western) diplomats asking me to do something more to 
prevent Kenyatta or Ruto from running in the elections. And I said it’s not my job. Judges in 
Kenya should do that … And if people vote for them, we have nothing to say” (Kabukuru, 2014).  
Western diplomats had sought to use the ICC to bar some Kenyans accused of human rights 
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violations from participating in an election in their country, a revelation that said a lot on the 
negative side about the actions of Western diplomats in African politics.  
 
The 2013 elections in Zimbabwe were by far better than the elections that were held in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and several African states that were characterised by widespread violence and 
intimidation but were however accepted by the same Western countries suggesting that in 
Zimbabwe, an election outcome would be acceptable to these governments and the MDC T only 
if it heralded the removal of ZANU PF from power (Mutambara, Interview, 2013, Apr. 22, 
Mbeki UNISA Lecture, 2013), the unilateral positions of these Western countries and the 
opposition in the conflict since 2000. Unlike the previous elections that had provided the 
opposition with grounds for challenging the election results, the people of Zimbabwe expressed 
their will in the 2013 elections in a peaceful and more conducive environment and condemnation 
of the election demonstrated a lack of respect for the internal political processes88. A South 
African ANC Member of Parliament, Pathekile Holomisa (2013) wrote in his personal capacity 
commenting on the outcome of the election in an article titled: Why Mugabe is a true African 
hero in which he said:  
Yet, since 1980, the year of independence, in election after election, Zimbabweans vote 
(President Robert) Mugabe back into power. He is 89 years old and many people have 
suffered under his rule. The question that needs to be answered is why Zimbabweans 
continue to want him to rule. Put aside the talk of the fear of the brutality of security 
forces and the rigging of elections – the members of the security forces are citizens of the 
country and are not immune to the deprivations occasioned by the state of the economy 
… The anti-colonial and liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, as in other countries, were 
waged in order to recover land and the natural resources which had been stolen by 
colonial settlers … The attainment of freedom without the restoration of land and natural 
resources is not enough. Any liberation movement that decides to rest on its laurels 
before the achievement of the second goal of the struggle betrays the spirit of its founders 
(Holomisa, 2013). 
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 Jonathan Moyo in an address to journalists as Minister of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services at 
the Bulawayo Press Club on 6 March 2013 said the election mood in 2013 had resembled that which prevailed in the 
1980 elections that brought majority rule and said following the over two thirds majority win by ZANU PF, it was 
now time for the nation and the media to forget politics of self preservation that had prevailed since 2000 and move 
on to reengage in a manner that would foster unity and development for the country. 
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The post-election period was characterised by a peaceful environment although intra-party 
problems began to surface both in ZANU PF and the MDC T suggesting the conflict had 
somehow been transformed from an inter-party confrontation to intra-party squabbles (Zengeni, 
2014, Jan, 4). In the aftermath of the 2013 elections, the MDC T began to implode as some 
members of the opposition led by Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma challenged Tsvangirai 
demanding his resignation or expulsion from the party for failing to remove President Robert 
Mugabe from power since 2000 and accusing him of having a poor sense of judgement, lack of 
good leadership qualities, a soiled personal reputation from his womanising, abuse of party 
funds, dictatorial tendencies and fanning divisions and violence in the MDC T party (Zimbabwe 
Mail, 2014). The disgruntled MDC T members began to demand leadership renewal which 
eventually saw the MDC T experiencing a second split in 2014. Tendai Biti as Secretary General 
of the MDC T had, in the wake of the fallout with Morgan Tsvangirai, admitted at a SAPES 
Trust policy dialogue that MDC T had been beaten fairly by ZANU PF attributing the 
opposition’s poor showing in the elections to its manifesto that lacked realism as compared to the 
ZANU PF manifesto that he said was based on tangible promises. He was quoted by the usually 
pro-opposition Zimbabwe’s Daily News saying: 
ZANU PF in the last election had a very simple message, bhora mugedhi (Score the ball 
meaning vote for ZANU PF). Even a little woman in Chendambuya or Dotito just knew 
one thing, bhora mugedhi. Perhaps we were too sophisticated, but what was our message 
because the message of change of 2000 is not the message for now. We were selling 
hopes and dreams when ZANU PF was selling practical realities. We (ZANU PF) are 
going to give you a farm, it’s there. We are going to give you $5 000 through (Youth and 
Indigenisation Minister, Saviour) Kasukuwere’s ministry, (it’s there) (Mbiba, 2014). 
Tendai Biti said these comments after falling out with Tsvangirai contradicting his earlier claims 
that the elections had been rigged by ZANU PF when he was still the MDC T secretary general  
exposing the double standards that often charaterised opposition politics throughout the period of 
the conflict.  
It was the same thing with winners in the election as the unity that characterised ZANU PF 
before and during the 2013 elections soon disappeared as the succession issue came back to 
haunt it. The party began to experience serious factionalism around the potential candidates 
likely to succeed President Mugabe (former Vice President Joice Teurai Ropa Mujuru and the 
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then Justice Minister, Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa) as the competing camps sought to 
position themselves favourably for the eventual takeover of power in a post-Robert Mugabe era 
at the expense of delivering in Government. As things turned out, Joice Mujuru was accused of 
plotting to topple President Mugabe and was replaced by Emmerson Mnangagwa as vice 
president towards the end of 2013 in a move seen as seeking to consolidate President Mugabe’s 
hold on power. It remained to be seen if President Robert Mugabe would manage the upheavals 
in the liberation party by finding a way of dealing with the potentially explosive succession 
politics and keep ZANU PF intact including after his departure from the political scene.  
Another challenge which ZANU PF faced in the aftermath of the elections was how to revive the 
struggling economy in the face of persisting hostilities from most Western capitals, in particular 
Britain and America and the rampant corruption that had been left unattended during the period 
of the Inclusive Government for political expediency. As noted earlier, Zimbabwe’s economy 
remained in a fragile state, with an unsustainably high external debt, massive de-industrialisation 
and informalisation in which the average GDP growth rate of 7.5% during the economic rebound 
of 2009-12 moderated due to liquidity challenges, outdated technologies, structural bottlenecks 
that included power shortages and infrastructure deficits, corruption and a volatile and fragile 
global financial environment (Monyau & Bandara, 2014). The ICG argued that the economic 
decline was caused by ZANU PF’s lack of policy clarity on the economy that was resulting in 
low investor confidence and a weak buying power within the citizenry (ICG, 2014). Although 
ZANU PF had made contradictory statements towards the end of the Inclusive Government with 
some ministers suggesting that the indigenisation policy needed to be moderated, President 
Mugabe remained resolute and committed to it. The issue of policy clarity was therefore out of 
the question since ZANU PF’s main policy that underpinned its campaign messaging was 
indigenisation and empowerment (ZANU PF Election Manifesto, 2013). It followed this up soon 
after winning the election and forming a Government with a blueprint, the Zimbabwe Agenda for 
Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation [October 2013 – December 2018] (Zim Asset) 
(Zim Asset, 2013). The policy document showed policy clarity and the ZANU PF failure to 
effectively turn around the economy was more to do with lack of funding for the proposed 
economic agenda. This was the reason why President Mugabe went to China in 2014 seeking 
Chinese a financial intervention to the tune of $4 billion to set Zim Asset in motion and signed 
nine deals covering infrastructure development and the propping up of the economy (Chinamasa, 
2014).  
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The economy however remained as a major problem for ZANU PF as it remained under siege 
from Western countries that were not happy with ZANU PF policies and its continued hold onto 
power, a factor which when coupled with Zimbabwe’s lack of monetary control after the 
dollarisation of 2009, limited the country’s ability to wriggle out of the malaise in the short term. 
Further, the indigenisation and empowerment policy which sought to empower the formerly 
marginalised blacks became a major threat to investment inflows given the competition created 
by the disposition of other African countries in need of the same but offering more attractive 
options because few of these countries seem to be bothered by the idea of safeguarding their own 
interests in the agreements against foreign exploitation. Charamba (Interview, 2013, Jun. 3) said 
a USA embassy official revealed in a meeting that in one southern African country that was 
competing for investment with Zimbabwe, the American delegation had to bring in its on 
attorneys to assist the country with its legal requirement in the business negotiations, adding that, 
this has been a perennial weakness of Africa governments of continuing to agree to deals that 
continue to favour foreigners well after the attainment of independence.  
The other factor that was holding the economy back had to do with corruption. Towards the end 
of 2013 and soon after the swearing in of a ZANU PF Government, Jonathan Moyo, as Minister 
of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services exposed the rot that was prevailing at the 
national broadcaster and thereafter media in Zimbabwe was reporting rampant corruption in 
state-owned and private companies in which top management were conniving with boards to 
award themselves excessively huge amounts in salaries and perks (ZimEye, 2013). One Chief 
Executive Officer of a company that started as a Government medical aid society for civil 
servants was earning as much as $230 000 per month at a time when the lowest paid civil servant 
making contributions to that Society’s fund was earning less than $300 per month (ZimEye, 
ibid). Despite the discovery during the period of the Inclusive Government that these often pro-
ZANU PF officials were corruptly awarding themselves hefty salaries that were unsustainable 
even in developed countries, nothing was done to address the anomalies for fear of 
compromising political support for the liberation party during the GPA. What ZANU PF will do 
to get the economy rolling again, dealing with corruption and the succession issue will determine 
whether it will remain a popular party in future elections and this greatly hinges on whether, as it 
continues to pursue its policies that seek to indigenise the economy, it will secure alternative 
funding to get its economic programmes running in the face of its continuing standoff with most 
of the Western countries.  
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For the opposition in the aftermath of the 2013 elections, Morgan Tsvangirai spoke in July 2014 
at a meeting organised by Chatham House on ‘the role of opposition politics in Zimbabwe’ given 
the threat of disintegration that was facing his party following a heavy defeat to ZANU PF in the 
2013 elections, at which he gave credence to the argument that his party gets leverage from 
Western countries. Repeating his claim that President Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF were 
suffering from a legitimacy crisis deriving from a stolen election, Tsvangirai once more called 
for an internationally-brokered national dialogue to rescue Zimbabwe from its economic crisis 
(Tsvangirai, 2013). Tsvangirai gave a clue that the MDC T strategy of seeking to push for 
reforms and concessions that would get it closer to political power had not changed from its 
position before and during the GPA when he said an internationally led process of compromise 
and reform was possible in Zimbabwe but called for re-engagement with the international 
community based on ZANU PF meeting conditions that would be judged by Western countries. 
His arguments reinforced ZANU PF’s claim that the opposition thrived on external interference 
by foreign powers in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs. Tsvangirai identified the link between the 
local and external dimensions of the conflict in Zimbabwe saying: 
Put simply, the domestic solution is unconditional dialogue by a broad section of 
Zimbabweans to unpack the crisis and chart the way forward. The current national reality 
is that we are isolated from meaningful investment capital flow and substantial 
development financial assistance ... We have had a myopic foreign policy that overlooks 
the significance of the broader international community, thereby underplaying the 
potential of leveraging international relationships in a broad sense. I am aware that the 
EU has decided to re-engage Zimbabwe and I know that the people of Zimbabwe stand to 
benefit from any form of engagement. But the international community must not just re-
engage without a framework; but must insist on implementation of agreed electoral 
conditions and the embracing of universally acceptable standards by the authorities in 
Harare (Tsvangirai, 2013).  
Tsvangirai said he did not encourage a mere removal of sanctions without a framework that 
compels Harare to respect full democratic values, respect and implement the national 
Constitution and the respect of the rule of law. He said: “Any re-engagement must be 
accompanied by a stubborn insistence by the international community on the universally 
accepted standards that ensure the guarantee of full freedoms and the enfranchising of the 
ordinary citizen” (Tsvangirai, 2013).  
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Judging by Tsvangirai’s response to the elections of 2013 in particular and the previous ones 
since 2000, the full democracy that he called for was nothing short of the MDC T’s full take-over 
of political power in Zimbabwe89. This stance gave credence to the claims that the opposition 
was working in cahoots with foreign powers to attain regime change in Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai’s 
statements also revealed that he had realised that the split of the conflict into two that was 
brought about by the ripening of the internal dimension of the conflict leaving the international 
dimension intact and the subsequent ring-fencing of the internal resolution effort from Western 
demands through SADC mediation left his party weaker.  
If the West is not going to have its way in Zimbabwe through an opposition take-over of power 
and given the divisions that were beginning to show amongst the Western countries towards the 
end of 2013 on how to handle Zimbabwe, and assuming ZANU PF avoids an implosion due to 
the succession issue, the future of any Zimbabwean reengagement with the West has to revolve 
around ZANU PF, a position that was acknowledged by the 2013 Chatham House report. The 
Herald columnist Nathaniel Manheru had this to say about the conflict between Zimbabwe and 
Western countries after 2013:  
ZANU PF is on the cusp of winning the fight against the West, on the verge of 
successfully enforcing worldwide recognition of its dear bundle of principles. Blair, 
Brown, Cameron, Bush and Obama, all these know that to the southern tip of Africa is 
some little stubborn country ready and prepared to give up all welfare for an 
unconditional recognition of its principles, values and interests (Manheru, 2014).  
Manheru rued the fact that nearly a decade and half of potential economic development had been 
lost by Zimbabwe not through venality but as a result of its quest to press for a hallowed 
principle of self-determination. In his address to the Group of 77 + China in Bolivia in June 
2014, President Mugabe called on Western countries to review their positions on Zimbabwe and 
join him in re-establishing constructive relations (Sasa, 2014). 
The AU and SADC positions and actions after the ZANU PF electoral win in 2013 demonstrated 
that the bodies had been satisfied with the way the GPA had proceeded despite the shortcomings 
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 In an article published in the Daily News on 8 July 2014, Morgan Tsvangirai addressed a number of issues 
pertaining to allegations levelled against him of poor leadership and wayward behaviour with women but also 
revealed his reasons for joining the GPA as taking over power from President Robert Mugabe saying: “It appeared 
to me after 2008 that ZANU PF had begun to appreciate the overwhelming impact of illegitimacy on all sectors of 
the economy. We all thought Mugabe had come to desire a dignified exit … We were wrong”.  
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discussed earlier in this chapter. The MDC T sought to use a SADC summit that handed the 
regional body’s chairmanship to President Mugabe to re-introduce Zimbabwe as a continuing 
conflict and the regional bloc refused to accept the proposal. Tanki Motae, indicated that the 
regional bloc had done the best it could in the political conflict in Zimbabwe, that the GPA had 
been a great success and Zimbabwe was back in the fold, saying: 
In Zimbabwe, there were elections last year which everybody accepted and anything that 
remained after the Global Political Agreement, I think if you remember the provisions of 
the GPA, was that after the elections then the Government put in place will put internal 
systems and mechanisms to follow up on what was outstanding (Gumbo, 2014). 
The statement suggested that as far as SADC was concerned, the Zimbabwe issue was now water 
under the bridge. Zimbabwe took over the chairmanship under a theme that sought to drive the 
beneficiation and empowerment agenda at the regional level. The AU also offered President 
Robert Mugabe the Deputy Chairmanship of the continental bloc in 2014 and handed him its 
chairmanship in 2015 showing revived confidence on the African continent in President 
Mugabe’s leadership. Some of media outlets that had been targeting ZANU PF since the 
beginning of the conflict in Zimbabwe were closing shop including the Short Wave Radio in 
2014 after 13 years of beaming into the country (Southern Eye, 2014) leaving the Voice of 
America’s Studio 7 as the only remaining pirate radio station suggesting the reason d’être for its 
establishment had been eliminated by the outcome of the elections of 2013 having been in 
existence from the beginning of the conflict in 2000. 
The document analysis on Mbeki’s lecture at UNISA on Zimbabwe further revealed that he took 
the opportunity to articulate his inner feelings about how the conflict and the resolution process 
played out90. Mbeki began by explaining that he had failed to speak at the opening of the 
symposium because Zimbabweans had insisted that he should attend President Mugabe’s 
inauguration since it marked the end of the GPA and pointed out that there were certain things 
that worried him greatly about Zimbabwe and in particular singled out “the very intense and 
sustained campaign to discredit (the Zimbabwe 2013) elections before they took place” to which 
he said the reason was to create grounds for condemning the elections if Robert Mugabe and 
ZANU PF won and accept them as free and fair if the opposition won (Mbeki, 2013). Mbeki 
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 Thabo Mbeki’s views as expressed in this lecture are paraphrased at length since it is in this communication 
that his real position on Zimbabwe comes out vividly. 
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questioned why Africans including scholars were buying into this “narrative about ourselves told 
by other people” and recalled his 2001 Discussion Paper91 in which he proffered advice that the 
course ZANU PF was taking was not good for the country and admitted that the latter refused 
concluding that: “But fortunately the Zimbabweans didn’t listen, and went ahead (with land 
reform)” (Mbeki, 2013).  
The former president said he had read books on the land reform programme and indications were 
that the programme was a success and that huge numbers of Zimbabweans had benefited. He 
also pointed out that he was shocked to know that some people thought the opposition in 
Zimbabwe would win the 2013 elections, especially the rural vote, given the benefits ordinary 
people had derived from land reform. Noting that Zimbabwe is a very small country, he 
wondered why it was such a major issue for some countries and people with the New York 
Times, the UK Guardian among others always putting the country on the spotlight and 
concluded that the reason lay in what he was told by some Westerner about southern Africa who 
said to him: ‘You have too many whites in South Africa. We are concerned about their future. 
They are our kith and kin. We are worried about what you would do to them, so we keep a very 
close eye on what happens’ (Mbeki, ibid). Mbeki said the reason why there had been so much 
focus on Zimbabwe by Western countries was that the country was communicating a message 
which many among the powerful players in the world found unacceptable, especially on the 
question of land. Mbeki said the West was saying about land reform in Zimbabwe: ‘They have 
set a bad example which we don’t want anybody else in Africa and the rest of the world to 
follow, so they must pay a price for setting a bad example’ concluding that the example was bad 
for Western countries but not for Zimbabweans and challenged African scholars to tell the true 
story about it (Mbeki, ibid).  
Mbeki observed that although the AU and SADC had deployed in Zimbabwe the largest group of 
election observers ever and the two missions had said the election was peaceful and free 
promising to look at the finer details to pronounce themselves on the overall outlook, the West 
had seized on the deferment to pronounce fairness in the elections and declared that they were 
not credible. Mbeki also revealed that Western countries had offered to fund the SADC Lawyers 
Association election mission to Zimbabwe in a bid to influence its position on the elections. 
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 This was the first time that Mbeki made reference to the document in public given that that at the time he 
penned it was not for public consumption. 
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Questioning why the West always disregarded African viewpoints on issues in Africa, Mbeki 
concluded that the reason why those countries were saying the elections were not credible was 
because Robert Mugabe got elected (Mbeki, ibid). He was of the view that Zimbabwe was going 
to be in the Western governments’ sights for adopting indigenisation laws and wondered why 
Africans were being denied the right to protect their own resources. Whilst acknowledging that 
democracy and human rights had been trampled in the process, Mbeki concluded that those 
issues could not outweigh the achievements of empowering the indigenous people and pointed 
out that the onslaught by Western countries was not only directed on Zimbabwe but on the whole 
continent of Africa (Mbeki, 2013). This view put into context the attitude of Mbeki to the 
conflict and the resolution process in Zimbabwe, especially his disposition towards ZANU PF 
and the opposition.  
In view of the SADC efforts in Zimbabwe, it remains to be seen whether the conflict was fully 
resolved in an environment where the opposition was striving to re-invent itself and Britain and 
America remained committed to maintaining a hostile stance towards the ZANU PF 
Government. After the 2013 elections, the EU lifted all other sanctions in 2014 but at Britain’s 
insistence, left President Mugabe and his wife on the list. This prompted Jonathan Moyo, the 
Minister of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services to question the newly posted British 
Ambassador Catriona Laing how Britain hoped to re-engage Zimbabwe less its leader (The 
Herald, 2014). That move of leaving President Mugabe alone on the sanctions list indicated that 
for the EU, especially Britain, the issue was President Mugabe’s continued hold on power. The 
EU’s willingness to engage Zimbabwe and ease sanctions after the 2013 elections provided 
evidence that the SADC exploitation of the ripeness in the domestic dimension of the conflict 
had a minimal spill-over effect to the external dimension in the post-GPA era. Some European 
countries, especially those that had much to gain by way of openly trading with Zimbabwe as 
was the case with Belgium in the diamond sector, began to soften their stance towards Zimbabwe 
calling for re-engagement and the removal of sanctions suggesting some EU member states were 
getting tired of the continuing stand-off between their regional grouping and Zimbabwe. Britain 
and the USA, the most embittered of the external powers however remained unfazed and while 
the former failed to stop the EU from eventually easing sanctions after the 2013 elections, the 
USA unilaterally continued to tighten screws on ZANU PF saying nothing had changed in the 
country for the better (Zulu, 2014). Charamba (Interview, 2013, Jun. 3) was of the view that the 
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USA and Britain may be waiting for a post-Mugabe era to re-engage Zimbabwe positively as a 
face saver having failed to topple President Mugabe since 2000.  
For as long as the USA and Britain remain to be the leading countries shaping Western and the 
wider international geo-politics, the external ripeness of the conflict in Zimbabwe which should 
be signaled by all the Western countries involved in the conflict accepting to find common 
ground with ZANU PF, will only set in if the current and future government in Zimbabwe gives 
in and makes a serious policy shift from the current nationalist outlook to one that is more 
friendly to Western capitalism. Such a development seems highly unlikely given the 
empowerment benefits that are beginning to be enjoyed in Zimbabwe in the economy deriving 
mainly from the results of land reform. Whilst the USA embraced Germany and Japan following 
the allied victory in World War 2, history has shown that the West led by Britain and America 
does not forget nor forgive easily when it comes to hostilities inspired by ideological and 
economic differences. Without changing its current ZANU PF inspired anti-imperialist ideology, 
Zimbabwe is likely to continue to be marginalised and vilified the same way Russia, Korea, 
Cuba, Iran and Vietnam were treated by the USA and the West for decades following the advent 
of deep-seated ideological and policy differences with the latter in the post WW2 era. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the internal ripeness that set in 2008 after the elections 
deriving from the political stalemate and the threat of an economic collapse was not fully 
exploited by way of coming up with a GPA that ironed out major issues fully when ripeness was 
at its before the signing ceremony, putting in place well laid down time frames and a robust 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism. Once the parties agreed to some form of agreement that 
was offering a plausible short term solution, SADC was happy with a GPA that would be 
consummated during its life span. As soon as the stronger party, ZANU PF, began to enjoy a 
shared legitimacy with the opposition and the economy was showing signs of stabilisation, its 
commitment to the full implementation of the agreement began to decline culminating in the 
unilateral proclamation of an election date after the expiry of parliament in an environment 
where the opposition was at its weakest. The opposition also failed to fully fulfill its part of the 
bargain with regard to sanctions and the elimination of pirate radio stations. Issue indivisibility, 
time horizons, information and commitment problems were major issues in the GPA and over 
time came to affect ripeness in the resolution process. The external dimension of the conflict 
remained unabated as Western countries continued on their unilateral path of wanting to see 
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ZANU PF and President Mugabe out of power92. Unfortunately for the opposition MDC T, there 
were signals that Western governments were losing confidence in the former’s ability to really 
bring the change they desired, a development that could spell doom for the party that has over 
the years been propelled by outsiders. Time will also tell whether the Western countries will 
accept defeat over their interests and concerns in Zimbabwe or they will continue on a path of 
seeking the removal of ZANU PF from power.  
Despite its structural weaknesses, the GPA managed to abate a more serious crisis in the country 
though it bought time for ZANU PF to regain lost ground and re-establish itself as a dominant 
player in Zimbabwe’s political landscape. Although SADC achieved a lot in overseeing the 
process, more needs to be done by way of strengthening its conflict resolution mechanism 
especially in coming up with  protocols that grant it a collective ability to hold sway over 
domestic politics of member states facing conflict situations especially in monitoring and 
enforcement. The SADC experience in Zimbabwe however suggested that despite failing to 
stamp its authority fully, the aversion of a potentially explosive crisis in Zimbabwe laid a firm 
basis for improving the bloc’s architecture for peace and conflict resolution especially in the 
preventive doctrine.  
If ZANU PF fails to handle its succession politics as well as find a formula to recover the 
economy in the coming five years to the next elections in 2018, it risks losing the electorate once 
more as happened in 2008. A columnist writing in the The Zimbabwe Standard commented on 
the need for a clearly defined succession plan as a way of managing transition in Zimbabwe 
saying: “Firstly we need to have a clear succession plan. It’s never too late to develop one. The 
success and continuance of an entity rests largely (but not entirely) on the strength and clarity of 
its succession plan. Many leadership journals use this as one of the criteria of measuring the 
sustainability of any business. I have no doubt this applies to both our country and the political 
actors in it”93 (Bere, 2014). This argument was propelled by the reality that an implosion within 
                                                    
92
 The British Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Catriona Laing, said in an interview with the Herald on 25 October 
2014 Britain would only reengage Zimbabwe if the latter addressed hurdles to do with the rule of law, electoral 
reforms and commitment to human rights, the same factors that strained relations between Zimbabwe and Britain 
since 2000. 
93
 The article appears to have been inspired by the succession battles that were rocking ZANU PF in 2014 and 
the fact that despite President Robert Mugabe being in power for 34 years, there was by 2014 no known succession 
plan which the author felt was an important requirement to keep ZANU PF and the country stable and safeguard the 
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ZANU PF might have serious ramifications on the conflict in Zimbabwe given the liberation 
party’s enduring hold on power. On the other end, the opposition needs to reinvent itself if it is 
going to remain a relevant force in Zimbabwean politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
legacy of President Robert Mugabe, aspects that were under threat from the consequences of a possible split or at 
most an implosion within the ruling party. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
The research interrogated ripeness theory and the conflict in Zimbabwe with the main objective 
of establishing implications for the resolution process in the period 2000 and 2013. The study 
thus focused on establishing: the incompatibilities that were creating conflict, the nature of the 
conflict and its manifestation; an interrogation of the ripeness theory and its improvements; 
ripeness in the period 2000 to 2013, its nature and how it influenced the intervention and the 
substance of the proposals; effects of ripeness that obtained over time; and, its impact on the 
conflict in the period soon after the expiry of the GPA in 2013. The methodology used in the 
study of seeking to interrogate a theory formulated in one paradigm using an approach from 
another paradigm worked without bridging the ontological and epistemological differences 
between rationalism and interpretivism. Ripeness was found to have been absent in the period 
from 2000 to the elections of 2008, became present and reached its peak between the 
announcement of the indecisive and disputed election results of 2008 to the signing of the GPA, 
declined slightly after the signing of the GPA and slid further down with the swearing in of the 
inclusive government and had vanished by the time of the 2013 elections. The Zimbabwe case 
demonstrated that ripeness can yield from political and economic developments in addition to 
other causes including developments in the battlefield. Whilst earlier elections had been 
disputed, ripeness became apparent when indecisiveness became an issue. Although one could 
tell that the nature of ripeness is obtaining from a political stalemate and economic challenges, it 
was however difficult to assign a specific value to it at any one time though its increase, decrease 
and effects could be felt and as such determining how much it was going to impact on the 
resolution efforts was a matter of subjective judgement in an environment characterised by 
genius of the intervener, chance, probability and uncertainty similar to Clausewitz described the 
conduct of war. This chapter presents the conclusions of the study focusing on the major findings 
from the conflict and the resolution process, and their implications for theory.  
The period from 2000 to 2013 saw Zimbabwe experiencing a deep-seated and complex political 
conflict that on the HBP conflict cycle shown at Diagram 2 was at the crisis stage with sporadic 
use of violence becoming more pronounced around election periods suggesting further escalation 
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might have led to widespread violence possibly transiting to war. The economic environment 
was also a factor as it helped in the conflict creation whilst in return the economy itself suffered a 
debilitation that was being fed by the manifestation of the conflict. The conflict was created by 
both historical factors and contemporary issues generated by ideological differences between the 
leftist anti-imperialist ruling party and the opposition that adopted a liberal orientation and in the 
main aligned itself to the West. Other causes included: a failed reconciliation between the post-
independence black dispensation and the former white settlers; the failure to completely 
reconfigure the state both by way of jettisoning all the bad ways of the pre-independence era 
including some oppressive laws and the failure to significantly dismantle the skewed domination 
of the economy along racial lines in which blacks remained the underdogs more due to lack of 
enough and timeous domestic political will, constraints from the Lancaster House Constitution 
and the constraints imposed by structural deficiencies in the world order; policies that sought to 
redistribute resources to the formally marginalised blacks without the new dispensation taking 
full control of the economy; redistributive policies that were not accompanied by a matching 
growth of the national cake; the perpetuation of a skewed land tenure system that continued to 
favour whites for two decades into independence, implementation of a land reform programme in 
a set-up where there were disagreements; the enduring hold on political power by the ruling 
ZANU PF party; and, the rise of an opposition with sponsorship and support from Western 
countries.  The conflict included both an internal and external dimension in which players mainly 
at the level of political parties were in competition for political power - ZANU PF with a 
monopoly over the state apparatus against MDC formations working in cahoots with most civic 
society organisations and some Western governments. The conflict had racial connotations that 
drew from the country’s colonial past and the existing world structural deficiencies yet 
presenting itself mainly as a black against black struggle for power predominantly within the 
domestic setting. 
The conflict manifested in the form of: efforts to close the political space by the ruling party; 
vicious contests for political power pitting the ZANU PF party against MDC formations; the 
MDC aligning itself to Western countries and collaborating with them against ZANU PF; denial 
of legitimacy to ZANU PF by opposition challenges to every election outcome; disagreements 
over policies that included clashes over land ownership; litigations and counter-litigations; use of 
the state machinery by the ruling party in the furtherance of political interests; war of words both 
between the domestic players, and ZANU PF and Western Governments especially Britain, the 
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EU and the US; interference, sanctions and marginalisation against the Zimbabwean economy by 
Western governments at the instigation of the opposition and Britain; and at times, widespread 
violence perpetuated by the state as well as the political parties in a manner that collectively and 
cumulatively all negatively impacted on state security, human security and the economy, a 
situation that was by 2008 threatening the country with state failure.  
The SADC intervention of 2008, though fraught with difficulties managed to transform the 
conflict to a lesser degree of intensity assuming new levels of hostilities and tensions as the 
squabbling shifted from inter-party to intra-party levels with all the major parties after the 2013 
elections seized by succession problems more from the realisation by the opposition parties that 
in their form up to 2013, they had failed to change the political landscape since 2000 and the 
effects of the failure by ZANU PF to renew itself since 1980. The political outlook in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2013 elections that was characterised by reduced hostilities suggested 
conflict prevention had succeeded though complete resolution was still to come in the future. 
Democracy and good governance remained contested with ZANU PF arguing that these had 
been consolidated whilst the opposition said there were serious continuing deficiencies leaving 
open the possibilities of future political clashes centred around political succession, election 
processes, the role of the state machinery in party politics, interpretation and the application of 
the rule of law, control of the media, corruption and external interference including the 
remaining sanctions. Land reform which had been one of the major causes of the conflict and 
was accepted as irreversible in the resolution process left largely intact its conflictous by-
products including lack of a clearly defined new land tenure system, failure to put a cut-off date 
to the programme, non-compensation of white farmers, the fate of most of the former 
commercial farm workers that were left stranded on the farms all unresolved leaving it as a 
potential conflict area in the future.  
Although the GPA was the best that could be achieved in the circumstances demonstrating a 
timely exploitation of the window of opportunity presented by the internal ripeness that set in 
2008, its by-product - the Inclusive Government - had both positive and negative achievements. 
Overall, the creation of the Inclusive Government reduced hostilities, stabilised the economy, got 
the feuding parties to discover each other, superintended the constitution-making process and 
delivered an election in 2013, which despite the disagreements that were continuing, was by far 
better than the elections held since 2000. It however failed to spur full economic recovery since 
it imposed huge costs on the fiscus during its time and beyond, and its policies during the GPA 
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were mired by contradictions, disagreements and political grandstanding at the expense of good 
governance. The malfeasances and the costs associated with the GPA and the Inclusive 
Government were the price that Zimbabweans had to pay for peace if one considers that the 
alternative could easily have been a civil war, state failure or both.  
Although Western powers remained hostile to the continued hold on to power by ZANU PF, 
there was increasing realisation that there was need to accept the incumbency of the latter in 
Zimbabwean politics if these countries were to have any meaningful influence in the post-
Mugabe era and were increasingly showing signs of wanting to once more work with the ruling 
party or at least with some elements within it. Consequently, most Western governments started 
re-engaging ZANU PF and easing sanctions suggesting that although the external dimension of 
the conflict remained unripe for resolution for the greater part of the GPA, eventually there was a 
limited spill-over from the internal ripening after 2013. The removal of sanctions after 2013 with 
ZANU PF still in power also demonstrated that the use of sanctions in intra-state conflict 
situations does not always yield the desired results. While sanctions brought untold suffering to 
Zimbabweans, ZANU PF exploited them for its own political mileage by shifting blame 
elsewhere including for matters it was responsible for and in the long run came out victorious in 
its objective of alienating the opposition and ultimately retaining political power.  
Contrary to Kleiober’s (1994) reservations about the ripeness theory, the study established that 
ripeness is a fruitful notion though its degree and extent in any given setting depends on the 
conditions creating it. In her critique, Kleiober (1994) drew parallels between the ripening in a 
conflict to that of a fruit which when it starts progresses up to a stage when it has fully decayed 
leaving a seed that germinates when it gets an opportunity in the future and expected ripeness of 
conflicts to follow the analogy from its appearance in the conflict to exploitation for complete 
resolution. Empirical evidence however indicated that as suggested by Zartman (1985), ripeness 
only provides an opportunity for parties, on their own or with the help of third parties, to move 
from lose-win to seek win-win outcomes in a conflict when their unilateral positions have been 
blocked by developments that occur as a conflict unfolds. Whilst a fruit ripens until it is 
completely decayed, ripeness in a conflict can appear and last only as far as circumstances 
creating it and its environment remain unchanged otherwise its intensity can stay at the same 
level, decrease, increase, or even vanish over time. It was thus evident that the notion of ripeness 
is wider and deeper than the piecemeal approach resorted to by most scholars and its full 
conceptualisation benefits from incorporating all aspects that make parties opt for a negotiated 
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settlement as variables that can help in identifying and exploiting it in conflict situations. These 
variables most of which were shown in diagram 3 are both structural deriving from the structure 
of the conflict and the intervention process as well as perceptual emanating from the parties’ 
mental disposition, attitudes and expectations. The intensity of ripeness over time can thus be 
induced or diminished by the developments in the structure of the conflict as well as by the 
actions of outsiders including interveners. The exploitation of ripeness is further complicated by 
the fact that not all the variables need to be acting at the same time for ripeness to be said to be 
present requiring a deep understanding of the conflict and robust intelligence to discern the 
variables that will be affecting the conflict to help in good decision-making by the interveners.  
From 2000 until the opportunity that presented itself following the brutal attacks on opposition 
members at a Save Zimbabwe Campaign rally in March 2007, parties to the conflict, working 
with external powers of their choice, remained committed to their unilateral paths of wanting to 
monopolise political power in Zimbabwe. Efforts by outsiders between 2000 and 2007 including 
those by the then President Thabo Mbeki, the Commonwealth the UN and African leaders to 
help the parties to find each other yielded little or nothing at all suggesting the absence of 
ripeness. The developments that created ripeness in the conflict in Zimbabwe did not obtain from 
the battlefield as there was no armed confrontation, but from the political and economic crises 
that were at their peak in 2008 following the indecisive and disputed elections in 2008. The 
political crisis produced structural changes in the conflict when ZANU PF could not proceed to 
unilaterally form a government as it had done after the elections that took place before 2008 due 
to its political loss in the elections and a legitimacy crisis, and the opposition, without an outright 
win and hamstrung by a state security apparatus that was unsympathetic to its cause, could also 
not form a government all combining to produce a political stalemate. In this regard, Mbeki’s 
efforts that had failed to yield much since 2000 were then helped by a change in the structure of 
the conflict in 2008 that was followed by a change in perceptions by the parties leading to the 
GPA. The state of the economy which was in a comatose in 2008 as a direct consequence of the 
political conflict, external sanctions and marginalisation also helped to create a perception of 
ripeness as the domestic parties to the conflict were of the view that failure to find an urgent 
solution would lead to a backlash by the citizenry and possibly state failure.  
The conflict resolution efforts demonstrated that it paid to have Mbeki appointed formally as a 
third party to reach out to the parties well before the setting in of ripeness as this helped in 
widening communication channels and provided him with an opportunity to work towards 
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inducing ripeness. As observed by Stedman (1991), the disposition of the military or rather the 
state security apparatus as a whole is critical in shaping the perception of ripeness in the parties 
for that sector’s intransigent behavior for its own sake or in support of any of the parties can 
derail the whole process. Fortunately, for the conflict resolution in Zimbabwe after 2008, the 
state security apparatus, though opposed to an outright takeover of power by the opposition, 
placed faith in the leadership of President Mugabe and left him to climb down from his 
uncompromising position and thus helped in creating minimum conditions for an environment 
conducive to the positive exploitation of the opportunity that was presented by the setting in of 
ripeness. The only option was thus to agree to negotiations as a way out to which the AU 
resolution at Sharm El Sheik that called for a negotiated solution was timely.  
Although the domestic and international dimensions of the conflict had interacted in a way that 
presented the conflict as monolithic, the developments since 2008 clearly divided the conflict 
into two. The conditions that created ripeness in the conflict in Zimbabwe in 2008 were directly 
affecting the domestic parties and as a result the conflict experienced internal ripening leaving 
out the external dimension as evidenced by the continuing hostilities from Western countries and 
their refusal to remove sanctions despite the formation of the Inclusive Government in 2009. To 
the AU and SADC credit however,  they did not wait for a complete ripening of the conflict as 
they moved in through the latter using Thabo Mbeki who had leverage as the head of state of a 
country with a powerful economy in SADC and his credentials as a liberation fighter as a 
facilitator for dialogue. 
One of the major points raised against ripeness theory is that the notion can only be detected in 
retrospect (Kleiober, 1994). To the contrary however, the blocking effect of the parties’ 
unilateral paths by the political stalemate and the state of the economy were clear referent points 
that were observable before the intervention. The identification of the presence of ripeness in the 
conflict in Zimbabwe that had not yet become an armed confrontation firmly placed the theory 
within the conflict prevention discourse showing that instead of waiting for conflicts to escalate 
to higher levels of hostilities, third parties can scout for opportunities to intervene and assist in 
the quest to constructively resolve conflicts even in their early stages of development. The 
substance for resolution directly emerged from the conditions that had created the ripeness - 
seeking to find an interim solution to the political stalemate, stabilise and turn around the 
economy, put in place mechanisms to come up with a new constitution and create conditions for 
a credible election in the future. The SADC intervention shielded Zimbabwe from the pressure 
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that was coming from external players that wanted to use the conflict to press for their own 
interests giving credence to the idea that the parties better positioned to first intervene to resolve 
a conflict are regional players who usually have a clearer understanding of the issues at stake 
because of their closeness to the conflict. The action by the UN of not pressing for direct 
involvement leaving the AU and SADC to deal with the situation, a stance that was also 
replicated by the AU when it handed over the problem to SADC reinforced this view. 
The SADC intervention was fraught with problems emanating from the institutional weaknesses 
of a community that is still emerging and thus still establishing the norms and mechanisms to 
effectively deal with conflict and the fact that membership to the organisation was voluntary in 
an environment where sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states 
were principles that remained deeply entrenched. Consequently, the SADC intervention was at 
most hinged on balancing between principled negotiation and pragmatism by setting parameters 
that ignored past injustices whilst relying on nudging, encouragement, peer pressure and parties’ 
voluntary conformity to address the immediate problems in the conflict. Although SADC 
achieved a lot in overseeing the process, more needs to be done by way of strengthening its 
conflict resolution mechanism especially in coming up with  protocols that grant it a collective 
ability to hold sway over domestic politics of member states facing conflict situations especially 
in monitoring and enforcement. JOMIC which had been created to monitor the agreement 
implementation and resolve disputes had institutional weaknesses as it relied on members of the 
warring political parties to be umpires. The GPA thus became more of a self-propelling entity 
and worked more from the desire by ZANU PF to be cushioned from the pressure that was 
coming from external players by the regional bloc and the desire by the opposition for SADC 
and the AU to guarantee the process given the state security apparatus’ hostility towards an 
opposition wholesale political takeover. The power of ripeness was however demonstrated by the 
willingness by ZANU PF to cede some of its political power to the opposition after 2008 as 
much as by the opposition’s temporarily shelving the ‘Mugabe must go mantra’ during the time 
of the GPA. 
The implementation of the agreement, which began as negotiations were still ongoing, had 
stumbling blocks emanating from the parties’ subsequent perception that the blocking effect on 
their unilateral positions had been eased by new developments in the conflict and started to 
deviate from their pledges. Factors that negatively affected ripeness over time also included the 
way rationalist explanations for war - issue indivisibility, information problems, commitment 
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problems and different time horizons - were dealt with in the resolution efforts. The way the 
resolution effort plays out depends to some extent on how long the conditions creating ripeness 
will last, how attractive the proposals for resolution are, the commitment of the parties to the 
resolution process, the quality of the framework for intervention and how suitable to the task and 
acceptable to the parties the intervener is. Once the situation is perceived to be suitable for 
intervention, the speed of identifying the right framework for intervention, the strategy and 
operational plan to be followed and the most appropriate person to lead it is critical if the 
strategic initiative obtaining from the perception that the situation is ripe for resolution is not to 
be lost in a fluid environment. The moment ZANU PF, which through issue indivisibility was 
dominating executive power, felt its legitimacy had been restored by the swearing in of the 
Inclusive Government, it hardened its stance and became a difficult bargainer in subsequent 
negotiations culminating in its unilateral demand for elections in 2013 despite the opposition 
parties and the facilitator claims that the environment was not yet conducive for free and fair 
elections. The resolution effort demonstrated that interveners need to shape the formula for 
resolution into a detailed and implementable plan of action complete with safeguards and to 
press for most if not all concessions needed from the parties when ripeness is still at its peak 
because changes in the structure of the conflict, time horizons, information and commitment 
problems come to affect ripeness and by extension the resolution process over time. Whilst the 
interveners will be focused on a win-win outcome, parties publicly pledge their commitment to 
the agreement yet in reality each would be committed to creating conditions favourable for the 
attainment of its unilateral objective in the conflict. Coalition building occurred across the 
conflict divide during the constitution-making exercise though parties also reverted to their quest 
for unilateral access to political power once the exercise ended.   
In line with Zartman’s (1985) observation that ripeness is not self implementing, the resolution 
efforts depended on the mediatory framework put in place by SADC and the conduct of the 
intervention teams. The conduct of presidents Mbeki, Motlantle and Zuma and their teams 
demonstrated that the touch and aptitude of the mediators/facilitators is critical for the success of 
the mediation efforts. The resolution process revealed that some of the major skills and attributes 
required for success in the exploitation of ripeness through mediation include an ability to do a 
thorough conflict mapping to establish the root causes of the conflict and identify the nature and 
degree of ripeness focusing on its strengths and weaknesses, a well thought out strategy of how 
to exploit the obtaining ripeness and a fitting operational plan that is cognisant of the conflict 
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context and balances between principled negotiation and pragmatism, upholds impartiality, 
fairness, good communication, inclusiveness, tolerance, patients and consistency as outlined in 
the AU Mediation Support Handbook (2014) and other related literature.94 It became evident that 
SADC needs to focus more on doctrine development in conflict resolution to improve its practice 
in the field.  
SADC’s strategic approach of using the OPDSC to consider conflicts on a case by case basis 
without imposing a fixed template both on the nature and form of intervention demonstrated its 
dynamism and viability in dealing with different conflict situations given that every conflict has 
its own context. While the terms of reference and reporting structures between the full SADC 
summit and the OPDSC in handling conflict situations at the political level are well defined, the 
operational interface with the Secretariat remains hazy with the latter not yet fully able to 
provide all the technical support required by politicians necessary for the efficient functioning of 
the architecture for conflict resolution. Although the state of the economy in 2008 helped to 
create conditions of ripeness and the offer for an economic rescue package helped the parties to 
accept the GPA, the idea of using the rescue package as a carrot in agreement implementation 
was not well established and not fully exploited in the SADC mediation effort. There was a 
disjuncture between what SADC sought to achieve in Zimbabwe through the GPA and the 
manner in which the rescue package was operationalised at a bilateral level between the offering 
countries and Zimbabwe. Despite these problems, the debilitation of the state was arrested and at 
an appropriate time in the resolution effort, SADC managed to identify and seize an opportunity 
(the ripe moment) to pull out to allow the conflict to cool off on its own after the elections of 
2013 avoiding a situation in which it could have been bogged down in the internal affairs of 
Zimbabwe for a very long time.  
7.2 Recommendations 
Ripeness is a fruitful strategic notion in determining when to intervene and what to do in conflict 
situations owing to signs that emerge from changes in the structure of the conflict and 
perceptions that develop in the parties that needs to be fully incorporated in the conflict 
resolution doctrine by broadening its parameters as suggested in Diagram 3 as well as adding 
others that may have been omitted. This recommendation does not mean that interveners should 
                                                    
94
 The OPDSC’s experience in the conflict demonstrated that although a measure of progress was attained in 
developing a conflict handling mechanism at SADC headquarters, more needs to be done to fully operationalise the 
Organ by staffing it with experts who can assist the intervention team in order to achieve best practices. 
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have nothing to do with conflicts that are not yet experiencing ripeness as early involvement 
helps in opening lines of communications, building confidence and providing an opportunity to 
induce ripeness and when ripeness sets in, reorganise third party efforts towards exploiting the 
opportunities that come with it. This begs SADC and the AU to develop appropriate and 
contextual cutting-edge conflict prevention, management and resolution doctrine that harmonises 
the exploitation of these two possible strategic dispensations including the ability to look out for 
the right time to pull out as well as outlining the operational plans to guide each of them and the 
best tactical methods to apply. The regional architecture for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution as enshrined in the protocol establishing the OPDSC and the SIPO, which signify a 
great leap forward in the development of a regional doctrine, need to be fully operationalised to 
provide effective technical expertise in support of mediation taking on board the advantages that 
obtain from knowing what ripeness is, its complicated nature and the opportunities it presents in 
conflict resolution. This can be assisted by expanding SADC’s clout especially in issues to do 
with limiting the degree of sovereignty a country under its spotlight can enjoy once it is agreed 
that it is experiencing a dysfunctional conflict situation requiring intervention by the bloc. There 
is also a need to lay down Standard Operating Procedures for the Secretariat staff streamlining 
roles and responsibilities to effectively provide the required technical support to the political 
leadership in conflict resolution. Despite the fact that SADC is still developing this capacity, its 
conduct in support of the intervention in Zimbabwe showed that the region is in the right 
direction in acquiring an effective mechanism for dealing with conflict situations but only that 
more needs to be done guided by theory and field practice. 
For the conflict in Zimbabwe, it is for all the players to realise that outsiders can only help but 
will never be the total solution to the problems bedeviling the country and the onus lies on all 
Zimbabweans to discover each other through tolerance and inclusivity accepting the strength that 
comes from diversity in race and ethnicity as well as in ideas. There is therefore an urgent 
requirement to build on what was achieved by SADC in Zimbabwe by 2013 and interrogate all 
potential conflict areas including in governance, relations between political parties and the state 
machinery, the succession issue and the after-effects of land reform to come up with sustainable 
solutions that will minimally guarantee harmony to secure a peaceful and prosperous future for 
the country in a competitive international environment. 
The UN should do more by way of integrating its conflict prevention, management and 
resolution doctrine with that of continental bodies and regional groupings such as SADC taking 
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cognisance of the opportunities presented by the theory of ripeness of conflicts to know the right 
times to intervene in conflict situations, the right organisation to be involved, the best strategies 
to be pursued and the resources and support needed to create conditions for success. When 
conflict occurs, the setting in of ripeness as a result of a change in its structure will not yield 
success unless there is willingness, resolve, motivation and readiness to pursue win-win 
outcomes. Whilst anarchy rules supreme in international affairs despite efforts to create 
multinational institutions that help in mitigating transnational challenges within the framework 
of globalisation, humanity needs to reflect on Immanuel Kant’s view that because the human 
being is capable of reasoning, over time, society should be capable of self-perfection. History 
shows that unjust systems are slowly being dismantled as demonstrated by the abolishing of 
slavery, the end of colonialism and global efforts to curb racism and as such, over time, and 
despite realist views that emphasise the survival of the fittest, it may be possible to create a better 
world for all in which differences are in most cases constructively resolved. Globalisation and 
developments taking place in modern human relations suggests that crude methods of relating to 
one another are no longer sustainable and countries no matter how rich or militarily powerful 
cannot continue exploiting weaker ones using brute force, double standards and treachery as 
happened during times of slavery and colonialism and still expect that the human condition 
world-wide can be improved. The identification of ripeness and intervention can stop a conflict 
from escalating but the greatest weapon in conflict prevention over time is eliminating the root 
causes of violent conflict most of which lie in deprivation and unfair practices. Developing 
countries also need to reflect on their governance and human rights records with a view to 
improving them to guarantee human security for their citizens. Differences and therefore conflict 
will always be there but if war and strife can be minimised through a global effort to change 
attitudes, perceptions and practices to gravitate toward equality, tolerance, strength in diversity, 
fairness, redress and reconciliation as well as sharpening the doctrine for conflict resolution to 
handle differences with increased positive results, humanity will have made a great stride in 
civilisation, a feat which seems far from being realised in present times. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
ZIMBABWE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS (1980 TO 2013) 
Political Party Election Year (Seats)95 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2013 
Alliance Khumbula Ekhaya (AKE)        0 
African National Party (ANP)    0     
Christian Democratic Party (CDP)       0  
Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe 
(CAZ)96 
2097 15       
 
Democratic Union (DU)        0 
Federal Democratic Union (FDU)       0  
Forum Party (FPZ)    0     
Freedom Party        0 
FreeZim Congress (FC)        0 
Independent Zimbabwe Group98 (IZG)  4       
Liberty Party of Zimbabwe (LPZ)     0    
Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD)        0 
Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC)99 
    57 41   
Movement for Democratic Change–
Mutambara (MDC–M)100 
      10  
Movement for Democratic Change – 
Ncube (MDC – N) 
       2 
Movement for Democratic Change –       100 70 
                                                    
95
 Blanks show that the party did not contest in the election of that year because it had not yet been formed, 
chose not to participate, had ceased to exist or merged with another party. 
96
 CAZ was formed from the Rhodesian Front (RF) party. 
97
 There were separate rolls for white and for blacks to ensure that the former would be guaranteed of the 20 
seats in parliament. 
98
  Most of its members were whites who defected from the CAZ party. 
99
 In 2005 the MDC split into the Tsvangirai and Mutambara led parties. 
100
 After 2008, there were power wrangles that saw the Mutambara led MDC splitting with Ncube retaining 
the larger of the two factions that emerged and contested the 2013 elections as MDC-N. 
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Tsvangirai (MDC – T)101 
National Democratic Union (NDU) 0  0  0    
National Front of Zimbabwe 0        
Patriotic Front – Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union102 
20 15       
Patriotic Union of MaNdebeleland 
(PUM) 
      0  
Peace Action is Freedom for All 
(PAFA) 
      0  
People’s Democratic Union (PDF)     0    
Popular Democratic Union (PDU)     0   0 
Progressive and Innovative Movement 
of Zimbabwe (PIMZ) 
      0 0 
United African National Union 
(UANC) 
3 0 0      
United Movement for Democracy 
(UMD) 
       0 
United National Federal Party (UNFP) 0        
United Parties (UP)     0    
United People’s Association of 
Matabeleland (UPAM) 
0        
United People’s Party (UDP)       0  
Voice of the People/ Vx Populi (VP)       0 0 
Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU PF) 
57 64 117 118  78 99 197 
Zimbabwe African National Union – 
Ndonga (ZANU – Ndonga) 
 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union – 
Federal Party (ZAPU-FP)103 
      0 0 
Zimbabwe Aristocrats (ZA)    0     
Zimbabwe Congress Party (ZCP)     0    
                                                    
101
 The MDC-T split again after the 2013 elections into the Tsvangirai ledt MDC-T and the MDC Renewal 
Team led by Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma, later on appointing Sekai Holland to be its interim leader.  
102
 Following the Unity Accord of 1987, PF ZAPU merged with ZANU-PF to form ZANU PF. 
103
 ZAPU FP changed its name to ZAPU after 2008 claiming it was the same ZAPU that united with ZANU 
PF in 1987 and had pulled out of the Unity Accord. ZANU PF contested this viewpoint arguing that the Unity 
Accord was still alive. 
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Zimbabwe Development Party (ZDP) 0      0 0 
Zimbabwe Federal Party (ZFP)    0     
Zimbabwe Integrated Programme 
(ZIP) 
    0    
Zimbabwe Progressive People’s 
Democratic Party (ZPPDP)104 
     0 0  
Zimbabwe People’s Movement (ZPM)        0 
Zimbabwe Progressive Party (ZIP)     0    
Zimbabwe Union of Democrats     0    
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM)   2      
Zimbabwe Youth in Alliance (ZYA)      0 0  
ZURD       0  
Independents      1 1 1 
Presidential Appointees      20  60105 
Ex-officio members (Chiefs)      10   
Total Seats 100 100 120 120 120 150 210 270 
Percentage of Voter Turnout 84.1 75.47 48.69 25.98 43.46 47.7 42.8 61.09 
 
Sources: African Elections Database @ http://africanelections.tripod.com.zw.html 
   Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
104
 After 2008, it changed its name to Zimbabwe People’s Democratic Party (ZPDP). 
105
 This was a quota appointed by the President and reserved for females as party of women and chiefs 
empowerment. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
LIST OF RESEARCH INFORMANTS 
Bronnert Deborah Then UK Ambassador to Zimbabwe, 2011 to 2014 
Charamba George Presidential Spokesman/Permanent Secretary Ministry of 
Information, Media and Broadcasting Services 
Chihuri Augustine (Com Gen) Police Commissioner General 
Chimbindi R. Albert (Amb) Then Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former 
Zimbabwe Diplomat to the EU and now Zimbabwe’s 
Ambassador to Ethiopia 
Feltoe Evans (Prof) Then ZEC Commissioner and now Lecturer (Law 
Department) at University of Zimbabwe   
Kurebwa Joseph (Dr) Lecturer (International Relations) Department of Politics 
and Administration, University of Zimbabwe 
Majome F. Jessie MDC T Member of Parliament for Harare West and a 
lawyer 
Mapuranga Machivenyika (Dr) Deputy Commandant National Defence College and 
Former Zimbabwe Ambassador to the UN from 1996 to 
1998, Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1999 to 2000, 
ambassador to Ghana from 2001 to 2004 and ambassador 
to the US, 2005 to 2013. 
Moyo Khaya Simon (Amb) Then ZANU PF National Chairman and former Zimbabwe 
Ambassador to South Africa (2007 to 2011) and now 
ZANU PF National Spokesman 
Mswela Concelia Lecturer at Joshua M. Nkomo Polytechnic in Gwanda 
Mtetwa Andrew (Amb) Director Research at National Defence College, former 
Ambassador to the African Union, 2003 to 2013 and before 
that, many African countries 
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Muchena Henry (AVM Rtd) Director Commissariat Department at ZANU PF 
Headquarters and Airforce of Zimbabwe Air Marshall 
(Retired) 
Mujuru T. Joice (Dr) Then Vice President of Zimbabwe and ZANU PF Second 
Secretary from 2004 to 2014 
Munyoro Gibson (Father) Silveira House, Catholic Church 
Mutambara G.O. Arthur (Prof) Former Prime Minister in the Inclusive Government, 
President of the MDC M (2009 to 2013) and Professor of 
Robotics 
Mwonzora Douglas Then MDC T Spokesman, Member of Parliament for 
Nyanga South, MDC T negotiator and now MDC T 
Secretary General 
Nyikayaramba Douglas (Maj Gen) Chief of Staff Quartermaster Services, Zimbabwe National 
Army 
Salomao Tomaz (Dr) Former SADC Executive Secretary from 2008 to 2013 and 
lecturer at the University of Witwatersrand’s Governance 
School 
Zengeni Knox (Dr) Then Acting Director Organ for National Healing, 
Reconciliation and Integration and now Visiting Lecturer 
(International Relations) at Northern University of 
Malaysia 
Zhuwarara Rino (Dr) Director Zimbabwe Film and Television School 
 
 
 
